The prize for the most complicated benefit ever implemented must
surely go to the Accommodation Supplement (AS), which was introduced
in New Zealand in 1993 to replace the former system of public
housing assistance based on incomerelated rents.
The AS is payable to both beneficiaries and fulltime workers,
but not to students or parttime workers. (Students who have
been students for more than 5 years find the New Zealand income
support system a particularly difficult nightmare, while parttime
workers can usually only gain supplementary assistance if they
claim a primary benefit in addition to their parttime work.)
The AS paid to beneficiaries is virtually a different benefit
from that paid to wage and salary earners. It is paid as if it
is a part of the main benefit, so that many beneficiaries do not
even realise they are receiving an AS as a separate benefit.
When beneficiaries find a job and come off the benefit, more often
than not they are still eligible for an AS. Furthermore, their
AS records are eliminated from the Department of Social Welfare
computer. Thus a full reapplication must be processed, when the
former beneficiary realises that they are entitled to a workers'
AS. The reinstated AS cannot be backdated; it is paid from the
date that the applicant contacts the New Zealand Income Support
Service to apply for an AS.
For a beneficiary, the AS is reduced by 25 cents in the dollar
of all earnings from zero to 80 dollars per week. At higher levels
of earnings, there is no further reduction in the beneficiaries'
AS.
For a wage worker, the maximum AS payable is determined by family
type; ie whether single, couple, or family with children. The
AS is also abated in accordance with income (effectively adding
25% to the recipient's tax rate on additional income) and with
"cash assets" (with 25 cents deducted from the annual
AS payment for every dollar of savings in excess of $2,700 for
individuals and $5,400 for families).
For both beneficiaries and workers, the maximum AS payable is
limited in accordance with location. There are three regions:
"Auckland", which includes Great Barrier Island; "Wellington",
which includes Palmerston North and Hamilton, and "Other".
The following list of anomalies that apply to the workers' AS
should not be regarded as exhaustive:
The presently structured AS is biased towards the interests of
landlords and banks - especially Auckland landlords - in two ways.
As the rent or mortgage is increased, the AS pays 70% of the extra
rent or mortgage. Thus, a $50 per week rent increase typically
means a $50 increase to the landlord, but only a $15 increase
on the part of the tenant receiving an AS. Thus the incentive
towards raised rents and mortgages is very strong, and the market
forces resisting such increases are comparatively weak.
The ideal solution, I believe, is a universal benefit structure,
combined with a higher rate of income tax. Even then, in the absence
of a full universal basic income (which would require a
flat tax rate of over 45%), there would still need to be specific
assistance for the housing requirements of low income recipients.
Tim Hume - newsgroup "nz.politics" (18 September, in
response to my own contribution) - suggests that the AS should
be payable only with respect to private sector housing, and that
state houses should be charged at incomerelated rents. I
agree, but I think that the AS for private sector housing assistance should
be simpler and better integrated with other forms of supplementary
income support.
A range of public housing options - involving a partnership between
central and local government (and including such options as "sweat
equity") - is needed to "anchor" the housing market.
By this I mean that public housing would effectively compete with
private housing. When the average rents in the private rental
market grow raster than the incomebased rents in the public
housing sector, then there will be an increased demand for public
housing and a diminished demand for private housing. Empty homes
in the private sector will limit voracious landlords more than
any form of moral suasion.
New Zealand successfully tried this approach in, for example,
the insurance industry in the 1890s and 1900s. With the introduction
of State Fire Insurance and Government Life, the Government was
able to "anchor" the market for insurance, thereby eliminating
the huge economic rents gained by the private suppliers. The private
insurance companies had to keep their charges down in order to
retain their customers.
The contrast between State Insurance in its early days and Housing
New Zealand today couldn't be more striking. Housing New Zealand
has in fact become one of the greedier landlords, swallowing up
Accommodation Supplements as its main source of profit. Housing
New Zealand acts as a vehicle that recycles Accommodation Supplements
while ratcheting up the private housing costs of low income families.
The solution is to regulate the private housing market through
competition from a genuine welfaremaximising rather than
a profitmaximising public alternative.
Back to: Rankin File Archive |
Go to Keith Rankin's page |
( viewings since 28 Dec.'97: )