To the Argument from Existence
Examined and Disabled
"Most men spend their lives in futile rebellion against things they cannot change, in passive resignation to the things they can, and - never attempting to learn the difference - in chronic guilt and self-doubt on both counts." [
1]
Many theistic apologists no doubt will grasp at anything to alleviate the pressure of enduring criticism of their god-belief claims, even if their defenses and counter-arguments dig their entrenchment into the arbitrary ever deeper. Strong, confidently asserted atheological arguments must be opposed and countered at all costs. I have encountered many objections to the Argument from the Fact of Existence (AFE), but so far the only serious ones I've found fall generally into the models I examine below.
AFE essentially argues that, because existence exists, god-belief is invalid. AFE achieves this end by recognizing the dependence of god-belief on the primacy of consciousness view of reality, which is false. This argument finds its support in the Objectivist metaphysics, which holds that, "if existence exists, then it has metaphysical primacy." [2] This means that existence exists independent of consciousness, not as a dependent on or creation of consciousness, as assumed by theism. Naturally, theists will find the conclusion of AFE uncomfortable since, if it is successful in soundly establishing this conclusion, then the persistence of god-belief is irrational. Consequently, those who insist on the truth of their god-belief claims will of course attempt to raise objections critical of AFE.
In my experience, unfortunately, few theists even appear willing to take the time to comprehend the principles employed by AFE, and as a result their attempts to raise objections against AFE routinely fail to provide them with a firm grasp of its primary premise, which draws on the issue of metaphysical primacy as defined by Ayn Rand. [3] Quite often, an instance in which a theist finds himself criticizing AFE, or more broadly, the philosophy of Objectivism, conjures the image of a blindfolded boy waving a bat at a piñata completely beyond his reach: he simply does not take the time to make a good shot. Indeed, he does not even recognize the need to remove his blindfold in order to identify his target. Hopefully with the material I've posted to the Objectivist Atheology website theists will afford themselves the attention needed to digest and comprehend the principles of Objectivism so that they can either discover a rational worldview for themselves, or at least put together a credible attempt to critique AFE.
The objections which I define below are for the most part fortified integrations of responses to Objectivist metaphysical principles which I have encountered first hand in correspondence with Christian apologists.
Objection 1 attempts to deny any association between one's god-belief program and the primacy of consciousness metaphysics. This objection is corrected by a brief review of the relevant evidence claimed by those holding to a god-belief.
Objection 2, Objection 3 and Objection 4 consist in attempting to divide fundamental concepts in order to smuggle invalid premises into one's metaphysical paradigm. These objections are corrected by preserving the integrity of fundamental concepts and by recognizing their objective nature and hierarchical relationship to one another.
Objection 5 and Objection 6 attempt to deny the validity of the issue of metaphysical primacy altogether, either by characterizing it as a false dichotomy or by denying its fundamentality. These objections are corrected by reviewing precisely how the issue of metaphysical primacy is defined, and by recognizing its inescapable, determinative influence on all philosophy.
Objection 7 attempts to establish some validity to the primacy of consciousness in order to defeat AFE by claiming that consciousness creates existence when concepts and ideas are formed, thus evading the fact that concepts and ideas are epistemological as opposed to metaphysical phenomena.
What should be borne in mind throughout these objections is the absence of uniformity among their philosophic implications, even though they are asserted to protect the same god-beliefs. The only uniting commonality among them is the intention to negate objectivity. While some objections imply that their proponents to some extent recognize the validity of the primacy of existence by their attempt to affirm the position that Christian theism is fundamentally compatible with the primacy of existence view (though they wish to compromise this very principle), others either attempt to confirm the validity of the primacy of consciousness in some respect (cf. Objection 6), or attempt to dismiss the issue of metaphysical primacy altogether.
This unwitting disharmony strongly indicates that the basics of religious metaphysics are mired in elusive ambiguity and that as a consequence religious apologists differ radically amongst themselves in their attempts to define the fundamentals of their worldview in explicit terms. This absence of uniformity on such fundamental issues among defenders of theism dramatically underscores the invalidity of god-belief in general, and brings apologetic ambition as a philosophical enterprise in particular into serious question. Indeed, this is precisely what we would expect to find among religious exponents if the conclusion that god-belief is philosophically dependent on the primacy of consciousness metaphysics is true. This brings to mind Ayn Rand's observation that one of the consequences of men's preference for the primacy of consciousness is the "shrinking of their intellectual range, i.e., of their capacity to deal with abstractions." [4]
Certainly, if attempts to demonstrate that traditional theism [5] is aligned with or dependent upon the primacy of consciousness view of reality fail, then naturally AFE cannot fully succeed in establishing its conclusion that god-belief is invalid by virtue of its commitment to an invalid view of reality, which the primacy of consciousness view of reality is. However, I am certainly confident that I have more than adequately demonstrated the bond between the primacy of consciousness and god-belief, particularly in the context of Christian theism. [6]
Most objections to AFE which I have encountered are not the result of deep consideration of the philosophical issues which it addresses, but often little more than knee-jerk reactions motivated by nervousness or panic that one's commitment to a false view of reality may have actually been uncovered and identified in explicit, unforgiving terms. As a species of failing to isolate essentials, this haste makes itself evident in rash dismissals, often engendering epithets amounting to the claim that the Objectivist approach to criticizing god-beliefs is simplistic or Procrustean in nature, and therefore inadequate or fallacious. Such dismissals, however, stem from a broad context of unchecked premises and, more often than not, a lack of understanding of Objectivism in general and of the importance of reducing one's principles to fundamental primaries in particular. Consequently, rebuttals to AFE are likely to be saturated with stolen concepts, frozen abstractions, neglected contexts and other conceptual blunders to which god-belief in general inclines men's minds.
With these points in mind, let us now turn to a brief examination of the possible objections Objectivists may encounter.
Objection 1: "God is not properly identified as a form of consciousness, therefore AFE is misdirected."
This would-be objection is no doubt at the top of the list of possible objections one is likely to encounter while proposing AFE. Essentially speaking, this objection constitutes the accusation that AFE relies on a caricature of god-belief in order to construct a straw man for the purpose of refuting and rejecting it. Some critics of the argument might hold that the primacy of consciousness label is an uncharitable designation for a certain variation of god-belief. God is more than a form of consciousness, some may claim, and therefore AFE is misdirected. But even if it is the case that certain theological doctrines can be manipulated into substantiating the position that God is "more than a form of consciousness," this would still not overturn the fact that god-belief as such (in particular those versions which posit a conscious ability to create existence, e.g., the universe) has a primacy of consciousness basis.
This attempt to evade the thrust of AFE will undoubtedly involve digression into a discussion of certain attributes or qualities claimed to be possessed by God in order to elaborate the notion in question beyond mere conscious implications. However, as readers will find in my analysis [7], those attributes or qualities provide no genuine explicative value, but instead serve as red herring issues, whose task is to drag discussion off essential matters and into areas of - at best - remote and nugatory concern. For instance, an apologist may point to the claim that God is "a substance." But where does this get him? We already know that he believes (or claims to believe) that God exists. As I found in that analysis, attempts to define this "divine substance" are no more than forays into non-definition; indeed, we are told in many ways only what that substance is not, not what it is, and certainly not how the claim to the existence of such a substance can be tested or confirmed. Such claims can only be taken on faith, and this fact alone (i.e., the fact that one must surrender his ability to reason in order to consider such claims as genuine knowledge) is sufficient to confirm the suspect nature of such claims.
The essential to keep in mind is that God, either as a form of consciousness or as an entity possessing a "supreme consciousness," is claimed to have the ability to create existence. Does the god-belief in question ascribe powers to the consciousness of God which have no example in nature? Indeed, in Christianity for instance, God is claimed to have supernatural conscious powers which are allegedly responsible for creating everything distinct from Himself. In the present context, this can only mean one thing: God creates the objects of His own awareness through a conscious act. The appropriateness of AFE is only further secured when we find that God is claimed to be able to manipulate or revise the identity of those objects after He's created them (e.g., water into wine, men walking on water, etc.), for this is also an explicit expression of the primacy of consciousness view of reality. So long as believers maintain the position that God is capable of achieving such feats through His "divine will" - i.e., through an act of consciousness, AFE cannot fail to hit its target.
Some apologists might assert that, since God exists, then God is also a form of existence, thus qualifying god-belief as an expression of the primacy of existence. But this ignores the fact that god-belief asserts that God's consciousness has the power to create its own objects and revise their identity at will (i.e., by an act of consciousness), which is incompatible with the primacy of existence, and which is certainly an expression of the primacy of consciousness. Besides, if the theist wants to affirm the primacy of existence, then he should recognize not only that god-belief is incompatible with the primacy of existence, but that it is totally unnecessary and expressly counter-rational.
Furthermore, I have found in my correspondence with defenders of god-belief claims, when I've declared the fact of existence as the proper starting point to cognition, the most common question in response is: How do you account for existence? With seeming innocence the unprepared apologist walks openly into the trap of his own making, unsatisfied with objective reality as his starting point, and insisting that "something prior" to existence - indeed, a form of consciousness - should be asserted to "account for" the fact of existence. Those who unwittingly commit themselves to this reversal of primaries normally do so in ignorance of the stolen concepts buried in their assumptions. This can only underscore the disingenuousness of any attempt to feign god-belief as an expression of the primacy of existence metaphysics. [8]
Objections 2-4: Dividing fundamentals
Some apologists who have attempted to critique arguments from metaphysical primacy try to introduce new parameters by way of a false alternative in order to protect their god-beliefs and to erect the frail pretense that god-belief somehow complies with the primacy of existence at the same time. This represents an attempt to dichotomize reality, and characterizes the next three objections I have encountered. Though they are fundamentally similar, they are sufficiently distinct to address individually.
Objection 2: "Necessary existence" vs. "Contingent existence":
This ploy is basically an attempt to feign agreement with the primacy of existence with the qualification that "necessary existence" holds primacy over "contingent existence." By "necessary existence," of course, the theist means "God," while "contingent existence" is taken to mean everything else. This rebuttal attempts to satisfy the primacy of existence principle while leaving room for the god-belief in question. This works nicely for theists since, even though an expression of wanting to have their cake and to eat it, too, such distinctions still seem to allow one to posit consciousness as the source of "contingent existence." Thus the theist can continue to reject the law of identity and presume the justification to continue affirming his faith in miracle-performing supernaturalia.
But offering this distinction as a means of insulating god-belief metaphysics from objections raised by the issue of metaphysical primacy begs the question. Essentially, that question is: What is primary: the fact that things exist, or our means of identifying this fact? I.e., existence as opposed to consciousness? The distinction offered in this objection fails to grasp the focus of the issue of metaphysical primacy, and thus allow the theist to evade it. An objective approach to the issue of metaphysical primacy does not compel us to affirm existence at the expense of denying the fact of consciousness; we do not say that existence exists and that consciousness does not. [9] Rather, the issue of metaphysical primacy assumes both the validity of the axiom that existence exists and the fact that consciousness exists. What the issue of metaphysical primacy requires us to affirm is the proper relationship between consciousness and its objects as a fundamental, philosophy-guiding principle. Objectivism holds that this issue is inescapable to all philosophy, even though all philosophies fail to deal with it consistently in essential terms, with the sole exception of Objectivism. The question is: Which holds primacy over the other, existence or consciousness?
If one attempts to obfuscate the issue of metaphysical primacy by saying instead that "necessary existence" holds metaphysical primacy over "unnecessary existence" or "contingent existence," as I have seen among those feeling the pinch of argumentation from Objectivist metaphysics, what is he saying? He is saying basically two things, one implicitly, and the other explicitly.
First, he is implicitly attempting to hijack the validity of the primacy of existence metaphysics into the service of his god-belief defenses, hoping that he can reinvest this principle with his own shaky premises. He is trying to say that he can claim legitimacy for his god-belief claims because he thinks they can be shown to square with the primacy of existence, so long as his preferred division of the concept 'existence' can be assumed. However, this cannot rationally succeed, as we shall see.
Second, he is explicitly attempting to divide the concept 'existence' by the introduction of a categorization, a division which must be assumed at the level of an axiomatic concept. This amounts to the assumption that the category "necessary vs. contingent" itself holds primacy over the axiomatic concept 'existence'. But we need the concept 'existence' intact in order for such a category to be formed in the first place, even if such categories are proven to be legitimate. Therefore, such a division commits the fallacy of the stolen concept.
Not only would we need the concept 'existence' at the very least implicitly intact in order to assume that such a distinction could possibly make sense (for both the concepts 'necessary' and 'contingent' - as abstractions from abstractions - genetically presuppose the undivided concept 'existence'), any attempt to assert such a division also commits the fallacy of "reverse-packaging." I define this fallacy as "the attempt to divide single concepts by imposing on them an arbitrary idea or standard." [10] The concept being divided in this case is of course the concept 'existence'. Even though some may hold that such a distinction is plausible or convenient, the fact is that no rational justification can be given for asserting this division at the level at which the issue of metaphysical primacy must be resolved, for the specific nature of particular entities is strictly irrelevant to the issue of metaphysical primacy. The central issue here is not the identity of which existents in particular hold primacy, but whether or not the action of perceiving that which exists holds primacy over that which is perceived, i.e., over the objects of consciousness. Distinctions among entities as such, whether one wants to categorize them as "necessary" as against "contingent," can only be identified later, after the issue of metaphysical primacy has been addressed, when, having a firm grasp of objectivity, attention can be turned to discovering the nature of particulars. [11]
And finally, we find the surreptitiousness of the theist attempting such a reply to Objectivist metaphysics at the peak of its shamelessness. For those apologists who would posit the primacy of "necessary existence" as against "unnecessary" or "contingent existence," if by "necessary existence" they mean "God" or some kind of "first cause," do so with the hope of including therefore also consciousness. Thus they would be trying to smuggle a package deal into their fundamental premises in order to evade the issue of metaphysical primacy. But the task of Objectivist metaphysics at this point requires that we determine which holds metaphysical primacy: existence, or consciousness? Theists will of course want both. They want the primacy of existence in order to secure validity for their claims; and they want the primacy of consciousness in order to appease their guilt and to rationalize their pursuit of the unearned. The result is nothing less than the compromising of one's philosophical foundations, as if food could be combined with poison and still be of benefit to man.
Thus, given these errors, we have no choice but to recognize the invalidity of this objection, if we are to maintain objectivity.
This objection is closely similar to the "necessary" vs. "contingent" existence objection which I addressed above. It is the attempt to place the category "finite vs. infinite" at the metaphysically fundamental level, on a par with, prior to, or as a substitute for the issue of metaphysical primacy, and thus fails according to the same reasons as stated above.
In addition to committing the same unnecessary concept-dividing blunder Objection 2, this anticipated rebuttal evades the fact that the notion "finite existence" is conceptually redundant while the idea of "infinite existence" is a contradiction in terms. To exist is to be something, which means: To exist is to be something specific. This means that to exist is to be finite; that which exists is itself, no less and no more.
Objectivism rejects any claim for the existence of so-called "infinite entities," as suggested in such a dichotomy as "finite vs. infinite existence." The claim to knowledge of an "infinite entity" fails to distinguish between the valid and invalid use of this concept.
As Leonard Peikoff states,
There is a use of [the concept] "infinity' which is valid, as Aristotle observed, and that is the mathematical use. It is valid only when used to indicate a potentiality, never an actuality. Take the number series as an example. You can say it is infinite in the sense that, no matter how many numbers you count, there is always another number. You can always keep on counting; there's no end. In that sense it is infinite - as a potential. But notice that, actually, however many numbers you count, wherever you stop, you only reached that point, you only got so far… That's Aristotle's point that the actual is always finite. Infinity exists only in the form of the ability of certain series to be extended indefinitely; but however much they are extended, in actual fact, wherever you stop is finite. [12]
Since any existent in reality is an actuality, and not merely a potential, the claim that something can both exist and be infinite is invalid. Consequently, like the "necessary vs. contingent existence" dichotomy examined above, the dichotomy "finite vs. infinite existence," even if construed as a compromise of the Objectivist position on the issue of metaphysical primacy as the theist would like, is meaningless. And therefore, this objection cannot be considered a legitimate criticism of atheological arguments which stem from the primacy of existence.
And lastly, as we saw in Objection 2, the "infinite vs. finite existence" objection, which I have encountered before among presuppositionalist apologists, attempts to smuggle the very same tired package deal into one's premises, a consequence of failing to distinguish between the concepts 'existence' and 'consciousness' and to grasp the issue of metaphysical primacy. Besides, we need the concept 'existence' intact in order to make sense of higher-strata abstractions like 'finite' and 'infinite' to begin with, and such would-be objections ignore this fact.
This would-be objection is akin to the two prior examples which I have already examined, Objection 2 and Objection 3. Like those, this objection again attempts to divide the concept 'existence' and to assert this division as ultimately primary. Consequently, it fails for the same reasons the others do. One cannot assert the distinction "material existence versus immaterial existence" before the concept 'existence' proper has been identified; without the unadulterated concept 'existence', neither of the two horns of this dichotomy has any meaning. Therefore, this objection is invalid. Something either exists, or it doesn't, regardless of whether we can categorize it as 'material' or 'immaterial'.
The point here is that hierarchy as such is an epistemological concern, and therefore not a metaphysical attribute of entities. One entity does not exist "more than" other entities. Identifying one particular as opposed to another particular will not provide a starting point. Simply, the mere act of distinguishing between particulars already assumes the axioms 'existence', 'identity' and 'consciousness' to begin with, even if only implicitly.
Peikoff observes,
In reality, facts are simultaneous. The facts discovered by Einstein, for instance, do not come into existence later than the facts discovered by Newton; on the contrary, the facts themselves co-exist eternally. But a hierarchy and order exists from man's perspective, because man cannot come to know all facts with the same directness and ease. [13]
Thus, even if distinctions such as 'material' as against 'immaterial' entities can be shown to be legitimate (and this in itself is highly questionable), they cannot replace the issue of metaphysical primacy as a fundamental philosophic concern, nor could one posit them as a proper resolution to it.
In short, Objections which assert the same kind of dichotomized concept-division at the base level of philosophy as the three I've covered fall by the same points of refutation. Once one attempts to divide the concept 'existence' in order to address the issue of metaphysical primacy, he commits himself to the fallacy of the stolen concept. And this is precisely what Objectivist metaphysics detects and identifies.
Objections 5-6: Denying fundamentals
The fifth and sixth potential objections which I examine below attempt to call into question the nature of the issue of metaphysical primacy as defined by Objectivism, whether it is valid or even fundamentally relevant to cognition and philosophical inquiry. The fifth objection I have encountered among a few Christian apologists who seemed more keen to dismiss the issue of metaphysical primacy rather than to comprehend its significance. The sixth objection is more or less one that I anticipate being advanced in defense of god-belief claims, though I have not encountered it among apologists to date.
Objection 5: "The Primacy of Existence vs. the Primacy of Consciousness is a false dichotomy"
While the previous three objections acknowledge to some extent (or pretend to acknowledge) the validity of the issue of metaphysical primacy as identified by Ayn Rand, this objection attempts to dismiss the validity of the issue of metaphysical primacy altogether. But if one holds that the primacy of existence vs. the primacy of consciousness were a false dichotomy, then he would in effect be holding the position that existence and consciousness are completely indistinct from each other, thus obliterating both concepts by "blending consciousness and existence into one indeterminate package-deal." [14]
The result of this kind of nullification at the foundation of cognition would result, among other problems, in the position that the hierarchical nature of knowledge is arbitrary or illusory. There would be no reason why someone would have to discover - or infer from previously discovered facts - that something exists before he proceeds to identify its nature. Logical reversals would be just as valid as properly executed logical conclusions. One could identify the nature of objects even without the objective confirmation of their existence (which is what theology essentially attempts to do in the case of defining God's nature). Abstractions would be intellectually indistinct from concretes, and facts would be indistinct from emotions. Why? Because the distinction between existence and the means of perceiving it is denied, and consequently one would have no means by which to discriminate between that which is real and that which he has imagined, or between that which is fact and that which "feels right." In other words, one would have no way of forming or grasping the concept 'objectivity' and its philosophical importance.
The objection that the Objectivist metaphysical principles commit themselves to a false dichotomy is the result of failing to grasp the meaning of the issue of metaphysical primacy. To correct this failure, I refer readers to the points I provided in response to
Objection 2 above.Additionally, I refer readers to the brief article
Are the Primacy of Existence and the Primacy of Consciousness Exhaustive Metaphysics? available on the Lawrence University Students of Objectivism website. This short article emphasizes, as its title suggests, why the primacy of existence and the primacy of consciousness are not a mistaken dichotomy, but are in fact the only two options one has in developing a metaphysical philosophy, and which provide a broadly categorical and exhaustive approach to metaphysics.
Objection 6: "The issue of metaphysical primacy is not fundamental"
I have not seen anyone seriously argue this (indeed, few non-Objectivists seem to grasp the issue of metaphysical primacy and the hierarchical nature of knowledge well enough to fabricate such evasions), but figured it will probably come up some day by some careless evader. So here I will offer a correction of this misunderstanding in advance.
An objection of this nature, like those preceding it, is the result of failing to grasp the significance of the issue of metaphysical primacy and the importance of identifying the proper relationship between man's consciousness and the objects of his consciousness in the determination of the course of his philosophy. What could be prior to (i.e., more fundamental than) the fact of existence? If one argues that God is prior to the fact of existence, then what coherence does the claim that God exists have? This would be a blatant stolen concept. [
15] If one asserts that some kind of principle is prior to the fact of existence, he endorses the primacy of consciousness, since principles are epistemological in nature (and therefore require consciousness), not metaphysical. Existence is not dependent upon principles, principles are dependent upon existence.If we examine the potential claim that "God is prior to the fact of existence," would we not find that this commits the defender of god-belief to the primacy of consciousness view of reality? Isn't that really what the theist wants: to assume that some form of consciousness is behind it all, that some conscious being is creating, directing, planning and influencing the nature of reality? And if this conscious being is "prior to the fact of existence," yet the theist still asserts paradoxically that this conscious being itself exists (thus dismissing the resulting incoherence of his claim to a matter later to be rationalized by further theological capitulation [
16]), is he not therefore saying that he wants to posit consciousness as such prior to existence? How then is the theist's metaphysical viewpoint immune from the Objectivist challenge? [17] Does the theist not recognize his own stolen concepts? How indeed is such an objection supposed to prevail when in fact it simply begs the very question at issue: What is fundamental?The solution needed here is to recognize that the implications of the hierarchical nature of knowledge demand an objective starting point, if indeed knowledge is itself to be objective. That knowledge proceeds by orderly ascendance commends us to identify in terms of essentials (as opposed to irrelevancies and detached and floating abstracta) what precisely is fundamental to our knowledge, what grounds it and what ensures rationality. That fundamental ground is the primacy of existence.
Objection 7: "Consciousness creates thoughts, and thoughts exist, therefore consciousness can create existence."
This inventive objection finds its inspiration in the intrinsic view of concepts, which treats ideas and concepts as if they were entities independent of conscious activity. It attempts to fault Objectivist metaphysics with something that can be directly observed introspectively: any time we author an idea, so the reasoning goes, we are actually "creating existence." The idea implicit in such reasoning is that ideas and concepts as such "exist" external to the mind, just like the objects which they name.
This objection results from the failure to distinguish between entities (i.e., objects in reality, existents which are metaphysical) and the process of naming them (which is epistemological). What new entity is "created" when man forms a concept? No new metaphysical entities exist. Rather, forming concepts and naming entities, which already exist, happen when man uses that which already exists, namely, his mind.
Concepts are not entities, contrary to common apologetic ploys. [
18] A concept is no more an entity than are the feeling of joy or sorrow, a nervous breakdown, a sudden realization, a memory or episode of dreaming. Concepts are functions of consciousness, not self-sufficient existents which one finds lying around the realm of existence like a rock, a puddle or a sofa. The confusion here arises from the failure to distinguish the fact that concepts are epistemological, not metaphysical, phenomena.Furthermore, in order for an objection such as this to carry any weight, its advocates are challenged to show how matter can "come into existence" by an act of consciousness. See my
Metaphysical Challenge to Theists. Can they demonstrate this? That is the $64,000.00 question.This objection, like others, intends to confuse the issue of metaphysical primacy by obscuring the fact that existence exists independent of consciousness, the act of perceiving that which exists. This has already been elaborated on above in my responses to similar evasions.
Why do many theists fear the issue of metaphysical primacy so much that they should invent such confused imbroglios? If they recognize the validity of the primacy of existence, how can they justify exceptions to it? In the attempt to special plead their case for the existence of a universe-creating, reality-ruling consciousness, theists have no alternative other than to make room in their view of reality for some assumption of the primacy of consciousness, which not only contradicts the primacy of existence (which they must affirm at least implicitly even to assert truth claims), but contradicts itself as well. [
19] It is this contradiction which lies at the root of theism which theists are trying to cover with the obfuscation of their apologetic schemes and devices and which they hope to spread to the world.
In Conclusion
For the theist to present a sound case for theism, he must first present a sound case for the validity of the primacy of consciousness. But to present a sound case for the validity of the primacy of consciousness implicitly presupposed by his god-belief, he would be expected to demonstrate an instance in which a form or act of consciousness actually creates a material object in the realm of existence. This is, after all, what he claims his God has done in the doctrine of creation ex nihilo and this is precisely the challenge I put forth to one apologist in
The Byron-Choi Dilemma. While many theists themselves admit that they do not know how this is done, they nonetheless insist that men accept it as knowledge, thus contradicting themselves.Each of these seven objections amounts to an attempt to evade declaring one's fundamental philosophical principles in explicit, essential terms, and following them consistently. Each arises from the failure - either willingly or by default to ignorance - to grasp the issue of metaphysical primacy, and each represents an effort to escape its philosophical force. Such responses betray theists' lack of preparedness for the kind of criticism which stems from rigorously systematic rational philosophy, as well as the lack of a firm grasp of basic metaphysical principles. Since mysticism cannot provide these things, mystics aim to hijack them and to attempt to present to their unsuspecting audiences the position that reason has a mystical basis. The result is a tangle of confused, reality-evading contradictions, stolen concepts and package-deals which do not secure a sure foundation to rational principles, but rather obliterates them altogether.
Anton Thorn
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Notes
"The Metaphysical Versus The Man-Made," Philosophy: Who Needs It, (New York: Signet, 1984), p. 24.[2] Leonard Peikoff, Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand, (New York: Meridian, 1991), p. 23. As Peikoff argues:
The primacy of existence is not an independent principle. It is an elaboration, a further corollary, of the basic axioms. Existence precedes consciousness, because consciousness is consciousness of an object. Nor can consciousness create or suspend the laws governing its objects, because every entity is something and acts accordingly. Consciousness, therefore, is only a faculty of awareness. It is the power to grasp, to find out, to discover that which is. It is not a power to alter or control the nature of its objects. (Ibid., 19.)
For a full validation of the primacy of existence, readers are recommended to review Dr. David Kelley's lecture The Primacy of Existence (1985), available at
Principle Source. See also Dr. Kelley's The Evidence of the Senses, (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1986), pp. 7-43; and my essay The Issue of Metaphysical Primacy.[3] See "The Metaphysically Given Versus the Man-Made," Philosophy: Who Needs It, (New York: Signet, 1984), pp. 23-34; See also my essay
The Issue of Metaphysical Primacy.[4] "The Metaphysical Versus The Man-Made," Philosophy: Who Needs It, (New York: Signet, 1984), p. 25.
[5] By 'traditional theism' I mean either monotheistic or polytheistic beliefs, which posit a universe-creating and/or reality-directing Will or Being (or group of such) which is capable of creating worlds and/or directing reality by simply willing it or commanding it, i.e., without the implementation of physical effort. The Christian notion of creation ex nihilo is such an example.
The Ruling Consciousness. The Ruling Consciousness.[8] In regard to this confusion over fundamentals, see my article
The Syndrome of False Primacies.[9] However, the primacy of consciousness, the commitment to metaphysical subjectivism - the view that existence finds its source in a form of consciousness - does amount to a wholesale denial of both existence and consciousness. Since existence does not exist independent of consciousness, the objects of consciousness have no independent identity. This can only mean that identity is a fabrication of some form of mind, and in no sense an unalterable absolute, a fact which the primacy of existence recognizes. Additionally, the primacy of consciousness view ascribes certain powers to consciousness, for instance the power to create its own objects and/or to manipulate their identity at will. This amounts to the obliteration of the concept 'consciousness' because consciousness is asserted to be metaphysically active, which is a contradiction in terms. Ultimately, the primacy of consciousness view, if taken seriously, amounts to chronic solipsism. And for a supernatural, universe-creating, reality-ruling consciousness, solipsism is the beginning and the end, the alpha and the omega, of religious cosmology.
The Issue of the Historicity of Jesus, from my Letters to a Young Atheologist.[11] Philosophies which affirm the "necessary vs. contingent" dichotomy at this point face additional problems in epistemology (primarily because the issue of metaphysical primacy has not been properly addressed). See especially Leonard Peikoff's essay "The Analytic-Synthetic Dichotomy," in Ayn Rand's Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, Second Revised Edition (New York, Meridian: 1990) pp. 88-121 for a thorough treatment of this problematic matter. Philosopher David Ross has made available online a study of the problems created by this persisting dilemma in his
IOE, The Analytic-Synthetic Dichotomy.[12] "The Philosophy of Objectivism" lecture series (1976), question period, Lecture 3; quoted in Harry Binswanger, ed., The Ayn Rand Lexicon, (New York: Meridian, 1988), s.v. 'infinity'. Philosopher Harry Binswanger also addresses the issue of the valid use of the concept 'infinity' in his lecture "Selected Topics in the Philosophy of Science," available through
Second Renaissance Books.[13] Leonard Peikoff, "Knowledge as Hierarchical," Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand, pp. 129-141.
[14] Ayn Rand, "The Metaphysical Versus The Man-Made," Philosophy: Who Needs It, p. 24.
[15] I examine this blunder at some length in
Letter 7: Correcting Common Errors of my Letters to a Young Atheologist section.[16] See for instance John Frame's
Van Til: the Theologian, wherein he discusses Van Til's treatment of "apparent contradictions" and his willingness to "remain satisfied with paradox" in otherwise hopeless efforts to resolve contradictory teachings and doctrines found in the Bible, pp. 29-34.[17] See for instance my three-part examination of
The Byron-Choi Dilemma.[18] One notable example of this ploy can be found in apologist Greg Bahnsen's misidentification of concepts and the laws of logic as "immaterial entities" in his
famous debate with Dr. Gordon Stein, treating that which is epistemological in nature as things metaphysical in nature. (Link requires RealPlayer.) How the Theist Checkmates Himself, which explains how the claim that a universe-creating, reality-ruling consciousness exists actually performatively contradicts itself.
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