The Idea of "God" as a Form of Consciousness
by Anton Thorn
The recognition that god-belief commits its advocates and defenders to the primacy of consciousness metaphysics has been contested by many. [
1] Most attacks against this objection consist of claiming that, since God exists, god-belief also affirms the primacy of existence view of reality. However, not only does such a maneuver evade the fundamental issues of philosophy [2] and commit its advocates to a grotesque, unworkable package-deal, it also demonstrates the pliancy of mysticism as a hopeful putty superficially promising to rebuff all objections by satisfying the points of failing which are often cited against non-theistic philosophies while simultaneously trying to evade them. Moreover, if the theist defending his god-belief views is honestly willing to affirm the primacy of existence view of reality, why does he not embrace Objectivism, which is built completely and consistently on this principle? If they are not so willing, then it seems they are trying to have their cake, and to eat it, too. Which means: They want to affirm two horns of a contradiction.But there are good reasons to support the identification of the Christian deity as a form of consciousness, both from its descriptions in the religion's primary sources (the books of the Bible) as well as from claims asserted by its defenders. The question here comes down to: What is God? To answer this question, let us look to the experts, the theologians and apologists and their sources, and discover what inferences we can draw from their claims and characterizations, to determine whether or not they support the identification that God is thought to be a form of consciousness.
Of course, many will object to my method of inquiry, perhaps contesting that one cannot discover the nature of God by trying to "deconstruct" Him. However, imagine if men in the future chose never to look under the hood of an automobile to discover how it works, but instead held that they could never hope to learn the principles by which its engine operates. They might insist that men simply have 'faith' that it will continue to operate, and that they should accept this state of affairs "just because." And when that automobile ceases to work, instead of examining the object to discover how to make it function again, they relied on hopes, prayers and incantations to get it moving. Would this get men very far? Would they progress? Would they be able to achieve their goals? Would they have any confidence at all in the content that they accepted as knowledge?
In the course of my examination, four relevant characteristics ascribed to the Christian God are explored, namely the claims that God is a spirit, God is immaterial, God is a substance, and that God is omniscient. Along the way, I will be pointing out a number of problems which theists might want to think about. Let us now turn to some of the relevant issues that come up in answer to the question, What is God?
The gospel of John states, "God is a Spirit" (4:24). But how far does this get us if the Bible does not define the notion 'spirit'?
There are several common uses of the term 'spirit', one of which we can justifiably eliminate from our consideration quite immediately. Since the spirits of the Bible are not alluded to in the sense that they are the product of fermentation or distillation (even though they may cause intoxicating effects; cf. Acts 2:13 et al.), it is reasonable to suppose that the meaning of 'spirit' in the sense used by biblical authors does not refer to alcoholic beverages.
A spirit may also refer to a feeling, mood or emotional disposition, also an inclination or attitude. If someone is in good spirits, this usually means that his emotional disposition toward something is positive and enthusiastic in nature. Similarly, one's spirited reply to the offer of a new prospect, such as desired employment for example, implies a benevolently receptive emotional disposition. Or, a sports victory may serve to strengthen team spirit. It is unlikely that the Bible-believers have this sense of 'spirit' in mind when this term is used in passages such as John 4:24.
If 'spirit' is a feeling or mood of the believer (as in "jubilant spirit" or "saddened spirit"), then how is the "spiritual" in this sense to be distinguished from the "emotional"? When Christians claim as John 4:24 says that "God is a spirit," how is this different from "God is a feeling" or "God is an outlook on things"? Such distinctions would tend to confine the focus of god-belief in the believer's imagination and emotional psychology rather than on an actual being existing in reality. Add to this the question that, if "God is a spirit" and if God speaks to believers through revelations, how does the believer distinguish between these revelations and the spirit of his emotional swings? [
However, despite the pressing problems encountered when attempting to untangle theism's philosophical quandaries and paradoxes from the emotionalistic dependencies of its believers, it is usually not these meanings which Christians and biblical doctrine usually have in mind when offering statements like "God is a spirit." Rather, 'spirit' in this sense usually denotes some kind of mystic entity, supposedly independent of man's consciousness, a being of some sort which evades man's senses but which nonetheless, we are told, exists in a supernatural realm.
The word 'spirit' comes from the Latin word spiritus, which means (among other things): breath, breeze, blowing, breathing, air, fragrance, haughtiness, arrogance, energy, mind or soul.
Along these and similar lines, Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary defines 'spirit' as:
Webster's II New Riverside Dictionary also includes in its definition of 'spirit':
From these indications, we can gather the following generalizations. One, that a 'spirit' is alive (a "vital or animating force" which may be said to "give life" to physical organisms), and two, that a 'spirit' is conscious ("the immaterial or sentient part of a person" which is "…associated with the feelings and mind"). Since consciousness necessarily implies life, and since life does not necessarily imply consciousness (e.g., bacteria and plants are living, but not conscious), the essential here is, unmistakably, consciousness (since spirits are not thought of as non-conscious living things, like bacteria). This rendering is underscored by several other senses offered above, such as a "malevolent being" which may possess a volitional faculty (to "become visible" or to "enter and possess a human being" or "soul").
The New Unger's Bible Dictionary, in contrasting 'spirit' with 'soul', states that these "two terms are often used interchangeably, the same functions being ascribed to each." [
4] The same source states that the term 'soul' as used in the Bible "has the meaning of the seat of the feelings, desires, affections, aversions." [5] Clearly, when the Bible refers to living beings in these terms, it is attempting either to isolate the concept 'consciousness' in a broad, groping generality, or to obliterate it altogether. [6]One online Catholic tract claims that John 4:24 ("God is a Spirit…") "means God has no body, because a spirit is, by nature, an incorporeal being. As Jesus tells us elsewhere, 'a spirit has not flesh and bones' (Luke 24:39)." [
7] But would those who agree with such inferences, that indeed God "has no body, because a spirit is, by nature, an incorporeal being," that God has no consciousness? This is not the case, for according to the Bible, God has a mind [8], God has unlimited awareness [9], God has a will [10], God has thoughts [11], God speaks and authors judgments [12], God plans the future [13], God can love [14], God can be angry [15], and God experiences pleasure [16]. Certainly Christians would not posit that God is not conscious but that God has all of these attributes of consciousness.As these points each indicate, the actions ascribed to the 'spirit' of God are essentially actions of consciousness. None of these actions can be applied to non-consciousness. So, essentially speaking, we have God as a mind without a body. In other words, consciousness without existence.
Many theists, in their hope to further remove their object of worship from the reality they resent, endow their deity with the quality of being "immaterial." This only tells us what God is not, not what God is, which is characteristic of theistic "thinking." Such "thought" consistently prefers non-definition and nondescript modifiers in which His spokesmen clothe Him. [17]
But what is "immaterial"? To what does it refer? Advocates will say that the "immaterial" is non-matter. But what new knowledge does this add? It does not add anything; it merely repeats the very claim in question without telling us what the immaterial is. This raises the suspicion that the term "immaterial" has no reference to reality, since all attempts to define it are negations (i.e., it is an empty term) in the hands of the theist.
Apologists will typically claim that "immaterial" is exemplified by the contents of one's mind: thoughts and ideas are not material in nature. Just as
Christian sources provide very little if anything in order to address such questions. For instance, the Catholic Encyclopedia poignantly states: "Matter has generally been conceived as in one sense or another the limitation of spirit. Hence, finite spirits were thought to require a body as a principle of individuation and limitation; only God, the Infinite Spirit, was free from all admixture of matter." [18]
From this, it can be inferred that a spirit is thought to be unlimited in nature, or at least significantly less limited than when it is in contact with matter. Matter is seen as a factor which limits consciousness, not as one which provides its means (as we find in biology and neurological science). This view naturally suggests that the defaulting assumption is that consciousness as such (somehow or no how) transcends the material, and is therefore limited by the material when brought into captivating contact with it.
From "the Word was God" (John 1:1) to "the Word was made flesh" (John 1:14), we see that this assumption was active in the early formation of Christian theology. [19] Not only would the recognition of the fact that consciousness is dependent upon matter (i.e., on the organic functions of the body) suggest that consciousness is a natural phenomenon rather than a supernatural phenomenon, it would also suggest that the proper conduct of consciousness (i.e., cognition and thinking) requires a proper methodology (i.e., reason). But this recognition was to be rejected by the mystics for it would ultimately hinder the elevation of their ideals above nature and the minds of their followers.
Thus emerges a dichotomy between the mind and the body which is essential to the Christian view of man's nature. [20] Since, it is assumed, consciousness is possible independent of matter (indeed, matter as such is even considered to be the product of consciousness), consciousness, on this assumption, must be self-sufficient without material processes of causality (e.g., organic tissue, the nervous system, sensory organs, etc.). If man's consciousness can "transmigrate" from his body after its death, like a snake shedding its dead skin, then consciousness is supposedly able to "exist" without material means. If this is so, then what has the science of neuro-physiology to do with the functions of consciousness? [21]
In order to substantiate their attribution of "immaterial" to the nature of God, apologists often point to instances in nature which may also be characterized as "immaterial" - instances whose existence is not under dispute by either the theist or the non-believer, usually with the hope that non-believers will accept the validity of this characterization as evidence for their god-belief claims. For example, as mentioned above, some apologists may point to the functions of man's consciousness, such as ideas or concepts, calling them "immaterial entities." [22] While this notion has problems of its own [23], several points can be made in regard to this strategy.
The idea that concepts are immaterial in nature, assuming it has legitimate philosophical plausibility [24], neither proves the existence of God, nor would it lend itself to a durable analogy in the attempt to argue for God's existence, for many points can be cited to show why such an analogy is quite weak. For instance, concepts are mental integrations which men form by an act of consciousness. [25] It is unlikely that apologists will admit that 'God' is a product of man's mental action of integrating the evidence provided by his senses (assuming there were any viable evidence to begin with). This would make God a dependent on man's consciousness as opposed to a self-sufficient entity. Additionally, concepts are not living entities, neither do they possess the faculty of volition, nor do they create universes or bend the laws of nature (i.e., perform miracles). Any analogy which attempts to liken God as an "immaterial entity" to concepts, is therefore quite weak, to say the least.
The formation of concepts of course presupposes (among other things) consciousness (specifically, the conceptual level of consciousness [26]). If 'God' is in any way analogous to concepts (so-contrived as "immaterial entities"), whose consciousness does 'God' presuppose (if not the believer's own imaginary escapades)? If the theist says in response to this that concepts presuppose the mind of God, then he affirms my position that God is asserted essentially as a form of consciousness (since concepts presuppose consciousness), and consequently the relevance of the
Argument from Existence.The assertion that God is "immaterial," and the assertion that concepts are examples of things that are "immaterial," together attempt to equate "God" to the similitude of consciousness or conscious functions. This of course spells disaster for any theistic argument employing such weak analogies, as such arguments end up committing the fallacies of the
stolen concept and of pure self-reference.
When asked to identify what God is, as opposed to what God is not, as encountered above, theists may say that "God is a substance," but even here they are reluctant to get into specifics. For instance, the
New Advent Catholic Encyclopedia (online) says thatGod is a simple being or substance excluding every kind of composition, physical or metaphysical. Physical or real composition is either substantial or accidental -- substantial, if the being in question consists of two or more substantial principles, forming parts of a composite whole, as man for example, consists of body and soul; accidental, if the being in question, although simple in its substance (as is the human soul), is capable of possessing accidental perfections (like the actual thoughts and volition of man's soul) not necessarily identical with its substance. [27]
Statements like this tell us very little, indicating as we've seen already only what God is not rather than what God is, and seem readily prone to chasing digressions instead of dealing with the primary issue at hand. A "substance excluding every kind of composition, physical or metaphysical" suggests that whatever this "substance" is, it is pure and undiluted: whatever this alleged substance is, it is thought to be free of any admixture, impurity or variation from homogeneity. But this still resists satisfying the question, what is this substance? What kind of substance, if any, is God made of? Certainly, theologians might object to the phrasing of this question, since to answer it would accept the implied premise that "God is made of something." But God is God, they will claim, not a composite of assembled substances. Indeed, the same source above states, "Now it is clear that an infinite being [i.e., God] cannot be substantially composite, for this would mean that infinity is made up of the union or addition of finite parts -- a plain contradiction in terms." However, with talk of an unidentified substance, one can hardly be faulted for the supposed faux pas of assuming that God is "composed" of that substance.
But if the claim is advanced that "God is a substance," why can we never learn specifically what this alleged substance is? If one asserts the claim that "God is a substance," as this Catholic source does, then we should be able to identify it in positive terms. Otherwise, how can one justifiably consider it knowledge? By what means can we identify this 'substance', and can we discover its attributes? Does it have an atomic number? Does it give off radioactive isotopes? Does it have a half-life? A shelf-life? An afterlife? Does it have a pour point? Is it combustible? If we accept it as true that "God is light" (I John 1:5), does this substance then give off thermal radiation? Can this substance conduct heat? Can it be combined with other substances? Can it boil or freeze? Does this make god-belief akin to any other kind of substance abuse? Or, is it free of any characteristics which are detectable? Does this substance have any scientific properties? If so, what are they, and what tests do the theologians recommend in order to validate their claims? If this substance does not have scientific properties, thus prohibiting scientific inquiry, then why should anyone accept the claim that "God is a substance" as valid knowledge of reality? If this "substance" has any identity at all, why would it not have attributes or properties which can be scientifically tested?
Existence exists, and to exist is to be something specific, to have a specific identity. And if we can discover that something exists, be it a tiny brook, the ruins of an ancient fishing village or a universe-ruling deity, we should be able to identify what that something is, and to set into motion certain scientific measures of investigation to validate our identification of its nature. However, this is never allowed by the theologian, as he covetously guards his claim to mystical knowledge in the shadows of non-definition so that the curious are unable to inspect it.
How this all differs from fantasizing and attempting to project one's imaginary constructs into reality is stubbornly elusive. But what is essential for our purposes is to recognize the underlying assumptions that, whatever this "substance" may be, it is thought to be conscious, and that this conscious "substance" is capable of activity without comparable instances in nature. If "God is a simple being or substance excluding every kind of composition," then whatever it is that God is, God is singularly and exhaustively that one thing. Thus, if God is conscious (as believers assume), then it seems that God's consciousness would not be merely an attribute of His being - as it is in the case of man, but identical with the totality of His very being itself. As apologist Cornelius Van Til put it, "The attributes of God are not to be thought of otherwise than as aspects of the one simple original being; the whole is identical with the parts." [
28] Accordingly, if God is conscious, His being is wholly conscious.Taking Van Til's notions as legitimate, one apologist asks "is it correct to say that God is, in some sense, his own thoughts, or do we not necessarily have to take that position (since God, in some sense, may be said to have 'parts')?" and concludes that it is plausible, on Christian theistic presumptions, to say that "God's 'thoughts' which are 'himself' is [sic] none other than his Word." [
29]Thus, if we should attempt to integrate in some fashion the notion that the whole of God is identical with His parts, that "God is… his own thoughts" and the claim that "God is a substance" into a unified idea, then we must conclude that the substance of God is thought, and that God is wholly consciousness, which could only mean: God exists as a form of consciousness.
Not only is it the case that God knows things, he knows everything that can be known (so His self-appointed earthly representatives claim). Although this notion 'omniscience' attempts to assert exhaustive knowledge without means, and is therefore not a valid concept [
Other activities ascribed to the God of the Bible also assume that God is a conscious being. For instance, God is said to be able to love [
31], which suggests God can know value and experience emotions in regard to His values. [32] God is said to have a personal will [33], to be able to experience anger or wrath [34], to author original thoughts and judgments [35], to plan the future [36], to choose the course of men's lives for them (which presumably no man can escape) [37], and to see and know all. [38] All of these actions necessarily assume that God is a conscious being, for each of these activities necessarily involves the activity of consciousness.According to believers, the Christian God is not only omniscient, but His awareness is ubiquitous, omnitemporaneous, and infallible. He is all-seeing [
39], and thus we have the ultimate divine voyeur among the panoply of history's assorted gods. He cannot fail to know every thought of the believer. And just as this belief influences the believer's psychology, it also affects his philosophy. Since it is to this omnipresent voyeur-god that the believer obliges himself to account in all matters of life, thought, moral choice and action, the believer pressures himself with the endeavor to discover this being's standards and to comport himself accordingly.Moreover, God's omniscient consciousness is said to hold priority over the facts of reality. For instance, in respect to the alleged "
knowledge which God has of the things that exist beside himself," Van Til holds that believers "must emphasize the fact that God’s knowledge of the facts precedes these facts" since "God knows or interprets the facts before they are facts." [40] In terms of essentials, this can only imply consciousness prior to existence, and conversely that existence is dependent upon consciousness. Notwithstanding the problems apologists encounter in attempting to prove such claims, Van Til's treatment of the "knowledge of God" explicitly reduces the notion of omniscience to its mystical roots: the metaphysical primacy of consciousness.
Conclusion
Each of the topics covered above - that God is a "spirit," that God is "immaterial" but yet a "substance," and that God is "omniscient," underscores the assumption that the deity of the Christian religion is thought to be exclusively a conscious being and that His activity is the activity of consciousness, however exaggerated beyond natural example. This is hardly a controversial conclusion for Christians. Indeed, Christians typically do not speak of their God as if He were non-conscious, and none of the putative characteristics which Christian theologians attribute to their God makes sense in the context of a non-conscious entity, such as a rock. By referring to God as a "spirit," Christian theology likens God to the spiritual nature of man, which includes his conscious functions: awareness, volition, thinking, affection, memory, etc.
Also, since the Christian God is said not to be composed of matter, we must assume that it is conscious without the means by which man is conscious. That is, God neither has nor requires sense organs, a nervous system or even a physical brain. God is assumed to have awareness of His objects by some kind of spontaneity (i.e., by no means) rather than through some instrumental or existential means (i.e., by some means). Thus, the Christian God is essentially thought of as a kind of floating consciousness which is not attached to anything physical or natural, completely free and independent of all the processes, and all the potential problems, which are characteristic to man's consciousness. Consequently, that God is a form of consciousness (as opposed to an organic life form possessing consciousness as a function of its organism) accurately represents the essentials which this notion attempts to subsume.
Therefore, we can conclude that this aspect of Christian philosophy, the doctrine of the Christian deity, is properly identified as an expression of the primacy of consciousness view of reality.
Anton Thorn
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Notes
[1] This essay is offered in order to support my contention that god-belief is rooted in the primacy of consciousness metaphysics, which informs a major premise of my
Argument from the Fact of Existence. Readers who are unfamiliar with certain terms used in this essay should review my online lexicon Important Terms where they are elaborately defined and/or explained.[2] In other words, what holds metaphysical primacy? In regard to this and other related questions, see my essay
The Issue of Metaphysical Primacy.[3] Indeed, the Bible itself equates the believer's emotions to the basis of his cognition in Proverbs 1:7, which states that "the fear of the Lord is the beginning of knowledge." As we add up the various pieces of this growing, intangible context - a context with no connection to the perceptual facts of reality, we find that the symptoms of god-belief resemble more and more the symptoms of self-reinforcing delusion.
[6] I would tend to agree with Rand (cf. "This is John Galt Speaking," For the New Intellectual, p. 124, "Credibility and Polarization," The Ayn Rand Letter, I, 1, 1, et al.) that the attributes ascribed to God's consciousness only serve to obliterate the objectively formed concept of consciousness. Consciousness is consciousness of something (i.e., of existence), it has a purpose "for those living organisms which possess it… the basic means of survival" (Rand, "The Objectivist Ethics," The Virtue of Selfishness, p. 18.), and operates by a specific means (cf. Rand, Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, pp. 29-39; "Our Cultural Value-Deprivation," The Objectivist, April, 1966, p. 1; et al.). The notion of God's consciousness expresses the wholesale rejection of these facts since God's consciousness is thought to be independent of anything beyond Himself (i.e., consciousness for God is not consciousness of something; see
God and Pure Self-Reference); God's consciousness serves no living purpose (i.e., since God is said to be eternal, immortal and indestructible, God does not face the alternative of life vs. death; see Why an Immortal Being Cannot Know Value); and God's consciousness is said to be omniscient (i.e., God has knowledge by no means; see God and Omniscience). Does God Have a Body? at the Catholic Answers homepage.[8] Cf. Acts 20:19; Rom. 11:34; I Cor. 2:16; Philip. 2:5, et al.
[9] Cf. Ps. 33:13-15, 139:1-24; Prov. 15:3; Acts 15:18; Heb. 4:13; I John 3:20, et al.
[10] Cf. Matt. 6:10; 26:39, 42; Luke 11:2; Rom. 8:26, 12:2; Heb. 10:9, et al.
[11] Cf. Ps. 40:5, 92:5, 139:17; Is. 55:8-9; Mic. 4:12, et al.
[12] Cf. Gen. 1:2, 6, 9, 11, 14, etc., 21:2; Deut. 1:17; Ps. 50:1, 108:7; Rom. 11:33, et al.
[13] Cf. Rom. 8:29-30; Eph. 1:4-5, 11; et al.; cf. also the
doctrine of prophecy.[14] Cf. John 3:16, 5:42; Rom. 5:8, 8:39; II Cor. 13:11; Eph. 2:4; I John 4:8-11, 16, et al.
[15] Cf. Num. 22:22; Ex. 32:2; Ezra 8:22; Rom. 1:18, 9:22; Eph. 5:6; Rev. 14:10, 19, et al.
[16] Cf. Gen. 33:10; Ps. 115:3; Is. 46:10; Matt. 3:17; I Cor. 12:18; Heb. 13:16, et al.
[17] Ayn Rand pointed out this tendency in her novel Atlas Shrugged when she wrote:
They claim that they perceive a mode of being superior to your existence on this earth. The mystics of spirit call it "another dimension," which consists of denying dimensions. The mystics of muscle call it "the future," which consists of denying the present. To exist is to possess identity. What identity are they able to give to their superior realm? They keep telling you what it is not, but never tell you what it is. All their identifications consist of negating: God is that which no human mind can know, they say - and proceed to demand that you consider it knowledge - God is non-man, heaven is non-earth, soul is non-body, virtue is non-profit, A is non-A, perception is non-sensory, knowledge is non-reason. Their definitions are not acts of defining, but of wiping out. (pp. 951-952)
[18] See the Catholic Encyclopedia's entry for 'spirit'. Incidentally, the view that "only God… was free from all admixture of matter," suggests that angels, demons, devils and other 'spirits' would have some material existence. If this is true, then their existence should be verifiable by some scientific means. However, science has yet to discover these elusive spiritual beings. This does not come quite as a surprise.
[19] In his writings, Paul even treats man's flesh as if it were a kind of prison. See Philippians 1:21-24; II Corinthians 5:8; et al.
[20] Cf. Romans 7:5-6, 15-23; 8:1-13; Galatians 5:17, 24-25; et al.
[21] For more treatment of the dependency of consciousness on the material body, see Jeffery Lowder's "argument from physical minds," in his Brief Survey of Evidential Arguments for Atheism; Michael Tooley's Opening Argument of The Craig-Tooley Debate, which Lowder cites; also Keith Augustine's The Case Against Immortality. (Note: In referring to Lowder's arguments I do not intend to imply that I affirm the view that minds per se are physical, only that they are ultimately dependent upon the physical. A mind is a human consciousness. Consciousness requires material means. This is testable: those who dispute this can drink a pint of whisky on an empty stomach, and see how the chemical interaction of the alcohol in their blood effects their perception, sense of time and judgment. Or, for more dramatic results, they can take a glass of bleach and irrigate their eyes with it, and maybe then they will "see the light." I'm guessing that those who dispute the material requirements of consciousness will not try this latter test, even though such tests will only confirm that it is pretty difficult to be conscious without senses which enable awareness.)
[22] I allude here to Greg Bahnsen's debate with Dr. Gordon Stein, in which Bahnsen claims that universals (i.e., concepts) and the laws of logic are "immaterial entities," just as he asserts that God is an "immaterial entity." When asked to define what "immaterial" means, Bahnsen did so negatively: "not extended into space." But, as we saw above, this only tells us what something that is "immaterial" is not, not what it is. An audio version of this debate (for Real Player) can be accessed at The Great Debate.
[23] Though within certain contexts one may plausibly treat concepts as "entities" - i.e., as units of mental integration, many apologists tend to be quite careless in this regard, due to their ambition to smuggle false and/or arbitrary premises into their reasoning. In order to eliminate or minimize confusion, one should keep in mind the overriding fact that concepts are epistemological, not metaphysical. Concepts as such are not entities. Rather, concepts are abstractions (i.e., mental integrations) which name entities (first level) and other abstractions (second level). Abstraction is a function of the mind, and as such, an action of consciousness. Actions are not entities. Many apologists fail to make this distinction in order to treat concepts as if they were metaphysical entities, which is a confusion of subject and object promulgating a package-deal fallacy. (See Ayn Rand, "The Psycho-Epistemology of Art," The Romantic Manifesto, p. 23, 46; Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, 2nd Ed., p. 15; Leonard Peikoff, "The Philosophy of Objectivism," lecture series (1976), question period, Lecture 3. See also Harry Binswanger's discussion of the nature of fire in his book The Biological Basis of Teleological Concepts, pp. 148-150.)
[24] Again, concepts by their nature are epistemological phenomena, not metaphysical; in terms of their reference in the context of this discussion, the concepts 'material' and 'immaterial' are metaphysical concepts, not epistemological concepts.
[25] See Rand, "Concept-Formation," Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, 2nd. Ed., pp. 10-18.
[26] Cf. Rand, Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, 2nd Ed., p. 5f.
[27] See the entry for God, under the section C: Simplicity of God.
[28] Christian Apologetics, chapter 1; quoted in
this post to the Van Til Discussion List. See also this post to the same list. this post to the Van Til List. God and Omniscience for an examination of this often-met notion.[31] See John 3:16, 5:42; Romans 8:39, 5:8; II Corinthians 13:11; Ephesians 2:4; I John 4:8-11, 16; etc.
[32] I challenge this very idea in my essay
Why an Immortal God Cannot Value.[33] Matthew 6:10; 26:39, 42; Luke 11:2; Romans 12:2; Hebrews 10:9, etc.
[34] See Exodus 32:11; Numbers 22:22; II Kings 22:17; II Chronicles 29:10; Ezra 8:22; Job 20:23; Psalms 78:31; Jeremiah 10:10; Romans 1:18; 9:22; Ephesians 5:6; Colossians 3:6; Revelations 14:10, 19; 15:1, 7; 16:1, 19; 19:15; etc.
[35] See Leviticus 18:4; 19:3; 26:46; Numbers 36:13; Deuteronomy 1:17; Nehemiah 10:29; I Chronicles 16:12; Psalms 40:5; 92:5; 139:17; Isaiah 55:8-9; Micah 4:12; Romans 11:33; etc.
[36] Christians often talk about what they call "God's plan," to which few Bible translations explicitly refer. For instance, see the Worldwide English Translation of the following verses: Ephesians 3:6; 6:18; Colossians 2:2; 4:3; I Timothy 3:9, 16; Revelations 13:8. See also the New King James Version of Isaiah 48:12. Christian ministers, theologians and pseudo-scientists alike are constantly barking about this alleged plan. For instance, Henry M. Morris, one of the faculty at the
Institute for Creation Research, writes in his essay God's Plan for Your Life, "The most important thing in life… is to discover and seek to follow God's great plan for our lives." Implicit in statements such as this is the idea that, if one does not accept this "great plan for our lives" as the "most important thing in life," then great woe will befall him (either in "this life" or in the "afterlife"). Thus, invoking the notion of "God's plan" has its part in the larger scheme of the evangelistic mind-control program of biblical indoctrination. As such, "God's plan" serves as a mind-numbing cue setting in motion the Bible's mind-game devices, as identified by Edmund D. Cohen in his book The Mind of the Bible-Believer, (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 1988), pp. 169-387.[37] Romans 8:29-30, 9:15-16, 21-24, 11:5; II Corinthians 10:18; Galatians 1:15; Ephesians 1:4-5, 11; II Thessalonians 2:11-12; II Timothy 2:19-20; I Peter 2:8; Jude 4; Revelations 13:8, 17:8, 17, 20:12, 21:27.
[38] I Samuel 16:7; I Kings 8:39; I Chronicles 28:9; Psalms 11:4; Jeremiah 17:10; Matthew 9:4, 18:35; Mark 7:6; Luke 5:22, 16:15, 21:34-36; Acts 1:24, 8:21-22, 15:8-9; Romans 2:3, 5-6, 16; 8:27; I Thessalonians 2:4, 3:13; II Thessalonians 3:5; Hebrews 4:12-13, 8:10, 10:16; James 5:8; I Peter 3:4; I John 3:20-21; Revelation 3:23, 17:17.
[39] This assumption, however, is not consistent throughout the Bible. To support the claim that God has "infinite knowledge" (a contradiction in terms, since knowledge has identity) and "sees all," Christians point to verses such as Hebrews 4:13, which states "Neither is there any creature that is not manifest in [God's] sight: but all things are naked and opened to the eyes of him with whom we have to do." But as Farrell Till points out in his article
The Evolution of God, "The Bible is also contradictory about the omniscient nature of God," citing verses such as I Kings 22:16-23; 16:20-22, 44-50 as problematic to the claim of an omniscient God. A blaring instance of God's non-omniscience is found in the tale of man's fall in the Garden of Eden, where God must ask "Where art thou?" when he was looking for Adam, who was hiding. (See Gen. 3:9.) "The Knowledge of God," Christian Apologetics, chap. 1.
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