A Lesson on the Issue of Metaphyiscal Primacy

A Lesson on the Issue of Metaphysical Primacy

In November, 2000, I received an e-mail from a theist (who shall remain nameless), who asked a simple question about a statement I had made in one of my essays. That essay is The Byron-Choi Dilemma. This essay, and the two parts which follow it, Sean Choi Responds and David Byron Responds, focus on an inadvertent yet fundamental disagreement between two well-seasoned apologists of the presuppositionalist tradition. It is recommended that those who are unfamiliar with the nature of the their disagreement read my three essays which expose it in what I believe are very clear terms.

My Statement and Questions about it:

My correspondent's question had to do with the following statement which I made in The Byron-Choi Dilemma:

Can it also be true that these two disagreeing responses actually confirm the relevance as well as the truth of the Argument from Existence? [1]

It is certainly true.

In response to my statement here, my correspondent asked (with some edits for clarity):

I don't see how that logically follows. Why can't their disagreement be such that one of them is right and the other one is wrong and so is the Argument from Existence? Or both of them being wrong & also the argument from existence being wrong?

Justifying my statement:

Before I addressed my correspondent's questions directly, I offered the following remarks in support of the statement I made and about which he inquired:

I don't know if you read beyond the cited portion of text which was clipped from the initial paper of a three-part series The Byron-Choi Dilemma. Perhaps since you first sent your message to me you have read my analyses of both Messrs. Byron's and Choi's comments to my challenge to TAG. [2] If so, maybe you have already found the answer to your questions. And if that is the case, I apologize for the superfluity of my tardy response to your question.

However, in case you haven't read beyond the cited text, or if you believe my verdict in that citation is unwarranted after reading my essays, I would suggest consideration of the following:

First of all, I recognize that the relevance of the Argument from Existence is confirmed by my point #1 in my assessment of Choi's response, which is: Choi's "acceptance of the notion that existence finds its source in a form of consciousness" as discussed in the section titled "Choi's Commitment to Metaphysical Subjectivism." For Mr. Choi did in fact write, "Since I see no reason to believe that it is *impossible* that existence ultimately is grounded in some form of mind, it follows that it is possible." Since the Argument from Existence deals specifically with the issue of whether or not the idea that existence finds its source in a form of consciousness is valid (cf., the issue of metaphysical primacy), Mr. Choi's acceptance of this notion as possible clearly confirms the relevance of the argument in question. In fact, I don't think this confirmation could be any more explicitly clear or unmistakable.

Additionally, the truth of the Argument from Existence is confirmed by Mr. Byron's own unwitting (and somewhat crude) recognition of the fallacy of the stolen concept committed by the idea that existence finds its source in a form of consciousness. If you look at my points #7 and #8 in my analysis of Mr. Byron's appraisal of the challenge I offered to TAG (subtitled "Identification of the Problem" and "Byron's Reversal"), you should get a clearer picture of this. Byron clearly senses an error (he states "priorities are exactly reversed" which is true), but he fails to identify precisely the culprit of that reversal (he lays blame to "the questioner" rather than the idea of metaphysical subjectivism itself - I found this astounding!).

These two points should show why I think my cited statement above is justified.

Addressing my correspondent's questions:

As for addressing your questions, which were:

I would state the following:

Given the above, it should now be quite apparent why my verdict follows, that together both Messrs. Byron's and Choi's responses to my challenge to TAG confirm the appropriateness and the validity of the Argument from Existence. Your question "Why can't their disagree be such that one of them is right and the other one is wrong and so is the Argument from Existence?" suggests that you recognize the irreconcilable nature of the positions garnered from their reactions to my challenge to TAG. Indeed, one affirms metaphysical subjectivism explicitly (Choi) while the other senses the stolen concept committed by metaphysical subjectivism (Byron) and wits that it has "disastrous results." So, clearly they cannot *both* be right. Needless to say, such unwitting tangles are an entertaining by-product of the Argument from Existence. (Indeed, to my delight, I've received a number of responses to the Byron-Choi Dilemma from my readers.)

As for the question on whether or not the Argument from Existence is wrong (which appears to be your desired conclusion as you mention this in both your questions above), how would one go about showing that it is wrong?

Indeed, there is yet another way in which both Messrs. Choi and Byron affirm the truth of the Argument from Existence, though it may be a little more difficult for those uninitiated in the fundamentals of Objectivist philosophy to recognize. In their respective messages, both Choi and Byron assert statements about external reality. For instance, Mr. Choi states, "the atheist in question said..." And Mr. Byron states, "the questioner asks the apologists to establish the possibility…" Both statements assert truths independent of their own consciousness respectively. And by doing so, they implicitly affirm the primacy of existence, the very principle which guarantees the Argument from Existence. Every time one asserts a fact about reality, even if we are mistaken about that fact, we are asserting that fact as a fact which does not depend on our consciousness of that fact in order for it to be a fact.

If for instance I say "Albany is located in New York," I am implicitly recognizing that this is a fact of reality independent of my being aware of it. The city of Albany is much older than I am, and existed long before I became aware of it. Thus, it is a fact that Albany exists (and is located in the state of New York; indeed, it is the capitol of that state), and this fact obtains whether or not I know it, accept it, or deny it. Even in considering this fact, I am implicitly affirming the primacy of existence principle.

The alternative to the primacy of existence is the primacy of consciousness, which is not only a contradiction of the primacy of existence, but also a contradiction of itself. Objectivism holds that the primacy of existence and the primacy of consciousness are exhaustive metaphysics. [3] The primacy of consciousness holds that, in some manner and to some degree, existence is dependent on consciousness. The most explicit form of the primacy of consciousness is the idea that existence actually finds its source in consciousness (which Mr. Choi affirmed in his response to my challenge).

Of course, Mr. Choi does not hold that existence (be it an apple, photosynthesis or the universe in general) finds its source in *his own* consciousness. Again, we already saw that *implicitly* he affirmed the primacy of existence by asserting a fact presumably independent of his own consciousness. So Mr. Choi may very well not be operating on the *personal* primacy of consciousness. Additionally, he may not be operating on the *social* primacy of consciousness either, since it is doubtful that he believes all facts are dependent on the minds of a group of (or all) men.

Rather, as a theist, he is operating on the *cosmic* (or "supernatural") primacy of consciousness, since he asserts the idea of a "god" - a conscious being (neither man nor a collection of men, but a supernatural being wholly distinct from the universe) - as the source of existence. Indeed, he expressly stated that he saw no problem with this view, even though it clashes with the primacy of existence, which he implicitly affirms in a two-fold manner when he asserts any fact claim as independent of both his own and of any group of men's consciousness. Consequently, there is an inconsistency here, which is resolved only by the explicit recognition of the primacy of existence and the affirmation of Objectivist metaphysics (which avoids the fallacy of the stolen concept). In short, that is what the Argument from Existence achieves.

I imagine this may generate many more questions than it may initially be seen to be answering. However, never fear as I have yet to publish my formal exposition of the Argument from Existence, which I also call the Argument from the Fact of Existence ("AFE") or the Argument from Objective Reality ("AOR"). Until then, it seems a hasty affair to consider the Argument from Existence to be wrong until it has enjoyed its formal presentation. My exposition of the Byron-Choi Dilemma, however, should stimulate a lot of food for thought in the meantime, as should some of my many other papers, which are posted on my website. I hope you enjoy them, as many others have.

Thanks again for your message.

Sincerely,

Anton Thorn

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Notes

[1] A reduced rendering the Argument from Existence would go as follows:

Premise 1. If existence exists, then god-belief is invalid.
Premise 2. Existence exists.
Conclusion: Therefore, god-belief is invalid.

A variation which assumes more substantial knowledge of Objectivism might be formed like the following:

Premise 1. If the primacy of existence is true, then god-belief is invalid.
Premise 2. The primacy of existence is true.
Conclusion: Therefore, god-belief is invalid.

This argument and several of its variations will be developed and critically examined in a series of essays which are currently in progress. However, it can be seen from a quick glance that both versions of this argument follow a valid format (known as modus ponens). In the case of the first version, the only questionable premise is Premise 1. Thus, if Premise 1 is true, then the conclusion follows necessarily. In the case of the second version, the corresponding premise is that version's Premise 1 as well.

[2] "TAG" refers to the "transcendental argument for the existence of God," as identified and discussed by the Van Til List and critiqued by the Secular Web.

[3] See for instance the essay Are the Primacy of Existence and the Primacy of Consciousness Exhaustive Metaphysics?

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