"If you can't dazzle 'em with brilliance, baffle 'em with bullshit."

Below I present Christian apologist David Byron's reaction to the excerpt from my original counter to TAG that HOWARD8984 shared with the Van Til forum on March 18, 1999. Each statement Mr. Byron makes is rich with implication, but also burdened by lack of clear meaning and analytic carelessness at several key points. While the cursory nature of Mr. Byron's response may be understandable, given the familiar and insulated setting of the Van Til forum, I believe this lack of clarity on his part is actually to be expected, due to the fundamental metaphysical issue involved in the present matter.

By now hopefully you have read my review of Sean Choi's comments to the passage HOWARD8984 excerpted from my original post. Without having read my review of Choi's comments to my challenge of TAG (the "transcendental argument for the existence of god"), it will be difficult to grasp fully the fundamental division that their responses to my challenge entail. Click here to go to my article covering Choi's evasive "rebuttal".

As you recall, I had posted an e-mail posing a simple challenge to the advocates of TAG, which HOWARD8984, in his inability to meet the challenge himself, decided to share with fellow back-slapping apologists he thought might be able to rescue him:

HOWARD8984 asked:

Now enter Mr. David Byron, self-elected pop star of transcendental apologetics, boasting an academic record including Yale University, another hypothetically favorite son of Ivy-League Christian mysticism. Contrary to Mr. Choi's myopic dismissal of the challenge HOWARD8984 delivered to these gentlemen on my unwitting behalf, Mr. Byron gave my contention some serious thought. Below his three paragraphs of 'rebuttal' (which, ironically, actually confirm the Argument from Existence) are reviewed and assessed by yours truly, Anton Thorn.

Citing David Byron:

[1] The Understanding of What Consciousness Is: The first thing that stands out in the leading statement of paragraph one, is the word 'intuitive'. Let us see how this word may offer clues into the academic mystic's mindset. By 'intuitive' does Byron really mean 'a priori'? If we look up the word 'intuition' in the dictionary, we might find the following:

It is not certain which of the above definitions of 'intuition' Mr. Byron had in mind when he introduced the term in the above paragraph, or if he had a different consideration in mind altogether. However, the question here is, why must we assume an "intuitive understanding of what 'consciousness' is"? "Intuitive" understanding as opposed to what? Why does Mr. Byron not stipulate an objective understanding of what consciousness is? Does Mr. Byron think that an objective understanding of consciousness is not possible? Or, is an objective understanding not preferred? Will an 'intuitive understanding' provide his philosophical position with a safety that objectivity will not afford him? The use of 'intuitive' here is highly suspect, and suggests, at least to the Objectivist, a tendency towards a kind of Kantian rationalism, which Rand defined as deduction without reference to reality. This suggestion is not without precedence in presuppositionalist rhetoric. For instance, when asked about the nature of the presuppositionalist's heavily touted 'ultimate presupposition', one might expect to hear a response to the effect that the presuppositionalist's starting point is "an a priori deductive certainty", which indicates the rationalist nature of their view of reality and epistemology.

Obviously if a deductive certainty could be said to be "a priori" - i.e., without experience, one cannot say with intellectual confidence at the same time that this 'deductive certainty' represents an assessment of reality. In essence, such 'certainty' is nothing short of a faith assertion. This position would be consistent with the appeal to 'intuition' that Mr. Byron makes above, judging by the definitions of 'intuition' proposed above. Any assertion of 'direct knowledge' - whether in the guise of 'intuition', 'revelation' or faith - is by nature a knowledge claim without reference to reality for two primary reasons:

1. Man's mind has a specific nature. That nature requires that man validate knowledge through a process of reason. Claims to so-called 'direct knowledge' constitute an attempt to abnegate and by-pass this reality.
2. Man's knowledge is knowledge of reality, i.e., of existence. The very reason mystics posit 'direct knowledge' is to evade the constraints of reality. Hence, assertions of 'direct knowledge' cannot be verified by an appeal to reality.

This is one of the central issues to all god-belief debates, and the religionist is often ready to employ the same subterfuge in his attempts to validate arbitrary assertions related to god-belief claims. Assertions that 'god' exists cannot be validated by any direct appeal to reality, nor by reasoning that ultimately backs out to direct appeals to reality. Hence the need for dubiously constructed 'a priori deductive certainties' as the religionist's starting points. Similar sophistry can be expected in religious assertions about the nature of consciousness.

[2] The Essence of Consciousness: How does Mr. Byron come to the conclusion that consciousness necessarily involves 'intentionality'? Is this an 'intuitive certainty'? What does Mr. Byron mean by 'intentionality'? Is 'intentionality' the same thing as volition? Do all instances of consciousness possess volition? What about lower order animals that possess consciousness? Are they so developed that they possess the faculty of volition, like men? Again, what is the essential to consciousness in Mr. Byron's view? How does he define consciousness? And, what is the source of his proposed definition? Or, does a definition of consciousness matter, or is Mr. Byron merely stumbling around out loud here? Certainly in the case of man, consciousness does involve 'intentionality' if 'intentionality' is the same thing as volition to the Objectivist. However, Byron seems to stipulate an 'intuitive understanding' of consciousness and that consciousness involves 'intentionality'. While it is one thing to identify the essential of consciousness, it is quite another thing to state that consciousness necessarily involves 'intentionality', especially if one has not objectively identified what consciousness is. How can one say that consciousness involves 'intentionality' unless one has first identified what consciousness is?

Or, perhaps Mr. Byron is attempting to pass off a frozen abstraction here, tacitly substituting ‘intentionality’ – or volition - for consciousness per se. While Mr. Byron and others may feel quite justified in assuming this, one must point out the error here. Volition cannot be the same as consciousness as volition in fact presupposes consciousness. Part of the main problem with Mr. Byron’s thread here is the lack of a clear definition of consciousness. "Consciousness is the faculty of awareness – the faculty of perceiving that which exists" [Ayn Rand, Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, 37; emphasis A. Thorn]. While theists of various creeds may find it difficult to agree on a concise definition of consciousness (for instance, the Bible does not define consciousness, so theists have to rely on extra-biblical sources for such definitions), it is difficult to see how one could argue against the fact that awareness constitutes the fundamental essence belonging to consciousness. Mr. Byron’s candidly announced assumption that ‘intentionality’, or volition or free will, is the fundamental essence that constitutes consciousness is noted and checked by an objective definition.

Both views of the task of consciousness, the religious and the Objectivist, are consistent with the essence ascribed to consciousness in their respected camp. It is consistent that the view that holds that consciousness is essentially ‘intentionality’ – or ‘will power’, would also hold that consciousness is a creative power. Compare this view with the theist’s conception of a ‘creator-god’, such as cited in the book of Genesis. This creator-god’s consciousness is said to be responsible for the creative act that resulted in the existence of the world and the universe. Basically, in Objectivist terms, the theist’s creator-god is a form of consciousness that is responsible for the fact that existence exists. The problems with this view, albeit obvious to the tutored Objectivist, usually evade the theist who accepts this view by faith (regardless of the window-dressing he gives it). These views are all consistent with the primacy of consciousness view of reality, to which the theist is philosophically committed.

Alternately, the view that holds that consciousness is essentially the faculty of awareness also holds as its natural corollary the view that the task of consciousness is perception - not creation. Herein can readily be detected the primacy of existence underpinnings of such a view of consciousness. Perception of what? Perception of reality, or, more specifically, of existence, reality being defined as the realm of existence. Therefore, for the Objectivist, consciousness is consciousness of something, i.e., the task of perceiving existence.

It is important to keep in mind some of the stipulations that the theist accepts on himself as an adherent to religious philosophy which may shed some light on his motivation to obfuscate an understanding of what constitutes consciousness. For the religionist, not only does existence find its source in a form of consciousness – i.e., consciousness as a creative faculty, but consciousness must transcend existence in the case of man, whose flesh merely serves as a temporary host for a resident form of consciousness. At all costs, including of rationality and objectivity, the religionist will do anything to show that consciousness does not presuppose existence in any way, shape or form, so long as such presuppositional implications stand in opposition to his primacy of consciousness view of reality. With these facts in mind, is it no wonder that some religious apologists would attempt to posit ‘intuitive understandings’ of what constitutes consciousness? Is it no wonder that the development of religious philosophy might attempt to ascribe consciousness to ‘a priori deductive certainties’? How these ‘a priori deductive certainties’ are distinguished from faith is not clear.

[3] The Form of Consciousness: A ‘form of consciousness’ is defined as exactly that: any instance of consciousness, either actual or alleged. Consciousness is an attribute of (some) living things, and for this reason consciousness necessarily presupposes living existents (i.e., consciousness presupposes existence); non-living existents do not possess the faculty of awareness. Any being that can be said to be conscious must be a living being during the period of time its consciousness is posited. As an attribute, consciousness possesses identity; any instance of consciousness is therefore finite. The principle of identity states that A is A. Corollary to this fact is the fact that, if A exists, it must be A. Any attempt to abnegate this principle (such as by positing a form of ‘infinite consciousness’ or similar constructs) cannot describe anything in reality.

Man is a living being which possesses consciousness, consciousness with a specific nature, a nature that man can discover and identify. Therefore, ‘man’ qualifies as a ‘form of consciousness’ insofar as Byron’s characterization [a] defines it. Man is an "entity with which… consciousness is identified in a particular case." However, before proceeding, some points must be clarified which are pertinent to the overall discussion. As pointed out already, man’s consciousness has a specific nature, a specific identity. This is the case with all instances of consciousness, be it man or any animal below him on the tree of life. Related to this is the fact that consciousness as essentially a faculty of awareness does not exist on its own outside of existence, or, for that matter, outside the universe (after all, there is no such place as ‘outside the universe’).

For three primary reasons, consciousness presupposes existence:

For each of these indisputable reasons, consciousness explicitly presupposes existence. The nature of consciousness is not to create existence, as the religionists would have it, but to perceive that which already exists. No example of consciousness that can be found in reality has ever demonstrated the ability to create existence. That is not simply because it has never been observed, but because such a task is contrary to the nature of consciousness.

[4] The 'Disembodied, Non-Particularized Consciousness': In his review of possible forms of consciousness, Mr. Byron admits, or perhaps considers worthy of admitting, the notion of a 'disembodied, non-particularized consciousness', which he does not define. What does Mr. Byron mean by this notion? Many have heard of a 'disembodied consciousness' - the notion of consciousness removed from a physical organism, however, it is unclear how any such notion can be admitted under any heading other than fiction. Just what Mr. Byron means by 'non-particularized consciousness' - whether he thinks this is possible regardless of its alleged disembodiment is not known - is not specified. However, the coupling of this term with the notion of a disembodied consciousness does nothing to relieve it of reasonable suspicion.

In light of the fact that Mr. Byron - a confessed religionist - admits arbitrary notions such as 'disembodied consciousness' (non-particularized or not) into the realm of possibility serves as a disclaimer on his intellectual integrity. However, in order to be consistent with the primacy of consciousness premise upon which Christianity stands, it would be surprising if Mr. Byron did not introduce these contrived notions of consciousness in his discussion of the subject. In fact, it is this 'model', as Byron terms it, or some variation akin to it, that eventually must be asserted by the theist when it comes to articulating his primary claims.

But the problems for someone like Mr. Byron, who may very well affirm 'models' of consciousness said to be 'disembodied' and 'non-particularized', are just beginning, once such arbitrary notions are admitted into the realm of knowledge. For a concept to be legitimate - i.e., objectively formed and integrated with other legitimate concepts, beginning with axiomatic concepts - it must either have referents directly perceivable in reality, or subsume concepts so referent in the process of forming objective abstractions. How does the notion of a 'disembodied, non-particularized consciousness' fit within an objective view of concepts? What are its referents? How is a notion such as this distinguished from fictions and falsehoods? Mr. Byron makes no justification for the admission of this notion into the realm of knowledge, but introduces it anyhow.

Ironically, it is the introduction of such notions that gives the theist ready access to his god-belief claims. An instance of a 'disembodied consciousness' is a notion postulated directly under the influence of Christianity - the notion of man's consciousness, referred to as soul or spirit, surviving the death of his organism. Where does this 'disembodied consciousness' go? It joins other 'disembodied consciousnesses' that gather under the guiding hand of a universe-ruling consciousness - a 'mega-consciousness'. The Christian calls this ruling consciousness God.

Yet, since these 'disembodied consciousnesses' are removed from their fleshly hosts, they are unburdened by the laws of nature. Quite simply, they can have any identity that the believer wants to give them. Since they are not visible (one does not see consciousness as one sees an apple or a tree), they are free of sensory detection, and therefore can reside anywhere and everywhere at will, even right under one's very nose. They can even have strange or extraordinary powers, and from this fabrication comes the grandest fabrication of them all: the 'creator-consciousness' - a supernatural consciousness in which all existence finds its source. Hence, the primacy of the unseen over the seen, of consciousness over existence.

[5] The Construal of Subjectivism: Mr. Byron summarizes the point of my challenge now by linking his prior assertions about consciousness to the notion that a form of consciousness so defined should be posited as a source of existence. That such a view of reality constitutes metaphysical subjectivism does not occur to Mr. Byron at this point, nor does it occur to him at any point in his proceeding statements. However, this is precisely what he is describing, frozen abstractions about the nature of consciousness aside. In general, Mr. Byron's assessment in this sentence is basically correct: the theist posits a form of consciousness (Mr. Byron has clued us in on this so far, as a 'model' of 'disembodied, non-particularized intentionality'), in which existence must be construed as finding its source. I refer the reader to any teleological ('design') or cosmological ('first cause') arguments for the existence of a god as exhibits of this construal.

One point that Mr. Byron may have overlooked here, in assessing my challenge to the theist, is that his challenge is to demonstrate the possibility that existence finds its source in a form of consciousness. Any argument asserted to support god-belief claims in and of themselves provide all the construal one needs in this regard. However, no theist throughout all history has been able to demonstrate this claim. On this evasion, both Messrs. Choi and Byron are on common ground.

Incidentally, Mr. Byron calls my statement a question, while there are no interrogatives whatsoever in any portion of it. It should be properly called an assertion challenging TAG for its unstated presumption of a subjectivist view of reality. Again, metaphysical subjectivism here is defined as the view that existence finds its source in a form of consciousness.

[6] Restatement and Equivocation: In the first sentence of his second paragraph, Mr. Byron attempts to summarize the problem outlined in the original excerpt from my post to HOWARD8984. However, this is where the equivocation Mr. Byron was setting up in his first paragraph (above) is coming to his aid. Again, as shown in my analysis above, the essential of consciousness is not, as Mr. Byron would have it, 'intentionality', but awareness. Yet, Mr. Byron insists on this 'intuitive understanding', as he calls it. As for his summary itself is concerned, as contained in this single-sentence restatement of my primary point, it is fine. It is the equivocation that is problematic, for consciousness "conceived as broadly as possible" would probably not entail volitional capacity to any significant degree, if at all.

Also, as pointed out above, Mr. Byron may not have read my excerpt very carefully, for there are no questions asked in any portion of my statement. My statement merely pointed out the fact that TAG rests on the presumption that existence can find its source in a form of consciousness, and that for TAG to be successful, the apologist is going to have to demonstrate this alleged possibility. If you recall, Mr. Choi saw it fit to accept this possibility without any attempt to demonstrate its supposed 'truth'. Perhaps Mr. Choi understands why acceptance of this presumption is necessary to the success of TAG. But it should be noted that Mr. Byron's use of 'questioner' is off target and benignly suspicious, for he may have chosen to use this term in order to undermine the intellectual confidence of my statement, which so far remains intact.

[7] Identification of the Problem: In these two sentences, Byron attempts to isolate the central problem presented by my objection to TAG, and does so quite successfully. Although transcendental apologists most likely have not isolated and identified the fallacy of the stolen concept (most likely due to the fact that religious philosophies abnegate the fact that knowledge is hierarchical in nature), it is gratifying to see Mr. Byron's keen insight at work here on such a fundamental matter. What Mr. Byron did not understand is that metaphysical subjectivism - the view that existence finds its source in a form of consciousness - is presumed by TAG, or any other argument posited in establishing the existence of a god. His failure to recognize this fact is part of what is responsible for the reversal he commits, identified in the following analysis.

True, Mr. Byron was not a participant in the prior dialogues between myself and HOWARD8984 (who by now should be more than painfully familiar with the course of my argument). Consequently, Mr. Byron may arguably be "seeing darkly" - to cite a metaphor - as if through a tinted glass, a glass obscured by HOWARD8984's selective excerpting. Regardless, however, what was imported from my original post should have been clear enough for Mr. Byron, for indeed he was able to gather this crucial issue from it.

However, what should be noted here are two primary points:

1. Mr. Byron senses the stolen concept of positing consciousness prior to existence and correctly objects to it, and
2. Mr. Byron falsely attributes this fallacy as belonging to a critic of TAG.

Regarding this first point, it should be pointed out with extreme emphasis that Mr. Byron's reaction to my contention with TAG differs significantly from Mr. Choi's reaction, who contrary to Mr. Byron saw no problem at all in accepting as possible the notion that existence finds its source in a form of consciousness (even though he never attempted to demonstrate it as was challenged in my excerpt). However, these two thinkers ostensibly represent the same system of philosophy, yet on the most fundamental issue in all philosophy - the issue of metaphysical primacy, we encounter this enormous division between their reactions!

So to illustrate their positions on the notion that existence finds its source in a form of consciousness, observe the following:

Mr. Byron wins. Mr. Choi should reexamine the issue. But Mr. Byron needs to identify which worldview stands on this impropriety. It is not Objectivism: Objectivism posits no such thing as a universe-creating/universe-ruling consciousness, or in any way posits a primacy of consciousness view of reality. Christianity, however, does. And herein lies the fundamental, root-level breach of reality that apologetic arguments such as "TAG" attempt to disguise: The primacy of consciousness premise.

In spite of all their posturing on supposedly foundational matters, the presuppositionalist's TAG itself presupposes unwittingly a false view of reality - specifically metaphysical subjectivism, which is defined as the view that existence finds its source in a form of consciousness. Nothing can be more fundamental than the fact of existence; not even "nothingness." However, in terms of essentials, TAG presumes the position that existence does not hold metaphysical primacy, but that consciousness holds primacy over existence, that only a form of consciousness can explain existence. TAG does not illuminate this fundamental issue - the most basic of all issues in philosophy. In fact, if anything, TAG completely obscures and evades the matter altogether, not only by presuming a stolen concept in determining its fundamental issue, but also by treating derivative concepts and abstractions as primaries (such as 'logic', 'morality', 'uniformity', 'category', etc.) in its developmental sub-arguments.

Ironically, in spite of all their repetitious sermonizing about 'ultimate presuppositions', there is amazing resistance among presuppositionalists to offer a coherent statement of their often-touted omnipotent axiom entailing the foundation of their system. Objectivism on the other hand would not be caught dead without explicit identification of this essential cornerstone, the axiom "Existence exists".

However, no matter how the presuppositionalist would like to phrase his axioms, he still presupposes something prior to the consciousness he asserts as his irreducible primary, something yet more fundamental than his "ruling being": Existence.

Religionists believe they have the perfect answers for such needless questions as:

It is critical to understand why two leading apologists stemming from the same vein of religious thought would be so divided on the issue of metaphysical primacy as Messrs. Choi and Byron are at this point. It is quite possible that neither Mr. Choi nor Mr. Byron recognize the essential distinctions between their two responses. However, these distinctions cannot be buried beneath the muck of cheap pedantry, yawn-inducing exegetical programs, or the contorted rationalizations of philosophical confusion that riddle reformed theology. These distinctions must be identified explicitly, as I have done above, and the reason for evading them must be exposed as well.

The crucial deficiency at the heart of this matter is the failure to identify issues of primacy in terms of essentials. Let us note Ayn Rand's position on the issue of essentials:

With these points in mind, applied to the context of the Byron-Choi dilemma, it is important to understand which essentials have been confused and obscured, thus perpetuating their fundamental division from being readily detected. The fundamental issue regards existence and consciousness. These two fundamental axiomatic concepts must be distinguished in terms of their essentials.

Existence, being the widest of all concepts, pertains to any thing that exists, or is said to exist. Which includes: every entity, characteristic, attribute, quality, etc.

Consciousness is the faculty of awareness - and leads to the question: Awareness of what? Consciousness is consciousness of existence, and its essential characteristic is this fact of awareness (as opposed to contrived 'models' which assert as essential such notions as 'intentionality' or 'creative power'; intentionality presupposes awareness as well as purpose, and as such cannot be a primary essential to consciousness).

Now that these two facts are now seen in terms of their proper essentials, their proper relationship can now be identified. Since existence cannot be explained by 'something prior' to it (i.e., without assuming it), we must grant to existence metaphysical primacy. The axiom that represents this recognition, is: Existence exists.

As I point out, in man's search to identify objective reality, the fundamental issue regards consciousness and existence, but not consciousness versus existence. However, when it comes to matters of identifying metaphysical primacy, the potential for conflict indeed arises if care is not taken to identify essentials and integrate them properly. If consciousness is asserted as prior to existence (as in the case of the religious view positing a universe-creating super-consciousness), then indeed the error Mr. Byron points out has been committed. If the goal of such a measure (positing an existence-creating consciousness, or 'god') is to explain existence, it fails utterly, for such a measure presumes existence already and therefore fails to 'explain' the existence of the god in the first place. In short, the urgency to explain existence per se is left unsatisfied, and the assertion of a kind of 'source consciousness' (i.e., 'god') is clearly moot. God, were he to exist, would have no purpose to pursue in his career.

Mr. Byron says that it is I who have my priorities reversed, when in fact it is the religionist who has his priorities reversed. As an Objectivist, my 'priorities' are existence, then consciousness, insofar as the two are related to each other hierarchically (which is always the case). Hence, the primacy of existence. The religionist, however, argues in essence that existence finds its source in a universe-creating, universe-governing consciousness, a god. So Mr. Byron's haste to discredit an attempt to challenge TAG fails, for he misidentifies which worldview commits this fundamental reversal of priorities he points out.

And here is where the fundamental enmity is found, in the primacy of existence versus the primacy of consciousness, first identified by Ayn Rand (see her article "The Metaphysically Given Versus the Man-Made" in her book Philosophy: Who Needs It [Signet, 1982]). It is this fundamental tension that has riddled all of philosophy since man was first able to think. Virtually all philosophies prior to Rand's Objectivism were either squarely pinned on the primacy of consciousness premise, or, in the case of some secular philosophies, compromised to varying degrees by the influence of the primacy of consciousness premise, which has always been popularly accepted. Christianity, perhaps more than any other worldview available to man, represents the most serious and consistent application of the primacy of consciousness view of reality man has known.

Why would Mr. Byron not see this blatant obvious fact? Certainly Mr. Byron, unlike Mr. Choi, has shown more keenness of insight by isolating the nature of the problem pointed out in my challenge. However, apparently unlike Mr. Choi, Mr. Byron does not see why TAG must presume this error in order to be successful. Together, in what I consider to be an event of intellectual irony of historic magnitude, both Messrs. Choi and Byron, in their attempts to refute my challenge, unwittingly confirm the Argument from Existence for the non-existence of god or gods.

Moreover, Mr. Byron states that my challenge results only in "disastrous results for [my] position and the reputation of [my] thinking." It is understandable how Mr. Byron arrives at this conclusion in light of his failure to recognize the true culprit of the grievous philosophical error he's just identified. But now that we know who the real culprit asserting the primacy of consciousness view of reality is, the actual question becomes: What can be done to rescue Mr. Byron's position and the "reputation of his thinking"?

Answer: Nothing at all.

[9] Byron's Ironic Allusion: The allusion here to Descartes is deliciously ironic. Contrary to popular thinking, Rene Descartes had 'Descartes before the horse' as well! In his famous line from his Discourse on Method, Descartes immortalized the misguided maxim, "I think, therefore I am." Descartes was trying to prove the fact that he existed, which is presupposed by any proof he attempted, regardless of the nature of its conclusion. Such a maxim implies that existence follows from (or as a result of) thought, which entails a primacy of consciousness view of reality. What Descartes probably should have written was, "I think, therefore I know that I am." There is a crucial difference.

[A] It is uncertain why HOWARD8984 would introduce the excerpt from my post using such words. He received my post on March 17, 1999, the day before he shared it here with the Van Til discussion group. To say the least, it is difficult how a mere 24 hours at best could constitute "not too long ago." It is apparent from such curiosities as these that HOWARD8984 preferred to conceal his involvement in an atheist debate forum from his Van Tilian buddies. [Back]

At least with the "axioms" using the term "consciousness", they do have one thing going for them that these "axioms" do not: the term "consciousness" refers to actual entities and, for man (that is, after all, who needs axioms to begin with) is a very wide concept, and therefore broadly applicable (indeed, universally applicable in the context of man identifying reality). However, consciousness is far from being the widest concept, for consciousness, as pointed out above, is not universally applicable to all existents. For more discussion on errors at the axiomatic level of cognition, see my article on false primacies. [Back]

[D] The informal fallacy of complex question is explained here. The question "Why does something exist rather than nothing?" commits a complex question fallacy because it presumes an affirmative answer to a question that is usually not asked. That question would be: Does existence exist to suit a purpose? When its hidden presumptions are thus broken down, it is easy to spot the presumptive error committed by such questions. Existence itself cannot exist in order to serve some kind of purpose or satisfy some kind of prior criterion, since 'purpose' and 'prior criterion' each presuppose existence already, thus rendering such questions into nonsense. [Back]

[E] Atlas Shrugged, pg. 973. [Back]

 Copyright © by Anton Thorn, 1999. All rights reserved.

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