To Thorn's Counter
Review and Commentary by Anton Thorn
"Angels rush in where tutored atheists know to watch their step."
Below I present Christian apologist Sean Choi's attempted dismissal of my challenge of TAG, which HOWARD8984 was kind enough to excerpt and drag over to the Van Til discussion group on my unwitting behalf. Mr. Choi's reaction is quite thin on intellectual effort and quite grand on triumphant pretense. Mr. Choi's response basically consists of three noteworthy points:
These three points are framed by Mr. Choi's confessed lack of comprehension of the challenge put forth to him as well as an ad hominem attack against the individual posing the challenge, due in large part to his acknowledged lack of comprehension, and also in part to his determination to guard his god-belief claims from rational counter. In the elaboration below, I point out each of Mr. Choi's failings. In addition to this, I point out why Mr. Choi's acceptance of metaphysical subjectivism is consistent with his position as a theist.
HOWARD8984 asked
:I was given this response from an unbeliever in a debate not too long ago. How would a VanTilian respond to this? I can't quite understand what he is asking myself.
Sean Choi wrote:
To tell you the truth, I don't really quite understand it myself. :) But the atheist in question said:
Note here that Mr. Choi readily announces that he does not "quite understand" my challenge, but proceeds to pass an assessment anyway. This haste to run in when not completely prepared may have been a big mistake for Mr. Choi, but unfortunately for his intellectual reputation, it shall not go down as his biggest mistake. Let us continue with the analysis to see why.
Excerpt from Thorn's Challenge:
[B]efore you can even rationally consider TAG, you MUST demonstrate the POSSIBILITY that existence finds its source in a form of consciousness*, and this neither you nor any other apologist has accomplished.
Sean Choi responded:
Merely the *possibility*? Well, if that is all that's needed, then I think we can meet that burden. Since I see no reason to believe that it is *impossible* that existence ultimately is grounded in some form of mind, it follows that it is possible [1]. If he want to counter this, then he has to give us a demonstration that necessarily, all existence is physical [2].
[1] Choi's Commitment to Metaphysical Subjectivism: Mr. Choi remarks that he can "meet [the] burden" of demonstrating the possibility that existence finds its source in a form of consciousness, but makes no such attempt whatsoever. We know that Mr. Choi, as a religionist, must accept this alleged possibility, that is not the challenge. The assertion of TAG presumes this acceptance necessarily. Mr. Choi does demonstrate that he understands the issue in question, for he restates the problem in his own terms, saying that he finds "no reason to believe that it is *impossible* that existence is grounded in some form of mind" [emphasis A. Thorn]. It is interesting to note that Mr. Choi disagrees with Mr. Byron on this point, for in his response Mr. Byron recognized the stolen concept once the issue was put into terms of essentials (click here for David Byron's response).
What is important to take note of here is two-fold:
Why is Mr. Choi willing to accept this alleged possibility without demonstrating how it may be possible? How could one even argue - basing his arguments on an appeal to reality - to the effect that any instance of existence could find its source in a form of consciousness? What would a demonstration of such an alleged possibility entail? Mr. Choi is of no assistance on this point, for he completely fails even to acknowledge that a demonstration of such a claim is in order at this point, but apparently feels justified in asserting this 'possibility' in spite of this default.
The only justification Mr. Choi offers for accepting this alleged possibility is by dismissing the *impossibility* of the opposite - a common practice among the transcendental crowd when it is apologetically expedient. Rather than support the assertion that a claim may be possible with evidence and sound reasoning, the apologist takes the 'backdoor' approach, implying that one must *prove* the impossibility of a particular condition before that condition can be justifiably be rejected as qualifying as a possibility. No need to offer evidence or rational support of any kind in favor of the asserted possibility; such truth status is assumed and asserted as a primary [A]. How does Mr. Choi come to the conclusion that it is *not impossible* that existence finds its source in a form of consciousness? Mr. Choi does not bother to say. Is he not aware of Objectivist arguments that establish this impossibility? Mr. Byron, who himself is a religionist in the same vein as Mr. Choi, recognized the stolen concept (see David Byron's Response); how is it that Mr. Choi did not?
As with any faith claim, there is always a point at which the defender of such a claim allows the arbitrary into the realm of knowledge. For Mr. Choi, this point is the acceptance of the possibility of existence finding its source in a form of consciousness. Mr. Choi does not once question this notion, but adheres to it like jelly to a donut. What Mr. Choi most likely realizes, as many religionists suspect when faced with their arbitrary claims reduced to their essential terms, is that, should the notion that existence finds its source in a form of consciousness be contested, his entire god-belief system is found in perilous jeopardy. But the fact that Mr. Choi does not even attempt a demonstration of the alleged possibility he himself endorses, speaks louder than words can say.
Mr. Choi's commitment to metaphysical subjectivism is further indicated by the very words in which he chooses to deliver his conclusion. Mr. Choi states, "Since I see no reason to believe…" Is what Mr. Choi is really saying that the possibility of existence being "grounded in some form of mind" follows from his seeing "no reason to believe that it is *impossible*…"? These are his words, after all. Is this not paramount to saying, "I want it to be so, that existence finds its source in a form of consciousness"? Perhaps Mr. Choi should have phrased his words a bit differently, such as, "Because I see no reason why it is impossible, I see no reason not to accept the notion that it is possible…" Using this language would isolate the nature of the claim to his acceptance of it, rather than implying that its truth status follows either from his ignorance or from his whim. [B]
[2] Equivocation, Evasion and Shift of Burden: Ironically, while Mr. Choi expressly states that he can meet the burden of demonstrating this burden, even though he does not do so, he then attempts to shift the burden of substantiation to the challenger. Why should he do this if his (non-appearing) demonstration is sufficient? Is Mr. Choi insecure in his conclusions thus far?
Mr. Choi now makes a move that is clearly dubious for his case, when he arbitrarily attempts to readjust the conditions of reality to suit his desired ends. Mr. Choi implies that the only possible counter to his acceptance of the notion that existence finds its source in a form of consciousness must rely on some proof arguing that "all existence is physical." Mr. Choi gives no reasoning whatsoever why this must be the case, yet he asserts it anyhow. Why would it be the case that such an argument could achieve the only counter to his subjectivism? Remember that metaphysical subjectivism is the view that existence finds its source in a form of consciousness (see note [B] of my commentary to Mr. Byron's statement for a substantiation of this definition). Mr. Choi refrains from explaining himself and appears to have caught himself in the throes of a non sequitur resulting from his attempt to spotlight away from his position (red herring).
In contrast to Mr. Choi, who has equivocated his terms ('existence' now becomes 'physical') in order to evade the fundamental issue here (the fallacy of the stolen concept), Mr. Byron recognizes the stolen concept and objects to it. So Mr. Choi's hopeful defense here is disabled by his own apologetic compatriot (see my analysis of David Byron's response).
Many religionists seem to conduct themselves with the attitude that, if only they could do away with "physical reality", all their apologetic arguments would proceed so much smoother. Likewise, Mr. Choi seems to be of the opinion that the atheist would be better off if everything could be shown to be physical. If, perhaps, he were dealing with a Hobbesian mechanist or a dialectical materialist, his subterfuge here might go unchecked, perhaps even indulged. But the fact is, he is dealing with a representative of Objectivism, a philosophy he most likely knows very little about, if at all anything.
Whether or not the entirety of existence is physical or non-physical, is a moot issue here. In matters of metaphysical primacy, which is central to any debate on god-belief (for the Objectivist, that is), it is the fact of existence - the fact that existence exists - that is of crucial concern, not necessarily the substance of existence. While it is true that the two cannot be separated, the point here is one of emphasis, context and essential characteristic. The essential characteristic of all existence is not whether or not it is physical, but that it exists. For the Objectivist, this fact carries metaphysical primacy: Existence exists. And it is in context of the fact of existence that metaphysical primacy is to be assessed, not the physical nature of its substance per se.
However, regardless of such emphasis, the theist conducting himself with the attitude that the non-theist bears an imaginary onus to prove the physical exclusivity of all existence in order to counter the theist's metaphysical subjectivism, is missing his own point entirely. The theist wants to posit a form of consciousness as the source of all existence. Mr. Choi does not contest this view; in fact, he affirms it by asserting its possibility (without justification) and asserting that any counter to this position must consist of a demonstration that all existence is exclusively physical (again, without justification). However, even if both these positions were justifiable (which they are not), Mr. Choi and other theists face an insurmountable problem when faced with the reality of physicality, even if all physicality consisted of a single, tiny pebble at most. For the theist would have to demonstrate how the physical has its source in the non-physical, which experiment would be quite impressive indeed, were he able to pull it off. Failing any such demonstration, the theist's assertions that consciousness is the source of physicality, is unjustified.
Furthermore, while Mr. Choi makes no attempt whatsoever to offer a demonstration of what he feels justified in asserting as a possibility (metaphysical subjectivism), as challenged in my original statement, Mr. Choi now turns to claim that the non-theist bears an onus of demonstration! So quite unashamedly, Mr. Choi requires the non-theist to meet a burden far beyond any he is willing to make, in order to substantiate his assertions. In such a way, Mr. Choi "presupposes" his way to yet another self-declared victory. The pursuit of the unearned is never quenched.
Continuing the excerpt from Thorn's Challenge:
Then and only then will consideration of TAG even be justified, for its aim is to put the face on the consciousness that the theist attempts to posit prior to existence (i.e., a 'personal God' - whatever that means...). Without demonstrating this possibility, TAG is completely impotent.
Sean Choi closes:
This guy lost me here. I think he might be educated beyond his intelligence. ;)
Regards,
Sean Choi
Confusion and Ad Hominem: Rather than attempt to comprehend this portion of my statement, or leave his response to another time when he does comprehend it, Mr. Choi instead commits an unwarranted ad hominem in order to discredit the initiator of the challenge, namely me, Anton Thorn. This ad hominem attack is completely unjustified, and suggests two things:
Presuppositionalists often posture themselves as constantly being on the guard for the contamination of informal fallacy. However, it is remarkable how often many of them actually resort - often unashamedly in the open, as Mr. Choi does here - to their commission. Before he ever received this challenge, delivered from my hand by HOWARD8984, Mr. Choi had never had any contact with me, Anton Thorn, whatsoever. He neither knew my name, nor my position on any issue; in sum, Mr. Choi did not even know I exist. Why then, one must ask, does he so rashly indulge in the cheap recourse of a personal attack, when in fact Mr. Choi could not know a damn thing about my educational level or my intellectual ability? What's ironic here is the fact that Mr. Choi himself readily admits twice (!) in his response to my challenge his inability to comprehend it fully. Does Mr. Choi resort to blaming others for his lack of understanding as a custom, or is this a one-time transgression?
It should be added to this that, at no time in the Van Til discussion group, did any other Van Til devotee even once call Mr. Choi on this point, tacitly handing him the moral blank check he had expected in return for the innumerable rationalizations he's offered them in his fallacy-laden arguments. So much for vigilance against fallacy…
Conclusion
:Mr. Choi's fallacy count is off the board. Most importantly, Mr. Choi endorses the stolen concept by accepting the primacy of consciousness premise. Without offering any justification whatsoever, Mr. Choi allows an arbitrary notion into the realm of the possible, even though no evidence will support this, while Mr. Byron - himself a religionist of the same cloak - points out the error in accepting this notion. Mr. Choi also ignores the challenge put forth to him: the challenge to demonstrate the possibility that existence finds its source in a form of consciousness. Even if Mr. Choi were to offer such a demonstration - an event for which he could likely charge spectators an impressive admission fee - he would then have to argue for the certainty that existence finds its source in "some form of mind" - a completely different argument altogether.
Mr. Choi also errs in considering that the non-theist, in order to counter the alleged possibility Mr. Choi endorses but does not justify, would have to demonstrate (Mr. Choi's very word!) that "all existence is physical." Mr. Choi does not explain the relevance of this asserted burden, he merely asserts it without explanation in an attempt to drag the focus of his argument away from his own premises.
Then, after admitting for a second time that he has difficulty understanding the challenge I have put forth, Mr. Choi attacks the challenger, a sign of intellectual defeat. Rather than making an attempt to understand the meaning of the second part to my challenge, or just refrain from commenting altogether until a clearer grasp of it has been acquired, Mr. Choi launches himself rashly into condescension against someone he has never met. Could it be that his assessment of the person challenging TAG is "presupposed"? And, if so, by what justification? Mr. Choi does not say.
But there is an even larger issue that must be pointed out here. Since Mr. Choi accepts the assertion that existence finds its source in a form of consciousness, he unwittingly confirms the relevance of the Argument from Existence. The point of the Argument from Existence is that god-belief presupposes metaphysical subjectivism - the view that existence follows from consciousness. This view of reality arises from the (usually unrecognized) acceptance of a stolen concept fallacy. The Argument from Existence exposes this fallacy and corrects it.
The most fundamental issue in all philosophy, Ayn Rand pointed out, is the issue of metaphysical primacy
[C]. ON this issue, there are two fundamental alternatives: the primacy of existence versus the primacy of consciousness. The primacy of existence premise is the recognition that existence exists, and that existence exists independent of consciousness; that whatever exists, it exists regardless of the fact whether some consciousness perceives it or not. On the other hand, the primacy of consciousness premise is the presumption that consciousness holds metaphysical primacy over existence, that somehow existence finds its source in a form of consciousness and that existence is regulated and sustained by, and completely dependent upon consciousness - whether earthly or non-earthly, that reality (the realm of existence) is a derivative rather than a primary, whose ultimate origin is "some form of mind."Clearly Mr. Choi endorses the primacy of consciousness premise and therefore is an advocate of metaphysical subjectivism. Once this fundamental presumption has been identified by the Argument from Existence, the fundamental flaw of such a view becomes clearly evident. (Even Mr. Byron recognizes it!)
Clearly, Mr. Choi has his work cut out for him if he wants his god-belief claims to withstand the tests of reason. I wish him "luck," because that's the best support he can hope for at this point.
Anton Thorn
___________________________
Notes:
[A] There is a common error in many philosophical systems that allows the treatment of virtually any truth claims as a possibility, regardless of the merits of its proposition(s). One way to determine if a claim in question is possible, argue many systems, is to determine whether or not one can imagine the conditions of the claim; if the conclusion of the claim is imaginable, then, it is assumed, the claim qualifies as possible. This is a blatant equivocation; simply because something is imaginable does not mean it is possible. I can imagine dogs that dispute the virtues of different translations of Homer, but it does not follow that such assertions are indeed possible. However, if the above principle is valid, then one would have to conclude that such ideas are possible.
This is the result of divorcing philosophy - specifically epistemology - from the constraints of reality. A is A; an entity can only act according to its nature. The Law of Identity cannot be contradicted, no matter how many prayers the religious offer up. Because of this fact, one cannot posit as 'possible' a condition that directly violates the nature of the entities in question. While one may imagine dogs gather to discuss Hegel, such as in a cartoon or fable, actually allowing such a notion into the realm of possibilities is absurd and intellectually contentless. The equation of the concept 'imaginable' with the concept 'possible' is a blatant equivocation of two conceptually distinct abstractions. To accept this equivocation is to say, "To hell with reality, whatever I imagine to be real, is possible, and if it is possible, then it must be necessary." This kind of thinking is the result of the primacy of consciousness premise infecting epistemology.
Dr. Leonard Peikoff writes:
For an idea to qualify as "possible," there must be a certain amount of evidence that actually supports it. If there is no such evidence, the idea falls under a different concept: not "possible," but "arbitrary."
"Possible" (and its synonyms), like any legitimate term, denotes an objective concept; it does not offer emotionalists an epistemological blank check. To say "maybe" in a cognitive context is to make a definite claim - it is to assert an ideas positive relationship to the evidential continuum - and, like any other cognitive claim, this requires demonstration. Gremlins and their ilk may not be described as "possible." [Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand, pg. 176.]
Compare Dr. Peikoff's statement with the context at issue with Mr. Choi's assertion about the "possibility" of existence finding its source in a form of consciousness. As Dr. Peikoff states, some evidence must be brought forth in support of an idea to accept it as "possible," and only then if it contradicts no other known facts. What evidence does Mr. Choi offer? He offers none. Perhaps this is the "epistemological blank check" that Dr. Peikoff warns about?
[Back][B] However, it is crucially important to point out a consistency here in Mr. Choi's thinking, which is noteworthy. If Mr. Choi accepts the notion that existence finds its source in a form of consciousness (metaphysical subjectivism), which he states he does, then it follows that he would accept the notion that truth must also be grounded "in some form of mind" (epistemological subjectivism). This is why it is so dangerous for individuals to accept the primacy of consciousness premise, for basing one's philosophical assessment of reality on a hopeless presumptive error can only lead to further errors - indeed catastrophic errors - further down the line when informing consequent doctrines of the resulting philosophic system. This is because, as Ayn Rand pointed out, knowledge is hierarchical by nature (which precludes such notions as 'omniscience', 'revelation' and 'faith'). New knowledge always follows from previously established knowledge, not the other way around. Epistemological subjectivism is the attempt to claim knowledge content without rational methods or justification. The only verbalized justification one will likely get when inquiring into the 'reasoning' behind knowledge so asserted, is usually something like "God said it," or "I just know" (i.e., a claim to faith, intuition, revelation or some kind of 'direct knowledge').
[Back][C] See Rand's essay, "The Metaphysically Given versus the Man-Made," Philosophy: Who Needs It, pp. 23-34. Also see the first chapter, "Reality," in Dr. Leonard Peikoff's book, Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand, for more details on the issue of metaphysical primacy.
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