Is Christian Morality Objective?

Part I: Introductory Treatise on Morality

Christian apologists since the Enlightenment have inflated their inventories of unusual and untenable claims about their religious ideals in order to protect them from critical scrutiny. One of the most recklessly untenable claims which finds its supporters among a broad spectrum of modern Christian apologetics, is the claim that Christian morality in particular is objective and that no moral system which denies the existence or sovereignty of Christian theism can be objective.

As one who has a deep familiarity with the Christian moral code and the moral code of the philosophy of Objectivism which rejects all mysticism (including Christian theism), I wonder how today's apologists can defend the view that Christian morality is objective when its foundations as given particularly in the New Testament run contrary to objective morality.

In this series I will examine the code of Christian morality as given in the New Testament by the religion's founders and submit its principles to the question of whether or not they can be said to be objective or not.

Before doing so, it is important to clarify those working definitions which will be assumed in my assessment of Christian moral principles. In this paper, the first installment in my indictment of the Christian morality, I will clarify what I mean by objective morality from the standpoint of Rational Philosophy, which is Objectivism. This clarification is by no means offered as a complete explication on the objective moral system, but rather only an introduction to some of the chief issues concerned, as well as to the contrast between the Christian morality and the objective morality.

Man requires morality, not because somebody (either a priest or a deity) says he needs it, but because he faces a fundamental alternative: existence or non-existence. Since man continually faces the possibility of his own death, his life requires that he act, and this means he needs values. Why should he act? Because he will die if he does not. What guides his choices and actions? A code of values, i.e., morality. This implies necessarily that man's highest value is his own life, because it is ultimately his own life which provides the standard of his actions and for which he must act. In light of this, we recognize that objective morality is profoundly selfish in nature, since man's own life (i.e., his self) is the primary beneficiary of his own actions.

The objective theory of the good, according to Ayn Rand, is:

Thus, the objective theory of the good, since it stems from "an evaluation from the facts of reality," is rooted in the law of identity. The objective theory of the good, like knowledge, is also hierarchical in nature, since the evaluation of the facts of reality proceeds "according to a rational standard of value." The objective theory of the good identifies that standard - man's life - and therefore "that the good is an aspect of reality in relation to man." It is because of this standard and the relation of aspects of reality that we can identify that food is good for man because it is his source of nutrition, and poison is bad for him because it can kill him. The fact that food is good for man and poison is not good is not something which men invent, but discover about reality. Throughout all its application, the objective theory of the good is completely consistent to the fact that existence exists and that to exist is to have a specific identity (i.e., the law of identity).

The objective theory of the good is generally contrasted against two competing theories, which Objectivism holds to be invalid and therefore unsuitable for man. Those theories are the intrinsic and the subjective theories of the good.

The view that man has the capacity to identify reality naturally presupposes that man is capable of the certainty that his consciousness is valid and that it has a vital purpose: to enable him to live. These facts must be made explicitly clear in the development of an objective view of morality, as Rand pointed out:

The objective view of man recognizes that he is an integrated being: man is both matter and consciousness welded into one unit. This means that the idea that the dichotomizing of standards for man's body against those of his mind is invalid, just as the soul-body dichotomy is invalid. Therefore, this dichotomy is rejected in the development of the objective theory of the good with the recognition that man's existential needs are just as valid as his philosophical and psychological needs, for the same reason and for the same purpose. The soul-body dichotomy is only compatible with a view of the good which dispenses with the objective view of man.

Certainly, this view of man cannot be compatible with the objective view of reality and the epistemology of reason as pointed out above. Consequently, it also cannot be integrated with the objective theory of the good, for the same reasons. The objective theory of the good is for man, not against him. Any philosophical theory which poses as being for man but is revealed upon examination to be against him, is a fraud in pious dressing.

Man, as an integrated being, requires a morality which is geared specifically to his nature, to his needs as a rational being. This is precisely what the Objectivist ethics, as discovered and identified by Ayn Rand, provides for man. The facts of man's nature - that he continually faces the alternative of life vs. death, that he requires food, shelter, warmth, a rational means of knowledge - underscore man's unalterable need for values. As she eloquently points out,

Man's primary value is: his own life. Without it, he cannot value anything, and should he exist while pretending that some other object can replace that distinctive value (e.g., "God" or "society"), he undermines his ability to live to the degree that he is consistent to that pretense. Such a view simply ignores the fact that it is the nature of his being as such which dictates what he must value in order to make living his life possible.

The result of productive work are the values which one produces. Since values are not readily available to man in nature for man simply to consume, man has no choice about the fact that the achievement of values requires his productive effort. But this effort is not possible without at least some estimation of one's own worthiness of it. And this brings us to the cardinal virtue of pride.

Together, rationality, productiveness and pride make man's life qua man a vital possibility. But without these, man has no means of ensuring his primary value, which is his own life. With these core values, against the backdrop of a free society (i.e., a society in which coercion and the initiation of force are banned from interpersonal relationships), one has the basic equipment to lead a moral life.

The political corollary to the objective theory of the good is the recognition of man's right to exist for his own sake. Just as man requires the freedom to use his mind, he requires the freedom to act, to pursue his values, and to achieve his happiness. A society which is built on the premise that man has a duty to sacrifice himself to others is a society which condemns men to lifelong slavery. In order to guard against such unspeakable injustice, man requires a society of individual rights.

As defined here, a political doctrine defending man's rights defends man's rational self-interest in social contexts. This means that an individual's activity with others is engaged by choice, not by psychological coercion or the use of force. It is only the recognition of the principle that man has the right to exist for his own sake which will protect men against coercion and force, and which will allow an individual to pursue those values which make his life worth living.

Mystical philosophy, by contrast, cannot develop an objective doctrine of individual rights, because according to mysticism, men are duty-bound to each other's needs and desires. The collectivization of men into a herd (or flock) is the political result of the ethics of sacrifice applied to man's relationship with others. Just as some men expect others to accept their irrational and untenable assertions in the realm of knowledge, those same men will expect others to forfeit their right to property in the realm of morality. The pursuit of the unearned, which is integral to any political theory stemming from the ethics of sacrifice, is the political counterpart to mysticism in epistemology. The desire for the unearned in certainty can only lead to the desire for the unearned in values. Just as knowledge and certainty cannot be the product of one's "unaided" mind - but must be absorbed via revelations of the ruling consciousness, man's values - more specifically, the products of the producers - must be appropriated (by coercion or force) from those who produce and redistributed (by divine commandment or popular vote) to those who claim need to them. Thus, the men of ability become enslaved, either by the State, or by the Church, to those who relinquish their minds and neglect their opportunities in life to develop productive ability.

If men evade or reject the objective theory of the good, they forfeit their capacity to establish a society of freedom. Without a society of freedom, the individual has no independence from others, and thus must survive by mooching off others, or by allowing others to mooch off himself. This is a choice all men face, but which so many evade as they run to embrace the non-thought, the zero-worship and the ethical suicide of Christianity.

We have already seen good reasons to consider that Christian morality assumes the intrinsic theory of the good, as defined above. Christians themselves may object to this classification, but the facts of the matter will bear this out. As you recall, the intrinsic theory "holds that the good is inherent in certain things or actions as such, regardless of their context and consequences, regardless of any benefit or injury they may cause to the actors or subjects involved"

But the marriage between Christian morality and the intrinsic view of the good does not stop there. It is held to be intrinsically good for men to be obedient to the will of God, even if this obedience leads them to despair, depression or even death (as in the case of the model Christian himself, Jesus, in the case of his willing obedience to be crucified). While crucifixion is hardly enjoyable and as such could hardly be considered "good" for man (at least for the one being crucified!), the obedience of a commandment from God which leads to crucifixion would be considered good, since complicity with God's will is said to honor God's inherent goodness. (And honoring God's inherent goodness, we are told, is good, even if it includes your suffering and painful death.)

Since the Bible commands its believers to rely on faith, it is summarily opposed to reason and man's reliance on it. The repudiation of reason is certainly consistent with a form of morality which expects men to take the commandments of a ruling consciousness as unquestionable moral prescriptions.

Just how is happiness supposed to follow as "an automatic consequence," and exactly whose happiness is that which follows? Exactly what makes something a moral good, and to whom is it said to be good, and why, when one's own self is disqualified from being the standard of good? This is the intrinsic theory of the good in explicit terms, and it is questions such as these which its defenders resist addressing in terms of essentials. Furthermore, note that one's happiness cannot be sought for its own sake as a final goal, but must be anticipated to follow somehow (automatically?) when one is allegedly "pursuing the moral good." This is precisely how "the good" and the objective theory of value are divorced from one another in religious moral teaching.

This is irrescindably evident in statements such as the "good is to be sought for its own sake chiefly," which we saw above. For in such declarations it is irrevocably implied that that which is called "good" is considered "good" regardless of its value to man, for it is "good" just because. Man's needs for living his life are thus ultimately irrelevant to the good, particularly if this "good" is said to be "good" with or without man's benefiting from his pursuit of it. This default is only sealed when one attempts to argue that man benefits automatically, through some means, while these means are left ambiguous and unidentified.

Does this sound like a morality fit for man's life? Indeed it is not!

The proper resolution to these unnecessary and destructive problems is to root the foundations of one's philosophy in objectivity and to recognize that man is not guilty by virtue of his existence. If existence exists independent of consciousness, as we discover when we look at reality and see that it does not obey our whims, and if we recognize that man is not guilty simply by virtue of his existence qua man, as Christianity essentially holds, then we should see that man is indeed capable of living a happy life.

Many who would contend that selfishness is evil while implicitly or explicitly treating happiness as a value (which in such a case 'happiness' would now be a stolen concept), will attempt to dichotomize man's pursuit of his own life in distinction to his pursuit of happiness. This can only result in causing unnecessary psychological discord and an inconsistent approach to values in general, which can only incubate guilt in believers. Man's pursuit of life and his pursuit of happiness are not to be dichotomized. But man's life and his happiness are not opposite goals, as Ayn Rand explains:

It is this state of achievement - that is, the success of achieving one's own values, which those who condemn man's reason, selfishness and pride intend to destroy in men when they expect him to accept the claim that the good is beyond the grave; that the good is divorced from man's life needs and values; that the good must be distinguished from that which is practical as opposed to that which is "spiritual"; that the good is something which cannot be earned, something which one cannot achieve through his own rationally productive effort, but something that men should instead passively wait for in the self-deceiving pretense of the hope for a supernatural form of consciousness to distribute it among men without concern for merit (cf. "divine grace"); that the good is ultimately beyond "this reality" and attainable only by the sacrifice of one's happiness in "this life." Instead of reasons why men have the right to pursue their own happiness, as the Declaration of Independence acknowledges, Christian morality and similar mystical constructs feed men excuses to evade the moral responsibility of living in the guise of answering to a "higher power" which they cannot comprehend or even prove exists. The cost is man's life and happiness.

Some may choose to defend their condemnation of man's selfishness by claiming that a selfish person necessarily, by definition, is one who feeds off others, as if parasitically sapping their life worth dry. But this view neglects the fact that the ethics of sacrifice always breeds two kinds of persons: those who sacrifice their values to others, and those who collect on those sacrifices. Can one expect that men should accept as a duty the commandment that they should sacrifice their values to others and there not be someone ready to collect those sacrifices? The affirmation of the ethics of sacrifice conjoined with the condemnation of those who subsist on the sacrifices of others ignores the fact that the collectors of sacrifice need those who are willing to sacrifice their values as much as those who sacrifice their values need someone ready to collect them. Those who sacrifice their values do so primarily for the momentary relief from the chronic guilt they have accepted as a primary condition of living. Thus, it is not merely the exchange of sacrifices which takes place in this neurotic dialogue, but the reinforcement of the psychological sanctions motivating such forfeiture of value.

The answer of course is for us to discover the objective theory of the good and for the individual to declare his independence from others and for him to produce his own values - not at the expense of others, but at his own expense, and not to allow others to mooch off him in their hopes that he, as a producer, will sacrifice his product (i.e., his values) to them at his own expense. Those who allow others to mooch off themselves naturally will expect to mooch off others as well. This breeds unnecessary dependence on others, which can only work against man's life because it deceives men into thinking they can exist by evading the responsibility of living. The objective theory of the good not only stresses the value of the individual's independence from others, it is the only moral doctrine which makes it possible.

And here we come full circle, from cause to effect, and from effect tracing back to its cause. The commandment for men to sacrifice their values is the commandment that men should sacrifice their minds. The commandment that men should believe as the priests dictate them to believe, is the commandment that men should subjugate their minds and disable their capacity to reason for themselves. The condemnation of selfishness is the ruse of cheating man from his own vital happiness. To hold sacrifice as a virtue is to negate man's ability to lead his life independent of others, just so that those who seek the unearned may profit at his expense. This is the morality of the moocher, the ethics of the parasite, the code of the evader and the doctrine of the mystic, all in one shabby tomb crowned with the symbol of the cross, a symbol not of death as such, but a symbol of slow suffering and agony. As such, there could be no more appropriate symbol for Christianity than an instrument of torture and execution.

These are the concepts and their respective definitions which will be assumed in my assessment of the claim that Christian morality is objective in nature. Already it should be clear from the definitions I have given that this claim cannot true, but rather that Christian morality is intrinsic in nature. But I am willing to be patient with my readers, and to show systematically, going through the verses of the Bible themselves, why Christian morality as defined particularly in the New Testament cannot be considered objective, but is indeed a product of a false view of reality, the primacy of consciousness metaphysics, and therefore wholly unfit for man.

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[1] Ayn Rand, Glossary of Objectivist Definitions, ed. Allison T. Kunze and Jean F. Moroney, s.v. 'ethics'; see also Rand's essay "The Objectivist Ethics," The Virtue of Selfishness, p. 13; and, Leonard Peikoff, Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand, p. 206.

[2] The dependence of political principles on moral principles is rarely understood or acknowledged by many thinkers. Political principles - that is, principles guiding one's interactions with others, how they treat and conduct themselves in relation to others - are often treated as primaries which cannot be questioned. Political theory, at least at the interpersonal level (as opposed to the societal level) is quite often supplanted in place of a doctrine of morality, and even mistakenly referred to as morality proper. This practice leaves political principles without an objective basis, and also leaves the individual clueless on how he should conduct his own life in relation to his own values, and why. These mistakes are avoided in Objectivism.

[3] Ayn Rand, "Galt's Speech," For the New Intellectual, p. 122.

[4] Leonard Peikoff, Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand, p.117.

[5] "What is Capitalism?" Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal, p. 22.

[6] Ibid., p. 21.

[7] Ibid., pp. 21-22.

[9] Rand, "Galt's Speech," For the New Intellectual, p. 121.

[10] Rand, "The Objectivist Ethics," The Virtue of Selfishness, p. 15.

[11] Ayn Rand, "The Objectivist Ethics," The Virtue of Selfishness, p. 20.

[12] Ayn Rand, "Faith and Force: The Destroyers of the Modern World," Philosophy: Who Needs It, p. 62.

[13] "This is John Galt Speaking," For the New Intellectual, p. 121.

[14] Ayn Rand, "The Objectivist Ethics," The Virtue of Selfishness, p. 22.

[15] "This is John Galt Speaking," For the New Intellectual, p. 170.

[16] Ayn Rand, "The Objectivist Ethics," The Virtue of Selfishness, p. 28.

[17] Rand, "This is John Galt Speaking," For the New Intellectual, p. 128.

[18] Ibid.

[19] I urge theology students who may be reading this to honestly ask themselves: What legitimately necessary goal do all your efforts to develop so-called "theories" and "doctrines" pertinent to god-belief accomplish?

[20] Ibid., p. 130.

[21] Ibid.

[22] Ayn Rand, "Man's Rights," The Virtue of Selfishness, p. 93.

[23] Ibid.

[24] By "anti-concept" I mean "an unnecessary and rationally unusable term designed to replace and obliterate some legitimate concept. The use of anti-concepts gives the listeners a sense of approximate understanding. But in the realm of cognition, nothing is as bad as the approximate." (Ayn Rand, "Credibility and Polarization," The Ayn Rand Letter, I, 1, 1.)

[25] Ayn Rand, "This is John Galt Speaking," For the New Intellectual, p. 183.

[27] For instance, see Proverbs 8:13; 11:12; 13:10; 14:3; 16:18; 29:23; Mark 7:22; I John 2:16.

[28] If 'virtue' is that action by which one achieves and/or preserves his values, then an 'anti-virtue' is the action by which those values are forfeited and destroyed. It is in this context that I consider both 'selflessness' and 'sacrifice' to be anti-virtues.

[29] Ayn Rand, "The Ethics of Emergencies," The Virtue of Selfishness, p. 44. This definition isolates the essentials involved in the concept 'sacrifice' far better than others I have found. Webster's II New Riverside Dictionary, for instance, defines 'sacrifice' as: "forfeiture of something valuable for something else." This definition neglects to identify the relationship of that "something else" to the "something valuable" being forfeited; it does not tell us that value being forfeited is of higher value than the one which is not being sacrificed. This source also defines 'sacrifice' as "A loss," which - although sacrifice results in a net loss to the one who sacrifices something - also gives only part of the story. For this does not take into account that the sacrifice of values is a loss chosen by the one who sacrifices something.

[30] Cf. Matt. 6:24; Luke 16:13.

[31] Romans 12:1.

[32] II Timothy 3:2, 4.

[33] S.v. 'sin'.

[36] Ayn Rand, "The Objectivist Ethics," The Virtue of Selfishness, p. 28.

[37] I Cor. 7:30. Compare this urgency to suppress one's emotions with passages commanding men to rejoice: Romans 12:15; I Cor. 13:6; Phil. 3:1, 4:4; I Peter 4:13; etc. Attempting to integrate these instructions - both to rejoice and to conduct oneself "as though [he] rejoiced not" - can only stifle man's capacity for rationally-achieved happiness, not liberate it. Such slantradictions as I call them are designed especially to cause confusion in the minds of believers, and ultimately guilt, when all one needs to do is declare his own independence and pursue the non-contradictory joy, which Rand extolled. (Cf. "This is John Galt Speaking," For the New Intellectual, p. 132.)

[38] Ibid., p. 29.

[40] "This is John Galt Speaking," For the New Intellectual, p. 128.