While I was delightedly surprised to see that Fred took the time to send me this quote after we had concluded our debate, I am far from unaware of the attitude that apologists such as Van Til take as far as justifying their base assertions, or "presuppositions". From the face of it, you, my reader, can probably spot a lot of problems with the views that CVT elucidates here. However, for those who may not see these problems, the following is given.

Dear Fred,

Okay, noted. As already stated in past exercises, here Mr. CVT admits that he sees no alternative to informal fallacy. With these words he commits his entire system to cognitive error and makes no attempt to conceal this, as this appears to be his *real* 'ultimate presupposition'; regardless, in matters of this present quotation, CVT is treating this conclusion as his primary. I appreciate his candor; so should you. However, we must bear in mind what we are talking about. We are talking about knowledge and its validation in general. Such dialogue would have to include - either implicitly or explicitly - some reference to the nature of the being to which this matter applies. That being is, in this case, man himself. Before we can make any knowledge statements about God, we would have to first achieve some understanding about our nature and our ability to acquire and validate knowledge (you should be seeing by now the hierarchical nature of knowledge through these principles; that hierarchical nature of knowledge is key to these concerns).

Let's continue.

"Spiral reasoning"? Is CVT here trying to euphemize a cognitive error? Sure seems like it. "We don't like the sound of 'circular reasoning' because that smacks of non-validity; let's call it 'spiral reasoning'; it has a better ring to it." Well, perhaps this was not actually said in some robe room prior to some seminary dissertation, but it sure seems quite feasible, doesn't it? But let's open the hood here for a second and understand the error that CVT is committing himself and his students to.

Circular reasoning (also called 'begging the question') is an informal fallacy of presumption. "These fallacies arise not because the premises are irrelevant to the conclusion or provide insufficient reason for believing the conclusion, but because the premises presume what they purport to be true. Begging the question attempts to hide the fact that a certain premise may not be true..." (P. J. Hurley, Logic, 3rd ed., Wadsworth Publishing, Belmont, Ca., 1988, pg. 136). Later, Hurley writes under the heading "Begging the Question (Petitio Principii)":

Thank you, Mr. Hurley, for this clarification. Now, notice what Mr. Hurley states: "it [the fallacy of begging the question, or circular reasoning] often involves using the conclusion to support the questionable premise." Oh really? This is backwards, isn't it? Shouldn't the premises be asserted to support their conclusion rather than the other way around? Where have we seen this before? I can think of a couple examples.

Simple modus ponens format: If P, then Q. P, therefore Q. The argument may be said to be valid, just as Mr. Hurley stipulated. Okay, fine. But is it true? Well, that's where the problem comes in. Look at the phraseology. See the problems? Where do you suppose the problem lies? Correct, the problem lies in the first premise. Premise 1 errs in its presumption, a classic question-begging give-away. Premise 1 presumes that the Bible is a reliable and trustworthy source of claims. However, this is not established. It is presumed. Many people accept this form of argument as sound, however, not realizing that the argument is just another instance of circular reasoning. After all, if you substituted "Koran" in place of "Bible" in the above example, you still maintain the same validity (modus ponens), but with this change you would be establishing the 'truth' of a competing religion. Would you accept the argument then? Or, does this shift only highlight the erroneous presumption involved in the original example?

By his own statements (see above), CVT seems to believe that such arguments may be accepted into the realm of knowledge. Some will say, "So what?" A mind is a terrible thing to squander.

Now let's look at another example of circular reasoning in progress:

How's that one? Is this argument valid in form? Well, let's see. It seems to follow the basic pattern of modus ponens: If P, then Q. P, therefore Q. I have inserted these variables into the terms of the argument to show their position. Now, can you see how this argument is begging the question from the preceding? First, you might want to identify the troublesome phraseology. Does the argument achieve soundness? Where do you suppose is the troublesome phraseology that Hurley mentions? Perhaps some will think that there is no troublesome phraseology here, that the argument is completely sound and reliable. But does the conclusion necessarily follow from the premises? If I replace 'God' in the above syllogism with 'tooth fairy', does the argument achieve the same truth status? Or, let's see if the same soundness is achieved if we alter the argument slightly in a different manner:

Certainly, it is quite apparent that both arguments commit the same fallacy, the same fallacy to which CVT assumes man is condemned to repeat in every task of reasoning. Calling it 'spiral reasoning' does not eliminate the problem; in fact, it is nothing short of an attempt to further conceal the problem. Why would CVT want to do this? Well, that would require a motivational analysis of CVT's intentions, but I would not be surprised if CVT were trying to protect something, such as decades of personal investment in pursuing his years of education, his chair at whatever-minster seminary and the pay it brought him year after year, not to mention the tremendous influence he garnered over young and gullible seminary students wagging their spiritual tails in agreement with every word that proceeded from his fallacy-varnished lips (by his own admission, mind you). Van Til stood to lose quite a bit if he did not offer a defense of the petty kingdom he had established through his work. Should it have been revealed that his work was in error, then all that he worked for - not to mention the borrowed self-esteem that he enjoyed from it - could quite easily have come crashing down on himself. But CVT was quite clever (and he learned this from Kant, by the way, but was grandly less sophisticated in going about it): Van Til built into his over-bloated theories the notion that man's nature necessitates that his reasoning is irreversibly flawed. A very clever thing to do, don't you think? Besides, all his little students had accepted everything else thus far, why would they not accept this? Furthermore, he had a great model, Immanuel Kant himself. If Kant could get away with it (and boy, did he!), then why can't Cornelius Van Til? Kant's task was far more impressive, for Kant snowed people into rejecting reality to spite themselves. Van Til, on the other hand, was arguing for something far 'safer' - for the existence of God and a heaven where everyone could go in the 'afterlife' and be 'happy'. Now, what could feel better than that? While Kant built a theory that offered those who accepted it absolutely no hope for happiness (in fact, those who do accept Kant's doctrines have been swindled out of their happiness as an end in itself, as this was his very purpose), Van Til worked within a far more insulated realm of constraints - god-belief - which is already popular, 'benevolent mysticism', 'eternal reward', 'hope', etc., all the accoutrements of a feel-good system, so long as you accept the system and don't care about feeling good about feeling good (more circularities!).

Let's proceed with our analysis:

STOP! "Know more about" WHAT? Van Til speaks of a "thing". What thing? What kind of 'thing'? An existent thing? Or a non-existent thing? Does Van Til presuppose existence here? Or, should we, his readers, guess? Again, we are speaking of methods of acquiring and validating knowledge here, right? Knowledge of WHAT? Has Van Til clarified this point yet? Or is he still in orbit on this issue, skirting it with yet more and more question-begging and equivocations, hoping this question never comes up? Does it matter? Apparently not to CVT. Should it matter? Well, that would depend on what it is one is trying to prove, wouldn't it? After all, if one were to clarify that all this circularity necessitated by man's finite nature were applicable to knowledge of reality as opposed to non-reality, that would be quite a statement, don't you suppose? Then again, CVT has not clarified if the target of his circular reasoning is to be found within reality or 'outside reality'. For that matter, we are still 'in the dark' so to say as to how Mr. Van Til would define the term 'reality'. A troublesome term for most folx (the folx who wrote the Bible failed to offer a concise definition), and I suppose that this oversight on CVT's part may not be unintentional. Then again, clarification of terminology and essentialized definitions has never been a strong point among mystics.

Again, this last point would have a lot to do with the nature of the subject matter in question. CVT does not clarify. Also, here he attempts to introduce yet another non-problem into the problem he's exploring. That is, namely, some kind of 'problem' arising out of the 'size differential' between the one employing circular reasoning (folx like CVT) and that to which this circularly reasoned knowledge is alleged to pertain. Why this is a problem, CVT does not elucidate very well, but let's note it and see where he wants to go.

Okay, why is that? Is this a result of the 'size differential' he introduced in the last statement? Well, if we replace the word 'God' (whatever that means) with another item (this time, one found in reality) that is definitely larger than "us", such as a mountain, would the same principle apply? Yes, no? What was the middle part? I don't follow you? Okay, let me explain. Here CVT says we would have to be 'larger than God' in order to reason about him. He does not offer a clear explanation for this conclusion, but let's not worry about that right now. Let's see how his new principle applies. I am not larger than Mt. Davidson, a large accumulation of raw matter known as a mountain or hill here in San Francisco. I am smaller than it; this mountain contains many millions of times the mass of my own body. By CVT's principle here, I would not be able to reason about it (size differential precludes this, according to the principle he is introducing here). Therefore, my recognition - based on reason - that this mountain exists in the territory known as San Francisco City and County is necessarily flawed (CVT may call it 'spiral reasoning' - an error is an error no matter what you call it; a spade is a spade; A is A) unless I arrive at it via a 'transcendental argument'? Even if I make the statement "Mt. Davidson exists" I am, according to CVT, committing an error of cognition. Why? Simply because it is bigger than me? So, when I make the assertion, "Ocean Avenue proceeds along the southern perimeter of Mt. Davidson," I am, according to CVT, in error. Again, size does matter, according to CVT. Why? Blank out.

Incidentally, if God is said not to "project into space" as so many apologists assert, and consequently has no physical form or occupies any physical dimension, how then can this non-problem - CVT's alleged 'size differential' problem - be a problem even for the theist? How can this 'problem' even be applicable, given the alleged nature of the subject matter, if the principle Van Til offers could be said to be legitimate? Is there no attempt among religious believers to make their claims at least coherent with each other?

Well, at least he admits it. Unfortunately for Van Til's disciples, it is unclear what the difference between "reasoning in a vicious circle" and "reasoning in a circle" is.

Thanks again, Fred, for sharing somebody else's thoughts. Would love to hear yours sometime.

While the quotation cited from Van Til's book is quite slim in content, much can be ascertained from his direct statements. Van Til blatantly declares that man is doomed to presumptive error in his reasoning, yet, insofar as this citation is concerned, offers no good reason to accept that declaration. When he does try to argue this point, his statements suddenly become murky with vague approximations. Epistemology was not a matter of precision for Van Til, so it seems from his comments here. He then attempts to justify his notions by asserting a strange principle which suggests that our ability to reason somehow hinges on the size differential between the person using this reasoning and the object of his reasoning. How he justifies this principle is unknown, but does imply a conceptual disconnect in that this principle essentially signals a kind of epistemological surrender, indeed, a surrender to accepting fallacy-laden premises as one's primary, for it is by this apparently problematic size differential that necessitates what Van Til calls a 'transcendental argument'.  Just as Van Til, borrowing from Kant, argues that it is due to man's nature as a being with identity that he is doomed to 'circular reasoning', so he also uses - of all things! - man's size as a strike against the stability of his mind. In such a manner do 'intellectuals' like Van Til attempt to establish and justify their superstitions and myth-mongering. Rather than having the courage to base their conclusions on reality and therefore develop testable arguments and theories, such 'scholars' seek only to evade reality and cover their tracks behind them in the process through subterfuge, suspicious rhetoric and a fondness for using non-problems (e.g., size differentials) as the levers to their obfuscation. True to his nature as a devoted mystic, Van Til stokes the furnace of superstition by indicating that any disagreement with his conclusion is the result of "Antitheism", which, no doubt, is considered the depths of evil in his circles. Take care to consider the source!

Notes:

[5] In fact, the futility of many theistic arguments can be exposed by a simple substitution of equally questionable terms for those suggested by apologists. For instance, considering a variant of Anselm's ontological argument, a theist might argue the following:

On the face of it, the argument follows the modus ponens model for syllogism, and therefore can be said to be valid. However, the arbitrary nature of the argument should be evident from that point on. [P] in premise one makes a statement about God's nature, which presumes that God has a nature, and therefore, presumes that God exists. Hence, as Hurley's statements above demonstrate, such an argument contains a premise that assumes the conclusion has already been shown to be true - thus, begging the question. Such an argument can be said to be an attempt to define God into existence. In spite of its obvious fallacious design, such arguments are accepted by many theists, often couched in extremely contorted linguistic somersaults in order to conceal the flaw. Replace the key term, 'God' in this case, with another nonsense term, such as 'Blarko', and the error will become highlighted, and the theist will be compelled to dismiss it. Observe: