Letters to a Young Atheologist

Letter 2: The Certainty That the Sun Will Rise Tomorrow

Original Correspondence:

Mr. Kappus writes:

Dear Mr. Thorn,

Mr. Dogmass asked me the following:

How do I answer him?

Thanks,

R. Kappus

Thorn responds:

Most people tend to make such issues much more complicated than they are. That's exactly what's going on here. Objectivism makes a clean break with the philosophy of the past by isolating precisely what enables certainty of future events like the sun's rising.

If one is going to answer questions like the one Mr. Dogmass asks, we must have a clear understanding of method, as the question above inquires into the how of cognition. Though method does not start with definitions (it begins with perception [awareness of reality] and concept-formation based on that perception, i.e., the axioms), a clarification of definitions is in order at this stage to understand what resources are needed in identifying the proper method being sought. (Keep in mind, you will never read anything like this in the Bible. But, you already know that.)

Remember, Mr. Kappus, knowledge has objective identity, and this identity cannot be contradicted. Knowledge is hierarchical in nature. This fact cannot be stressed enough, nor can it ever be jettisoned when one is striving for certainty in knowledge content. No man will ever be able to master differential calculus before he grasps the principles that govern why 2+2=4. Why? Because knowledge is hierarchical. Higher abstractions depend inextirpably on the validity of prior abstractions, the method of forming and reaching those abstractions, and the axioms at their fundamental root level. Anyone positing knowledge as the product of "revelation" rejects this fact, whether or not he knows it. All digression from the fact that knowledge is hierarchical, and the corollaries of that fact, constitute a contradiction, whether you are Jesus or David Hume. This is every man's problem. The quest for automatic knowledge is invalid from its beginning.

The definitions given above are part of the how of man's cognition. Without a method, we have no means of achieving knowledge, no means of achieving certainty. But so far we're lacking something else. A method is empty without content, without an object. By itself, a method achieves nothing for us. We need inputs. The inputs are the what of our cognition, they are the content, the reference to reality. And it is these inputs, the entities about which we are speaking, that will determine just how the method, the how of our cognition, must proceed. Our definitions, as with (legitimate) concepts, provide a crucial link between the what of cognition and the how of cognition. There must be a link between the what and the how of cognition. Otherwise, our method will proceed without reference to reality, which is what happens in the case of mysticism. The common trait shared by all mystical philosophy, whether it is Plato's intrinsicism, Christianity's 'revelation' or Kant's over-bloated assault on man's mind, is the premise that knowledge is achieved by method without reference to reality.

What are the entities involved in the context of your debate with Mr. Dogmass? This is self-evident: The sun and the earth (two irreducible primaries) and their relationship. Both the sun and the earth are entities. An entity is: "a perceived existent of specific nature and attributes--the foundational concept of all conceptual knowledge." To some degree, Hume had something going for him: He was willing to look at the facts of reality. But he stopped cold right there. What he abandoned was the need for an objective method. And here you should be seeing exactly where the division between "materialism" and "mysticism" takes place. Ayn Rand makes this exquisitely clear:

A crucial question that often goes unasked (and consequently unanswered) in debates on epistemological method is the question: Knowledge of what? The tendency of most philosophy "out there" is the habitual, thoughtless treatment of knowledge as a thing in itself, as a detached 'entity' having no objective standard outside itself, no reference beyond itself. This not the case with Objectivism.

Objectivism is explicitly clear in its reliance on perception as a means of discovering and gathering the facts of reality. This is because, in Objectivism, knowledge is knowledge of reality. In other words, the content of man's consciousness, to be valid, must always have an object. Knowledge, according to Objectivism, is "a mental grasp of the fact(s) of reality, reached either by perceptual observation or by a process of reason based on perceptual observation. It is the correct identification of the facts of reality." The objective standard of knowledge in Objectivism is reality itself, i.e., the realm of existence. While many philosophies may make this claim, only Objectivism achieves this consistently and without contradicting either itself or the facts of reality. It is a fully integrated, fully comprehensive system of philosophy. It is the state of the art.

How do you know that the sun and earth exist? By perceptual observation. This is valid (a means of perception is a means of perception). It is directly perceived, and the observation of the sun and the earth imply the first axiomatic concept at the root of all reasoning: Existence. Hence, the axiom existence exists. In other words, Objectivism begins with reality. It also sticks with reality. No need to jump into mystic orbits, no need to doubt everything we perceive. Existence exists, and that is all that Objectivism is properly concerned with.

What else is implied necessarily by observing the sun and the earth? That the observer has a means of observing, a faculty of awareness. This is the fact that the observer is conscious. And this gives us the second axiomatic concept: Consciousness.

Then, we have another primary implicit recognition at the root of this process (particularly in man, who is capable of the conceptual level of consciousness): that what is observed is something that exists. This is the axiom Identity. What I perceive is something. It has a specific nature, an identity. It is what it is. A is A. A is not non-A. As a corollary, if A should exist, it must be A. I.e., if something exists, it must have a specific identity.

Thus, when we (existence/identity) perceive and observe (consciousness) the sun (existence) and earth (existence), we recognize (consciousness) that these are entities of a specific nature (identity) which cannot contradict themselves (the Law of Identity). The earth rotates on its axis and revolves around the sun because it is the metaphysically given.

The answer to Mr. Dogmass' question can be expressed in simple, non-contradictory tautologies whose content is directly referential to reality: What is the claim? That the sun will rise tomorrow. Basically, this claim is far simpler. It is the claim that the earth will continue to spin and that it will continue to maintain the same proximal relationship with the sun. That's all!! See, it's that simple! In other words, the earth's identity is the earth's identity; the sun's identity is the sun's identity and the relationship of the earth to the sun is the relationship of the earth to the sun. Voila!

Again, let's look at the definition we offered above: A proposition is certain when it is "backed by all evidence for proof and free of rational doubt." Is there any basis for "rational doubt" in the context of applying our method to the objects under concern here? If so, what is the nature of the basis for that rational doubt? Indeed, there is none.

Your certainty is achieved. Get up early in the morning and see how right you were!

Christianity contradicts the axiom of existence exists by claiming that existence is a product of a form of consciousness ('creation'). This commits the fallacy of the stolen concept. It lies at the root of Christian theism. Many other problems result as a consequence to this.

Christianity contradicts the axiomatic concept 'consciousness' by positing it as independent of existence; by assuming that consciousness is a faculty of creation rather than a faculty of awareness (awareness is secondary to any Christian conception of 'consciousness'; hence the rejection of the senses and the advocacy of 'faith'); by rejecting the fact that knowledge is hierarchical in nature (i.e., that the content of consciousness is not reducible to axiomatic concepts and is not based on a process of reason, whose method is logic, which is the process of non-contradictory identification); and by treating knowledge as content without reference to reality (i.e., that the content of one's consciousness is the product of 'divine revelation', 'intuitions' or any form of 'just knowing'). Many other problems result as a consequence to this.

Christianity contradicts the Law of Identity by its claim that "God is infinite," by rejecting the identity of consciousness; by positing the notion of 'miracles' - which is posited as the 'divine' contradiction of the nature of entities. Many other problems result as a consequence to this.

It is because of the rejection of Objectivist axioms that epistemological systems like that offered by Christianity offers its users no means of distinguishing knowledge from emotion. Since the content of one's mind - the what of cognition - is not held to the objective standard of reality, there is no basis for a distinction between how one feels (i.e., emotion) and what one thinks (i.e. reason). Objectivism provides the solution for this problem, a problem which no other philosophy before it has even attempted. I currently have an essay in progress which deals with this very problem which Christian believers today inherit from their primitive forebears.

You may ask Mr. Dogmass what are the definitions of these key terms, and what are the source of the definitions he offers for these key terms. We know the Bible offers no such definitions. This is what is so remarkable in instances like what you're experiencing with your Christian acquaintance. He's obviously assuming meaning to the words he's employing, and in the present conversation with you, it appears that he's willing to adhere to the meaning of his key terms consistently. That's an extremely vulnerable procedure for any mystic to be caught in. What is his definition of "certainty"? What is his definition of "proof"? What is his definition of "evidence"? What is his definition of "entity"? Or "identity"? Etc. Any Christian, Muslim, Zoroastrian, Wotan-lover, etc., attempting to pin the non-believer into a necessary role of skepticism and doubt (which is precisely what's going on here) should be pressed to offer the definitions he assumes for the key terms of his arguments.

Next, Mr. Kappus, press him to identify the source of those definitions. This is going to be tough for a Christian. If he cannot offer definitions from the Bible (the Bible doesn't even speak of proofs and rational argument), then he must rely on "pitiful, woeful, fallible man" for the source of his definitions. Just as you and I do. Only, we make no pretense about that. I certainly don't. Which men do you trust, Mr. Kappus? Ancient primitives who believed in a universe created by a childish, whim-worshipping ruling consciousness, a universe in which one moment you could be sinking to the bottom of a lake, and the next moment you're walking on the water?

He should also be able to explain the method of achieving certainty that his worldview offers, and clarify exactly how his definitions are applicable to that process, as I have done above in the case of Objectivism's solution to such matters.

Keep your eye on my website. I have some real hard-hitting articles that deal with these issues in great detail. I hope, eventually, to create a website that provides as a whole the greatest fundamental challenge to Christian theism found on the net. But I am just getting started.

I hope everything above makes perfect sense to you. If you have any questions, please let me know.

My best wishes to you and your family for the New Year.

Anton Thorn

Follow-Up Correspondence 1:

Mr. Kappus writes:

Dear Mr. Thorn,

I responded to Mr. Dogmass as you had suggested, but he seems quite unwilling to accept your proposals. He didn't give much of a reason why he would not accept your reasoning, but he did ask me some more questions, which I am not certain how to answer.

Mr. Dogmass asked:

What should I say?

Sincerely,
R. Kappus

Thorn responds:

Why wouldn't they be the same? Existence exists. Going back to my e-mail from the other day, where is the "rational doubt" challenging our certainty? On what basis would one question whether the nature of the sun or the earth or their relationship together change? Quite frankly - to be consistent, to deviate from the knowledge that the sun has specific properties at one point, one would need some kind of evidence that those properties are undergoing some kind of mutation. What is that evidence? Or, should one just throw his mind to the wind (literally?) and suspect that identity changes without cause? That's the implicit suggestion behind such questioning. David Hume had no protection against such suggestion as his system did not rely on objectively identifying the identities of the objects under consideration. Even for Hume, reality was a big mystery, and cognition for him was an exercise haunted by the specter of causeless doubt. This premise is built into the apologist's treatment of rival philosophy - to the point that apologists do not recognize it themselves. I have a few articles in the works that may help elucidate some of this for you.

Best regards,

Anton Thorn

Follow-Up Correspondence 2:

Mr. Kappus writes:

Dear Mr. Thorn,

Again I went back to Mr. Dogmass with the points you mentioned in your last letter, which, I might add, I thought should seal the case. But Mr. Dogmass still will not let go of this subject.

Mr. Dogmass wrote:

Any thoughts?

Thanks!

R. Kappus

Thorn responds:

That's obvious: Existence exists.

Again, existence is perceptually verifiable. One cannot prove that existence exists, for to attempt such a proof, one would necessarily presume existence. I suspect your Mr. Dogmass has a malignant axe to grind against man's perceptions as a means of acquiring legitimate knowledge of reality, but resists stating so outright.

I pour a glass of milk. It is a glass of milk. I turn around to put the carton of milk away. When I turn around again to face the glass of milk, is it now:

Obviously, A is A because if A should exist, it must be A. To dispute it requires one to presume it. Why is A what it is? Because it exists. Existence exists.

Your Mr. Dogmass is a confirmed mystic. He won't be satisfied until he feels justified in asserting solution X ('god'). If he wants to posit 'god' as some kind of cosmic guarantee backing the uniformity of nature, he should explain how his solution is superior to the Objectivist's. While Objectivism recognizes that existence is a self-sufficient absolute, the theist posits existence as a contingency, dependent on something "prior to" existence. What can be prior to existence? Non-existence? How so? Does existence spring into existence from non-existence? More dullardry.

Furthermore, to insinuate that the uniformity of nature requires the cosmic guarantee of 'god', the theist making such an assertion would be wise to see that he is merely postponing an answer to his own question (whose answer is right before his nose, right here in reality): Asserting that the uniformity of nature is dependent on 'god' presumes that god's nature is uniform (by this point, a stolen concept). But if existence is not sufficient in itself (i.e., if the uniformity of nature is not a self-sufficient fact of reality), then what cosmic guarantee does one have that 'god' will continue to manifest his "unchangeable nature" as theists love to claim? God's word? Good grief! Their man Jesus promised believers the ability to cast mountains (Matt. 17:20) and trees (Luke 17:6) into the sea if one's faith is strong enough, just by commanding the mountain or tree to do so, just like that. That's a biblical promise. Let's see God keep this word.

And lastly, if Mr. Dogmass cannot offer any rational doubt to call the Objectivist's certainty (as established in my e-mail from the other day) into question, then he has no argument. He just doesn't like the solution you offer because it does not validate his god-belief psychosis.

The mind of the Bible-believer.... is a sick mind. Tell your Mr. Dogmass that his god-belief is a form of mental disease and that he would be wise to seek help now, while he's alive.

Best regards,

Anton Thorn