Letters to a Young Atheologist

Letter 4: On Theories and Epistemological Obligations

Hello Mr. Kappus,

Thank you for your kind remarks and your continued correspondence. You relayed some questions from Mr. Dogmass that I would like to address below. Perhaps one day he will "see the light," n'est-ce pas? Anyway, onwards and upwards as one of my professors used to say!

Hello Mr. Thorn!

Mr. Dogmass still will not accept the points I've brought out in our emerging debate regarding the existence of 'god'. He still insists that I believe his claims that his God exists, and that all others do not! Amazing, eh? So, he asked me the following questions when I told him that his claims are unsupported:

Any thoughts on this?

Several issues here:

Mr. Dogmass asks about rights, yet he does not indicate what nature of 'rights' to which he refers. I would tell Mr. Dogmass that, according to an objective political theory of rights, an individual certainly has the right to govern his mind as he chooses, whether rational or irrational. Since man's first right is his right to exist for his own sake, it is corollary that man has the right to his own mind and its governance. Any attempt to restrict a man of his right to accept whatever notions, regardless of truth value or validity, will result in a breach of that individual's most fundamental right: the right to himself. This is precisely why I would argue to defend the religionist's right to embrace his/her religious beliefs.

For the same reason, this is why I argue to defend my right not to embrace those beliefs. The conduct of one's mind is not subject to the wishes or ordinances of others, no matter how seemingly benevolent or well-intended those wishes and ordinances may be alleged to be.

So, the short answer, politically speaking is, no, I do not agree that "...no one has the right to deny the validity of a theory..." For example, Mr. Dogmass and other mystically inclined persons definitely have the right to reject my theories regardless of whether or not they have actually scrutinized its core assertions and associated evidences. The assertion of a theory imparts absolutely no obligations on others if they do not accept those obligations. I hope this is clear.

Epistemologically speaking, however, should one aim towards objectivity in his assessments of asserted theories, he takes on himself - to the degree that he is loyal to achieving this objectivity - the epistemological obligation of critical analysis, in as much as said theory may apply to his life (this being the governing standard of all man's values). But the use of the concept 'right' in Mr. Dogmass' question is indeed suspect. There may be many valid theories asserted by individuals throughout the world, on a wide variety of topics, that may not have any bearing upon my life, even though I strive for objectivity. Do I have an epistemological obligation to pursue the theories offered by the post-Webern schools of music regarding compositional methods? Not if I do not accept such an obligation, certainly not! Do I pursue such theories in my spare time when they interest me (and they do!)? Yes, when time allows. Is this study crucial to my life? Only inasmuch as the enjoyment of my life is crucial to my existence. And the enjoyment of my life is of primary moral import.

Do I have the right to deny the validity of Arnold Schonberg's compositional theories any more than I have the right to deny those applied in the corpus of Nikolai Roslavets? Sure, of course I have this right. After all, whose right would I be violating if I do decide to deny it? Does it mean I'm correct? No, not necessarily. These are different matters, and they do not conflict. There is no such thing as the right to having no one deny what's true. You cannot turn to your correspondent and say "Mr. Dogmass, you have no right to deny quartal harmonic theory deduced from the later works of Alexander Scriabin," can you? Regardless of your appreciation of Scriabin's tone poem "Prometheus" (1908-10), his composition demonstrates quite successfully the validity of his innovative theory. Similarly, if I were to argue for a theory that the quartal harmony theory which Scriabin developed in "Prometheus" was explicitly developed in his later composition "Vers la Flamme" (1914), would you be obligated to "study in an unprejudiced manner all the evidences" of this theory? Please be careful here when you're considering notions of 'rights'. Rights are not primaries, nor are they frozen abstractions; be careful you do not treat them as such.

There are many theories about what happened on that fateful day in Dallas, TX, November 22, 1963, when President John F. Kennedy was fatally assassinated. Does the welfare of my being rest on the acceptance or refutation of any of these theories? Of course not. Do I have an obligation to survey each and every available theory and endeavor to prove or disprove each one of them before I can rest easy and enjoy my life? Of course not. Just because something is submitted as a theory does not grant it the status of a lien against my life and livelihood.

Furthermore, this question presupposes that said theory does indeed offer evidences. When evidences are offered, then any critical assessment of said theory will have something to go on in its review. However, if evidences are not forthcoming, or the evidences alleged to apply are determined to be invalidly "lifted" (i.e., fallaciously asserted as supporting the theory), then the theory is deemed disingenuous from the point of this determination and warrants no further entertainment as a candidate for acceptable knowledge.

Capice?

Mr. Dogmass asked:

Well, look at the nature of the claims integrated by the theory. First, do the constituent claims readily deal with reality? Is the subject matter itself not of controversial nature? The subject matter is the relationship of the earth to the sun in this theory, no? Are these things readily identifiable? If so, do the claims constituting the theory aim at identifying this relationship?

Be careful not to draw hasty generalizations here.

Mr. Dogmass asked:

Not at all. A theory must stand on the merits of its claims, their correspondence to reality and the quality of their integration. Geocentricism, the view that the universe revolves around the earth, was indeed accepted as a common belief in many societies (in fact, some folx today still advocate this belief), but nonetheless it was accepted in spite of the absence of any rational argument in support of it. (In fact, look what happened to Galileo Galilei when he attempted to share his verdicts with the world!) A theory must be treated as a simple claim, in the sense that it is a grand assertion, since this is a matter properly pertaining to the nature of claims and their validation. A claim is not valid simply by virtue of its assertion; there must be some reasonable appeal to reality to support it. There are several broad categories by which various kinds of claims are defined. Arbitrary claims are claims that have no basis in reality and lack evidential support.

Accepting claims and theories as true regardless of support is a symptom of a much larger problem: the abnegation of the recognition of the hierarchical nature of knowledge. The fact that new knowledge must integrate with and be built from antecedent knowledge is a consequence of this hierarchical nature of knowledge.

Consider the consequences of considering a new theory true until proven false. Every time you meet a new theory, you'd have to accept it as valid knowledge even before examining its assertions. Advocating such a view amounts to a virtual endorsement of complete gullibility and indiscriminate acceptance of claims, regardless of their merits.

If you feel this is a good policy, that one should accept theories and claims until proven false, regardless of their nature and content, then you are free to present your case.

In my conversation with Mr. Dogmass, I asked him what his working definition of 'theory' was, as I suspected you would have asked this as well, or at least prompted me to ask him this. He asked the following:

What do you think?

A "preconceived idea which is based upon subjectivity"? Is Mr. Dogmass asserting that this description applies to all theories by definition? If so, then it appears that he would be arguing that the concept 'theory' necessarily presupposes subjectivity, but I know of no reason why this should be, according to an objective definition of 'subjectivity'. I wonder what definition of 'subjectivity' Mr. Dogmass has in mind here. Did he explain? I see no statement in his definition about the integration of constituent claims forming the theory being either essential or needing to be valid. Or, do you suspect that in Mr. Dogmass' view of what is essential to a theory, these things not apply?

I took the following from an online dictionary just for grins….

According to Objectivism, a theory is "a set of abstract principles purporting to be either a correct description of reality or a set of guidelines for man's actions." [Glossary of Objectivist Definitions, s.v 'theory', cite Rand, Ayn, "Philosophical Detection," Philosophy: Who Needs It, p. 14.] This definition adequately integrates the points given in the definition above.

I would also hasten to point out as well, Mr. Kappus, that religious apologists do not posit the existence of a deity as a theory to be discussed and pondered in the light of reason. This turnabout is suggested by all the foregoing questions about what constitutes a theory and on what basis a theory should be accepted rationally. However, in the case of god-belief claims, the exact reverse is the case: the claim that 'god' exists is to be accepted unquestioningly on grounds of 'faith' - i.e., to be accepted 'just because' someone said so or some ancient document says so. Faith is acceptance of claims without appeal to evidential reference to reality and in contravention to such appeals to reality. Faith claims are not about discovering the facts about reality and then constructing cogent theories on facts identified as pertinent to some issue we find in existence. Rather, faith claims constitute a cognitive disconnect in the minds of those who rely on faith as some means or faculty of knowledge having nothing to do ultimately with reality or the realm of existence. Notice how those who adhere to faith claims dismiss your reliance on your senses as your first and primary contact with reality. Indeed, they reject the primacy of our senses as a means of perception. Instead, they offer 'faith' which ultimately reduces to wishful thinking, over-indulged hopes and, finally, whim-worship.

To equate god-belief claims with scientific theories only diminishes one's comprehension of the essential distinctions in operation here. In the case of scientific theories, the constituent factors are the facts of reality; it is the facts of reality which are the touch points giving the validity of any theory is pertinence to reality and its thrust as a set of ideas to be considered rationally. In the case of god-belief claims, there is no such counterpart to the scientific theory's reliance on the facts of reality as their key constituent factors. Indeed, there are no factors in reality which can plausibly support god-belief claims in light of objective thought. Those advocating belief in supernatural beings will claim otherwise, but not one theist can produce a single piece of evidence in support of his god-belief claims that another theist can also construe as supporting his mutually exclusive god-belief claims.

Another point here is to identify what is at stake in the quest for validating a theory, or refuting it. A scientific theory, for instance, is not posited in order necessarily to achieve some kind of moral stranglehold on those who accept it. If one posits the heliocentric theory of our solar system, what is the scope of that theory? The scope of that theory has immediate bearing on astronomical inquiry, but in an essential perspective, it has no scope on an individual's life per se. I may accept the heliocentric version of understanding our solar system, but does accepting this theory compel me to sell my belongings and give to the poor? Of course not! Should we accept Mr. Dogmass' implicit premises - namely that his god-beliefs are on an essential par with scientific claims, then we're in for a slippery slope of losing contact with the context of what is initially being claimed and subverted to accepting what is ultimately desired: that we surrender our minds to the claims of a priestly ruling class whose intention is to sacrifice our values for their benefit, in the guise of serving a "merciful, loving God." The dishonesty here could not be more pungent.

Turning to some related points….

I asked Mr. Dogmass again if he can prove that God exists, but he gave me no positive answer. Instead, he retorted, "You wish for me to prove that God exists, but that would not be the question, rather, the task falls upon your lap to prove that he does not." Isn't this a reversal?

Yes, it's a classic reversal, and it's frequently encountered in the god-belief debates. Now, do you suppose Mr. Dogmass is saying that there is a principle (in logic or his particular brand of theology or what have you) that essentially states that a claim is to be accepted as truth until proven false? Or, is he suggesting that the audience of a claim bears the onus of disproving claims before their rejection of said claims can be justified? This seems to be the position suggested by his statement here. However, there are some severe, intraversible problems with it. Let me explain.

First of all, a classic principle to reason is the principle that the onus of proof falls on him who asserts the positive. In the case of god-belief claims, the theist asserts a positive, the claim that 'god' exists. Now notice the nature of this claim by reviewing its few components: it asserts that it is a fact that something exists. Thus, it not only asserts a positive, it asserts an existential positive - that 'something' indeed 'exists'. The statement takes the form of a simple sentence, and as such, *appears* to be the conclusion of a prior arrangement of premises, since ostensive appeals to reality through the senses do not validate such a claim as "God exists." What are these prior premises, assuming they have been identified? Depending on which theists you talk to, the sky's the limit as to what justifies this grandiose assertion. (Of course, their priority is not backing up their claims, but that you accept them unquestioningly.)

Working in concert with the above principle is a related principle which states that one need not prove a negative. The operative term in question here is *prove.* Let's unpack this term, shall we? In the context of offering support for the validation of positive existential claims (such as "Blarko exists"), the concept *proof* presupposes the concept *evidence* (e.g., evidence for the conclusion that Blarko exists), and, furthermore, the concept *evidence* necessarily presupposes existence (there is no such thing as "evidence for the non-existent"). Consequently, we can conclude from this that the concept *proof* is inapplicable to defending a negative existential claim (e.g., "Blarko does not exist"). So, on this principle, Mr. Dogmass' statement, "…the task falls on your lap to prove that ['god'] does not [exist]" is flawed since it does not rationally integrate its key concept (*prove*) with the context of its application here (i.e., to prove the non-existence of something asserted to exist).

(Just as an exercise, however, how would anyone who objects to the principle I define here prove that Blarko does not exist? For the record, let me assert it as a positive claim for which - playing the devil's advocate - I am not willing to support, nor am I going to relent on insisting that anyone who does not accept my above principle must prove does not exist. Any takers? Please identify what 'evidence' you would produce in order to prove that Blarko does NOT exist. After he is through with this task, the objector is invited to prove that Allah does not exist, then after that, that Brahma does not exist, that Santa Claus does not exist, that the tooth fairy does not exist, and so on. You get my point, I hope.)

Clearly, given the solidity of these two principles it is only rational to hold the theist to his claim, and request - yea, insist - that he support it. Should evidence not be forthcoming, then the claim is in peril of being qualified as *arbitrary* (i.e., a claim without any legitimate rational merit whatsoever) and hence warranting rejection.

Can these principles be overridden by a larger principle? Regardless of the nature of the object a positive existential claim asserts as existing, the fact that it is an assertion whose purpose is to conclude the certainty of said object's existence, necessitates support. Otherwise, all assertions would be treated as conceptual primaries and the notion of logical support for conclusions would be a myth. However, this is not the case: All assertions are not primaries (there is a hierarchical nature to knowledge, and therefore a hierarchical nature of claims), and the requirement for logical support - either by direct perceptual appeal to reality, or by reasoning which ultimately finds its grounding in direct perceptual appeal to reality - is no myth at all. Indeed, this is what logic is all about!

Essentially, the question to the theist is this: Are you willing to stand by your claim or not? If so, then it is time to argue for it, rather than posturing yourself as arguing from it. Arguing from this conclusion that 'god' exists may be well and good for your little minds, however, in the serious realm of ideas, whatever results from your arguing from is only as good as the proposition upon which it is based, in this case, the claim that a 'god' exists. This claim has no rational support whatsoever, and the theist's reluctance to submit rational arguments which avoid fallacies (such as the fallacy of the stolen concept) for this conclusion only testifies to the fact that he has no case at all.

Also, keep in mind the theist's evangelical task: to 'win' converts. Hence, the need for a system of apologetics. Asserting claims such as 'god exists' as an irreducible primary may be fine for the choir, but as theists taking their evangelism to 'the world' it would be wise to consider the intended audience of this evangelism. I do not happen to be a member of the choir, so Mr. Dogmass' asserting such claims as if they qualified as primaries will not fly; he will have to identify something that we both agree on first and then attempt to reason your conclusion from that point. Anything short of this will only produce - and rightfully so - a series of snickers from this audience. But, entertainment is a large industry in America, and there's always demand for more. If you're original in the exercise of your apologetic, you just may win a prize in some arena.

However, should the theist default on his rightful onus to provide evidential support in the construction of his proof for the assertion that 'god' exists, then he forfeits any chance for debate. This does not mean that the atheist automatically 'wins' the debate, for that would presuppose that a debate had in fact taken place. However, what is there to debate if the theist does not stand by his claim and argue for its validity? Quite simply, should the theist default on his rightful onus, he concedes his position altogether.

Furthermore, I would also maintain that, since reality is objective, and not contingent upon our thoughts and philosophical sparring, should it be agreed that one side or another actually win a debate, that does not necessarily mean that 'god' does indeed exist (for existence does not depend on rational thought; the identification of existence, however, does). An atheist engaged in a debate, for instance, may not be very well accomplished at articulating his thoughts. Do the religionist's arguments for 'god's' existence depend on the skill level of atheistic opponents? Perhaps in the religionist's mind they do.

I wish you the best,

Anton

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