Letter 7: Correcting Common Errors

Part I. "Why Does Existence Exist?"

Mr. Dogmass wrote: "The first was originally posed by Martin Heidegger: 'Why is there something rather than nothing?'" 

Mr. Dogmass nowhere shows this to be valid question; instead, he simply assumes that it is valid, and expects it to have a valid answer. It will be clear to those who have a firm grasp of Objectivism, that this fellow has not thought very carefully about this subject. 

For one thing, Objectivism will view such questions as "why does existence exist?" as essentially fallacious. For no matter how one will want to answer such a question, one would have to appeal, at least implicitly, to that which exists (or to what supposedly exists). Otherwise, one would put himself in the dubious position of assuming that the appeal to non-existence somehow explains existence. (The trend in philosophy since Plato, and perhaps long before him, is to posit some form of consciousness as the "answer" to such questions, even though this tactic is irrescindably incoherent.) 

Thus, by posing this question and assuming that it is valid, Mr. Dogmass implicitly (but unavoidably) commits himself to the fallacy of the stolen concept. If we ask why something is, but simply turn around and posit that something in our explanation of that something, what mileage have we gained? Indeed, we're back to where we started, yet we don't admit it to ourselves. This is what Mr. Dogmass does in assuming that the question "Why is there something rather than nothing?" (or "Why does existence exist?") is a valid question. One will have to assume the fact of existence in order to answer the question. But in so doing, he will have to deny the fact of existence in order to validate his assumption that there must be a reason why there is something rather than nothing. He must assume the very concept his argument wants to deny, thus 'stealing' it from the objective hierarchy of knowledge, and rendering invalid any conclusion he hopes to draw from his argument.

Existence exists. We must start somewhere. The theist wants to start with a form of consciousness. He wants to posit a mind (albeit supernatural) which is responsible for creating all its objects. This is called metaphysical subjectivism, a view which holds that existence finds its source in a form of consciousness. 

Some may object to my characterization of the question "Why is there something rather than nothing?" as fallacious, contesting that there is no such thing as a fallacious question. However, it is true when we examine issues in epistemology and logic, that there is a such thing as an invalid question. The fallacy known as 'complex question', for instance, is a species of invalid question. It is a question which operates on a false assumption and expects the reader to accept that false assumption in order to answer it. The typical example is the question "Have you stopped beating your wife?" The question assumes that one is a married man and that he beats or has beaten his wife; indeed, it implies such beatings are a regular occurrence. Contrary to these assumptions, however, it could be the case a) that he is not married, or b) that he is married but has never beaten his wife. Since the question is asked in a manner in which a 'yes' or 'no' response can be the only appropriate reply, one cannot answer it on its own terms and avoid affirming its erroneous premises. One would implicate himself simply by answering. The question is fallacious because it leads one to accept a false premise, assuming either a) or b) are the actual case, if he should choose to take it seriously.

Likewise, a question which leads one to commit a fallacy in order to answer it is also invalid. If taken seriously, the question "Why is there something rather than nothing?" will lead one to commit the fallacy of the stolen concept; indeed, the fallacy of the stolen concept is unavoidable on the question's own terms, as we saw above. One would have both to assume and deny existence in order to address the question. If Heidegger did not recognize this, it was principally because he was not operating on a fully rational philosophy. Yet, today we have theists assuming this question is valid all the time in the construction of their apologetic ruses. What is it that theists want to posit in response to their invalid questions so as to appear to satisfy them? Of course, they assume that the only logical answer is to assert a universe-creating, reality-ruling form of consciousness, which they call God, and delight themselves with this as their answer, never allowing themselves to recognize that the question leads them to accepting a stolen concept, and assuming that their arguments justifying this illicit move make it valid. 

Mr. Dogmass wrote: "And so Heidegger's question becomes interesting. Atheism can describe the properties of what is. Objectivism can say that existence exists, but it cannot account for existence."

As we saw above, the idea of "accounting for" existence is meaningless. Would not whatever Mr. Dogmass asserts as "accounting for" existence also exist itself? If so, then he has not given an explanation (or an "account"), and if not, then he still gives us no explanation. One does not "explain" existence by appealing to non-existence, or to consciousness. Statements like Mr. Dogmass' assertion above, that "Objectivism... cannot account for existence," only underscore the validity of the Objectivist identification that religion wants to posit a form of consciousness prior to existence.

Mr. Dogmass wrote: "Any world view has to deal with questions in five areas: 

1. Origin/Being (like the question above) 
2. Meaning/Predication 
3. Ethics/Norms 
4. Destiny 
5. Aesthetics" 

I agree that philosophy can be divided into five principle areas or provinces, but I would not endorse the divisions which Mr. Dogmass suggests entirely. Rather, I would agree with Rand that those five branches are:

1. Metaphysics: What is the nature of reality? 
2. Epistemology: What is knowledge and its proper validation? 
3. Morality: What is the proper code of values to guide man's choices and actions? 
4. Politics: What is the proper social theory for man? 
5. Aesthetics: What is a proper theory of art? 

There are a number of general differences between this list [1] and the list which Mr. Dogmass provides. First, Mr. Dogmass wants to position the notion "origin" as a primary concern on his list. The origin of what? Ostensibly, of being as such, since he also includes this in his first area of philosophic concern, and since he is mistaken that existence or being as such can have an explanation beyond itself, as we saw above. Here we immediately see his system's vulnerability to stolen concepts, since the idea of an origin of being as such, i.e., of existence, is prone to denying that which must be assumed, which is the fact of existence itself. What could possibly be the origin of existence to begin with? If we posit X as the origin of existence, are we not assuming that X exists? If not, then there is no explanatory value in positing X (since non-existence does not explain existence), and if we do assume that X exists, then we're positing what we originally set out to explain, while denying it at the same time. This will not do, for it is internally fallacious and cannot lead to rationality, which should be our goal at this point. 

By asserting at the outset that a proper philosophic code must address the issue of origins to being, Mr. Dogmass intentionally stacks the deck such that non-theists will automatically fail in providing a sufficient foundation to their philosophy. One cannot attempt to reason about the origin of something before one has identified the nature of that something. There is an order of priority here which theists who place such emphasis on the question of "origins" tend to overlook. If I see a car, for example, and have not made the effort to identify its make, I will have nothing to go on in determining the nation in which it was manufactured (i.e., its origin).  When I investigate the matter and discover that the car is a Volvo, for instance, then I can reasonably infer that the car originally came from Sweden. No, that's not a fantastic example, for it may be possible so far as I know that Volvo has manufacturing plants in other nations (e.g. Canada, Belgium, et al.), and the car could have been produced there. And of course this example already assumes that I've determined that the object I perceive is a car. Had my example not made this assumption, it is clear that the identification of the object as a car would constitute yet another step in this process. The point is that I do not need to know where the car was manufactured in order to be fully certain that the object I am perceiving is in fact an car. The question of the object's origin is not essential to a correct identification of the fact in question. So clearly we must begin any inference of "origins" with the identification of the nature of the object in question. Otherwise, we risk committing our conclusions to a false or inaccurate context.

When it gets to the universe as a whole, which is the sum of all existence, talk of "origins" is invalid, unless one is willing to assume that non-existence as such provides valuable explanation to that which does exist. But how does non-existence explain anything, and how does non-existence qualify as an "origin" of that which does exist? Were we to assume that non-existence plays a metaphysical, explanatory role for existence, we would also have to infer that existence came about through some kind of causal activity, and thus we would risk positing the concept 'causality' apart from existence, and consequently commit ourselves to another stolen concept. How can one posit a cause without assuming the existence of an entity which does the causing? As David Kelley states, "there's no dance without a dancer." Likewise, there's no cause without a causal agent, i.e., without something which exists. This points to the fact that we must begin with something which exists, i.e., we must begin with existence as such.

II. Misconstruing Atheism - A Commonplace Straw Man

Throughout his message, Mr. Dogmass shows himself accepting and repeating a tiresome misunderstanding, either careless or deliberate, of what atheism is, and of the nature of the Objectivist axioms, in order to vilify them. [2]

For instance, Mr. Dogmass wrote: "Athesism, if it's honest, can only provide a tautology in answer to the first set of questions: Existence exists, Rand's pseudo profound first axiom, begs the question." [sic]

First of all, Mr. Dogmass nowhere offers an argument for his conclusion here. His conclusion simply "follows" because he wants it to, not because it is the product of any valid reasoning based on objective facts. But more importantly, Mr. Dogmass completely misconstrues the nature of atheism. The fact is, atheism as such is not a position, but a negation in regard to the specific matter of adhering to a god-belief. Atheism is the absence of god-belief; an atheist has no god-belief. This is the definition truest to the roots of the concept, and is the proper use of the term. It does not follow from this that atheism as such is a philosophical code, for it is not asserting a positive. 

Consequently, to hold atheism culpable for the presumed failure to answer positively certain questions about philosophical issues, is to commit the fallacy which I call the allegation of the neglected onus. Atheists do not embrace god-beliefs. But this leaves it wide open what the atheist does embrace in terms of a positive philosophic system. Thus, Mr. Dogmass' intention here to dismiss all atheists with the wave of his hand as committed to alleged irrationalities is the result of his failing to integrate concepts objectively in terms of their essentials. This is most likely the case because he does not ascribe to a rational philosophy himself, and thus is unequipped to deal with concepts objectively. 

Furthermore, in regard to Rand's axiom 'existence exists', it is hard to see how this can "beg the question" (a charge which modern theists lob at non-theists far too frequently to be a course of reason, but rather a matter of unexamined habit, or anxiety to dismiss those positions which do not validate the apologist's own confessional investments). As an axiom, or starting point, the statement 'existence exists' is not the product of proof or argument, and thus cannot commit the fallacy known as begging the question. Nor is 'existence exists' the answer to a prior question. All concepts, and consequently all propositions, necessarily presuppose the fact of existence. It should be no surprise that Mr. Dogmass nowhere gives any support to his accusation that the axiom 'existence exists' begs the question. 

Mr. Dogmass wrote: "Furthermore, atheism cannot ascribe meaning to the existence of anything."

Again, it is not the task of atheism as such to ascribe meaning to existence. This belongs to a system of philosophy. Atheism is not a system of philosophy, as I pointed out above. Mr. Dogmass is trying to build a straw man by showing the alleged failure of atheism, but he cannot make it stick except by drawing on illegitimate premises. 

Mr. Dogmass wrote: "One of our esteemed atheists (still a member of the list) once declared, 'Everything is meaningless,' which is an honest statement for an atheist."

Whether or not the claim that "Everything is meaningless" is "an honest statement for an atheist" certainly depends on the worldview of the atheist in question. Since atheism as such is a non-position, a negation of a position (a negation of god-belief), there's simply not enough to go on in determining what one does affirm if all we know is that he is an atheist. I can only speak for myself: I am both honest and an atheist (since I have no god-belief), and I certainly do not affirm anything remotely resembling this position. Again, as we've come to expect from him, Mr. Dogmass gives no argument to support his characterizations here; he simply assumes his way to his desired conclusions, something which theists often accuse atheists of. 

Mr. Dogmass writes: "However such a claim requires no response, for the very making of a statement presumes meaning, so the statement is internally contradictory."

Agreed. What I do not agree with is the claim that such statements naturally apply to all atheists. This is a caustically naïve. 

Mr. Dogmass wrote: "Atheism can assume the uniformity and predictability of the universe, but cannot account for them."

I wouldn't even say that atheism specifically assumes "the uniformity and predictability of the universe,"  since atheism has no such task. Indeed, atheism cannot really even be said to have a task to begin with. It is simply non-belief in a set of ideas of a particular kind, namely god-belief. This incurs no positive commitments or obligations, nor does it necessarily imply a failure to administer legitimate philosophical responsibility. An atheist may affirm a benevolent, orderly universe, or he may hold the view that the universe is a malevolent, chaotic and disorderly jumble. Such possibilities are lost on Mr. Dogmass, and the view of atheism which he promotes here is simply another mischaracterization which he sets up in order to knock down with a mere wave of his hand. This is obvious because Mr. Dogmass does not argue for his conclusion here, he simply asserts it and others like it as if they were self-evidently valid. He would do well to check his premises, and the nature of the definitions they assume. 

An atheist, if he subscribes to a rational philosophy (as opposed to some form of mysticism or other irrational philosophic model), can justifiably assume the uniformity of the universe, and consistently so (something the theist can never do so long as he remains loyal to his mystical views), if by 'uniformity' we mean the universality of the law of identity. Existence exists, and as we saw above in Part I, this fact is fundamental and irreducibly primary; we do not explain this fact by appealing to something prior, for there is nothing prior. (Positing something "prior" to existence would assume that that something also exists, so no new ground is gained by such positions.) The law of identity, A is A, is a corollary of this fundamental, irreducibly primary fact; to exist is to be something, to be itself. This is the case with anything that exists. The universe is the sum total of existence, and thus wherever the universe exists, existence exists (and vice versa). And wherever existence exists, identity exists, and thus identity is universal. This simple chain of reasoning is all one needs to be justified in assuming the universal application of the law of identity, which is the foundational principle of reason and logic. No supernaturalism, no magic beings, no reality dictators, no hocus pocus or imaginative superstitions are required to recognize this, nor does positing any of these add anything to what is already there. The law of identity is not the product of consciousness, as the mystics would have it. Indeed, conscious activity must assume, either implicitly or explicitly, the fact that existence exists and the law of identity as its natural corollary, in order to reason in the first place, since consciousness itself also has identity. 

Mr. Dogmass wrote: "It must admit that the universe consists of a very large set of independent, unconnected particulars, that causal relationships are illusory and that continuity of being is also merely a figment of the human imagination, for there is no overarching principle that unites entities and events."

Individual atheists may admit the things which Mr. Dogmass identifies here, but clearly atheism as such does not, nor is one committed to these things by virtue of being an atheist. Again, to what particular philosophy does any particular atheist subscribe? Mr. Dogmass does not address this question. Instead, he wants a shortcut to repudiating his imagined enemies and critics. Again, I can only speak for myself, and do not pretend to speak for other atheists, because I recognize that many other atheists have fundamental disagreements with my philosophical position on many philosophic matters. 

However, Mr. Dogmass believes that he can speak for all atheists by filling in the blanks of their positions when they are not here to speak for themselves. There may be atheists who hold that "causal relationships are illusory and that continuity of being is also merely a figment of the human imagination," but I personally have not met any who affirm this view, nor have I read any writings of atheists who explicit assert this view (though I've read some that come quite close, or do even worse). We should also note that Mr. Dogmass nowhere cites atheists advocating the positions he rails against, which is not surprising. And even if he did, this would not validate his assumption that all atheists ascribe to the positions which he attributes to them. It is plain to see that he is trying to minimize his effort to "debunk atheism" by parroting assertions modeled by apologists preceding him, as if such a route provided a valid shortcut to his desired ends.

Specifically, what Mr. Dogmass fails to do is to show how the positions which he ascribes to atheists (presumably to all atheists) follow naturally and necessarily from the fact that they are atheists. If Mr. Dogmass cannot do this, then all his characterizations crumble into the sinking sand on which he's fabricated them. It is no surprise that he does not even try, but simply rattles off a list of accusations, accusations which he's likely read in some apologetic handbook (e.g., Bahnsen & co.) or picked up from some dime-a-dozen "ministry" website, chat group or sermonizer. 

Moreover, Mr. Dogmass' idea that the objects in reality are "connected" by some kind of "overarching principle," suggests the carelessness we find among so many thinkers today, who fail to distinguish between metaphysics and epistemology. Principles are abstractions, and are not metaphysical in nature; they do not 'exist' independent of consciousness for they are integrations performed by conscious activity. We do not break open a rock and find inside an "overarching principle" - like a fortune in a Chinese cookie. Things (objects, particulars, concretes) simply exist, and man conceptualizes them. Concepts do not 'exist' in some subliminal dimension of the universe which we grasp through passive "intuitions" or "revelations" (a view known as intrinsicism, which Objectivism rejects [3]). Just as we saw above that the notion that something must "account for" the fact of existence is invalid by virtue of the fallacy of the stolen concept, so is the notion that existence exists in order to fulfill a purpose, and for the same reasons. Metaphysically, there is no 'purpose' for the existence of things apart from reference to man's needs and/or involvement; to assert a purpose apart from man, as if the objects of reality exist in order to serve something beyond itself, is to accept another in a long line of stolen concepts.

Implicit in Mr. Dogmass' statement is the subtle endorsement of a false dichotomy, the two horns of which he identifies explicitly, namely that "causal relationships are illusory and that continuity of being is also merely a figment of the human imagination," or that there must be some "overarching principle that unites entities and events." In other words, the alternative assumed here is that reality ("causal relationships" and "continuity of being") is either the projection of the contents of man's consciousness ("merely a figment of the human imagination"), or that it is metaphysically unified by the contents of some cosmic, floating consciousness ("overarching principle" ostensively authored by the ruling consciousness). Thus the two alternatives which Mr. Dogmass apparently thinks are exhaustively representative metaphysics are the primacy of consciousness on the personal level, or the primacy of consciousness on the supernatural level. Thus, either way, when we dig up the operative assumptions buried under the morass of apologetic subterfuge, we find that it is the primacy of consciousness which is assumed as a rock-bottom, non-negotiable starting point. 

Not only do apologists fail to recognize this (for they are blinded by the subjectivity of their own god-beliefs and their internal, self-protective defense mechanisms), they will protest this point and resist any recognition underscoring the dependence of their worldview on the primacy of consciousness principle. Hence, they are held captive in the throes of their own stolen concepts, floating abstractions and package-deals, though they never achieve full awareness of this fact. It is their confessional investment which governs all criteria of scrutiny, not loyalty to the facts of reality, and those criteria have been tailored not to allow their defenders to scrutinize their own premises at all critically, let alone objectively.[4]

Since religious belief fosters the attitude of mind that one's own ideas (or those which he accepts as part of his god-belief program) are based on infallible transmissions from supernatural realms, those supposed transmissions are held as unquestionable premises, no matter how complex or abstract, no matter how cumbersome or resistant to comprehensibility, integration, or reduction to hierarchically prior facts. Cognition, for the believer, is not a means of discovering and identifying the facts of reality through a process of reason so that one may live his life and achieve his values, but a means of submission and obedience to those allegedly infallible transmissions from the supernatural (and by extension even to those who claim to hold the keys to their "proper interpretation"). On the question of how the believer "knows" these infallible transmissions are "true," he accepts a run-around, a tangled thread of interminable circularity, a yarn whose terminus is woven in confusion and incomprehensibility, whose ideas have no tie to reality, where emotion and knowledge are indistinguishable from one another while the believer's hopes are said to be at least equivalent with the concept of truth, if not fundamentally superior in terms of what to consider valid. [5]

If Mr. Dogmass is sincerely interested in an "overarching principle" on which to base a rational system of philosophy, he will have to look no further than to Objectivism. For in Objectivism we have the primacy of existence, the fundamental principle to all rational philosophy which identifies the fact that existence exists independent of consciousness. It is, however, this very principle which theists of course reject, because they cannot validate their god-beliefs on the basis of this principle. See my essay The Issue of Metaphysical Primacy for a deeper look into the definition and validation of this "overarching principle," which Mr. Dogmass claims atheists cannot provide.

Mr. Dogmass wrote: "There is no One that unites the Many."

The task of resolving conceptual problems no more belongs to atheism than it does to evolution or music theories. This belongs to the domain of rational philosophy, specifically to the branch of epistemology. Again, atheism is not a philosophic code unto itself, but a negation of a confessional commitment in regard to god-belief. A-tooth-fairy-ism (the non-belief in the existence of the Tooth Fairy) also does not address the so-called problem of universals, but this does not invalidate one's rejection of the Tooth Fairy, nor does one's rejection of the Tooth Fairy incapacitate the philosophical system to which he does ascribe from being equipped to deal with such problems. The same is true in the case of a-Satanism (the non-belief in Satan), a-Blarkism (the non-belief in Blarko the Wonder Being), and a-Santaism (the non-belief in Santa Claus). Person A's non-belief in X does not mean that Person A cannot reason objectively about Y (i.e., non-X), unless Y can be shown to be hierarchically dependent on X. This is why modern apologists have invented presuppositional apologetics, to make Y (in this case, one's use of reason) seem dependent upon X (in this case, Christian god-belief). Meanwhile, so long as the believer continues to allege unmet obligations where no such obligations are justified, he will continue to insulate his own confessional commitments from objective scrutiny.

Borrowing from Theism?

Mr. Dogmass wrote: "Atheism must borrow from theism the idea of an ordered universe, in which things cohere in a transcendent unifying principle."

Again, we find the persistence of what appears to be a deliberate misunderstanding, built on a hapless disintegration of essentials, which lays onus where no onus is due. Mr. Dogmass holds the absence of theism as such accountable for presumed faults, but his announcement of these accusations is delivered through a series of unargued assertions, one after another, each built on the same misunderstanding, each built on a false view of what atheism entails in terms of essentials, thus a product of religious bias, not of reason. This puts all atheists in the same boat in terms of that philosophy to which atheists do ascribe or employ, which is embarrassingly naïve. This is just another attempt to paint an individual's rejection of theism as inherently impotent, and it fails for the same reasons we've seen so far. 

If one's atheism is the product of reason [6], there is no reason why the accusation that atheists must "borrow from theism" necessarily holds. Reason and faith are epistemological opposites, and regardless of what the theologians have said through the centuries, reason is not the "handmaid of faith." [7] However, in spite of these facts, Christian apologists will continue to accuse non-Christians of "borrowing" from their worldview. So let us attend to this accusation for a few moments before moving on.

Mr. Dogmass wrote: "Add to Heidegger's question this one: 'Why is everything as it is at time A and the same at time A+n?'"

But this is not the case for all A's. Some A's change over the course of given periods, such as the population of Tokyo. What remains constant throughout all change, however, is the fact that existence exists. No matter what the population of Tokyo is at any given moment, whether 10 million or 15 million persons, the fact that existence exists does not change. And this is the ultimate basis of our acceptance of the law of identity, the principle that, for any A, if A should exist, it must be A. (This is certainly not an instance of "borrowing" from Christianity.) The theist wants the non-theist to "account for" the fact that existence exists, as we saw above. But any effort to provide such an accounting will amount to philosophical pretentiousness, for one will have to assume that which he must deny in order to grant the notion that existence can be accounted for by appeal to something other than existence - i.e., to non-existence. Non-existence explains nothing. The fact of existence is absolute, the basis for all explanation, even invalid explanation. It is undeniable, irreducible and inescapable. It is not explainable by appealing to consciousness, which is what the theist essentially wants [10], for this commits the theist to a stolen concept. Theists would do themselves a service by waking up and recognizing this. 

Mr. Dogmass wrote: "Atheism cannot answer that question; it can only assume on the basis of faith that things will continue as they have been. This applies not only to the material world (the only world atheism"

Mr. Dogmass did not finish his paragraph, so it is uncertain what the full point was that he was trying to convey here. Nonetheless, we have enough to work with, and what we find in what is given here, is that Mr. Dogmass is simply prolonging his reliance on the same illicit misrepresentation of atheism that we've seen so far. As mentioned numerous times now, atheism has no such obligation as Mr. Dogmass assumes here, so there is no failing here at all. All we have is bluster which essentially amounts to "I don't like atheism, so therefore it must be wrong." Beyond this, he gives us no argument to support the purported notion that non-theistic philosophies necessarily fail in the manner in which he is here saying atheism fails. Nowhere in his message does he demonstrate any awareness of his error in this regard, or any willingness to correct it. 

Part III. Ethics

Mr. Dogmass wrote: "Atheism can say, 'I don't like the Holocaust,' (or the Crusades, or the Inquisition) but it has no warrant to say that the Holocaust (or any of the other events) was evil, or that anything is good."

Here's another instance of the same error being repeated. It is clear that his intention here is specifically to discredit non-belief as such, when in fact he should focus on examining and criticizing the positive philosophical doctrines which various atheists might embrace. He may learn something, and I suspect this is one reason why he prefers to straw man his objects. The very fact that he does not support this assertion and the many which precede it with argument is in itself noteworthy.

Contrary to common apologetics, one needs neither to be a theist, nor to assume the truth, implicitly or explicitly, of a type of theism, in order to identify evil acts as evil, or to make objectively informed pronouncements against evil-doers. Objectivism in fact rescues the concepts 'good' and 'evil' from the concept-stealing clutches of the mystics, by basing them on an objective theory of values, a theory which is incompatible with religious metaphysics and morality. (See for instance my Introductory Treatise on Morality.) On the religious view, or more fundamentally, on the primacy of consciousness metaphysics which roots the religious view, the notions 'good' and 'evil' can be manipulated into meaning anything one wants them to mean by claiming that they comport with the dictates of the ruling consciousness. After all, Hitler's Holocaust against the Jews was justified in whole or in part (some would argue in whole) by reference to god-belief (Doug Krueger seals this case in his essay Copin' with Copan), as have so many other atrocities throughout history (e.g., the crusades, witch hunts, mock trials of accused heretics, the Inquisition, etc.). Buried in the philosophical premises of the ideas and policies which gave rise to and motivated such atrocities is the primacy of consciousness view of reality. They are on the public record and should not require any further comment so long as this connection is recognized and properly understood.

The "Normative Standard of Ethics" - Part I

Mr. Dogmass wrote: "For judgements like good and evil cannot be subjective, but must proceed from a standard, that by the very nature of ethics is required to fulfill three criteria: the normative standard of ethics must be transcendent, personal, and absolute."

Here Mr. Dogmass identifies three cardinal criteria which a "normative standard of ethics" should fulfill, according to his worldview. We shall examine each in turn. But at this time, we should notice the following significant omissions: nowhere does he  

Without addressing or clarifying these preliminary concerns before he begins to discuss the identity of the proper standard of ethics (or morality), he might as well be "speaking in tongues" which none of his readers can understand. The meaning of his primary terms is taken completely for granted and thus unclear, and consequently any secondary terms he should now discuss float in the air with no philosophical basis, with no tie to reality, no objective reference. This failure to define his terms will only haunt his argument from here forward, in spite of his efforts to posture as an authority in these matters. 

Mr. Dogmass wrote: "Transcendent and absolute are actually two sides of the same issue: any ethical standard must be ultimate, for if we say that ethical norms proceed from a finite individual (subjectivism) or a group of individuals (conventionalism) the man or culture that has been set up as a standard is capable of corruption."

Mr. Dogmass nowhere defines what he means by 'transcendent', nor does he explain what he means by the term in reference to the matter at hand (e.g., what does the thing which is said to be 'transcendent' transcend?). Thus, he provides little or no direct context to his assertion that the standard of ethics must be 'transcendent' in nature. Furthermore, we do not find this term 'transcendent' or any of its cognates defined in the Bible (Strong's Exhaustive Concordance does not even give an entry for this word, going from 'tranquility' to 'transferred', giving 'transcendent' a complete miss). Thus, the above statement is vague and open to various interpretation, and unfortunately allows for an indefinite latitude of ambiguity amenable to the influence of mystical (i.e., irrational) bias. Given the frailty of indicators for his intended meaning, we cannot rule out the possibility that Mr. Dogmass uses the term simply for its sound effect or emotional charge rather than to identify a genuine moral need.

William L. Reese, in his Dictionary of Philosophy and Religion [12] notes the following in regard to the term 'transcendent':

From the Latin transcendere meaning "to cross a boundary." This term, along with its other forms, "transcendental," "transcendence," and "transcendentalism," has been used in a number of ways, and with a number of distinct interpretations, in the history of philosophy.

In his Dictionary, Reese lists eight separate definitions and uses for the term in question. However, I will not try to coordinate from Mr. Dogmass' statements which of Reese's definitions for 'transcendent' he has in mind when he uses the term (since this may only multiply any guesswork on my part). Instead, I will rely more on the context of Mr. Dogmass' statements (what little there is) in order to draw out what he means. I can only work with this by attempting to provide my own interpretation of what is meant here, though because of its imprecision of thought, my effort to do so may not yield a product of certainty. However, the point of this exercise, which shall thread its way through the next few sections, will be to demonstrate that these criteria, supposing they were by themselves justified, do not warrant the leap to the supernatural or to the notion of a deity unless such notions are built into the criteria implicitly, i.e., only if the supernatural or deity is presupposed and smuggled into the theist's criteria. With this in mind, let us proceed. 

By the term 'transcendent', he seems to be wanting to say that an ethical standard must be in some way "beyond" that for which it serves as an ethical standard. In other words, the ethical standard for man must be "beyond" him in some way, specifically, outside his influence to change. If this is what Mr. Dogmass means here, I think there is a hint of truth here. This is what appears to be meant by his statement that "Transcendent and absolute are actually two sides of the same issue." Something that is absolute is not open to man's revision; it is stable and fixed. Likewise something that is 'transcendent' is beyond man's influence to change. But I am not convinced that my translation of Mr. Dogmass' statement here (primarily because of its insufficiencies) is very accurate because at this point the two terms seem redundant. If we posit something that is absolute, what new legitimate information or stipulation are we given by describing what is absolute as also 'transcendent'? Something that is absolute is equally "beyond" man's influence to change as well, so what need is there for this term 'transcendent', which at this point seems problematic, and even suspicious? Mr. Dogmass, of course, does not elaborate. 

If the 'boundary' to be crossed is assumed to be that delimiting reality, thus pointing to a standard "outside reality" (i.e., non-reality), we are justified in rejecting Mr. Dogmass' criterion 'transcendent' from the very beginning of our inquiry. The non-real has no application to the real, and the standard of real values does not find its source in the non-real. If Mr. Dogmass & co. want to say that their standard of ethics is genuinely real (i.e., that it actually exists), why the need to 'transcend' reality? Such supposed criteria, from an objective point of view, can only be considered as a gateway to the arbitrary.

However, assuming any accuracy to my interpretation, this approach to moral norms appears to be built on a logical reversal. What appears to be happening is that the ethical standard is being described after the ethical system itself has been framed and developed rather than first asking what an ethical system is, what it should accomplish, and why, if at all, anyone needs it. (See my points above.) Mr. Dogmass' preferred course is not a rational (i.e., scientific) approach to the subject of ethics, but a means of rationalizing a system of ethics which one has accepted without first addressing these important questions. His aim here, so it appears, is to give the primitive nature of religious confessional investments an air of modern credibility.

By a rational or scientific means of approaching the issue of ethics, we should be willing at minimum to address questions such as the following: 

Religious ethics in general, and Mr. Dogmass' considerations of ethics in particular, do not proceed according to this course of inquiry, an approach which seeks to discover and identify man's needs based on evidences in reality. Instead, religious ethical teachings reverse this approach, preferring one which begins with non-negotiable, predetermined conceptions of what constitutes the practical expression of ethics (namely self-sacrifice compelled by unargued commandments), and then rationalizing why ethical standards might be needed by man and inferring from these presuppositions what supposedly constitutes those standards. Then, after all this, some definition of ethics may be provided, but one which must be retrofitted to accommodate preconceived notions of right and wrong. Theists who intend to defend their religious programs against the criticisms of non-believers should take note: "Definitions are the guardians of rationality, the first line of defense against the chaos of mental disintegration." [13] Instead of discovering what are man's objective moral needs and identifying a code of values which conforms to his meeting those needs, man is to be conformed - by force, if necessary - to ethical norms which do not stem from his objective moral needs, and thus meeting those needs is at best taken for granted or simply deemed irrelevant to his moral nature and conduct. This is worse than simply a sloppy approach to the issue of ethics, an issue far too important to man to be left to the hazards such evasions and omissions can only produce; it is a view of morality which, if taken seriously and applied consistently, dramatically undercuts man's potential to live and enjoy his life on rational terms.

The Bible, to my knowledge, nowhere defines the concepts 'ethics' or 'morality'. Indeed, my concordance does not even have entries for these two crucial concepts. This failure to define crucial terms suggests two things, 

Because of this latter point, that we must infer an ethical code from the primitive writings of the Bible, theologians will constantly be at risk of interpolating modern definitions, views and prejudices into their inferences, thus shaping their resulting conclusions, definitions and doctrines according to the image of ethics they already have in mind. The passages in the Bible which offer moral tenets or inferential cues (e.g., direct commandments, maxims, parables, etc.) are not only often ambiguous, they are also often couched in poetic imagery which may be taken literally or figuratively by particular theologians and commentators, allowing their own biases more sway than may initially be perceived. This is one reason why there are not only numerous incompatible interpretations on the meaning of various passages among Christians, but also why Christianity as a whole is splintered into dozens of rival denominations, sects and conferences. In addition to this, theologians are at risk of assuming at the outset of such an enterprise that the ethical inferences which they derive from the books of the Bible can integrate all the many precepts, injunctions, and illustrations of ethical principles contained therein into a consistent, non-contradictory whole. 

If such a consistent integration of ideas is presupposed by theologians at the outset of coordinating into a systematic whole, a set of genetically unrelated maxims, injunctions, and inferences, all of which are assembled together in what amounts to popular vote among an elite group of priests, a process which seems wildly presumptuous (particularly because of the many different authors contributing to the books of the Bible, the great span of time in which they were composed, edited, redacted and assembled - on the verge of 1500 years! - and thee broad-ranging circumstances from which these inferences must be derived), it is difficult to see how the assemblage produced by such an effort can be objective and suitable for man. This resembles more of a cut-and-paste approach to philosophy than an effort of reason. [14] Man's needs are certainly not the fundamental concern in such a task, but preserving a confessional investment which is unfit for man. And this they call morality!

I submit that it is because of the astounding enormity of such a task as the attempt to derive an integrated, systematic and non-contradictory code of ethics from the murky writings contained in the Bible, that Mr. Dogmass and others like him are so typically silent when it comes to defining their views on ethics in terms of essentials. The bases of their principles are not the facts of reality which we discover objectively, but arbitrary, predetermined conclusions guided by confessional commitments which are not open to negotiation. The result cannot be objective, for the facts of reality do not provide the standard, nor will they magically rearrange themselves in order to become irrelevant to man's life needs. The result can only be arbitrary, for the standard amounts to nothing more than the religious precommitments of whichever theologian is assembling these inferences and calling them a consistent whole. 

The Issue of Slavery

Mr. Dogmass wrote: "Witness the fact that in the US in 1860 slaves were declared property and not humans, or in Germany in the late 1930s that Jews were declared less than human. Atheism can wrinkle its nose in disgust at such things, but it cannot say they are wrong."

This is one reason why man needs philosophy to begin with: to determine what makes his life possible and what is beneficial or harmful for his life. Atheism is not a philosophy. Certain philosophies are atheistic in nature in that they do not affirm notions of the supernatural or ascribe to god-belief, but this says nothing about the philosophic positions which they do endorse, and this is the fact which, time and time again, Mr. Dogmass resists engaging.

The "Normative Standard of Ethics" - Part II

Mr. Dogmass wrote: "The normative standard must be higher than any human institution, because human institutions are all capable of corruption."

The explicit meaning of such statements is that the standard of a proper moral code is absolute and not subject to revision by whim. The implicit meaning, however, is that that standard should be something other than man, something which man must serve.

Mr. Dogmass' chief concern here appears to be identifying a system of morality whose standard successfully averts the threat of corruption, either from inside or outside the system. If it is true that "human institutions are all capable of corruption," this is nowhere more explicit than in the case of churches, which are human institutions whose aim is to interpret and filter the teachings of the Bible.

The assumption implicit in Mr. Dogmass' positions, however, is that, since man should not (for whatever reason) be allowed to think for himself and use his capacity to reason in order to determine what his values are and what is the proper course of action needed to achieve and protect those values, man must be controlled by commandments and injunctions which enslave his life to an existence of self-denial, self-sacrifice, and self-immolation. Faith, not reason, is to be man's moral guide. In other words, man's entire life is to be governed by his mystical beliefs in the supernatural ("Do as I say, not as I do," saith the Lord thy God) rather than by the facts of reality. This ignores the fact that man's moral choices and actions are goal-oriented (i.e., values-oriented) and that his goal-oriented choices and actions must be based on reason, not faith, if those choices and actions are to have any value and meaning to his life.

Mr. Dogmass wrote: "Even such an august body as the UN-run International War Crimes Tribunal is not infallible. To whom does someone convicted by the Tribunal appeal if, say, a judge is paid off? To whom do we appeal if the Tribunal becomes the corrup instrument of a corrupt state? Even such a planetary body is not ultimate enough to provide an ethical norm of right and wrong, of good and evil. There must be a transcendent standard." [sic]

Even Mr. Dogmass' own example of the UN undermines his own point. The UN can be described as "transcendent" in that its authority supposedly "transcends" national borders and therefore presumably individual and national sovereignty. Here we have a "transcendent standard" which is obviously, and by Mr. Dogmass' own admission, open to corruption, just as the Church is. The fact that it is "transcendent" in some way does not guarantee it from being corrupted, or from being corrupt in the first place, as we find among the churches and church leaders. The UN's authority allegedly "transcends" national authority, just as apologists claim that the church's authority allegedly "transcends" the personal sovereignty of the individual, which does not seem to concern Mr. Dogmass.

What Mr. Dogmass and theists like him want is to claim that the moral system proper for man should be of supernatural origin. In other words, they want it to "transcend" reality, to find its norm in specifically non-natural, non-human (i.e., inhuman) standards, but which humans are expected to accept on faith and obey in spite of their deliberate anti-man design and incomprehensibility. Essentially, what Mr. Dogmass and theists like him want is an infallible and unquestionable source of knowledge and morality. This is both a wishful fantasy (for knowledge is hierarchical and achievable only by means of reason, not an automatic "gift" from the beyond), as well as an expression of the desire for the unearned. Such a view of knowledge and morality is suitable chiefly for those who either do not wish to think for themselves, or who are interested primarily in controlling other persons, or both. The acceptance of a supposedly infallible and unquestionable system of philosophy, particularly in morality, is well suited for those who presume the authority to preach to their laity "do as I say (not as I do)." Such a view of morality, of infallible and unquestionable decrees alleged to be of supernatural origin, is suited to enslaving man, not liberating him so that he can live and enjoy his life.

The attempt to use reason in order to argue for such a system of morality, a system which is completely opposed to the principle that man has the right to exist for his own sake, is to make a mockery of both reason and morality. Those who claim that ethical standards must be in some way "transcendent" must clarify what they mean. Exactly what should the standard of an objective morality "transcend"? Mr. Dogmass has given us some inkling of why he thinks ethical standards should be "transcendent," but this is insufficient, even if his explanations were clearly expressed in terms of rational principle (and from what he has provided, I cannot grant that they are so clearly expressed, for even his own examples have a way of coming back and biting him).

To whom or to what does the believer appeal if he should discover evidence that the church fathers have suppressed evidence which contradicts the alleged infallibility of the Bible? Should he consult with the church leaders? What guarantees that they will treat such discoveries objectively, seeing that their entire basis for authority is built on the presumption that the Bible is infallible? Apologists will say that individuals should consult the Bible to resolve such matters. But this would simply beg the question, because it assumes the validity of the very point in question. 

Mr. Dogmass wrote: "Atheism cannot account for why the human mind finds mathematically related vibrations of the air beautiful; it cannot account for the difference between noise and music (and postmodern culture has been aggressive about obliterating the distinction, as the pop charts show.) It cannot account for the why some poetry and prose is beautiful and the Tax Code is not."

The Tax Code may indeed be considered an object of beauty to some people. For instance, church leaders whose churches are exempted from taxation are likely to consider it beautiful. [23] Socialists and dictators, people who desire to rule other men, will likely consider a set of laws designed to bring them regular yields of unearned income to be an object of beauty. The desire for the unearned is explicitly fostered by both religious and secular forms of collectivism.

Mr. Dogmass also mentions music ("...mathematically related vibrations of the air..."), and claims that atheism "cannot account for why the human mind finds [music] beautiful." Is Mr. Dogmass suggesting that his theistic worldview can "account for" "why the human mind finds [music] beautiful"? Can Mr. Dogmass show us for the record where the authors of the Bible discuss the physics of music (e.g., acoustics) and the psycho-epistemology of musical response in the human mind? Consulting modern scientists and psychologists who claim to be Christians in order to provide such an account, and thereby offer the pretense that the Christian worldview "accounts for" such phenomena, would clearly be disingenuous. If the Bible does not explain the "secret" why the interval of a major third sounds more coherent than that of a minor third in certain musical contexts, what justifies the Bible-believer to blame non-believers for this very failing? Besides, as we've seen time and time again, it is not the task of atheism to provide such an account in the first place, so Mr. Dogmass' clearly biased accusation here is completely inert.

Ironically, Mr. Dogmass complains parenthetically that "postmodern culture has been aggressive about obliterating the distinction [between music and noise], as the pop charts show." While this comment certainly may well be accurate in some cases, he's trapped by his own quandary here. For again if the Bible does not provide the supposed solutions to the problem he's trying to isolate here, then it very well may be that his own primitive worldview is partially to blame. (After all, it is indisputable that Christianity is and has been the predominant religious influence in American culture.) I don't know of any place in the Bible where its authors explain the difference between music and noise, but if they do, Mr. Dogmass is welcome to point it out. After all, the psalmists repeatedly urge believers to "make a joyful noise" [24] and this exhortation is rather open-ended, and does nothing to suggest that its author had in mind any less blurred distinction between music and noise than the pop charts Mr. Dogmass complains about. Indeed, the author specifically instructs the reader to make noise, not music. So it's unclear exactly how Mr. Dogmass would defend his stated resentment here. 

The irony of Mr. Dogmass' complaint here only multiplies when we recognize the fact that man's capacity to enjoy music to begin with is selfish in nature, and Bible-based religion is completely opposed to man's selfish enjoyment. When one says that something is enjoyable, be it a piece of music, a fine meal or an evening of lovemaking, to whom is it enjoyable? Obviously, to one's self. The concept 'enjoyment' has no meaning when detached from man's selfishness. Quite simply, the Bible's condemnations of man's selfishness, whether it be his mind (by commanding him to accept the arbitrary on faith, thus derailing his ability to reason), his pride (pride is the most hated of man's virtues according to the Bible), or his capacity for pleasure (which the Bible condemns as "carnal" and "wicked"), cannot be integrated with his ability to enjoy music. And since theists must implicitly reject the hierarchical nature of knowledge (as a consequence of rejecting reason by preferring faith in 'revelations'), they will most likely not recognize the connection between man's selfishness and his ability to enjoy music, even if it is isolated for them. 

Mr. Dogmass wrote: "It cannot account for the beauty of the world, for beauty under atheism is a figment of the imagination and has no more reality than good or evil. Atheism uses highflung words but if it is honestly expressed, it reduces to nihilism. There is no truth, no beauty, no good, no evil, no meaning, no origin, no destiny, nothing. It cannot tell the difference between being and non-being, meaning and confusion, good and evil, truth and falsehood, beauty and ugliness. It cannot even tell the difference between philosophical plenum and vacuum, as the title of the thread so eloquently illustrates. It can only say, as Robert DeNiro expressed in _The Deer Hunter_, "This is this!" in an echo of Rand's empty words."

As we saw in Part I already, Mr. Dogmass does not recognize the nature of a starting point, specifically the fact that a starting point by its very nature assumes no prior concepts.  And as we've seen throughout Part II and Part III, he also fails to grasp the fact that atheism is not a philosophical "system," merely a negation of a certain kind of belief, namely god-belief. Both these facts are lost on him, and these are not isolated cases, but are the norm rather than the exception. And so long as atheists validate these common misconstruals, either deliberately or inadvertently, theists who have been taught to repeat them, like Mr. Dogmass, will likely never recognize their error.

No, atheism as such does not account for the beauty of the world, but not for the reasons which Mr. Dogmass assumes (or wants his reader to assume). It is not the task of atheism to "account for" the beauty of the world, nor for its ugliness, and we should not expect it to. Depending on what is meant here by "account for" (admittedly a loaded term if left open to implicit understanding), this is the task of philosophy. 

I don't know what he means by his reference to "the difference between philosophical plenum and vacuum," or its context (I am not privy to the "thread" he mentions), but I would like to know what that difference is in his mind, and why he thinks "atheism" cannot "tell" it. 

Atheism is not a blanket term that can be excised of fundamental contexts in order to stand as a representative for all non-theistic philosophies.  In this respect, I generally agree with George H. Smith when he writes:

". . . I never crusade for atheism per se outside of a wider framework. Atheism is significant, to be sure. But it's significance derives entirely from the fact that it represents the application of reason to a particular field, specifically the area of religious belief. Atheism, unless it is ingrained within this greater philosophical defense of reason, is practically useless. When, however, it is the consequence of the habit of reasonableness, then atheism stands in opposition to the wave of supernaturalism and mysticism we are currently experiencing. In other words, irrationalism in any form it may occur." [25]

Notes

[1] This list is not my invention. This is precisely how Ayn Rand summarized her philosophy in its most general conception. See for instance The Essentials of Objectivism on the Ayn Rand Institute Homepage.

[2] I refer readers to Post 65: The Definition of Atheism, from The Tindrbox Files, for the definition of atheism which I am assuming here.

[3] See for instance Peikoff, Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand, pp. 142-150, 245-247.

[4] Apologist Greg Bahnsen admits as much when he writes in his short essay Van Til's 'Presuppositionalism' that God's "word and character are not questionable."

[5] Many believers have cited Paul's statement in Romans 8:24-25 (cf.) et al. in order to bolster their view that hope as such has epistemological significance (i.e., as a means of validation).

[6] See for instance my Atheological Credo.

[7] I show why the view that reason must assume faith is in error in my essay The Issue of Metaphysical Primacy.

[8] I would note, but not for the reasons which theists like Mr. Dogmass presume, that some secular philosophies such as Communism, while not intentionally "borrowing" from theism, have inherited many of religion's negative points, simply because their framers, like their religious predecessors, failed to question their premises. See for instance my correspondence Religion Wears a Bloody Glove to show the essential philosophical similarities between religion and its secular collectivistic counterparts. So if Christians want to assume ultimate credit for a brain child like Communism, so be it.

[9] By 'exegetically flexible' I am referring to the pliancy of "scripture" whose virtue is its enabling of various denominations, sects and schisms to expound biblical passages in support of their competing interpretations. The scriptural dilemmas generating the highly charged Calvinist-Arminian frictions are a case in point.

[10] See for instance my essay The Ruling Consciousness.

[11] See this post to the Van Til Discussion list.

[12] Amherst, NY: Humanity Books, 1999; s.v. 'Transcendent, The'.

[13] Ayn Rand, "Art and Cognition," The Romantic Manifesto, Second Revised Edition, (New York: Signet, 1975), p. 77.

[14] This is neither a far-fetched criticism nor an unexpected realization if we examine the Bible with a critical eye. The books of the Bible were assembled in a manner which relied exclusively on fallible human criteria and means, including theological biases and the vote of numerous councils whose primary purpose was to agree on which texts were to be officially recognized as authoritative canon. See for instance Richard Carrier's excellent summary of this latter point The Formation of the New Testament Canon. Further, the fact that each particular biblical text itself was assembled from otherwise unconnected statements and sections is recognized by many scholars. For instance, D. E. Nineham points out that the Mark's gospel, the earliest of the four collected in the New Testament, "consists of a number of unrelated paragraphs set down one after another with very little organic connexion, almost like a series of snapshots placed side by side in a photograph album... [that] essentially each one is an independent unit..." (The Gospel of St. Mark [The Pelican New Testament Commentaries], Harsondsworth, 1963, pp. 27-8; quoted in G. A. Wells' review of Gary Habermas' and Antony Flew's debate on the resurrection, A Resurrection Debate). Thus, the description 'cut-and-paste' has a literary as well as a philosophical application appropriate to the subject matter at hand.

[15] See What the Bible Says About Human Slavery.

[16] In fact, an often suppressed fact is that during the debates on the abolition of the practice of slavery in 19th century America, some of the chief voices against abolishing slavery were Christian leaders who defended the practice on biblical grounds! Pro-slavery Christians have cited such verses as Genesis 9:25, Exodus 21:20-21, Leviticus 25:44, Deuteronomy 15:12-18, Jeremiah 27:8, 12, Joel 3:8, Acts 17:26, Matthew 10:24, Ephesians 6:5-6, Colossians 3:22, I Timothy 6:1, Titus 2:9-10, I Peter 2:18-29 et al., demonstrated the dismally unenlightened views of the Bible's authors.

[17] See especially Ayn Rand, Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal, (New York: Signet, 1967), 349 pages, including index.

[18] Again, I refer readers to Religion Wears a Bloody Glove.

[19] See especially Ayn Rand's "The Objectivist Ethics," The Virtue of Selfishness, (New York: Signet, 1964), pp. 13-35. Objectivist philosopher Tara Smith has devoted an entire book to this thesis in Viable Values: A Study of Life as the Root and Reward of Morality, (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000), 191 pages. Online readers are encouraged to review Eyal Mozes' Life As the Standard of Value.

[20] See Introductory Treatise on Morality.

[21] Cf. Proverbs 8:13, 11:2, 13:10, 16:5, 18; Isaiah 25:11, 28:1; Ezekiel 16:49; Hosea 5:5; Mark 7:20-23; Romans 1:30; II Timothy 3:2; James 4:6; I Peter 5:5. The online Catholic Encyclopedia's article on Pride states that pride "is ordinarily accounted one of the seven capital sins...," and is regards as "a species of contempt of God" and thus  a "mortal sin of a most heinous sort."

[22] Ayn Rand states that "The virtue of Pride can best be described by the term: 'moral ambitiousness'. It means that one must earn the right to hold oneself as one's own highest value by achieving one's own moral perfection." "The Objectivist Ethics," The Virtue of Selfishness, (New York: Signet, 1964), p. 27.

[23] For instance, see this article Tax-Exempt Case Has Positive Outcome for Churches on the National Liberty Journal website.

[24] See for instance Psalms 66:1, 81:1, 95:1-2, 98:4-6, 100:1. Psalm 98:4 even says "make a loud noise" in addition to "make a joyful noise."

[25] From Smith's How to Defend Atheism.

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