For ease of user navigation, this essay is divided up into the following sections:

• dispenses with the "traditional use" of "evidences" in order to securely adhere to dogma rather than to the facts of reality;
• is antagonistic to man's independent mind (which may be referred to as "intellectual autonomy");
• does not stand up to rational philosophy (Objectivism) under scrutiny; and
• relies on subterfuge rather than on objectivity in order to convince prospective converts of their own supposed intellectual futility.

Quotations attributed to Mr. Walker will refer to this post, unless otherwise noted.

One of the primary focuses of presuppositionalist "thought" is found in the area of classical philosophical issues, such as universals and induction, with which many modern philosophers have struggled in futile effort. In regard to these "problems," exponents of presuppositionalism make the bold claim that their version of Christianity supplies all the answers needed finally to resolve them. In regard to induction, which is the primary focus of Mr. Walker's apologetic in the above-referenced post, and consequently of my proceeding analysis, philosopher Michael Martin offers the following recognition in this respect:

Essentially, the presuppositionalist apologetic holds that one is not "justified" to assume the validity of the pre-conditions of induction without also assuming the existence of the Christian God as the agent responsible for the reality of those pre-conditions.

Atheism is the negation of god-belief, and as such makes no positive philosophical claims. By extension, atheism asserts no positive view of metaphysics, epistemology or ethics, and therefore bears no obligation to inform a view on induction. To hold atheism as such responsible for providing solutions to philosophical quagmires, and then attack it when it does not satisfy this alleged obligation, is, in my view, fallacious. Such attempts to discredit non-belief are the result of a poor and prejudiced understanding of the concepts involved.

However, this does not relieve an individual from the necessity of using his mind and of defining the proper means of cognition. The science which provides the proper means of cognition, as well as the principles which give man's cognition its foundation, is philosophy. According to Objectivism, philosophy is indispensable to man's life. I quote Ayn Rand:

Consequently, while I maintain that atheism per se does not inform a view of the fundamental nature of existence - and consequently is not obliged to "provide a rational justification" for one's views on the fundamental nature of existence, one's particular philosophical ideas, whether they are implicitly or explicitly held, do inform such a view. Consequently, it is wrongheaded to hold atheism as such accountable for such a justification.

Thus, to pursue Mr. Choi's question, "Can the atheist, *within his metaphysical assumptions*, provide a rational justification for the inductive principle?" it is necessary to ask: "What are a given atheist's metaphysical assumptions?" Are these assumptions held implicitly, or explicitly? What is the basis of these assumptions? Are there presumptions which these assumptions themselves presuppose? What ultimately lies at the bedrock of a given atheist's cognition? Essentially, what is his starting point?

However, from what I've gathered from my attendance to their literature, these facts and distinctions are not at all what presuppositionalists tend to incorporate into their argument schemes. Instead, their argument is that a whole and proper view of induction cannot be complete without the inclusion of their particular Christian god-belief in the presuppositional foundations of induction, since, they hold, the universe is the creation of the Christian God of the Bible, and that any predication (that is, affirming truths) taking place within it at least implicitly acknowledges this to be the case. It is certain aspects of this claim and its supporting arguments which I examine in the following analysis.

But even if we grant Mr. Walker's premises for argument's sake, how does he establish that "All arguments for ultimate authority end up 'begging the question'"? Certainly even the presuppositionalist must admit that this is a broad generalization which Mr. Walker asserts, but for which he offers no support, at least in his post, nor does he cite a source which offers such support. If he were to put forth an argument to support this, what would it be? Or, perhaps he just parrots this claim from its sources as if its truth were self-evident or uncontroversial.

But even before he should put forth a supporting argument for this generalization which he applies universally (including to his own schemes), he should explain what he means by "ultimate authority" and what presumptions this notion has (i.e., he should define his own terms).

What is important is that Mr. Walker is willing to admit that he begs the question in attempting to establish his conclusions. Commitment to fallacy is just that: a commitment to cognitive error. How does Mr. Walker expect arguments to succeed when they can only proceed on the commitment to fallacy? Blank out.

Mr. Walker tries to clarify his point when he writes, "The question is not whether one 'begs the question', but whether or not one's ultimate foundations can provide an adequate explanation for all that we assume to be true of the universe." But this continues his admission that question-begging is indeed a necessary part of his worldview and apologetic. This is his error, not the non-believer's. Declaring one's own commitment to circularity and expecting the non-believer to match fallacy for fallacy - presumably by necessity - are counterproductive to his expressed goal of providing a convincing argument or "adequate explanation," but it is no surprise given the stolen concepts upon which his view is internally dependent.

One wonders precisely what may constitute Mr. Walker's standards for adequacy in explanation when he affirms that an explanation (i.e., appealing to "God") reached by circular argument achieves this adequacy. Adequacy according to what standard? Certainly this standard cannot be reason, for the reasonable does not knowingly proceed on the basis of admitted fallacy.

The apologist challenges the non-believer to "provide an adequate explanation" or to "account for" the uniformity of nature. But the uniformity which we discover in nature is simply the extension of the fact that existence exists, and its corollary - the fact that existence is identity - to everything which exists. The apologist expects the non-believer to "justify" his presumption of these facts, which are perceptually available to both believers and non-believers, which means: the non-believer cannot assume the law of identity in order to "prove" that nature is uniform (without begging the question). But why should anyone want to try to "prove" that nature is uniform, particularly when this fact is entailed axiomatically (i.e., corollary to axiomatic concepts)?

So the apologist not only bears the onus of demonstrating the worthiness of any alleged starting point he claims to ground his view of reality and knowledge (Is it irreducible? Is it fundamental? How is he aware of it? etc.), he also bears the onus of proving the existence of his alleged God, which so far he has not done. And suppose he could prove the existence of God, what then? The consequences for the apologist would not be in favor for the doctrines he is peddling; instead, the very possibility of a proof of God's existence would spell disaster for his agenda. As one prominent Objectivist notes,

If one could prove the existence of God, then this knowledge would be available to all men, since it would no longer be a matter of faith, but a matter of reason. But if the existence of God were provable and now a matter of reason rather than faith, then where would that put Christian theism as a philosophy with all its appeals to mystery and mysticism? How could Christian doctrine be considered a matter of revelation if one could validly argue for its conclusions? Where would a legitimate proof of God's existence put the priest? Indeed, a genuine proof of God's existence would radically cripple religion both philosophically and, more importantly, psychologically.

Mr. Walker reasons:

In informal debates I have asked advocates of presuppositionalism if it is the case that they accept the Bible's claims and teachings unquestioningly, and, after some understandable hesitation, they have affirmed this. This is an extremely uncomfortable - dilemma for the believer to find himself in, for if on the one hand he does not affirm that he accepts the teachings of the Bible unquestioningly, then he must consequently admit that he measures those teachings according to some standard external to the Bible (such as his own reasoning, which is condemned by presuppositionalism as deceitfully "autonomous"), thus compromising his claim to submission to "God's authority" as 'ultimate'. And if he says that he measures the Bible's validity by reference to "the created order," he begs the question, for he assumes the truth of the notion of creation, a staple doctrine of Christianity.

On the other hand, if he does admit that he accepts the teachings of the Bible unquestioningly, as suggested by Bahnsen's remark, then he must admit that he will never be in a position to evaluate the validity of the Bible's claims objectively (i.e., without warranted prejudice), because they must be taken completely for granted from the beginning, regardless of external support (or the lack thereof) and in the absence of rational verification. The Bible is quite a lengthy yarn to be subject to such undiscriminating acceptance, and would require complete intellectual surrender on the part of the believer in order for this claim to actually be considered true.

Mr. Walker's claim that Christian theism alone provides a consistent "justification for induction, uniformity of nature, the laws of logic, human dignity and objective morality" directly conflicts with the view that the teachings of the Bible should be accepted unquestioningly, for now he appeals to some standard which he believes Christian theism can satisfy. This is hardly consistent.

When Mr. Walker asserts that "No other worldview can provide such" a justification, allegedly without begging the question (an error in cognition which he admits his own worldview commits), he offers another unargued claim. Not only does this statement deepen his previously acknowledged commitment to circular reasoning, it takes the form of a universal negative claim which is most likely offered prematurely and smacks of purely dogmatic bias (i.e., he wants it to be the case). The principal question here then becomes: How does he arrive at this conclusion? The theist may respond to the request for proof concluding that "no other worldview than Christian theism can provide a rational justification for induction, uniformity of nature, etc." by pointing out that atheists routinely acknowledge that they are under no obligation to prove negative assertions (such as the assertion "there is no God") and thus presumes that he's off the hook in this regard. Indeed, the atheist is not obligated to do so (especially when it comes to god-belief debates).

However, since many Christian apologists insist that non-believers prove the non-existence of God, they should be willing to attempt to prove their own negative claims in the interest of consistency. If the theist is unwilling to be consistent with his own instances of insistence on obligations for the atheist, he concedes on this point and thus loses credibility (assuming he's achieved any to begin with). After all, if Mr. Walker is so certain that "no other worldview can provide" a rational justification for induction, the uniformity of nature, the laws of logic, etc., can he not at least demonstrate the steps by which he arrived at this view? Or, should he be satisfied by his own unargued positions? Or, perhaps his assertion is a mere representation of untenable wishful thinking?

Now let us turn to the primary topic which concerns us, namely the uniformity of nature and the foundations of induction, so far as they are relevant to Mr. Walker's apologetic.

With this fundamental point in mind, let us now examine Mr. Walker's argument in regard to induction.

Mr. Walker's presented the following:

Before I begin my analysis, there are two primary areas of concern which I believe should be pointed out.

Second, to pre-stage my analysis, there is a serious concern which a review of Mr. Walker's premises brings to light, but which are not convincingly answered in favor of his argument. His first premise specifically includes the parenthetical reservation that the orderliness of the universe is not absolute. While not necessary to his argument's overall validity, this parenthetic aside we shall find is problematic for the theist, ironically in regard to the matter of induction itself! Additionally, we will find that his second premise is untrue. If I can demonstrate that there are problems with Mr. Walker's premises, then we have good reason to reject his conclusion. And when we recognize that Mr. Walker's argument, even if it were sound, fails to establish the existence of the Christian God of the Bible, we should also recognize that such arguments, if this is the best argument we are given to support the apologist's claim that God exists, constitute an evasion of his onus to prove his claims.

Premise 1: The Non-Absolute Orderliness of the Universe

(Although this point is not critical to either the validity or the goal of Mr. Walker's argument, I think it deserves special mention in my analysis particularly because of its devastating implications for Christian epistemology in general, and induction in particular, which is of central importance to the present discussion.)

His first premise reads: "Induction assumes an orderly (not absolutely), predictable (not absolutely) universe."

Notice his parenthetical reservations here: Induction assumes an orderly universe, but this orderliness is not absolute. Consequently, if this orderliness is not absolute, then one's ability to predict its events will consequently be non-absolute as well, as Mr. Walker mentions. Thus, presumably, the same cause may not have the same effect in two or more identical instances. No doubt, being a theist of the Christian tradition, which incorporates into its doctrines the assertion that miracles are a reality, Mr. Walker qualifies this orderliness as not absolute in order to leave room to posit divinely inspired revisions of reality (i.e., existence, identity, causality, etc.), and thus allow any elasticity which his dogmatic commitments or argumentative convenience may require him to defend in the future (such as in the case of defending the gospel story of the resurrection).

Mr. Walker later emphasizes this in his message when he states, "The Christian worldview does not assume ABSOLUTE uniformity and orderliness." But does not Christian theism assume that the "created realm" [sic] is uniformly subject to God's will? And if so, is this uniform subjection to God's will not also absolute? Or, are some things more subject to God's will, while other things are less subject to his will?

Apart from these parenthetical reservations, I see no problem with the premise that induction assumes an orderly universe. There is, however, no need to compromise the assumed orderliness of the universe, since all exemptions from this orderliness and all violations of the law of identity are deemed arbitrary by Objectivism and only serve to destroy the reliability of induction. Contradictions do not exist, and consequently there is no need to make allowance for contradictions in one's theory of induction.

Premise 2: Accounting for "Account for"

Furthermore, since "account for" alone does not guarantee rational validity in one's explanations, what measures are in place in the presuppositional apologetic to protect one's explanations from reaching beyond the objectively valid and "transcending" into the arbitrary? Since one can presumably continue to insist that one's explanations be "accounted for" by ever appealing to prior knowledge - particularly if one ignores the hierarchical nature of knowledge, does the presuppositional method allow for an objective stopping point to guard against infinite regress, stolen concepts, and similar errors? Obviously the answer is no if, at the end of the "accounting" which the presuppositionalist believes to offer the best solutions to his questions, we find a breach of knowledge hierarchy and the assertion of concepts genetically stripped from their objective roots (such as the idea of consciousness prior to existence), which is inevitable in any defense of mystic philosophy. Thus, it may very well be the case that the apologist's challenge that atheists "account for" certain philosophical issues, is little more than an invitation to join the apologist in his orgy of fallacy-worship. Besides, if "account means logical proof," as Mitchell has claimed, wouldn't we need to assume uniformity before we even embark on constructing proofs?

I argue that if the appeal to theism in the effort to "account for" induction commits the fallacy of the stolen concept, then its conclusions are invalid and Mr. Walker's wholesale denouncement of non-Christian philosophy is made in haste. Suffice it to say, from what we can gather so far from Mr. Walker's apologetic, induction, according to Christian presuppositionalism, is not based on the facts of reality; indeed, they are based on the "character of God." This means that the apologist's "resolution" to this so-called problem of induction rests on the primacy of consciousness view of reality, which is false because it commits the fallacy of the stolen concept (since it posits existence as a product of a conscious act). Thus the appeal to theism in an attempt to resolve conflicts associated with justifying induction, is invalid.

Moreover, if a philosophy can provide a reasonable explanation for why we are justified in assuming the orderliness of the universe without appealing to theism, then Mr. Walker's second premise is untrue and his argument is consequently refuted. And Objectivism does provide a such an explanation: Existence exists, and that which exists is that which exists independent of consciousness. These facts are implicit in all of man's perception, they must be assumed even in order to question, doubt or reject them, and they are grounded in the perceptually available facts of reality, in every entity which exists. The answer lies, literally speaking, right in front of our eyes.

The apologist will no doubt refuse to abandon his argument, and will likely attempt to preserve it by attacking the fundamentals of Objectivism in the context which I have outlined here. But how would he accomplish this? Most likely, he will argue that the Objectivist fundamentals are somehow incomplete or inadequate to fulfill the task in question, that the axiomatic concepts 'existence', 'identity' and 'consciousness' are neither primary nor irreducible, for some fantasy-indulgent reason or another. Such an attempt would amount to, according to Objectivist principles, the open advocacy of stolen concepts at the foundation of one's view of reality and knowledge. For what could be prior to the fact of existence? And this is precisely what lies at the core of all theism: the denial of the hierarchical nature of objective knowledge, the rejection of reason as one's only means of knowledge and of reality as the final court of appeal.

Mr. Walker's Three Follow-up Comments

After he presents his primary argument, Mr. Walker stated the following:

Certainly I cannot object to the first sentence here. Engaging in an activity is not equivalent to a rational justification for that activity. However, and this is why I voiced my concern above about the presuppositionalist's use of "account for" in my analysis of Mr. Walker's argument, asking for a "rational justification for WHY" the universe is orderly can potentially lead to conceptually dangerous ground if the objective hierarchy of knowledge is not observed. For it is here where one must identify his affirmation of the metaphysical primacy of existence if he is to safeguard objectivity. Otherwise, he jeopardizes his view of reality to stolen concepts and frozen abstractions. Again, the reason why the universe is orderly is because existence is identity.

Mr. Walker also wrote:

This would depend on what question such a statement is offered to answer. The statement "I use induction because it works" suggests purpose fulfillment. Thus, if the question this statement is intended to answer were "Why do you use induction?" the statement "I use induction because it works" is an appropriate answer. Is it the presuppositionalist's position that induction does not work? However, Mr. Walker's point is that the use of induction is not equivalent to a rational justification of why induction works. Thus, if in answer to the question "What is a rational justification of induction?" one states "I use induction because it works," then one could make the case that such an answer is inadequate, and possibly begs the question.

And finally, Mr. Walker concluded his argument with the following statement:

How can this be if in fact the biblical theist must allow for the activity of a universe-manipulating form of consciousness, a deity? How can this be when the theistic view of the world depends on the primacy of consciousness, which is invalid? If as Mr. Walker holds we posit the orderliness of the universe with the reservation that that orderliness is not absolute, but must be flexible enough to permit the volatile activity of a being capable of performing miracles (i.e., of violating the law of identity which grounds induction), then already we see that the assumed reliability of induction is completely compromised in the hands of theistic philosophy. This is basically akin to offering what the theist calls a "rational justification" for induction while denying the very principle which makes induction possible in the first place, which is the law of identity (and its application to action, which is the law of causality). Induction, therefore, in the hands of the theist, becomes a stolen concept.

If the object of our inductive thought can be A at one moment and suddenly become non-A through some kind of thaumaturgy (e.g., magic or 'miracle') which leaves no objectively traceable cause in the next moment, then induction cannot achieve any reliability to begin with (for A ceases to have reference to objective reality since its identity can be revised according to God's whimsy). If I must grant validity to the notion of miracles at any point in my view of reality (as the Christian does), such that water can be magically transformed into wine (cf. John 2:1-11), that A can become non-A through supernatural (i.e., unnatural) means of causality (e.g., by divine whim - i.e., non-causality), how can I assume the identity of any object with any certainty at all? The theist may say that the answer is faith. But how is faith a substitute for objective certainty, which I achieve through Objectivism? Indeed, wishing, hoping and fantasizing are not man's means of cognition, nor can they replace man's reliance on his own ability to reason. However, this is precisely the end result of such allegiance to folly as proposed by Christian apologists. It is a clearly unworkable sham at the very least. The Christian's alternative to Objectivism is indeed nightmarish!

I think Mr. Walker and his ilk should take their arguments back to the rhetoric mill from which they learned them, and fundamentally reconsider their positions. Religious men are by their very nature not very critical thinkers. Since their fundamental view of existence, of man and of knowledge is something which has no basis in reality and which they must accept unquestioningly, it does not come as a surprise that their arguments and treatments of competing views proceed in a superficial and procrustean manner. Bible believers, particularly those who claim that the Bible is inerrant, commonly consider it normal course to assume that the 66 books of Bible are 100% factually true and that they offer sound philosophical doctrine, even though they typically have only read a fraction of its content. This hasty allegiance to dogma is completely antithetical to critical thought, and completely incompatible with the presuppositionalists' pedantic pretenses.

As for Mr. Walker's claim about the "rational ingredients" needed to "make sense out of induction's reliability" being provided exclusively by Christian theism, I will focus my inquiry on this matter in a following section. So far, however, we have found that not only does Mr. Walker's argument not even attempt to prove the existence of a god, biblical or otherwise, it also fails to protect itself from committing the fallacy of the stolen concept, which I have found to lie at the foundation of any theistic view of reality, principally because such views (to varying extents) assert a form of consciousness as the source of existence.

Mr. Walker cited the critic's statement that "[induction] predates the Judeo-Christian God as well," and then responded:

Here Mr. Walker assumes the very truth of his primary claim, namely that the Christian triune God exists, and that this triune God is "the GROUND of induction," which are the very claims in dispute. Thus, he is guilty of the very charge he accuses his critic to have committed. This gains for his overall argument no mileage whatsoever.

Furthermore, he assumes that his god-belief is not a human invention. But there are good reasons to suspect that god-belief is a human invention. For one thing, all claims for God's existence are learned from other men. For example, there is no constellation of stars which clearly and unmistakably spell out God's name or unequivocally testifies of God's existence. We do not look at the face of the moon and find inscribed among its geographical formations the words "Jesus saves," like a flashing neon sign on a church which gains its primary revenue on bingo night.

So-called "sacred writings" or "scriptures" claimed to be divinely inspired were penned, reproduced, edited and compiled by men, and are claimed by men to be the word of God. Scholars have been able to approximate the date of these writings, and although there might not be unanimity on their results, this has made it possible for us to determine when in history certain ideas were introduced to various communities and to human culture in general. And since even the earliest human beings would have had to have engaged in inductive reasoning in order to survive, even if only on a primitive level by comparison to human thinking today, there is certainly good reason to accept the view that induction precedes the development of Judeo-Christian theism, as Mr. Walker's critic stated.

Furthermore, when we review the history of god-belief, we discover that it evolves just like any other human field of thought, just like philosophy, technology or art. In fact, religion is a primitive form of philosophy, since it is an attempt to address man's primary needs and to give him a comprehensive view of reality and his life. This alone does not make religious claims true or even valid, nor does it prove that religion is suitable for man's life. The religionist has either to ignore these facts, or to downplay them, in order to assert the eternal validity of his god-beliefs, in the manner in which Mr. Walker does here. And if in his arguments for the existence of God the apologist assumes this eternal validity in spite of all these reasons confirming the proposal that god-belief is a human invention, he again begs the question.

Above, we saw in Mr. Walker's primary argument for Christian theism the claim that "only a Biblical worldview can provide the rational ingredients to make sense out of induction's reliability." What are those "rational ingredients" to which Mr. Walker alludes, where do they come from, how would we be aware of them, and, specifically, how do they integrate to form a rational justification of induction? These are some of the questions which I will now explore, and in so doing I refer to another portion of Mr. Walker's overall apologetic.

Mr. Walker's non-believing critic wrote:

Mr. Walker responds:

This is where the rubber meets the road for Mr. Walker's argument and where its devastating refutation finds its most practical impetus. Here Mr. Walker has stated what he believes to be the essential "ingredients," so to speak, of the rational justification of induction that he's looking for, which he expects others to find in the assertion of the "Christian God."

Essentially, what Mr. Walker holds to be the foundation of induction, the uniformity of nature, the laws of logic, human dignity, and objective morality, must be something that is:

In the case of the first four attributes which Mr. Walker names, I see no reason to think the ascription of these qualities to a god or any other "supernatural being" is justified, especially when Objectivism holds that these apply to its own starting point, which is the fact that existence exists. I must resist passing judgment, however, in the case of the fifth ascription - "all the other attributes of the Biblical God" - since many of the qualities which Christians ascribe to the biblical god are anti-conceptual to begin with, and those that are not may very well have nothing to do with a "rational justification for induction. I will briefly step through these qualities one by one to determine their relevance to the matter in question.

[1] Eternal: Mr. Walker wants to point to something that is 'eternal' as singularly supplying a "rational justification for induction."

The facts of the case are, that:

Existence is eternal.

Dr. Peikoff argues thus:

Since time can only apply within existence (as a relationship between distinct objects), the attempt to apply time as a measure to the totality of existence is incoherent (since all objects are included within that totality, thus leaving nothing with which the totality can have a relationship). The only valid option open to man is to recognize that existence is eternal.

Thus, the fact that existence exists fulfills this pre-conditional requirement to induction which Mr. Walker cites. And what's more, is the fact that existence is perceptually self-evident, i.e., axiomatic. There is no need to resort to faith claims or to assert the supernatural to recognize the fact that existence exists. One merely need open his eyes and be aware of his environment directly.

[2] Self-existent: Mr. Walker wants to point to something that is also 'self-existent' as singularly supplying a "rational justification for induction."

The facts of the matter are:

Existence is self-existent.

Existence is neither created nor destructible. One cannot argue that existence depends upon 'something prior' to existence in order to "account for" existence. Such an argument would have no explanatory value, since it would still have to posit the existence of something as being responsible for existence. Otherwise it would constitute an appeal to non-existence, and of course that is the substance of religion anyway. In other words, one must assume the fact of existence in order to attempt either to prove existence, or to dispute it. Either option commits those who choose it to the fallacy of the stolen concept.

[3] Immutable: Mr. Walker wants to point to something that is also 'immutable' as singularly supplying a "rational justification for induction."

The facts of the matter are:

What could change the fact that existence exists? Non-existence? If one were to claim that "it is possible that existence could go out of existence," where would it go?

Even to argue for such positions (for whatever purpose), one would first have to presuppose existence just by crafting an argument, and would presuppose existence in the very solution to such imaginary imbroglios. In other words, a position that would attempt to hold that the fact that existence exists is not immutable would negate itself in any assumption of permanence or immutability (permanence or immutability of what?).

[4] Orderly: Mr. Walker wants to point to something that is also 'orderly' as singularly supplying a "rational justification for induction."

The facts of the matter are:

The Law of Identity, which is a corollary to the fact that existence exists, is the recognition that, for A to exist, it must be A. I.e., existence is identity. This fundamental, irreversible and inviolate fact is the essential pre-condition to induction. The Law of Identity is literally universal: It applies wherever existence exist. And the totality of existence is subsumed by the concept 'universe', which includes all things which exist or are postulated to exist. For something to be included in the class of existents, it must a) be part of the universe, and b) be itself (i.e., not A and non-A). Something need only exist for a) and b) to apply.

[5] "All the other attributes of the Biblical God": Mr. Walker wants to point to something, in addition to possessing all the prior qualities he mentioned specifically, which also possesses "all the other attributes of the Biblical God," as singularly supplying a "rational justification for induction."

The facts of the matter are:

They are:

Given the above analysis, I conclude that all of these characteristics, [a] through [q], as well as a litany of others, are clearly non-essential to a "justification of induction." Certainly, Mr. Walker has some explaining to do before his position, as indicated by his own words above, can be considered to have any merit whatsoever. But, as attributes of an unchanging God, they are, according to Mr. Walker's assertion above, necessary for a rational justification of induction per Christianity. I could have enlarged my analysis to include a review of yet additional qualities ascribed to the Christian God (e.g., righteous, holy, opposed to sin, supernatural, non-corporeal, three-headed or "trinitarian," et al.), but I suspect my readers already get the point from what analysis I have provided. It is clear that, given what has been exposed so far, Mr. Walker's attempt to "ground" induction in the deity of Judeo-Christian mysticism, is wholly misguided.

More importantly, Mr. Walker's statements about the foundations and philosophical justification of induction show no concern for the primary facts of reality (i.e., the axioms, the laws of identity and causality, etc.), the nature of man's consciousness, the role of perception in man's awareness of reality, or the importance of objective concept-formation. How can one expect to "justify" induction without consideration of these important points? Perhaps Mr. Walker takes these things for granted, or perhaps he feels they are not relevant to the issue. What Mr. Walker's argument strongly suggests is that the relevant facts of the matter are secondary to an appeal to authority which determines how those facts are supposed to be interpreted in terms of his confessional investment (i.e., by "divine decree" or, essentially, by whim). But on what basis would an appeal to authority find any philosophical merit if one cannot first determine the facts necessary to settle such questions as "which authority is properly authoritative?" - a question for which we would need induction! Certainly, this cannot be considered rational.

Consequently, given the above analysis, here are the reasons in brief why Mr. Walker's overall apologetic in regard to a "rational justification of induction" fails:

If Mr. Walker wishes to maintain that Christian theism as such is necessary to "account for" the preconditions of induction, I must conclude that his position is itself the result of poor induction.

What does Mr. Walker really want to posit as the singular "rational justification of induction"? Clearly, what Mr. Walker wants to posit as a precondition of induction is not consciousness as such, but the metaphysical primacy of consciousness.

In every case, whether the element to which Mr. Walker pointed may be found to be legitimately connected to a "rational justification of induction" or not, what lurks behind the chimera of his ostensive concern for rational standards is the assertion of a universe-creating, reality-ruling consciousness, a 'mega-consciousness' which allegedly possesses each of these traits inherently, by its nature ('God'). As such, the gargantuan package-deal represented by this deity takes the starring role as the single precondition necessary to any rational justification of induction. This explicitly entails the primacy of consciousness view of reality, that a form of consciousness rather than the facts of reality dictates the nature of man's norms of reasoning and means of acquiring knowledge - essentially that things are the way they are because someone wants them to be that way. So we find that the apologist is merely hijacking legitimate epistemological issues, such as the justification of induction, in order to smuggle his primacy of consciousness premises into the realm of rational debate.

But what justifies the primacy of consciousness? This is the question that the apologist will never be able to answer without resorting to the stolen concepts that make the position of the primacy of consciousness seem viable to men. However, since apologists for religious claims avoid phrasing their arguments in terms of essentialized fundamentals (e.g., the issue of metaphysical primacy), but instead prefer vague, mystically embroidered terms which can be defined by the expedience of the moment (e.g., 'God', 'creator', etc.) even they do not recognize the need to validate their most basic premise, which is the assumption that consciousness holds metaphysical primacy over existence.

The answer to all theistic enterprise and apologetics, rather than bothering with tiresome discussions about issues like induction, is simply to identify one's starting points: to recognize that existence exists, that to exist is to be something (the law of identity) that man can identify that existence exists by the direct appeal of his senses (the fact of consciousness). This leaves basically only one option for the apologist who holds that there is no common ground between believers and non-believers on which to base his initial starting points, and that is: insist that the non-believer "account for" the fact that existence exists. This is nothing short of an invitation to join the theist in accepting his stolen concepts. The attentive non-believer, however, will recognize this invitation to error, and simply leave the mystic begging his own questions and pining for company to his misery, unindulged.

The theist's problem essentially lies in his rejection of the law of identity. Of course, theists in general will usually not come out and say openly that they reject the law of identity. Instead, a less direct approach is preferred, such as Mr. Walker's parenthetical qualification which we saw above to the effect that the uniformity of nature is not absolute. In spite of such reservations, theists will typically claim that their doctrines not only adhere to the law of identity, but that one cannot assume the validity and applicability of the law of identity without granting, either explicitly or implicitly, the presupposed validity of their god-beliefs. A little dose of philosophical detection is sufficient to expose this.

For instance, the theist wants to posit a supernatural entity as the sustainer of identity, thus ensuring the viability of induction by ensuring the stability of the metaphysical (i.e., of reality). This course of reasoning operates on the assumption that an entity's existence is insufficient to guarantee (or "account for") its own identity as an absolute. It is not enough that a rock exists in order for the rock in question to have a finite nature (i.e., to be a rock), goes the theist's assumption. A form of consciousness (i.e., "God") is required to guarantee (i.e., "account for") this, claims the apologist.

Thus, implicit in the presuppositional huss of the apologist's argument is the inferred principle that an entity's identity requires something outside itself to provide the entity with its identity - as if to give the entity "metaphysical currency." Without that something outside itself to guarantee (or "account for") its identity, it would presumably have a random identity, i.e., any identity but its own specific identity, i.e., no specific identity. The apologist presumably takes such ideas seriously and insists that they have philosophical significance.

The critic asked, "I am curious, would knocking out one of these 5 pillars of yours from under your particular TAG Christian worldview invalidate it in your eyes?" And Mr. Walker responded:

Notice that Mr. Walker offers no straight answer here. He never admits that the identification of a genuine flaw in his apologetic will be sufficient to demonstrate its invalidity. Instead, he blatantly evades the question by repeating his claim that refutation is impossible. His defense amounts essentially to the reiteration of the claim that "God is immutable (unchanging)," which simply begs the very question at issue here. How's that for honesty?

Far from making a plausible case for any of the conclusions Mr. Walker has asserted in regard to his god-belief, he offers us a series of untenable claims and poorly constructed inferences which casts serious doubt on the efficacy of presuppositionalist apologetics in relation to induction. Given the analysis I present above, I see no conclusion possible other than to dismiss Mr. Walker's reasoning as trite and vacuous. Apologists seeking to establish the alleged legitimacy of their god-belief commitments should consult other models, for Mr. Walker's suffers from serious faults.

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[4] "Philosophy: Who Needs It," Philosophy: Who Needs It, (New York: Signet, 1984), p. 2.

[5] "The Chickens' Homecoming," The New Left: The Anti-Industrial Revolution, (New York: Signet, 1971), p. 107.

[6] However, Objectivism readily identifies how skepticism and mysticism are two faces of the same coin. As Leonard Peikoff notes,

[7] It was a commandment which Jesus gave to his audiences that they believe. Indeed, Jesus commanded the ruler of the synagogue, "Be not afraid, only believe" (Mark 5:36).

Jesus promised condemnation to hellfire to those who do not believe. Mark 16:16 has Jesus say, "He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved; but he that believeth not shall be damned."

Similarly, John 3:18 has Jesus say, "He that believeth on him is not condemned: but he that believeth not is condemned already, because he hath not believed in the name of the only begotten Son of God." And the 36^th verse of that same chapter reiterates this position: "He that believeth on the Son hath everlasting life: and he that believeth not the Son shall not see life; but the wrath of God abideth on him."

Clearly, the Bible threatens those who do not believe its claims with condemnation, torment and suffering.

The author of the Epistle to the Hebrews considered unbelief to be linked to an "evil heart" (3:12), and that unbelief is sufficient to keep men from enjoying salvation (3:18-19).

The Bible, particularly the New Testament, posits the notion of 'hell' as a constant reminder to believers that the punishment for non-belief (or heretical belief) and disobedience is eternal torment in the inextinguishable flames of the "lake of fire" (Rev. 20:10-14).

And in Revelation 21:8 we learn that the "unbelieving… shall have their part in the lake which burneth with fire and brimstone…" Clearly, unbelief as such is condemnable, according to the Bible, and the consequence for unbelief is eternal torture and suffering.

Many more such verses can be found which support the indictment that the Bible threatens men who do not believe, yet these should suffice.

[9] The issue of the objective, hierarchical nature of (legitimate) knowledge and how the mystic epistemology of Christianity in particular is an attempt to derail this objective nature, will be identified and exposed in my future essay, "The Nature of Christian Knowledge."

[11] In other words, one need only affirm the Objectivist axioms, 'existence', 'identity' and 'consciousness' and recognize their proper relationship. In questions of "authority" apologists may complain that non-believers cannot prove the validity of their own minds. As one apologist once asked me, "How do you know your mind is a reliable guide?" The question amounts to: How does one justify his own consciousness? But why should this be necessary? The fact of consciousness is axiomatic: one must assume the fact that man is conscious even to question, deny or ignore it. The insistence that one should "justify" his own consciousness ignores this fact and commits those who insist on such matters to an infinite regress.

[13] Leonard Peikoff, "Maybe You're Wrong," The Objectivist Forum, April, 1981, p. 12.

[17] "Introduction to Logic," lecture series (1974, Lecture 9; quoted in Glossary of Objectivist Definitions, by Ayn Rand (ed. Allison T. Kunze and Jean F. Moroney) (Gaylordsville, CT: Second Renaissance Books, 1999), s.v., 'induction'.

[18] The mysterious ingredient lurking behind Mr. Walker's intellectual aloofness here is most likely what presuppositionalists refer to as the sensus divinitatus, or the direct knowledge all human beings allegedly have of the Christian God.

[19] By 'empiricism' in this context I mean the empiricists in David Hume's skeptical tradition. For Objectivist treatment of Hume's ideas, see David Kelley's The Evidence of the Senses, (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1986), pp. 18-21, 129-130, 156-157, 172-173, et al.

[23] Peikoff defines 'hierarchy of knowledge' as "a body of concepts and conclusions ranked in order of logical dependence, one upon another, according to each item's distance from the base of the structure [i.e., of one's philosophy]. The base is the perceptual data with which cognition begins." Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand, p. 131. See especially pages 129-141 of the chapter titled "Objectivity" for a more complete discussion of the Objectivist view of the hierarchical nature of knowledge and its importance to objectivity.

[24] I do not mean to suggest here that the reversal of the relationship between knowledge and emotion is the only derailment of the knowledge hierarchy to which religious philosophies commit their adherents. Indeed, there are many such instances of hierarchical reversal which result from the attempt to base one's ideas on alleged "revelations," but their root is the misprioritization of emotion over knowledge (e.g., that wishing makes something true). I explore these problems in greater detail in my upcoming essay The Roots of Christian Knowledge.

[25] In this context I refer to Christianity as any religious code which takes its fundamental inspiration from the Old and New Testaments; accepts Jesus as the "Son of God," affirms the miraculous resurrection of Jesus as evidence of the supernatural and the key to personal salvation, etc.

[26] A tangentially related question on this point would be: Are these theists Christians, or are they Van Tillians? I suspect - and this is definitely "off the cuff" - that as "reformed apologetics" continues to evolve in its arbitrary meandering, Christianity proper (however loose such a definition we must allow) will suffer the birth of yet another splinter group: the Van Tillians, a group of academics whose primary idol of worship, should they admit it or not (it's doubtful any ever will), is not the Jesus of the New Testament, but the apologist Cornelius Van Til himself. After all, there are photos of this individual, testifying to his actual existence on earth - a benefit which Jesus-believers do not have. Calling them "Reformed" would not be satisfactory. For even the "Scripturalists" - i.e., the followers of Gordon H. Clark's teachings - refer to themselves as "Reformed" as well, yet the divisions between them and those who align themselves with Van Til's views run deep and bitter. Indeed, "there be some reading here today who shall not taste of death…" till they hear a recording of Van Til himself broadcasting his convoluted arguments and cheap intellectual gimmicks to sheepish sycophants, recorded when Van Til was indoctrinating more impressionable young minds at the seminary. That is, after all, only my prediction. It may have already been fulfilled!

[28] I must point out my taking exception to the notion of positing the notion of "the atheist worldview," as the non-theistic critic mentions here. There is no single "atheistic worldview"; rather, there are worldviews which dispense with theism, of which Objectivism is only one.

[30] Leonard Peikoff, "Idealism and Materialism as the Rejection of Basic Axioms," Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand, p. 31.

[31] The New Unger's Bible Dictionary, Harrison, R. K., ed., (The Moody Bible Press: Chicago, Ill., 1988), s.v., 'omniscience'.

[33] See Peikoff, "The Philosophy of Objectivism," lecture series (1976), Q&A Lecture 8, quoted in "Mercy," The Ayn Rand Lexicon: Objectivism A to Z, p. 290.

[35] That the Christian God is said to be wrathful or angry is clearly and explicitly stated in the Bible. For instance,

Numbers 16:46 states that "there is wrath gone out from the LORD; the plague is begun."

II Kings 22:17 states (God allegedly speaking here), "Because they have forsaken me, and have burned incense unto other gods, that they might provoke me to anger with all the works of their hands; therefore my wrath shall be kindled against this place, and shall not be quenched."

In II Chronicles 28:11, we read: "Now hear me therefore, and deliver the captives again, which ye have taken captive of your brethren: for the fierce wrath of the LORD is upon you."

Clearly the poets of the Bible figured their God to be prone to the attribute of wrath, since we read in Psalm 89:46: "How long, LORD? wilt thou hide thyself for ever? shall thy wrath burn like fire?"

And in Psalm 90:7 we read (in prayer to God), "For we are consumed by thine anger, and by thy wrath are we troubled."

Indeed, the Bible has its God motivated by his wrath to dreadful action, clearly acting only on impulse. For instance, Exodus 22:24 has the biblical God state: "And my wrath shall wax hot, and I will kill you with the sword; and your wives shall be widows, and your children fatherless."

Exodus 32:10 has the biblical God state: "Now therefore let me alone, that my wrath may wax hot against them, and that I may consume them: and I will make of thee a great nation."

The biblical God is also portrayed as inclined to pin the blame of his wrath on the actions of man, for in Deuteronomy 9:7-8 we read, "Remember, and forget not, how thou provokedst the LORD thy God to wrath in the wilderness: from the day that thou didst depart out of the land of Egypt, until ye came unto this place, ye have been rebellious against the LORD. Also in Horeb ye provoked the LORD to wrath, so that the LORD was angry with you to have destroyed you." Poor Horeb, how horrible was his fate!

And again in Deuteronomy 9, verse 22, we read, "And at Taberah, and at Massah, and at Kibrothhattaavah, ye provoked the LORD to wrath."

Incidentally, if God is said to be "immutable" - i.e., that he does not change, then God must be eternally wrathful (and therefore hopelessly miserable), for otherwise, if God's wrath is excitable and quenchable, then this would infer that God has the capacity to change, and this would contradict aforementioned attributes of God.

[37] Many will object to the use of the term 'scheming' in this context because of its negative connotation. But such negative connotation is appropriate to the context, according to Christianity's own primary source, the Bible. For instance, Ezekiel 14:9 states: "And if the prophet be deceived when he hath spoken a thing, I the Lord have deceived that prophet, and I will stretch out my hand upon him, and will destroy him from the midst of my people Israel." If this kind of deliberate divine deceit is not rightly characterized as scheming, what is?

[38] On this note, I would point to the passages in the first chapters of Genesis which portray God as a creator of "earth and heaven" (as if they needed a creator). See also the scriptural supports given for item [i] "omnipotent" above.