God and Omniscience

Commentary by Anton Thorn

 

 

Christianity holds that God is omniscient. While this term has proven a bit troublesome to define [1], it is generally taken to mean exhaustive knowledge of the universe, i.e., of all existence. This means, any being said to be omniscient must possess all possible knowledge of all things, past, present and future. No knowledge, even knowledge of fictions, could lie outside the purview of the omniscient mind.

Although most Christians happily accept this characteristic as a necessary part of their deity's personality as stipulated by dogma, few believers actually examine the claim of exhaustive knowledge to discover the problems this notion leads to.

Many critics of Christianity have already pointed out how the notion omniscience cannot cohere with other characteristics supposed to belong to the Christian deity, such as omnipotence and omnibenevolence [2]. In this paper, however, I will not repeat those arguments, as they already stand firmly developed and resist challenge by defenders of god-belief claims. Instead, I discuss two problems that the notion omniscience necessarily brings into the matter of God's supposed character which usually go unnoticed and are not likely anticipated by those who posit such notions. I also offer what I consider to be the hidden reason why authors of theistic religions would choose to ascribe the notion of omniscience to their deity or deities, given the fact that this notion cannot be integrated with the facts of reality.

 

Unearned Knowledge: Omniscience as knowledge without method

For an omniscient being, knowledge cannot be said to be a product of reason, as in the case of man. Reason, which is man's only means of knowledge, presupposes non-omniscience. The very task of reason is to proceed from previously validated knowledge to evaluate new knowledge claims according to its congruity with that previously validated knowledge, with the intention of validating new knowledge as a result. A being said to be omniscient by nature does not have to go through this drawn-out process as there would never be any new knowledge for it to acquire or validate; it simply knows because it already knows. No means or method of knowledge is at all applicable in the case of an omniscient being.

While the Christian may maintain the position that his alleged deity possesses the attribute of omniscience without concern for the fact that omniscience is basically knowledge without method (i.e., an alleged short-cut to knowledge, a product I shall call unearned knowledge), the Christian faces a problem when attempting to integrate this quality with other issues, such as the fact that knowledge for man is the product of reason, the claim that God created man in his own image [3], and other matters.

The Christian apologist may indeed reject my characterization of omniscience as unearned knowledge by arguing that God has epistemic rights to exhaustive knowledge because he is the creator of all knowledge. However, it should be readily apparent that such an argument is clearly begging the question, for it assumes as one of its premises an extraordinarily questionable assertion, namely, that God is the author of all knowledge. One would be hard pressed to defend such a claim. [4]

For instance, in 1988, while riding home from work one afternoon I was in a brutal bicycle accident. I have knowledge of this experience because I was involved in it and experienced it firsthand. My friends and family members learned of the accident when I told them about it. The question for the theist is, how does God know about it (assuming God does know about it)? Did God author the accident and therefore know this knowledge? If God can be said to have this knowledge by authorship of the event, then this implies some kind of method of knowledge acquisition, for knowledge is now thought to be the product of some creative process. But wouldn't this mean that God did not have this knowledge prior to its authorship?

The theist may argue that prior to the authorship of this knowledge, it simply did not exist. Given the prior descriptions of God as an omniscient being, such a position indeed seems quite arbitrary, because

  1. this implies that at one point God did not have knowledge of his event (which amounts to non-omniscience), and
  2. arguing that prior to the authorship of the knowledge of the event of my accident the knowledge did not exist evades the fact that new knowledge arises as a result of the facts of reality, rather than the other way around. (I.e., the theist commits himself to a logical reversal.)

Did God learn of my accident the day it happened? If so, then this implies a means of knowledge, which presupposes a lack of knowledge at some point prior to the event in question. Hence, this would mean that God is not omniscient.

Did God have knowledge of my accident since the foundations of the world were laid? This position implies that there was a point at which God came into this knowledge - at the time of the creation of the world. But religionists argue that the world is not eternal, so that means that the creation of the world had to have a beginning at some point in time during God's career as creator, and therefore this knowledge would not be eternally visited to God, but must have had a starting point, too. This again implies non-omniscience prior to the foundations of the world. This position therefore implies that somehow God came into knowledge that at a prior point he did not have. How did he come into this knowledge? By what method? Blank out.

Did God have knowledge of my accident for all eternity? This seems to be the only position that will relieve the theist of his burden to avoid stating that at one time God was not omniscient, but this position also entails further problems. First and foremost, this position requires the religionist to offer a 'mere assertion' which no appeal to reality will be able to verify or support. This commits the religionist to an arbitrary position which would be quite difficult to maintain in a serious philosophical setting since he can offer no facts in its defense, only more baseless assertions. Second, such a position readily commits the religionist to the incoherence that other philosophers have pointed out with the notion of omniscience, such as the problem of determinism in man, which conflicts with man's free will. For instance if God knew about my accident for all eternity, there is no way that it could have been avoided; however, I could have chosen not to ride my bike that day and avoided the accident altogether. Again, the facts of reality are not on the theist's side. [5]

Quite simply, the theist cannot have his cake and eat it, too. If God is omniscient, which necessarily means knowledge without method (since a method of knowledge presupposes non-omniscience), then the knowledge God has can only be characterized as unearned, since his knowledge is not the result of any productive means of effort, but simply a spontaneous phenomenon. The knowledge God has can only be said to be earned knowledge if it is the result of some kind of productive effort (such as perception, reasoning, research, etc.). However, such productive effort would presuppose that the knowledge resulting from that productive effort was not previously known, which means: productive effort in pursuit of knowledge presupposes non-omniscience.

If the knowledge God has can be said to be rightfully belonging to him because God creates knowledge, then this suggests that God at one time did not have the knowledge that later he created it. This again calls the claim of God's omniscience into question. Knowledge for man is always the product of some kind of mental effort. But for God, claims the religionist, knowledge is, as stated above, in effect a spontaneous phenomenon.

This notion is clearly at odds with knowledge as man knows it, and the theologians' attempts to resolve this problem have only increased their payload of more problems rather than resolve any. Any resistance to grasping this distinction should be noted by the critic, for it is nothing short of an admission on the theist's part of his own pursuit of the unearned. As David King states,

The concept of omniscience is the secret wish-fulfillment of every mystic. To acquire one's knowledge, by a process of struggle and effort, is abhorrent to the mystic. But to know everything, to know it instantaneously and without effort, to know it causelessly without any specific means of knowing it, or acquiring one's knowledge, or holding one's knowledge, this is the mystics' passionate dream. The concept of omniscience is a psychological monument to the mystics' hatred of effort. [6]

If the theist argues that God is the creator of the knowledge of my accident by arguing that he is the author of the fact that I had an accident, then the theist openly proclaims his advocacy of the primacy of consciousness view of reality (this should hardly come as a surprise). Such a view would entail the suppression of the laws of nature - e.g., the law of identity and the law of causality - in favor of interjecting the notion of a ruling consciousness capable of overriding these laws and directing the course of reality by its whims.

However, it is a fact that my accident was naturally caused: while pedaling vigorously down a steep slope, my right foot, which was not secured by a toe clip, slipped off the pedal and from the momentum thrust itself between the front wheel and the frame of the bike, causing me and the bike to flip forward onto the pavement below. The causal chain that led to the accident is quite clear. No cosmic act of consciousness is required to explain these facts. So at this point, to accept the theist's claims that God authored the facts of the event (which he argues merely to give his supposed deity epistemic rights to knowledge of the incident), we must suppress our knowledge of the causative facts of the accident as the proper explanation of the event in order to replace them with the whims of an omniscient ruling consciousness, whose existence has yet to be demonstrated. Clearly the theist has a lot at stake in preserving the reputation of his god-beliefs if he's so willing to jettison the facts of reality, and lay the tremendous burden of the causal maintenance of the entire universe on God's shoulders, in order to preserve them from rational scrutiny. [7] Just how one can assert the primacy of consciousness view in the face of facts attesting to the contrary is indeed reprehensible.

Many religionists also attempt to assert that their God is logical. This position is also in dire contradiction to the notion that God is an omniscient being. Logic is a cognitive process of non-contradictory identification. As such, it is a means of identifying the facts of reality that is required only by beings who need to identify reality. Which means, logic is required only by those beings who do not already possess knowledge of reality. This necessarily infers that logic presupposes non-omniscience. Hence, logic is completely superfluous in the case of an allegedly omniscient being, such as the Christian's God. Since the Christian God is said to be omniscient, he requires no means of validating knowledge claims, he would know already! The same objection can be raised when the theist attempts to link his claims of an omniscient God to the concepts of rationality and objectivity, which, as dealing with the means of validating knowledge, these concepts necessarily presuppose non-omniscience. Thus, it is difficult to see how the theologian can attach the laws of logic to his god-belief claims, when problems like these arise at the outset of such claims.

Given these basic points, the theist positing an omniscient being must in the end confess his desire for unearned knowledge. For man, knowledge is not gained without some effort of discovery, reasoning and validation. An omniscient being, however, has no need for these. An omniscient being would require no method of acquiring or validating knowledge as these presuppose non-omniscience and fallibility. What the theist most likely secretly desires is a source of ready knowledge that he can claim at his disposal (through such notions as 'revelation', 'faith', etc.) that bypasses all method of reasoning. If the mystic can claim access to such a source of knowledge, and this claim is accepted, those who accept such a claim grant

to the mystic unearned authority - i.e., authority without substantiation of productive effort. This pursuit of unearned authority is evident in the case of the spokesmen for orthodox religious philosophy, for they assert as with authority their god-belief claims as if they were knowledge of certainty. Yet when pressured on matters they must admit that the roots of their knowledge - their 'omniscient god', the alleged source of their knowledge - is incomprehensible - which means, beyond their understanding. Thus, with this admission, the theist surrenders all potential authority on matters of reason and truth. Further, positing the notion of omniscience only broadcasts the religionist's own pursuit of the unearned, in this case, of unearned knowledge.

 

Omniscience as knowledge without purpose

What purpose would exhaustive knowledge of the universe serve any living being? Why would any being require such knowledge? Would a being necessarily just have exhaustive knowledge about the universe if it did not need it for any specific reason, or to fulfill any specific purpose? Without a purpose to fulfill, it seems such exhaustive knowledge of the universe would be superfluous at best, even cumbersome.

For man, knowledge undeniably serves a variety of purposes, all of which can be reduced to one general overall purpose: to deal with the problems of his existence. Whether it is learning how to eat a bowl of cereal, learning where the bowl in the cupboard for the cereal is, learning what ingredients are in that cereal, the process required to manufacture that cereal, the means of distributing that cereal to consumers who purchase it, or learning how to run the business that manufactures that cereal, all these things point to a single fundamental issue: man's mortal existence.

God, however, is said to be immortal, eternal, everlasting. Certainly, such a being does not face the same problems of existence that man does. Indeed, such an entity could not face any problems (and even if it did, God is also claimed to be omnipotent, so it would face no problem that it could not overcome). Therefore, God requiring any knowledge at all - either limited knowledge that is the result of a productive process of reasoning, or unlimited, exhaustive knowledge of the universe that requires no method - could not be for the purpose of dealing with the problems of its existence, since it is a given (by reference to its other attributes - immortality and omnipotence) that God will overcome all problems, if in fact it could be said that God faces any problems. An immortal being would not need knowledge to solve problems because it could not be said to face problems.

Thus the question of why God would require omniscience remains unanswered.

If omniscience is exhaustive knowledge of all existence, what purpose precisely could the vast majority of this knowledge possibly serve? Take for example a simple stone you find in a field. Let's say it weighs roughly half an ounce. An omniscient being would know this. Additionally, an omniscient being would know how many grams this stone would weigh. This omniscient being would also know how much this stone weighs according to any imaginary weight scale that any human, past, present or future might figure on inventing. It could weigh 5.713 Basslestons, for all we know, where 'Bassleston' is a unit of measure of which we have no knowledge at this time. But of course, we would also know that these weight scales presuppose an earthly standard. The average human being has no idea what a stone weighing roughly half an ounce on earth would weigh on Mars, or on Venus, or on the sun. But an omniscient being would know these facts as well. Such knowledge would be child's play for this being. In fact, all knowledge would be child's play to an omniscient being.

Let's say this stone appears gray with red streaks; an omniscient being would know this as well. But of course, this color evaluation presupposes yet again an earthly standard as well as a human optical standard. But an omniscient being would know what color the same stone would look like according to other standards, whether on this planet or on another, whether human or non-human, whether colorblind or color perfect. All possible and imaginable variations would be known, as well as any variations outside our imagination or scope of supposed possibility. Such knowledge is, again, child's play for an omniscient being.

But these two considerations, weight and appearance, are concerned with only two of the many properties of the stone's identity. What about the makeup of the stone? What elements comprise the stone? As far as our knowledge goes, we know that a stone such as the one I am writing consists of literally billions of atoms, atoms comprising elemental molecules, which together make up the stone. An omniscient being would know this. An omniscient being would know in detail every atom making up that stone; it would know the precise location and position of each proton, neutron, quark and any other subatomic particle composing the stone at every instant, past, present and future.

In addition to all this knowledge (which would fill volumes for man), an omniscient being would know the elemental history of every - each and every - atom within that stone. Let's say there are just one billion atoms in the make up of the stone (and to be accurate, there are probably several times a billion squared making up the stone). An omniscient being would know about every particular atom at present. That includes how many atoms, what kind of atoms they are, how many molecules those atoms make up within that stone, the physical distance from each other at which they reside in that stone, the potential molecules those atoms would make if they were combined together under whatever conditions they may (and this omniscient being would know the extent of this potential as well), etc.

In addition to this, this omniscient being would also know the specific history of every one of these billions and billions of atoms from its time of creation. That would include, for every atom making up the stone, the time of its creation, the nature of its identity at its creation (which may have changed since its creation), the number of transformations it may or may not have experienced as an atom - or, the number of transformations it could have experienced had things happened just a bit differently than it had. An omniscient being would also know the relationship to any atom with which each atom of this stone came into contact in the past. This omniscient being would know where precisely in the earth it initially deposited each atom and where that spot is exactly today, as well as where it will be in the future. It would also know where each atom of that stone will be in the next 100 years, in the next 500 years, 1000 years, one million years, etc. All such knowledge would have no limit whatsoever, for an omniscient being.

Multiply this situation with every stone you find in every field in every county, every state, every nation, every continent, even every planet and solar system in existence now, or in the past or in the future, and you have quite a volume of potential knowledge. Multiply this situation beyond mere stones or grains of sand; imagine every molecule of water, every molecule of oxygen, every molecule of every kind of gas, plastic, of every kind of metal, of oil, of carbon, of any kind of organic matter, etc., ad nauseum.

While the Christian positing an omniscient God might reply that these incredible notions only attest to the glory and magnitude of God (something no man can verify, only assert without reference to the facts of reality), a rational man would ask, "What purpose does all this supposed knowledge serve this allegedly immortal being?" To a rational man, such surplus of knowledge indeed seems quite superfluous to the point of perverse wastefulness. Why would any being need to know all these facts about all these items? Why would it be profitable for any cause or goal to know about every atom that makes up my shower curtain, for instance, and the shower curtain I had up in place prior to the one I have up now, and every shower curtain that ever existed anywhere on earth, and any shower curtain that will ever exist in the future, and any shower curtain any human being, past, present or future, can imagine or conceive? What is the advantage of such knowledge? What possible purpose could this serve on behalf of an omnipotent, immortal being that can know no threat, fear or loss to itself?

Statements to the effect that God could have a purpose for which he would require such complete knowledge would be moot in the light of God's other characteristics. Any notion of how God could be said to have any purpose at all is itself moot in the light of the fact that he is supposed to be an eternal, immortal being, a being that can know no loss, no threat, no death, no demise, no privation of any sort. Such a being would have a nature radically different from that of man. For it is precisely because man does have something to lose - ultimately his life - that makes values possible and even relevant to his existence. A rock, for instance, cannot know death - it is not alive. It cannot know value. The same with a robot. A robot has no awareness of its own existence, like the rock, and therefore can have no knowledge of potential loss of its own existence, and hence can know no values. [8]

But let's say, using Rand's example, that we can construct a robot that can be aware of its own existence, but we make this robot to be indestructible, like the Christian's God. No force can threaten this robot; it stands to lose nothing because it is indestructible, immortal, everlasting, eternal, yet it is aware of its own existence, like the Christian's God. Can such a being know value now? The Objectivist position is quite simply, No, it cannot.

Ironically, the Christian posits an immortal being which is also omniscient. But it is precisely because this being is immortal that it cannot know values. Christians will likely protest this, failing to see the incoherence of their own statements. This is where Objectivist philosophy comes in to bring some clarity into the matter. Christians, in their detestable habit of failing to define their terms (a habit they picked up from the primitives who wrote the Bible, no doubt), often treat the concept 'value' as if it were a primary. They often treat the concept 'purpose' with the same carelessness as well.

However, until these terms are objectively defined and their proper relationship is understood, they are in effect meaningless terms which can be brandished more for their emotional effect than for their objective relevance. It is most probably the case that the average Christian has not given a lot of thought to the concept 'value', how it relates to the concept 'purpose', or why these concepts cannot be integrated with the notion of an immortal being. But until the theist can present a valid case for ascribing value and purpose to their notion of an immortal being which can know no loss, no threat or privation, the Objectivist view of ethics stands as perhaps the strongest case against the existence of such a being in this respect.

In order to overcome this challenge to the presumed coherence of the Christian's god-beliefs, he must deny the concepts 'value' and 'purpose', in fact, all objective morality to begin with. Only then could he posit an immortal being capable of morality. But such a maneuver would be self-defeating for the theist. Couple the fact of this moral incoherence with the Euthyphro dilemma [9] and the standard challenges to the presumed coherence of the Christian deity (neither of which any philosophers have been able to show to be invalid), and the Christian's god-belief is in serious peril.

 

The Real Reason For Claiming God is Omniscient

Now that we can safely determine that God - if defined as an omnipotent, immortal, everlasting being - would have no need of its own for exhaustive knowledge, we now turn to the only other reason left for positing omniscience as a characteristic of God: a need outside of God. What need outside of God could there be for God to have omniscience? Any answer to this question would impose a circularity of vicious proportions, since God is said to be the creator of anything that is outside himself; he would be said to have created his own need, but would he have needed to create this need? Furthermore, if anything that is outside of God, either the totality of everything outside him proper - such as the universe, or whatever else besides the universe God is said to have created - or any part of that totality - can be said to require that God be omniscient, then the purpose of God's omniscience is then dependent upon something outside him.

What could this purpose be, then, if it is something outside God? Could the universe require an omniscient God? On what basis could one make such an argument? For its mere existence? Well, we already should know that existence exists, and that existence exists independently of any form or act of consciousness. What would such an argument hold that the universe could gain from the omniscience of God? The universe itself is not a living being, so it cannot know value; 'value' according to objective theory of ethics only applies to living beings capable of rationality which face the alternative of non-existence. Neither God nor the universe fits this criterion. Therefore, any argument that concludes that the universe requires that God be omniscient, and that is the purpose that God has for being omniscient, will fail.

But man is a living being, and he can know value. Indeed, value is what makes his life possible to begin with. Can it be for man's sake that the priests and theologians assert that God is an omniscient being? Could man himself be the purpose of God's omniscience? While most Christians may have a hard time admitting to this, it appears to be the only plausible answer to the riddle that the theologians and priests have set up for themselves regarding an omniscient deity.

Thus by considering these points, we know that God himself would have no need for all the superfluous knowledge that omniscience would bring, for God is said to be immortal and indestructible. Such a being would have no need for such knowledge. Therefore, any purpose for God's omniscience must be outside God, if indeed there could be said to be a purpose for God to be omniscient. We also recognize that the universe itself could find no advantage in the omniscience of God, so the universe as the recipient of the benefits of God's omniscience is incoherent. The same would be the case for inanimate objects in the universe. A planet or asteroid, for instance, has nothing to lose - such entities cannot know value, therefore these things cannot be the purpose of God's alleged exhaustive knowledge.

Hence, we must turn our attention to man himself as the purpose of God's omniscience, for in fact it is from men to begin with that all claims of god-belief originate (the stars do not align in the form of letters and attest to the existence of God or gods by spelling out their names). But what could man need that would be fulfilled by an omniscient God? Man himself cannot tap into the mind of an alleged being which is said to be omniscient, so there is no direct benefit for man in having his God be omniscient.

But perhaps there is an indirect benefit that is fulfilled by God's alleged omniscience. What could that indirect benefit be, and whom would it benefit? To answer this question, we have little alternative other than to direct our attention to those who posit God's omniscience in the first place, for here is where such inquiry would necessarily have to start. Who is it that asserts that God is omniscient? Is it the layperson? No, it is not. Lay persons receive instruction, they do not author it. The priests, however, are the ones who do author church instruction, and it is from this source - the priesthood itself - that we first learn of the characteristics of God. [10]

What would the priests have to gain from attributing the notion of omniscience to the deity that their laity have accepted as their God? What would the notion of omniscience lend to that deity that no other notion could achieve? What advantage would the priests have by describing their God as an omniscient being? Quite simply, their advantage would be one of tremendous influence over the individuals under their care. And this influence is precisely what the priests seek to begin with.

How would supposing an omniscient deity prove effective in enlarging the influence of a priesthood? Quite simply, actually. An omniscient God is more than just a God which would know everything. Such a God would know everything about each believer, which means He would be all-seeing. Belief in an all-knowing, all-seeing God would be far more frightening than belief in a God of limited knowledge and vision into the lives of His believers. Indeed, the fear factor of religion is in fact substantially intensified by the notion that God is all-knowing and all-seeing. The priests who invented the god-belief of the Judeo-Christian tradition knew very well what they were doing, and crafted their God with the maximum capacity to wage terror in the minds of believers and render the maximum obedience to the priesthood.

Consider the psychological ramifications of belief in an omniscient God. An individual accepting belief in such a being would never be able to know privacy in the most private haven of his existence: his own mind. While the priest himself may not claim omniscient privilege to the minds of his flock, the priest is ever ready to remind the believer of the all-seeing eye of their voyeuristic God. There is possibly no greater paralyzing psychological fear than belief in a being which can know one's own private thoughts, feelings, impulses and motivations. The priests who invented and developed prototypical god-beliefs knew well to include this notion of omniscience as a means of compulsion, as a tool of enslavement, as a force ensuring obedience to the priests own whims.

Recognition of this fact should be no secret to either believers or critics of Christianity. Indeed, some spokesmen for the religion are quite open about these issues. For instance, The New Unger's Bible Dictionary [rev. 1988] states that God's "possession [of omniscience] is incomprehensible to us, and yet it is necessary to our faith in the perfection of God's sovereignty" [s.v. omniscience]. Such admissions as this clearly affirm the conclusion that the purpose of positing God as an omniscient being lies outside God and is centered on man. Authorities of Christianity have also admitted that, like the other characteristics attributed to God, omniscience "is well calculated to fill [believers] with profound reverence. It should alarm sinners…" [Ibid.]. (It should be noted that Christians often supplant the term "fear" with the more euphemistic "reverence".)

But fear is not the stopping point for the priest. Fear has never been enough for those who seek the unearned through the dominion of others. Indeed, fear is merely a starting point; it is the means of getting the believer's attention. Threats of hellfire and everlasting torment are usually enough to perk up the ears of those who've accepted many of the other (often unconsciously held) premises shared with the priest's worldview, such as belief in the superiority of others, the substitution of knowledge with emotion (i.e., mysticism) [11], and the ethics of self-sacrifice. But threats such as this are not enough in themselves to achieve the priest's purpose. What the priest sought could only be gained by convincing believers that they were unworthy of the self-esteem their religion denied them.

The well-known freethought author George H. Smith poignantly identifies the power of psychological sanctions employed famously by priests and religious leaders in his book Atheism: The Case Against God:

A physical sanction, if successful, causes the emotion of fear. A psychological sanction, if successful, causes the emotion of guilt. A man motivated by fear may still retain an element of rebelliousness, of determination to strike back given the opportunity. A man motivated by guilt, however, is a man with a broken spirit; he will obey the rules without question. A guilt-ridden man is the perfect subject for religious morality, and this is why psychological sanctions have been extremely effective in accomplishing their purpose. [pg. 301]

And effective they have been indeed! So effective that for the nearly 2000-year history of Christianity, morality has been equated to unquestioning belief, humility, selflessness, obedience and servitude, self-inflicted ignorance ("judge not"), herd mentality, and, most importantly, the ethics of self-sacrifice. These 'virtues' (or more accurately, 'anti-virtues') have been the perennial hallmarks of religious morality, and Christianity is perhaps their most perverse champion.

The intended effects of a psychological sanction, "if successful," as Smith points out, are no less than the complete disablement of the believer's mind. Not only does an effective (i.e., successful in the context of Smith's point) priesthood have nothing to fear from a flock of mentally disabled followers, it stands to gain precisely the benefits it seeks to gain without putting forth the effort they loathe so much: an income! For the priest, the cycle of the unearned is complete: from claiming unearned knowledge to pursue unearned wealth and influence. The means of choice is the only means that could avail itself to those seeking the unearned: deceit, dishonesty and the threat of force. The history of the church stands as a monument to the priest's desire for the unearned.

 

The Bible explicitly advocates that men have fear

Anything assuring the obedience of the laity would indeed be consistent with the mystic's hatred of effort pointed out earlier in this article. The mystic's hatred of effort arises from his hatred for reality. This world, scream the mystics, is just a shadow, a phase, an trial intermission before the main event, which they say lies beyond life, beyond death, beyond the grave, beyond this world, beyond this reality. Ability in this life is mundane, temporary and ultimately meaningless, they say, and must be shackled in the service of a 'higher cause', serving the purpose of a 'higher reality,' an 'authority' residing in the clouds. The entirety of the Old Testament book Ecclesiastes (which comes from the Greek word for "preacher" and means "speaker before an assembly" in Latin) is dedicated to making this point. "The theme of the book is the vanity of mere earthly things contrasted to the knowledge and service of God" [The New Unger's Bible Dictionary, s.v. "Ecclesiastes, Book of"]. Modern believers often take this to mean that only God can "fill the God-shaped void in men's hearts." [12]

In Ecclesiastes 3:14, the author states quite explicitly his belief that one of God's primary tasks in relation to men has been to make sure they fear Him: "I know that, whatsoever God doeth, it shall be for ever: nothing can be put to it, nor any thing taken from it: and God doeth it, that men should fear before him." Such a belief, that any God whose primary interests include making his creations fear him, bespeaks a petty-minded, hostile and brutish view of life. But what should be clear by such verses is the emphasis their authors put in their descriptions of their object of worship. Quite apparently, these authors took great delight in peddling fear.

Ecclesiastes 5:7 belittles man's capacity to enjoy the use of his own mind in relation to the fear that should limit or keep this capacity in check: "For in the multitude of dreams and many words there are also divers vanities: but fear thou God." Would the fact that another individual indulge his mind in dreams, be they frivolous or intellectually productive, threaten the priests to such a degree that they would utter categorical injunctions of fear and threats in the manner they did? Obviously the priests had plenty to lose from the freedom of thought among their followers, and plenty to gain through such fear-mongering. Why would these priests not have been willing to go out and earn what they wanted in the first place?

Ecclesiastes 8:12 shows how the priests twisted their fear-mongering into something that their gullible followers should actually value and cling to: "Though a sinner do evil an hundred times, and his days be prolonged, yet surely I know that it shall be well with them that fear God, which fear before him." Believers were taught that prosperity and a benevolent life were the reward for their fear of God. Certainly such verses were needed to accomplish the priest's task, for believers observing the success of non-believers would have to have been warned from drawing dissenting conclusions about their god-belief.

Ecclesiastes 12:13 offers the final summary of the priest's teachings: "Let us hear the conclusion of the whole matter: Fear God, and keep his commandments: for this is the whole duty of man."

So long as the believer surrenders his mind to the preacher, the preacher has this authority to hold over the believer's head, and nothing will impede the perpetuation of the psychological sanctions notions like omniscience make possible.

Is it any wonder why the Bible, for instance, contains no prohibitions against slavery? Is it any wonder that the Bible never develops a theory of individual rights in any way, shape or form? Is it any wonder why the Bible does not prohibit racism? Is it any wonder why the doctrines of the Bible are vehemently postured against the integrity of man's self-esteem, attacking him for daring to have pride in himself, for valuing his livelihood on earth, for esteeming those values that make his rational life possible in the first place? Is it any wonder that the Bible contains no declaration of independence, proclaiming the right of every individual to his life, his liberty and his pursuit of happiness? A philosophy built on the notion of a voyeuristic 'omniscient' deity is hardly the recipe for a healthy, happy and productive life of reason. As the author of the epistle to the Romans remarked, "Be not highminded, but fear" [11:20].

 

The Book of Proverbs:

A brief survey of the book of Proverbs illustrates how much fear figured into the primitive philosophy of early Jewish culture [13]:

Proverbs 16:6 demonstrates the typical attitude of the times that invoking fear is justifiable because they thought it was the proper means of achieving morality: "By mercy and truth iniquity is purged: and by the fear of the LORD men depart from evil."

Proverbs 1:7 shows how the biblical authors thought that emotions such as fear leads to knowledge, which can only suggest an epistemology of feelings: "The fear of the LORD is the beginning of knowledge: but fools despise wisdom and instruction."

This idea is repeated in other passages from Proverbs:

Proverbs 9:10: "The fear of the LORD is the beginning of wisdom: and the knowledge of the holy is understanding."

Proverbs 15:33: "The fear of the LORD is the instruction of wisdom; and before honour is humility."

Some proverbs explicitly command men to have fear:

Proverbs 3:7: "Be not wise in thine own eyes: fear the LORD, and depart from evil."

Proverbs 23:17: "Let not thine heart envy sinners: but be thou in the fear of the LORD all the day long."

Proverbs 24:21: "My son, fear thou the LORD and the king: and meddle not with them that are given to change:"

It's a wonder how some Christians can believe the absurd claim that the roots of a constitutional republic find their source in a primitive text advocating fear, loyalty to a king and arbitrary rigidity!

Proverbs 8:13 has the authoring priests attempting to define their notion of 'fear', equivocating and watering it down to mean a virtue instead of a debilitating emotion: "The fear of the LORD is to hate evil: pride, and arrogancy, and the evil way, and the froward mouth, do I hate."

Proverbs 10:27 suggests that fear will actually give the believer a longer life: "The fear of the LORD prolongeth days: but the years of the wicked shall be shortened."

Proverbs 14:26 equates fear with confidence. How that can be is not explained: "In the fear of the LORD is strong confidence: and his children shall have a place of refuge."

Proverbs 14:27 shows that biblical authors clearly thought something could be gained from having, or instilling, fear: "The fear of the LORD is a fountain of life, to depart from the snares of death."

Proverbs 15:16 is probably aimed at those who suffered loss in order to gain "the fear of the Lord": "Better is little with the fear of the LORD than great treasure and trouble therewith."

Proverbs 20:2 warns that provoking a fearful king to anger endangers one's own life: "The fear of a king is as the roaring of a lion: whoso provoketh him to anger sinneth against his own soul."

Proverbs 22:4 shows that fear was a highly valued commodity: "By humility and the fear of the LORD are riches, and honour, and life."

 

Jesus the fear-monger

The New Testament authors also talked up the issue of fear in their tales and doctrines. As could be expected, the claim of Jesus' messiahship did not quell the priestly motivation to rule believers by fear. In fact, the fear-mongering only increased with new proclamations about a place called hell, where believers thought they would endure eternal suffering if they were found lacking of perfect holiness. [14] Some verses from the New Testament will serve as example to this:

Matthew 10:28: "And fear not them which kill the body, but are not able to kill the soul: but rather fear him which is able to destroy both soul and body in hell."

Matthew 28:8 seems to confuse divergent emotions: "And they departed quickly from the sepulchre with fear and great joy; and did run to bring his disciples word."

Luke 2:10 suggests that reason to have joy should cancel out fear: "And the angel said unto them, Fear not: for, behold, I bring you good tidings of great joy, which shall be to all people."

Luke 1:50 attributes unearned forgiveness ('mercy') in return for fear: "And his mercy is on them that fear him from generation to generation."

Luke 5:26 suggests that fear was a common response to Jesus' works: "And they were all amazed, and they glorified God, and were filled with fear, saying, We have seen strange things to day."

Luke 7:16 confirms that suggestion: "And there came a fear on all: and they glorified God, saying, That a great prophet is risen up among us; and, That God hath visited his people."

Luke 12:5 has Jesus actually command men to have fear: "But I will forewarn you whom ye shall fear: Fear him, which after he hath killed hath power to cast into hell; yea, I say unto you, Fear him."

Luke 12:7, two verses later, Jesus commands men not to have fear: "But even the very hairs of your head are all numbered. Fear not therefore: ye are of more value than many sparrows."

Luke 12:32 confirms this commandment in contradiction to Luke 12:5: "Fear not, little flock; for it is your Father's good pleasure to give you the kingdom."

Luke 18:4 has Jesus confessing that fear of God is beneath him: "And he would not for a while: but afterward he said within himself, Though I fear not God, nor regard man;"

Luke 23:40 has one of the criminals crucified with Jesus recognize Jesus' haughtiness: "But the other answering rebuked him, saying, Dost not thou fear God, seeing thou art in the same condemnation?"

 

The ever-present voyeur-god

The priestly authors saw to it that believers be continually reminded of the claim that an omniscient God "sees all" - that God is always watching, that the believer can never escape God's judging eye. In all cases, the claim that God was omniscient is always there to remind the believer that God is listening to the believer's thoughts. No escape from the voyeuristic God is possible, according to the priest. This strategy is highly effective in assuring the effectiveness of psychological sanctions.

In the Sermon on the Mount, Jesus repeats several times that God's voyeuristic attention is constantly trained on the thoughts and actions of the believer. Thus God's omniscient eye is used to bolster to the psychological sanctions established through the advocacy of fear in prior verses.

Matthew 6:3-4: "But when thou doest alms, let not thy left hand know what thy right hand doeth: That thine alms may be in secret and thy Father which seeth in secret himself shall openly reward thee."

Matthew 6:7-8: "But when ye pray, use not vain repetitions, as the heathen do: for they think that they shall be heard for their much speaking. Be not ye therefore like unto them: for your Father knoweth what things ye have need of, before ye ask him."

Matthew 6:17-18: " But thou, when thou fastest, anoint thine head, and wash thy face; That thou appear not unto men to fast, but unto thy Father, which is in secret: and thy Father, which seeth in secret, shall reward thee openly."

Other New Testament passages bolster the voyeurism of God:

Luke 16:15: "And he said unto them, 'Ye are they which justify yourselves before men; but God knoweth your hearts: for that which is highly esteemed among men is abomination in the sight of God."

Acts 15:8: "And God, which knoweth the hearts, bare them witness, giving them the Holy Ghost, even as he did unto us."

II Timothy 2:19: "Nevertheless the foundation of God standeth sure, having this seal, The Lord knoweth them that are his. And, Let every one that nameth the name of Christ depart from iniquity."

Hebrews 4:13: "Neither is there any creature that is not manifest in his sight: but all things are naked and opened unto the eyes of him with whom we have to do."

I John 3:20: "For if our heart condemn us, God is greater than our heart, and knoweth all things."

Hebrews 10:31 makes a final point about the ever-present fear of an omniscient deity: "It is a fearful thing to fall into the hands of the living God."

Verses as those above have been used by Christian leaders as weapons of mind control ever since they were first set down on paper.

 

Cultivating suspicion:

But wouldn't a doctrine intending to invoke fear be incomplete if it were not accompanied also by some kind of assurance that prevents undermining that fear? That is a good question! Indeed, we find in the New Testament many 'scriptures' that foster suspicion of outside influence once the psychological sanctions pointed out above have been accepted and have begun to take affect. The Bible is full of warnings against any critical voice emanating from outside the church. By identifying them, we recognize that the priestly elites who authored the Bible invented a very handy tool to protect their followers from scrutiny: presume all dissension as inherently false! Observe the following warnings from New Testament authors:

Matthew 7:15 states: "Beware of false prophets, which come to you in sheep's clothing, but inwardly they are ravening wolves."

Matthew 24:11 states: "And many false prophets shall rise, and shall deceive many."

Matthew 24:24 states: "For there shall arise false Christs, and false prophets, and shall shew great signs and wonders; insomuch that, if it were possible, they shall deceive the very elect."

II Peter 2:12-13 states: "But these, as natural brute beasts, made to be taken and destroyed, speak evil of the things that they understand not; and shall utterly perish in their own corruption; And shall receive the reward of unrighteousness, as they that count it pleasure to riot in the day time. Spots they are and blemishes, sporting themselves with their own deceivings while they feast with you;"

I Timothy 6:3-4 states: "If any man teach otherwise, and consent not to wholesome words, even the words of our Lord Jesus Christ, and to the doctrine which is according to godliness; He is proud, knowing nothing, but doting about questions and strifes of words, whereof cometh envy, strife, railings, evil surmisings,"

Such verses are conveniently ambiguous and therefore malleably applicable in adept hands, as these could clearly come in handy for any Jim Jones or David Koresh seeking to build his own flock of gullible sycophants who take his every word as the solemn truth. Ascribing to them the putative credibility that many people unquestioningly assume comes with antiquity only makes them all the more effective.

 

Sheltering the fearful from reality

The priests also saw to it to protect their fear-causing 'wisdom' from scrutiny by deliberately divorcing it from this world. This effectively puts the content of that which is claimed beyond any human access, and thus confirmation of such claims can only come as a result of simply believing on faith, i.e., through gullibility. To question the validity of the verses or their meaning is to question the authority of 'scripture', of the church or of the priest(s), and invite damnation on one's own soul. If a believer complains that he does not understand (often because he detects an error), he is exhorted "trust in the Lord with all [his] heart; and lean not unto [his] understanding" (Proverbs 3:5). As far as the priest is concerned, one of the benefits of the submissiveness and gullibility advocated in the Bible is that he need not brandish whips or chains in order to cultivate his slaves. To the extent that believers accept these doctrines, or dogmas, they surrender themselves before the priesthood as for slaughter. Bible authors did not choose the metaphor 'sheep' for its cuddliness.

Some verses attributed to the Apostle Paul serve as ample evidence of this maneuver:

I Corinthians 1:20-21 states: "Where is the wise? where is the scribe? where is the disputer of this world? hath not God made foolish the wisdom of this world? For after that in the wisdom of God the world by wisdom knew not God, it pleased God by the foolishness of preaching to save them that believe."

I Corinthians 1:27 states: "But God hath chosen the foolish things of the world to confound the wise; and God hath chosen the weak things of the world to confound the things which are mighty;"

I Corinthians 2:6-7 states: "Howbeit we speak wisdom among them that are perfect: yet not the wisdom of this world, nor of the princes of this world, that come to nought: But we speak the wisdom of God in a mystery, even the hidden wisdom, which God ordained before the world unto our glory:"

I Corinthians 2:13-14 states: "Which things also we speak, not in the words which man's wisdom teacheth, but which the Holy Ghost teacheth; comparing spiritual things with spiritual. But the natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God: for they are foolishness unto him: neither can he know them, because they are spiritually discerned."

I Corinthians 3:18-20 states: "Let no man deceive himself. If any man among you seemeth to be wise in this world, let him become a fool, that he may be wise. For the wisdom of this world is foolishness with God. For it is written, He taketh the wise in their own craftiness. And again, The Lord knoweth the thoughts of the wise, that they are vain."

I Corinthians 4:10 states: "We are fools for Christ's sake, but ye are wise in Christ; we are weak, but ye are strong; ye are honourable, but we are despised."

As Dennis McKinsey notes:

Contradictory data is portrayed as a test of the believer's faith. The more out-of-tune with reality Christianity becomes, the greater the test and ultimate reward. Teaching an individual to "become a fool in order to become wise" ranks with the ultimate in indoctrination. If this isn't a black-is-white approach, what is? The lengths to which the elite will go to generate support are truly awesome. [The Encyclopedia of Biblical Errancy, Prometheus Books, 1995, pp. 466-467.]

 

Conclusion

In many ways, the mystic's notion of omniscience is fundamentally flawed. In addition to the many problems associated with this notion that other critics of religion have pointed out, the notion of omniscience attempts to posit knowledge without method as well as knowledge devoid of any purpose whatsoever. As such, the notion omniscience represents the mystic's desire for the unearned as well as his wish to escape the constraining facts of reality.

Quite simply, since the notion of omniscience has nothing to do with the concept knowledge in any rational sense, the mystic must find a term other than knowledge as any part of the definition of omniscience. Since all legitimate knowledge known to man is the product of rational effort, there is no such thing as automatic knowledge, or knowledge without method. This is precisely what the mystic is attempting to posit as an attribute of his alleged deity, yet such a notion has no correspondence whatsoever to the facts of reality. Therefore, the notion 'omniscience' does not qualify as a legitimate concept. Indeed, it stands as an anti-concept asserted to substitute and obliterate genuinely rational concepts for knowledge.

We recognize, given the fact that exhaustive knowledge of the universe could suit no purpose of any immortal being which can know no threat or loss, that the real purpose for ascribing the notion omniscience to a deity lies in the hands of the priests who originate the ascription in the first place. As a tool to bolster church authority through positing a voyeuristic God capable of 'seeing' every act and thought of the believer, the priests and theologians have formulated the ultimate device for the psychological invasion of privacy.

We also see, by the Bible's own repeated admissions, that fear is to be considered a virtue according to this worldview, that men indeed are commanded to have fear, that this fear holds moral primacy over all other emotions one can expect to experience in life. How apologists today can argue that the Christian worldview, a worldview built on the fear of threats, is the only worldview that can account for reason, morality and science (!) is a genuine distortion of the crudest sort.

 

 

Anton Thorn

________________

[1] Attempts to define the term 'omniscience' generally include the presumption that knowledge can be quantified without regard to its hierarchical nature. Since most philosophy, both modern and primitive, fails to some degree to recognize explicitly the fact that knowledge is hierarchical in nature (primitive philosophies, such as religion, for instance, in fact implicitly deny this fact by asserting such notions as 'revelation' and 'faith' in their implied epistemological schemes), the tendency to treat all knowledge claims (propositions or statements of facts) as inter-equivalent primaries, is very high. It is only through this kind of reckless disregard for the objective nature of knowledge that makes mystical notions of knowledge possible. In addition to this ignorance, the fact that there are no instances of 'exhaustive' or 'infinite knowledge' in reality is the reason why theologians encounter such difficulty in finding a suitable and coherent definition for their pet term. Quite simply, since the term 'omniscience' integrates no existents as its units in the formation of the idea, it fails to qualify as a legitimate concept. The problems discussed in this paper are a direct result of this recklessness. This disregard for the facts of reality also suggests why we see such variance among the solutions to the problems associated with the notion omniscience which philosophers and theologians alike have suggested and developed for centuries of religious inquiry.

Some biblical passages that declare God's omniscience include: Psalms 33:13-15, 139:11-12, 147:5; Proverbs 15:3; Isaiah 40:14, 46:10; Acts 15:18; Hebrews 4:13 and I John 3:20.

Of course, the fact that the notion omniscience is self-refuting is easily demonstrated: Can an omniscient being know the delight of learning new knowledge? Clearly, there is no way to answer such a question without contradicting the premise of omniscience. Theists usually tend to dismiss such problems as this either by ignoring the problem (referring to such problems as "evidence of the eternal mystery of God") or trying to rationalize their way out of it through long-winded, contorted arguments. In some cases the theist may actually attempt to evade such problems by calling the critic's own judgments into question in a kind of ad hominem.

 

[2] For instance, see Michael Martin's Atheism: A Philosophical Justification [Temple University Press, 1990], chapter 12 (pp. 286-316). Martin notes in his conclusion on the matter of the incoherence of divine attributes:

Suppose my arguments fail and theists show, despite the problems considered in this chapter, that the concept of God is consistent. This would not show that the concept of God has any application to the real world. Consistency does not entail truth, although it is a necessary condition for truth. After all, many statements embodying consistent concepts are false. [316.]

Other critics who have pointed out the incoherence of divine attributes include Douglas Krueger [What is Atheism? A Short Introduction, Prometheus Books, 1998 - see particularly pp. 165-172]; George H. Smith [Atheism: The Case Against God, Prometheus Books, 1979 - see particularly pp. 73-76].

Objectivist author David King also points out the incoherence of omniscience with the other attributes commonly attributed to God in his book Guide To Objectivism, chapter 9.

 

[3] Genesis 1:26-27 state:

And God said, Let us make man in our image, after our likeness: and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the earth, and over every creeping thing that creepeth upon the earth. So God created man in his own image, in the image of God created he him; male and female created he them.

According to exactly what image did God create man? God is said to be immaterial, so it cannot be the form of man's body by which God reflected his own image in creating man. And, according to Genesis, man was created without knowledge of good and evil - this had to be learned. Therefore, one cannot say that man was created after God's moral image (however, reading through much of the Old Testament's tales of war, rape and pillage, this would explain a lot). Nor can one say that man was created after God's epistemic image (i.e., after the way that God knows things), for man is not omniscient and must employ reasoning in order to learn and validate new knowledge. Nor can one argue that man was created after God's 'living' image, for he is not immortal like God. (Arguments that suggest that the fall of man resulted in his mortality quickly disintegrate into post hoc interpolation.) However, the whole notion of God having an image is moot in any case, since God is said to be infinite, which means in effect that God has no identity, for whatever identity one attempts to ascribe to God, God is more than that identity. Man, on the other hand, does have a specific identity and nature, so any such comparison as made in primitive 'holy books' is baseless.

 

[4] The assertion that God is omniscient is not stipulated by any of the traditional arguments for the existence of God or gods (which have been shown repeatedly to fail anyway). Even if the traditional arguments for God's existence, such as the cosmological, 'design' or ontological arguments, were said to be sound, neither of those arguments show that God must have exhaustive knowledge of the universe. That God is omniscient is usually just assumed for the sake of complicity with primitive 'holy' books that make originated the assertion. This is true even in the case of any minor arguments for the existence of God (which have also been shown repeatedly to fail).

 

[5] It should be noted also that the religionist cannot dispense with the premise of man's free will, either. The premise of free will is often the resort of many theists who posit an omniscient being as the solution to the problem of evil. Many critics of Christianity, for instance, have noted that, if God is omniscient, omnipotent and omnibenevolent, then what accounts for the fact of evil in the world? Certainly an omniscient and omnipotent God would have unlimited opportunity and ability to prevent evil, yet both moral and natural evil exist in the world. If God is also omnibenevolent (i.e., all good), he would act to prevent evil. But the theist attempts to counter this incoherence with the free will defense, arguing that God gave man free will, and by that free will man chooses to do evil. There are many, many problems with this view, and they have been substantially developed by many critics of religion, such as Michael Martin, Theodore Drange, Douglas Krueger, et al. (The reader is encouraged to visit Internet Infidels to read their articles published there.) However, for purposes of this paper, it is important to bear in mind that the religionist's advocacy of the free will defense as the solution to these problems only creates more burdens for the theologian, which the history of philosophy has shown he cannot handle.

 

[6] David King, Guide To Objectivism. The entirety of this text can be found at the following URL:

http://www.vix.com/objectivism/Writing/DavidKing/GuideToObjectivism/CHAPTR09.HTM

 

[7] Furthermore, arguing that God created the laws of nature, which some theists do in order to get around these problems, is absurd on the face of it and only commits the theist to yet more insuperable problems. If God is said to have created anything, then that necessarily presents a causal task. However, if one argues that God created the law of causality, one assumes causality in order to explain causality. The same problem arises with the law of identity: if God is said to have created the law of identity, the law is already assumed by positing God. Any thing that exists necessarily has an identity. The theist taking the position that God 'authored' the laws of nature must outright reject the laws of nature in order to posit a need to explain them; i.e., he will have to deny the fact that A is A. But A is A. And corollary to this fact is the fact that if A should exist, it must be A. Any thing that exists or is said to exist has by virtue of its existence a nature, an identity. It is what it is. Likewise, causality is identity applied to action. Any action by God, be it creation, revelation or damnation, presupposes both identity and causality. The theist asserting the notion that God escapes these facts of reality has no alternative but to nakedly embrace irrationality. Each instance where the theist posits God to explain the facts of reality entails a stolen concept. The theist believes he can get away with this by open rejection of reality as well as the hierarchical nature of knowledge. In the end, however, he just paints himself into corners that he cannot escape.

 

[8] Ayn Rand wrote in Atlas Shrugged (as part of "John Galt's Speech," pp. 930-931):

'Value' is that which one acts to gain and keep, 'virtue' is the action by which one gains and keeps it. 'Value' presupposes an answer to the question: of value to whom and for what? 'Value' presupposes a standard, a purpose and the necessity of action in the face of an alternative. Where there are no alternatives, no values are possible.

See also Rand, "The Objectivist Ethics," The Virtue of Selfishness; Leonard Peikoff, Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand, pp. 207-220. Also, see my upcoming article, An Immortal God Cannot Value for more details regarding the incoherence of attributing moral value, purpose and love to an immortal being, such as God.

 

[9] The Euthyphro dilemma takes its name from a dialogue by Plato. The point of this dialogue is to present a case for the invalidity of the claim that God is the source of morality and of 'divine command theory'. Such a claim entails two horns of a dilemma: either God's commandments are moral because God issues them (which means, anything God commands must be moral by virtue of his command; such a position reduces morality to nothing more than divine whim), or God's commandments are moral because they cohere to an independent standard, which means that God cannot be the standard of morality. See Douglas Krueger's book What Is Atheism? A Brief Introduction, as well as Krueger's article "Copin' With Copan'".

 

[10] Religionists may object to this identification by arguing that the idea of God's omniscience comes from the Bible, which they say is the word of God, which means they argue that the idea of God's omniscience comes directly from God. However, this strategy presupposes the belief that God's existence is fact, and that that God is indeed the God which authored the Bible. Such claims have continually failed to be established. Thus, such objections can only beg the question.

 

[11] An exciting article currently under construction in the Anton Thorn workshop identifies precisely how the Bible's failure to distinguish between knowledge and emotion results in a confusion of the two, with the hazardous results being an epistemology of subjectivity and whim-worship.

 

[12] The notion that man has a "God-shaped void in his heart" is quite striking, especially when apologists maintain that God has no shape or form, that God transcends all understanding of the physical. However, it comes as no surprise that theists of any weave would neglect the need for coherence and integrity in their philosophical doctrines and statements.

 

[13] It should be noted while reading these passages that fear is taken as a primary, not as a consequence to prior facts. In objective philosophy, we recognize that emotions are not experienced without cause, as the biblical authors seemed to think. Emotions lie outside man's immediate control; they are a product of new knowledge measured against his values. The primitive philosophers who authored the Bible would have done well to discover the objective nature of emotions, that they are not causally irreducible and that they serve as a poor basis for epistemology.

 

[14] James 2:10-11 states: "For whosoever shall keep the whole law, and yet offend in one point, he is guilty of all. For he that said, Do not commit adultery, also said, Do not kill. Now if thou commit no adultery, yet if thou kill, thou are become a transgressor of the law." This attitude seems to contrast to a great degree with that of Jesus', whose main concern relative to James' was seemingly that believers just have faith and conduct themselves with meekness, etc. By the time the author of James wrote, the new religion had taken on more severe standards of obedience, as the doctrines were clearly evolving.

  

© Copyright by Anton Thorn 1999. All rights reserved.

 

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