80. RESPONSES TO HOWARD, Pt. III

June 6, 1998

 

Installment number 3, right on schedule.

Quoting Tindrbox: "When the Objectivist says, 'Existence exists', he is speaking of existence as a concept, which means, he is speaking conceptually."

Howard writes: "Is ‘conceptual’ material or immaterial in nature? It think this is the question that BK and myself would like you to explain."

‘Conceptual’ refers to the function of the mind, i.e., the function of consciousness. Consciousness, as I have mentioned, is a function of a concrete, not the concrete itself. Since it is a function (i.e., an activity), it requires that some ‘thing’ functions (i.e., acts), and thus it is clearly dependent on an existent, material entity (the brain).

A concept is a mental integration, and this indicates the active nature of conceptual faculties. Asking whether or not ‘conceptual’ is ‘material’ or ‘nonmaterial’ is rather missing this point.

Howard requests: "Please describe what it looks like if it is material, and if it is immaterial, explain the empirical process of knowing it."

A question like this hardly seems serious. I strongly doubt that Howard really thinks that this question is worthy of asking (at least the first part about ‘what it looks like’). As I have mentioned, concepts are mental integrations, an activity within the mind. Concepts do not exist as concretes.

You ask "if it is immaterial, please explain the empirical process of knowing it." Are you asking, "How does one perceive consciousness?" That’s what it sounds like, though it is not clear. If in fact this is the question, it is actually unanswerable, for it is a question that would be using the conclusion as its premise also. Consciousness, like existence, is axiomatic. Axioms are perceptual self-evidencies. One does not have to say anything about either them (the axioms existence and consciousness) in order to demonstrate their existence other than: Look at reality. The statement ‘look at reality’ presupposes a consciousness that can perceive (i.e., look) and an object to be perceived (i.e., reality, existence). Consciousness is the ‘subject’, and reality (existence) is the ‘object’, which exists independently from one’s consciousness.

Can one ‘prove’ that existence exists, and that one possesses consciousness? This is a frequently asked question. Here are some things that I think would be thought-provoking:

‘Proof’, in the full sense, is the process of deriving a conclusion step by step from the evidence of the senses, each step being taken in accordance with the laws of logic. (L. Peikoff, Introduction to Logic, lecture series [1974].)

"You cannot prove that you exist or that you’re conscious," they chatter, blanking out on the fact that proof presupposes existence, consciousness and a complex chain of knowledge: the existence of something to know, of a consciousness able to know it, and of a knowledge that has learned to distinguish between such concepts as the proved and the unproved.

When a savage who has learned to speak declares that existence must be proved, he is asking you to prove it by means of non-existence - when he declares that your consciousness must be proved, he is asking you to prove it by means of unconsciousness - he is asking you to step into a void outside of existence and consciousness to give him proof of both - he is asking you to become a zero gaining knowledge about a zero. (Ayn Rand, from ‘Galt’s Speech’ in Atlas Shrugged, as quoted in her book For the New Intellectual, pg. 154.)

Your question was not entirely clear, but I think this may illustrate an important point.

Howard states: "If empiricism is the only criteria for knowledge, of which you claim in the later part of this post."

This does not seem to be a complete sentence, but I would like to know where I have ever stated that "empiricism is the only criteria for knowledge". There are not my words. In fact, the term ‘empiricism’ has been used in such a variety of contexts (both in these debates and outside them) that I would ask that you might clarify what you mean by this term specifically as you use it here. Do you mean ‘sense-perception’ by your use of the term ‘empiricism’ here? If so, then where did I say that sense-perception is a ‘criteria for knowledge’? By 'empiricism' do you mean an entire theory of epistemology, which abnegates the fact of consciousness? That is obviously not Objectivism. What do you mean by ‘criteria’? Basically, your statement here is a little vague, given the backdrop of many of your earlier statements. I might be able to respond with more certainty if I understand your definitions, which so far have not been presented.

When I speak of sense-perception, I mean the means by which man acquires material basis of knowledge about the world outside him, i.e., about reality. Sense perception does not provide man with automatic knowledge, but with percepts, which he must process (i.e., identify and integrate) in his mind (i.e., in his consciousness) through reason. Without these percepts, man has nothing to identify and integrate in his mind, and hence his consciousness will not function, and he will not be able to deal with reality. This is the nature of consciousness: consciousness requires an object to be conscious of. That object is reality.

What would happen to a man if suddenly all of his senses were cut off from his mind? He would no longer receive perceptual data or material about his environment. He would no longer be able to function, and, unless he were aided by individuals with intact senses and perceptual faculties, he would soon die. Observe someone who has lost his eyesight, and watch how much of a change losing just one of his senses he has experienced.

"Let the witch doctor [Rand’s terminology for the religious intellectuals] who does not choose to accept the validity of sensory perception, try to prove it without using the data he obtained with sensory perception." (Ibid., 155.)

If the religionist thinks that there is a means of gathering knowledge that by-passes sense-perception, by all means, let’s have a demonstration. If sense-perception is not a means of arriving at what some call ‘ultimate truth’, can you explain what the alternative means consists of? For that matter, can the proponent of the notion ‘ultimate truth’ explain what is meant by that term, and how is it different from plain old, run of the mill, everyday truth? How does the religionist define his terms here? How does the Bible define these terms? I’ve asked in the past how the Bible defines the concept ‘truth’, but I don’t think I’ve seen anyone attempt to answer this question. Is the religionist willing to present his definitions and stick to them consistently??

By the way, you may want to complete that last sentence, Howard.

Quoting Tindrbox: "'By ‘concept’ I mean a "mental integration of two or more units which are isolated by a process of abstraction and united by a specific definition,' (Rand, The Romantic Manifesto, pg. 17). Any concept, such as ‘shoe’, ‘flower’, or ‘bowling pin’, is the cognitive identification of the particulars it represents, and the concepts presuppose (:knowledge is hierarchical:) the axiom existence exists."

Howard responds: "So here, are you saying that there exists nonmaterial substances?"

What do you mean by "nonmaterial substances"? Can you define this term? This seems to be oxymoronic. Can you help us out here? How about an example of a "nonmaterial substance"? And if there are entities in reality which are nonmaterial, how would that matter? Existence still exists. The religionist's task is still to demonstrate that all existence finds its source in a form of consciousness. Can he stick to the matter at issue here?

Howard asks: "How can a naturalist worldview even have nonmaterial substances?"

What do you mean by "naturalist worldview" in this question? Also, before I could answer this question, you will have to clarify what you mean by "nonmaterial substances" as this is not very clear. Also, can you explain what any of this has to do with my statements above? So far, you seem to be harping up another non-problem.

Howard writes: "When Rand uses the word ‘abstract’, the standard definition is ‘apart from nature’."

I have never read or seen any definition of the term ‘abstract’ that says "apart from nature". What is your source for this statement?

My dictionary defines the term ‘abstract’ as "considered apart from concrete existence <an abstract idea>". Is this the same definition you’ve taken and changed, inserting ‘nature’ in yours where the dictionary states ‘concrete existence’? Are you trying to stack the deck here, Howard, in an attempt define ‘consciousness’ as a supernatural phenomenon? If not, then please clarify, and if so, then you practice a dishonest maneuver here.

When Rand uses the term ‘abstract’, you can be sure she has a thorough definition for it, and that definition does not recklessly state that ‘abstract is anything that is apart from nature’. Abstracts (or more properly abstractions) in rational epistemology are man’s epistemological means of perceiving and identifying that which exists - and that which exists is concrete. There is existence, and there is consciousness, which identifies what exists. Reason offers man the only valid guide for concept-formation and abstraction.

The act of isolation involved [in concept-formation] is a process of abstraction: i.e., a selective mental focus that takes out or separates a certain aspect of reality from all others (e.g., isolates a certain attribute from the entities possessing it, or a certain action from the entities performing it, etc.). (Rand, Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, pg. 11.)

Howard requests: "Please explain how an atheist worldview can even have nonmaterial substances without quoting Ayn Rand."

What is an ‘atheist worldview’? Can you elaborate on what you mean by ‘atheist worldview’? Is there one ‘atheist worldview’? Or, are there many? Do all atheists share the same worldview because they are atheists? how can this be? I know many atheists who are violently opposed to the philosophy I advocate, and also opposed to other philosophies advocated by still others who do not possess a god-belief. After all, we each have the right to conduct our minds the way we choose. But please, Howard, explain what you mean by ‘atheist worldview’, and tell me - if you please - whether you think all atheists advocate this ‘atheist worldview’ or not.

What do you mean by ‘nonmaterial substances’?

Do you not like it when I quote Ayn Rand? If you don’t, all you should really do is just come forward and say so. That doesn’t mean I will stop citing her writings. Her writings are exquisitely well reasoned. They say many things a lot better than I ever could, and I happen to agree with a lot of things she wrote. Do the passages I cite intimidate you? If not, why would you ask me not to quote her?

Would you like me to stand on my head, too?

** ** ** ** ** ** ** $

Well, that’s about all I’m going to write tonight in this post. I will address the last bit of Howard’s post tomorrow, when you’re all in church being told what to think, not how to think.

May you get what you deserve,

Tindrbox

$$$

 

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© Copyright 1999 by Anton Thorn. All rights reserved.

  

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