Kicking Against the Pricks

Volley No. 11: The Final Word

by Anton Thorn

 

 

Below you will read my response to Mr. X's last message to me, to which I did not respond due to the deterioration of the civility of his correspondence. I offer the following as my final word to our correspondence.

 

Mr. X writes:

"Hmm. Lets see....I don't remember you sending me any links to sites laying out specific 'individual rights', but I could be wrong."

Thorn responds:

Mr. X seems to be missing the point a bit here. As I have already mentioned, man's fundamental right is his right to exist for his own sake. All other rights are derivative of this fundamental. Also, I did offer a link which explains in detail how the Objectivist view of man's rights are reducible to its starting points. See Volley 8 where I gave a link to Mr. Gregory Wharton's explanation, in an essay called Is It Right to Live? of how man's right to exist is derived from the Objectivist axioms. Furthermore, I have already referred you to Rand's essay "Man's Rights" in her book The Virtue of Selfishness, pp. 92-100, also in Volley 8. I believe these sources will get you started in your understanding of man's rights according to Objectivist philosophy.

Mr. X writes:

"Where do you get these rights?"

Thorn responds:

What does Mr. X mean here by this question? Do rights that pertain to the human being originate from something apart from the human being? How can this be so? Rights are not "intrinsic entities" (as if such a notion had any rational meaning) which man "finds" in some source outside his nature. When one asks the question "Where do you get these rights?" the assumption suggested is that rights are 'things' that one must locate and ascertain. This is quite misleading.

To quote Ayn Rand,

"Rights" are a moral concept - the concept that provides a logical transition from the principles guiding and individual's action to the principles guiding his relationship with others - the concept that preserves and protects individual morality in a social context - the link between the moral code of a man and the legal code of a society, between ethics and politics. Individual rights are the means of subordinating society to moral law. ["Man's Rights," The Virtue of Selfishness, p. 92.]

Thus, as Rand elucidates here, 'rights' are conceptual in nature. Thus, rights are an abstract identification of the recognition that man must be free within a social context in order to pursue his moral ends. Rand goes on to say,

A "right" is a moral principle defining and sanctioning a man's freedom of action in a social context. There is only one fundamental right (all others are its consequences or corollaries): a man's right to his own life. Life is a process of self-sustaining and self-generated action; the right to life means the right to engage in self-sustaining and self-generated action - which means: the freedom to take all the actions required by the nature of a rational being for the support, the furtherance, the fulfillment and the enjoyment of his own life. (Such is the meaning of the right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.) [Ibid., pp. 93-94.]

 

Rand is correct to point out that

The concept of individual rights is so new in human history that most men have not grasped it fully to this day. In accordance with the two [traditional] theories of ethics, the mystical or the social, some men assert that rights are a gift of God - others, that rights are a gift of society. But, in fact, the source of rights is man's nature. [Ibid., p. 94.]

Here Rand anticipates many misunderstandings regarding the nature of man's rights which have been perpetuated since their first philosophical inception and development. The notion that rights are derived from some source outside man's nature, be that alleged source the wrath-saturated deity of Christianity (as if there were one) or the supposed benevolent generosity of Society (as if society were an entity), is a frequently encountered misconception which is rarely if ever corrected outside the context of rational philosophy.

The former notion, that man's rights spring from the religious view of the world, is a farce of grand proportions. Make no mistake: the idea of man's individual rights is neither compatible nor reconcilable to the notion of self-sacrificial ethics in service to a universe-ruling consciousness. The fact that a religiously dominated Dark Ages, where the state and the church were one, perpetuated tyranny of unprecedented proportions, is no accident. The facts that faith and force are corollaries (see Rand), and that the principle of man's individual rights are the first line of his defense against the initiation of the use of force, assure us that an objective development of the concept of man's individual rights cannot find its source in religious philosophy. The fact that religion and man's individual rights are ultimately incompatible (such as in the case that religious philosophy is taken seriously and implemented on a societal level), is undeniable and supportable by reference to a mountain of historical evidence, in spite of the constant claims we routinely hear that America's founding principles were Christian in derivation. Such a lie must be countered every time it is uttered.

The latter notion, that man's individual rights find their source in society's edicts and/or whims, is another farce of grand proportion. Much of this view is merely a secularization of its farcical religious counterpart. In both views, man's rights are said to find their source in a form of consciousness beyond man's capacity to comprehend and without reference to man's nature as a living being capable of rational thought. Just as God is claimed by the mystics to be a conscious being which no man can understand or conceive, 'society' is claimed by the collectivists to be an entity of 'collective consciousness', whose 'cultural force' (i.e., its whims) are inaccessible to reason and valid by virtue of the mere fact that it is cultural in nature. Thus, a nation which is governed by a foundation of individual rights is just as 'valid' as a nation which is governed by a collective of tribal elites sending its citizens into forced labor camps or gulags. The label 'culture' in this case, is the secular counterpart to the mystic's 'God' - a salve invoked to end discussion and stop the mind from reasoning any further.

Rand was wise to point out that,

The Declaration of Independence stated that men "are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights." Whether one believes that man is the product of a Creator or of nature, the issue of man's origin does not alter the fact that he is an entity of a specific kind - a rational being - that he cannot function successfully under coercion, and that rights are a necessary condition of his particular mode of survival. [Ibid.]

Thus, since man is man, just as A is A, reasons Rand, rights are dependent on man's nature, and therefore the "source of man's rights is not divine law or congressional law, but the law of identity" [Ibid.] Hence, appeals to theology for an explanation and development of man's individual rights are not only unnecessary, but contradictory to the very issue in question, since theology rests on faith, and faith rests on the denial of reason, and therefore on the denial of the law of identity. Thus, the common cry that America is founded on Christian theism is not only completely false, it misses the point completely.

Mr. X writes:

"According to what laws of nature are these rights guaranteed?"

Thorn responds:

Objective laws, upheld by a rationally erected government, including a police force and the civil courts. Outside of these, there are no 'guarantees' assuring the protection of man's rights. See Ayn Rand's essay "The Nature of Government," in her book The Virtue of Selfishness, pp. 107-115. See also her book Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal, for further development of her philosophical view of the role of government. See also the points mentioned above.

Mr. X writes:

"Are these rights manifested physically in reality, or are they subjective concepts Miss Rand invented?"

Thorn responds:

This is a complex question fallacy intimating a false dichotomy: Either rights are "manifested physically in reality" or they are "subjective concepts [Ayn] Rand invented." Neither need be the case; the two alternatives given are not jointly exhaustive. Hence, the implication is a false dichotomy. And since it is an error veiled in the form of a question, the question is fallaciously complex.

Also, Mr. X's question above is quite revealing of his own lack of integrity, for in Volley 9 he is quoted as saying, "You have asked me repeatedly if I believe man has the right to 'live for his own sake'. I have answered that question: Yes!" Now his pretentious (and fallacious) question above testifies of Mr. X's distanced attitude and indifference to the matter of individual rights, even though earlier he affirmed that he does have the right to exist for his own sake. While he found it appropriate to ask me a number of questions regarding the development of the concept of man's individual rights, as defined by Objectivism (which I have answered), Mr. X remains silent in providing answers to those same questions by reference to his religious commitments. He remains silent on this issue, even though he claimed in Volley 9 that he provided "a specific Bible verse stating this very fact," that the Bible articulates an objective doctrine of man's individual rights (which he did not do). Thus, to the extent that Mr. X assumes and/or enjoys his right to exist for his own sake, he must borrow from a worldview (from Objectivism) that is contradictory to his own (which is Christianity).

Again, Gregory Wharton's essay Is It Right to Live? will be sufficient in addressing the fact that man's individual rights, according to Objectivism, are objective in nature.

Mr. X writes:

"You want me to give you some scriptural reference for Man's 'individual rights'?"

Thorn responds:

Yes, indeed I would. After all, you wrote "The Declaration of Independence had as its foundation Christian thought" (see Volley 4), which commits you to the challenge of providing some reference within the primary Christian sources (namely, the books of the Bible) authenticating such a claim. I have explained how this claim is indeed in gross error, and you have defaulted in arguing for the legitimacy of this claim. Thus, we must conclude at this point that this is yet another empty, impotent, Christian claim.

Mr. X writes:

"I'd sure like to see the primordial rock your 'individual rights' are carved in!"

Thorn responds:

See above.

Mr. X writes:

"Come on, Thorn, do you expect me to believe that there are 'individual rights' somehow guaranteed by the mere fact of existence?"

Thorn writes:

No, I do not, nor did I ever make any argument claiming so much. If the fact of existence were sufficient to guarantee man's rights, then violation of those rights would be impossible, for existence exists indisputably. However, their source is in the law of identity, as explained above, and the law of identity is a corollary of the fact of existence. The guarantee of man's individual rights must be provided by an objective form of government charged with the recognition and protection of man's rights. Again, please see above.

Mr. X writes:

"What's your starting point for that? Or is your ever-present droning of 'Existence Exists' going to be your answer? I'm sorry, but that isn't an answer to anything; I'm not even sure it's a complete sentence."

Thorn responds:

The statement "existence exists" is a complete sentence, as it includes both a subject (the noun 'existence') and a predicate (the verb 'exists'). Since the verb 'exists' is intransitive, the predicate does not require an object. Hence, the statement "existence exists" is a complete sentence.

As for Mr. X's other worries, the reader is advised to review the section above.

Mr. X writes:

"My position has always been that existence is dependent of the conscious will of God. Logically, since the Universe as we know it (your boundary for existence) did not exist prior to about 15 billion years ago, it must follow that some 'cause' is responsible for its creation. Since the Laws of Conservation prevent matter from spontaneously generating, there must be some 'supernatural' event to bring matter into existence--hence, God. Existence exists because God exists. This is my argument; prove it wrong. You want to call it a 'stolen concept'? Go ahead, but you've got NOTHING in your corner to prove me wrong; I at least have a ton of circumstantial evidence to back up my claim. Like it or not, the Universe is not static, nor is it eternal. Science left that model of reality behind in the 50's along with Ayn Rand. I suggest you join the rest of us in the 21st century."

Thorn responds:

Mr. X offers his version of the classic 'cosmological argument' which traces its philosophic roots back to the ancient Greeks. In Mr. X's version, the argument can be expressed in the following syllogism:

Premise 1: The universe exists now. (This is unexpressed in Mr. X's argument, but it is understood and presumed.)

Premise 2: The universe did not exist prior to about 15 billion years ago.

Premise 3: Some cause is responsible for bringing the universe into existence.

Premise 4: The Laws of Conservation prevent matter from spontaneously generating.

Premise 5: "There must be some 'supernatural' event to bring matter into existence.

Conclusion: This 'supernatural' event is God or, more accurately, an act of God.

 

Thorn's Analysis and Refutation:

 

Premise 1 ("The universe exists now") is the only premise which does not require an argument to accept as true. 'Universe' is defined as "the sum total of existence." Since the universe includes by definition all things that exist or can be said to exist, and existence is known ostensibly through the senses, all one needs to do in order to accept this premise is to be conscious of something in existence, which implies two things: First, the recognition that existence exists because something is perceived, and second, the recognition (albeit implicit) that existence is known through a means of perception, which is a function of consciousness. Hence, existence and consciousness are already recognized on the implicit level of cognition just by making such assertions. So far, the Objectivist axioms are hereby assumed by Mr. X's argument. Does the rest of his argument consistently keep itself in check with these foundational recognitions? Let's watch and see.

 

Premise 2 ("The universe did not exist prior to about 15 billion years ago") is a bit shaky and indeed an unprovable assertion. The idea that "the universe did not exist prior to about 15 billion years ago" finds its inspiration in modern scientific cosmological research, dubbed the "Big Bang" theory. The "Big Bang" theory holds that the universe as we know it today (as an inflationary occupation of vacuous space of stellar and planetary bodies, as well as dust, debris and sundry elements) did not always exist in the form in which it now exists.

As one article found online puts it:

Fifteen billion years ago, give or take five billion years, the entirety of our universe was compressed into the confines of an atomic nucleus. Known as a singularity, this is the moment before creation when space and time did not exist. According to the prevailing cosmological models that explain our universe, an ineffable explosion, trillions of degrees in temperature on any measurement scale, that was infinitely dense, created not only fundamental subatomic particles and thus matter and energy but space and time itself. Cosmology theorists combined with the observations of their astronomy colleagues have been able to reconstruct the primordial chronology of events known as the big bang. [See http://members.tripod.com/~ssscott/]

Articles such as this are typical in their summary expression of the 'big bang' theory. In all cases, the idea of the 'big bang' begins by positing an "initial, hot state" of all material existence collected into a compressed "atomic nucleus" or "singularity." In no serious attempt to summarize the gist of the 'big bang' theory will one find words to the effect that existence is a creation of some will or act of consciousness, as if matter could pop into existence ex nihilo as claimed by religious creationists.

In all serious versions of the 'big bang' theory, it is argued that some form of existence - be it called a 'singularity' or an 'atomic nucleus' - is posited as the beginning state of the current inflationary occupation of matter throughout the vacuum of space. Even according to the 'big bang' theory, so far as this student has been able to discover, the axiom of existence is not violated or in any way negated. Cosmological paradigms attempting to conclude with a theistic position of a form of consciousness as the 'creator' of the universe cannot avail themselves to 'big bang' cosmology simply because there is no compatibility between 'big bang' cosmology and creation theism to begin with!

Often, the point at which zealous apologists for theism rush in, is the hopeful idea that science has demonstrated that the universe had a definite starting point in time, thus opening a gap for theistic arguments to wedge their antiquated feet into the realm of science in order to subvert it in the service of a theology of hidden agendas.

In either regard, Mr. X's argument, just as is the case with any cosmological paradigm, does not succeed in any manner in the attempt to undermine the Objectivist metaphysics. No matter what, both the scientific cosmologist as well as the religious cosmologist must begin by positing some form of existence as the initial starting point from which all assumptions stem.

 

Premise 3: "Some cause is responsible for bringing the universe into existence."

Here is where the fallacy of the stolen concept gets the better of the cosmological paradigm and renders it conceptually impotent. The argument attempts to posit the 'universe' - which is defined as the sum total of existence, as needing a cause. Yet, the argument wants to posit this cause as existing as well. But that's the whole pinch: if something exists, it is already part of the sum total of existence. Thus, to posit the beginning of the universe is to posit that at one time the universe did not exist, and that therefore nothing existed prior to this alleged emergence of the universe.

You cannot lift a stool over your head while sitting on it. However, that is precisely what is being attempted, conceptually speaking, in the cosmological paradigm at this point. One cannot posit the concept 'cause' outside of existence, for there would be no existing agent responsible for enacting the asserted cause. But when one argues that the universe requires a cause, is to attempt to posit the concept 'cause' outside existence, for 'universe' is the sum total of existence. Thus, there can be no cause outside the universe, for there is no outside the universe to speak of.

 

Premise 4: "The Laws of Conservation prevent matter from spontaneously generating."

This is the most ironic premise in this version of Mr. X's cosmological paradigm. Why is that? Observe: Mr. X posits that existence requires a creator (which is asserted to exist). His argument asserts that existence (i.e., the universe, which is the sum total of existence) requires a creator because it has a beginning point (i.e., it is not eternal, it was created; never mind the question-begging nature of such a premise). Then Mr. X brings in Premise 4, which cites the "Laws of Conservation," claiming that this law will "prevent matter from spontaneously generating." How does Mr. X take the phrase "spontaneously generating" to mean? Indeed, he does not say, rather, he hopes that it goes unquestioned! But we see in the premise following Premise 4 that a "supernatural event" is required to solve the non-problem set up by his argument's prior premises.

The question here is: How does positing the "supernatural" - whether an event or an entity causing that event - alleviate the violation of the "Laws of Conservation" cited in Premise 4? Christian theologians and creationists love to argue that God created the world ex nihilo. But what does this mean, creation ex nihilo? It literally means: "out of nothing." So, the Christian posits that existence (i.e., the universe) came into existence through an act of the supernatural. So, now the question becomes: How did this take place, and how is it verifiable? What is the 'supernatural,' and how can one know what it is? If the theist asserts the supernatural, then he claims knowledge of the supernatural. How was this knowledge gained? How is the allegation that "the supernatural" is known tested and verified? Often, Christians will claim that they "know" this through "revelation," yet this hardly answers the question. Indeed, after poking this premise, the evasive premise of 'revelation,' one realizes that "revelation" means nothing more than something accepted as knowledge when read in the Bible. Thus, appealing to revelation constitutes yet another episode of begging the question, as what is claimed to be 'revealed' knowledge is accepted on the tenuous grounds that the source of that 'revealed' knowledge - e.g., the Bible, is true, which premise is defended on the ground that it is known to be true by revelation! Therefore, appealing to 'revelation' does nothing for the Christian's position.

 

Premise 5: "There must be some 'supernatural' event to bring matter into existence."

This premise is not supported by any of the prior premises, nor is there any justification for linking this premise with any of the reasoning offered in support of those premises preceding it. Hence, this premise is a non sequitur. None of the foregoing premises justifies positing something that is said to be "supernatural" - whatever that is intended to mean. Since the argument in general is seen to be an instance of philosophical groping for causality, which is identity applied to action, and which therefore is natural, not 'supernatural', the introduction at this point of the 'supernatural' is both hasty and unjustified by previous premises.

Essentially speaking, what Premise 5 of this argument wants to posit is a form of consciousness as the instigator of existence. However, not only would this position commit the non sequitur that Mr. X's appeal to supernaturalism commits, it would flagrantly commit the argument as a whole to the fallacy of the stolen concept (which it committed already in Premise 5 above). Thus, no matter how Mr. X would like to phrase his version of the cosmological paradigm, he runs straight into brick walls by committing fallacy after fallacy. Premise 5 here does not rescue him from this habit, which has established itself since the beginning of his correspondence with me.

 

Conclusion:

Hence, the conclusion, "This 'supernatural' event is God or, more accurately, an act of God," is both completely unwarranted as well as unjustified by the preceding premises. The argument Mr. X offers utterly fails.

Advise to Mr. X: Keep trying!!

 

Thorn comments:

Mr. X offered his argument and challenged me to "prove it wrong," which I have done, even though he quipped that I have "got NOTHING in [my] corner to prove [his argument] wrong." To correct Mr. X, I have my mind! Therefore, I submit that this quip was secreted in great haste, for indeed I have proven his argument wrong by pointing out its glaring flaws.

Most likely, individuals like Mr. X will not accept my examination and verdicts because they are so neurotically committed to the teachings they were taught when they were young, and never discovered the courage necessary to challenge those teachings. Look at religionists today: Virtually all adults who attempt to 'apologize' for their religious beliefs grew up under the influence of some form of mysticism, be it the brand of god-belief to which they are now committed, or some other variant which was rejected when another variant was embraced in its place. While I do not know this to be the case specifically with Mr. X (a self-confessed Catholic), I surmise that it is most probably the case. He was most likely taught to experience guilt or fear - most likely both! - should he ever question the authority of the dogma he was brought to swallow by his parents and/or peers as a young person. To this day, he continues to sacrifice his mind in service to it. The result: Another willing victim for the tribal collectivism of religion!

 

Now on to other matters…

Mr. X writes:

"I don't really care what you think of Christianity or religion in general--to each his own."

Thorn responds:

Then what's the fuss, Mr. X? Why do you go to such trouble to tangle with me if you don't care what I think about your god-beliefs? Throughout all your correspondence you have attempted to defend your god-beliefs by attacking my lack of god-belief. Now you claim that your position is one of indifference to my criticism. This hardly seems plausible, given all the energy you've expended in the attempt to damage my reputation or find some, as you put it yourself, Achilles' heel in either my own thought processes or in the processes of Objectivism in general. Your efforts to do so to this point have not only failed, they have backfired in your face. And now you say you "don't really care" what I think about Christianity? Your words and your actions do not appear to be compatible here at all.

Mr. X writes:

"But no amount of verbal gymnastics on your part will make the facts of reality go away, namely that the universe--existence--is finite, therefore had a beginning, therefore has a cause for existence."

Thorn responds:

Indeed, I have no intention of engaging "verbal gymnastics" to "make the facts of reality go away"; this more accurately describes the religionist's position. All along in our correspondence, I have embraced the facts of reality wholeheartedly, namely that existence exists, that to exist is to be something (which means: to exist is to have identity), and that the task of consciousness is to identify reality, not create it. It is Mr. X who has each of these positions reversed, but is unwilling to examine his root premises and hidden assumptions.

Furthermore, to say that the universe or existence is finite and then from this declaration conclude that it "therefore had a beginning, therefore has a cause for existence" is to commit a non sequitur (which in this case assumes an equivocation). Something can indeed be finite, but also eternal. There is no contradiction in the pairing of these concepts. The Objectivist position is that existence is necessarily finite in identity. In other words, if something should exist, it must be something rather than anything but something, which means: to exist is to be something particular, i.e., finite. A is A. If A should exist, it must be A, and cannot be non-A.

However, the finiteness of existence in terms of its identity and its temporal nature are indeed two different matters altogether. I have discussed this in the past. Please review the following:

From the Tindrbox Files, Section 16, Post 79: "Responses to Howard, Pt. II"

I know of no contradiction or inconsistency between the concepts ‘eternal’ (which indicates a lack of applicability of temporal restraints) and ‘finite’ (a component of the Law of Identity: A is A, A is only A, A is not non-A).

When I state that existence is eternal (i.e., uncreated, indestructible), I refer to the fact that time is not a presupposition to existence, but rather existence is a presupposition to time. Time presupposes existents which are engaged in a relationship. This is consistent with Objectivism’s metaphysics as I have provided. Again, it is important to bear in mind one’s definitions. Observe:

Time is a measurement of motion [which presupposes that entities exist]; as such, it is a type of relationship. Time applies only within the universe*, when you define a standard - such as the motion of the earth around the sun. If you take that as a unit, you can say: ‘This person has a certain relationship to that motion; he has existed for three revolutions; he is three years old.’ But when you get to the universe* as a whole, obviously, no standard is applicable. You cannot get outside the universe. The universe is eternal in the literal sense: non-temporal, out of time. (L. Peikoff, The Philosophy of Objectivism, lecture series [1976].)

* ‘Universe’ here is defined as the sum of existence, i.e., all that exists. According to Objectivism, the universe contains every entity said to exist. If something exists, it is naturally part of the universe.

Hence, time, since it is dependent on the relationship of existent entities, presupposes existence. There is no such thing as ‘something outside the universe’. Therefore, there can be no temporal standard that can apply to the universe as a whole. The universe exists, existence exists. Existence as such is not bound to temporal constraints for this reason: temporal constraints presuppose existence, not the other way around. Therefore, since existence exists, and temporal constraints are dependent upon existent entities in relationship to each other, time only exists within the universe, and the universe itself (i.e., existence) is eternal, i.e., non-temporal, or untethered to temporal constraints. The notion ‘temporal constraints’ has no meaning when applied to the universe as a whole.

Now contrast this term ‘eternal’ with the term ‘finite’. When one says that an existent entity (such as an apple or a shoe) is ‘finite’, he recognizes the Law of Identity, that A is A, and that A is only A. A shoes is not a horse, a lizard is not a telephone, a mountain is not a bowl of rice krispies (though it can be compared to one, when one is excessively hungry), and a chopstick is not a political doctrine. Entities are finite in the sense that they possess identity, and therefore a finite nature. There is no entity (i.e., existent) that possesses an ‘infinite’ nature. This would be a direct violation of the axiom of identity, which presupposes the fact of existence. This is the primary problem with the definitions of ‘god’ - they violate the Law of Identity. There is no justification for this.

When Objectivist metaphysics makes the statement that something is ‘finite’ in nature, it is not a statement of temporal finiteness - in the sense that entities are bound to temporal constraints, but of existential finiteness. By ‘existential finiteness’ I refer to the Law of Identity (A is A). Again, Objectivist metaphysics is completely consistent with its identification of reality.

Therefore, there is no ‘apparent contradiction’ between these terms. As long as one does not confuse the principles involved, no confusion should result from the use of these terms. If you review my original statements, you will see that the statement I give above as clarification is completely consistent with the former.

Clearly, the arguments which effectively checkmate Mr. X's position have already been made and nailed up on my website for all to see. Mr. X is certainly not prone to doing his homework, so it seems.

Mr. X writes:

"Even the idea of this seems to profoundly confuse you; so you try to rationalize it with made-up 'fallacies' like 'stolen concept' or 'package deal'. You even stated in the previous post that such questions as 'why does existence exist' couldn't be asked! But alas, I did ask them! You can't ask them because your silly little philosophy can't even comprehend the question." [sic]

Thorn responds:

Mr. X's frustration with his own position prompts him to continue attacking mine. Because Mr. X does not like being caught in his commission of stolen concept fallacies, he calls the identification of such fallacies "made-up" and thus hopes to escape their ruin. However, Mr. X indeed recognized the error when he attempted to posit causality "at the heart of existence" in Volley 10, after I corrected this error in Volley 9.

Also, Mr. X never once attempted to accept the challenge of my riddle, first posed to him in Volley 5, namely the question: Can you argue for the position that existence is a creation WITHOUT first presupposing existence? Of course, the correct answer to the question is, no, he cannot. No one can. Why? Because any attempt to argue that existence is a creation would necessarily commit the fallacy of the stolen concept.

Mr. X writes:

"Objectivism is a stale, dated philosophy, postulated by a bitter hack of a writer. It can't evolve with new knowledge of our existence; instead, you arrogantly assume Miss Rand knew everything there was to know about existence. All Objectivism is, is her opinion of 'how things are' and here opinion of 'how things ought to be'."

Thorn responds:

In other words, Mr. X does not like the philosophy of Reason, and his dislike is motivated by his unexamined commitment to mystical philosophy. The very fact that Mr. X would write something like "you arrogantly assume Miss Rand knew everything there was to know about existence," only underscores his anxiety in facing the challenges put forth by the pathology of religion made possible by applying the principles of Objectivism.

Mr. X writes:

"I'm trying to read 'The Fountainhead' right now, but frankly, its awful. I've read better prose from grade school book reports." [sic]

Thorn responds:

I suspect Mr. X is not a deep thinker (and past correspondence confirms this suspicion), or that he has set out to read Ayn Rand's The Fountainhead with the presumption that he simply will not like it, regardless of its many virtues. I suspect Mr. X's remark here is a combination of these two reasons. Beyond this, I cannot help the man. As the old adage holds, you can lead a horse to water, but you cannot make him drink. Similarly, you can model rational thought to a man, but you cannot make him think for himself.

Mr. X writes:

"P.S.--I don't care if you post these responses on your site, if it makes you happy, go for it. I do request that you NOT use my name." [sic]

Thorn responds:

Mr. X's request is noted. I have no problem honoring it.

May he get what he deserves!

Anton Thorn

___________________________________________________________________

© Copyright 2000 by Anton Thorn. All rights reserved.

 

 

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