French Communists: Internal Democracy and Strategic Uncertainty
James Cohen[*]
It is neither the
best nor the worst of times for the French Communist Party. With the collapse
of the
After a long postwar period in which the French Communists could count on up to more than a fifth of the vote, the party went into a tailspin in the mid-70s and seemed to be heading for extinction. From a 21.6% showing in the 1973 legislative elections, the party fell precipiously to 7.8% in the European parliamentary elections of 1989. Communist presidential candidate Andre Lajoinie bombed out with 6.9% in the first round of balloting in 1988. In 1995, the 8.6% score of presidential candidate Robert Hue signaled a modest but perceptible rebound. The party is currently represented in the National Assembly with 24 deputies to the Socialists' 67 (and more than 300 on the right). A recent poll revealed that three voters out of ten are willing to admit that the Communist Party plays a "useful role" in French political life.
Various
explanations have been advanced for the party's overall decline in the past 20
years. Clearly, its traditional working-class base has eroded. The socially
homogeneous industrial suburbs where the Communists used to flourish have
become much more differentiated, forcing the Communists to become more of a
"catchall" party. To some extent, the Communists have been successful
in finding support among urban service workers - in particular those in public
service - along with highly trained engineers, technicians, scientists and
teachers. The party continues to control several of its municipal bastions in
the "red belts" around
More generally,
the ideals of social change through political struggle have taken a severe
beating in
What, then,
allows the Communists to be moderately optimistic today? The first obvious
reason is a recent change in leadership. George Marchais,
the party's Secretary General from 1972 to 1994, was almost a caricacture of the rigid bureaucrat - the very symbol of
his party's affiliation to the austere Eastern European model of socialism. His
successor, Robert Hue, was a obscure figure nationally until he suddenly found
himself in the leading role.
Contrary to most
observers' expectations,
Individual
characteristics aside,
"Metamorphosis" means that party members are being encouraged to do
what was practically unthinkable in the past, that is to engage in open debate
about what kind of program they want to bring to the French people. Although
the Soviet-inspired doctrine of "democratic centralism" was abolished
by the party leadership in the 1980s, not until recently has debate actually
been promoted as a method for reaching decisions. While many authoritarian
features of the Soviet system were repudiated by
Veteran party members, according to many accounts, are not finding it easy to respond to this call to join the debate. The freedom they have been given to discuss party strategy has given many of them the impression that the leadership is unable to provide orientation. Yet in spite of strong reservations by some, the transition to a more democratic mode of functioning seems irreversible.
One of the
purposes of the party's recent 29th Congress (Dec. 18-22, 1996) was to institutionalize
the practice of debate. The Congress, the first since 1994, was held in the La Défense business district west of
Militants were free to approve or disapprove the resolution, and for several weeks leading up to the Congress, L'Humanité regularly printed a range of viewpoints including the texts of two organized groups of opponents. Although these groups were not given the opportunity to present their own full-blown resolutions, they were able to modify the main text with dozens of amendments.
In a similar
vein, the
Symbolically the Congress broke with its heritage of hierarchy and regimentation by doing away with the elevated podium and placing all speakers at the same level, using a wide TV screen to facilitate visibility.
The 29th Congress also recognized, for the first time, substantial autonomy for the party's affiliated labor unions. Beginning in the 1920s, the large trade-union confederation CGT (Confédération Générale du Travail) operated as a conveyor belt for party thinking; top officials of the CGT were also in the national bureau of the party. This is no longer true. On the first day of the 29th Congress, CGT Secretary General Louis Viannet publicly resigned from the national bureau, symbolically cutting the umbilical cord.
The internal debate has covered the whole gamut of current issues. The question that looms largest is whether the Communists can give new content to the current phase of European integration, which they criticize as reflecting the trend toward laissez-faire economics on a world scale. A key related question is to how to connect more effectively with emerging social movements, from public sector workers to students, women, immigrants and the unemployed.
Three organized tendencies within the party have formulated three strikingly contrasting approaches. The first and by far the dominant tendency (approved by more than 90% of the delegates) is the one backed by the top party leadership. Its approach is designed to keep the Communists distinct in program from the Socialists while still favoring every opportunity to coalesce with them. Hue and his followers openly criticize the Socialists' free-market approach to European integration but do not exclude governing with them, which of course would mean compromising on this central issue. Since the Maastricht Treaty is already in effect and preparations for the single European currency (the "Euro") and the European central bank are already well under way, the leadership figures that the Communists may have to adapt to this reality, whatever its implications for workers.
One oppositional tendency, which could be referred to as "ultra-orthodox", is made up of those who feel that by compromising with the Socialists on Europe, the party is betraying its revolutionary heritage. They call for a clear "break" with the capitalist system and criticize the party's current language, which they consider too fuzzy, about "moving beyond" capitalism. This tendency, which includes many who are clearly nostalgic for the old days of Stalinism, controls only one territorial federation out of 96, but may possibly influence up to 15% of party members nationwide.
The second group, slightly more influential because of its support among intellectuals, is known as the "Refondateurs" (Re-founders). They call for the party to form, in conjunction with other forces on the left, a "pole of radicality" which would serve as a dynamic counterweight to the Socialists. These other forces could include the Greens, the neo-Trotskyist Communist Revolutionary League, and, above all, various emerging social movements: workers' struggles of course, but also defense of immigrants' rights, unemployed workers unions, students' fights to defend the quality of higher education against ministry-imposed cuts, etc. The point is to be present wherever "radicality" manifests itself in struggle and to form a bloc which could theoretically regroup 20% or more of the electorate. The consolidation of such a bloc would presumably force the Socialists - who are also in the neighborhood of 20% - to move toward more radical positions.
The Refondateurs agree with the current leadership that the party should not return to its old habit of trying to control every movement it is involved in. But unlike Hue and his followers, they recommend staying out of governmental coalitions as long as the Socialists continue to endorse a free-market European policy.
But it is unlikely that Hue will heed this advice. The organization of the French elections in two rounds encourages a party like the Communists, after standing to be counted in the first round of balloting, to join forces with other parties on the left in the second round. In exchange for this support, the party can reasonably hope for participation in government, possibly to the tune of two or three ministerial positions. Hue has made it clear that he wants his party to become a "party of government" for the first time since 1984.
The prospect of a left government is not as remote as it might seem: legislative elections are due to take place in 1998, and the governing right, under Prime Minister Alain Juppé, has steadily lost support because of its austerity policies and its bandaid measures against unemployment. Although figures can be misleading, Juppé has barely cracked 30% in recent popularity polls.
While clearly the
French Communist Party is more democratic than ever before, this is no
guarantee of a decisive breakthrough in the foreseeable future. The sense of
disarray felt by many militants is not just due to their lack of experience in
open debate; they also are finding it difficult to understand exactly what
their party stands for. There is a uneasy feeling on the part of many
Communists, including
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