THE OLD COMMON LAW AND THE NEW TRUSTS 119 of twenty-three years. The Porto Rican Code has changed this to the customary American standard of twenty-one years of age. The Porto Rican Code has retained the continental usage of requiring a registry of civil status, including the records or entries of births, marriages, emancipations, acknowledgments and legiti- mations, and deaths, to be in charge of the municipal judges in Porto Rico.17 UNIVERSITY OF MIcHIGAN. JOSD~PH H. DRAKE. [ro BE CONTINUED.]

THE OLD COMMON LAW AND THE NEW TRUSTS*

IN reality the trust question is not new but old. Telephoning, telegraphing and railroading have contracted the world economically to correspond to a mere county as it existed a few centuries ago, with its towns and villages. In such a county there was but little free competition. It is therefore of interest today to examine the means then devised by our ancestors to protect their weak against their ‘strong, and also to observe the trend of modern decisions as to these questions. I. By going back a few centuries when trusts were the rule, we find the prices of many of the chief articles of consumption fixed in - every case not by the owner but by custom, by law or by the justices. The courts under whose jurisdiction these matters came were the lower courts, which were not courts of record, the sheriff’s tourus and the courts leet.’ These courts enforced the ancient customs and there can be no doubt that the numerous statutes fixing, for instance, the price of bread were in reality re-enactments or at least modifications only of older customary law. The prices of almost all articles then of necessity to the common people were fixed not by competi- tion but by law. Bread, beer, beer barrels, ~vine, meat, fish, poultry, wax, candles, cloth, innkeepers’ rates, grinding charges of mills, ferry rates, blacksmiths’ charges, weighers’ fees, cartage charges, rates of interest, rate of wages, were in those days regulated by law and not by free contract. SIP. R. Code, Sec. 3I9i cf. Sp. Code, Art. 326. *This article was written in March, 1903, but has been delayed in publication. Some additional authorities and able discussion supporting substantially the asme views may be found in an article by Bruce ‘Wyman, Harvard Law Review, January and February, 7904. D. M. F. Dalton, Sheriffs, ch. soS.

120 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW: Sometimes the owner of the business in question had a monopoly. When, for instance, we find the case of Torcester common bake house, which was to bake “for the whole town,” cited as being a good custom, this implies that the Torcester common bake house could not charge more than a reasonable price for its services.2 We read of bakers being put to jail “for bad and insufficient bread,” and excusing themselves in vain that their mills could not grind so well [as those of Edinburgh] nor their servants bake so white.1 We read in Dalton on Sheriffs (p. 182) that “bakers inhabiting out of cities, bor~ughs and corporate towns, shall have IIIJ. S. in allow- ance for their charges in baking of every quarter, three horse loaves to be sold by the baker for one penny, 13 d. for XIJ., and every loaf to weigh the full weight of a full weight loaf.” We find a series of statutes regulating the price of bread.4 The act of 1709 (8 Anne) re~nacts the prior acts and gives an elaborate table regulating the size of the loaves to be sold for 2, 6, 12 or iS pence accordingly, so that when wheat is 5 shillings per bushel and the magistrates allow is. 6 pence the bushel to the baker for baking, then a one penny loaf must weight 7 ounces and 2 drachms, and the eighteen penny loaf ii pounds; 9 ounces and 6 drachms. It provides that the mayor and aldermen within the City of London and ‘the mayor, bailiffs, aldermen or other chief magistrates for the time - being of any other city, town, corporation or borough, or two or more justices of the peace in towns where there shall be no such mayor, bailiff, aldermen or chief magistrates, shall severally and respectively, and from time to time as there shall be occasion, set, ascertain and appoint * * * the assize and weight of all sorts of bread, to be sold or exposed to sale by any baker or other person whatsoever within the limits of their several jurisdictions, having respect to the prices of grain, meal or flour, wherever such bread shall be made, which shall bear the several public marks in or about the city, where such assize shall be so set, and reasonable allow- ance being made to the bakers for their “charges, pains and livelihoods.” The officers l~ad power to enter the baker’s premises during the day time to weigh and search for bread, and to seize “improper” bread. This assize of bread and also of beer continued in force for centuries. Britton, who died in 1306, mentions that jurors shall inquire of it.~ Blackstone speaks of bakers having to stand in the ~Hix v. Gardiner, 2 BuIst. 195 (II Jac.). s6g6—Elchies’ Dec., Vol. a, Article Burgh Royal. 4~3 Edw. and; Si H. 3, Stat. 6; sS H. 6, 13 B., 8 Anne c. iS; s Geo. s, Stat. a, c. a6; 5 Geo. s, c. a5; 3! Geo. a, c. 29; 3 Geo. 3, c. Is; 53 Geo. 3, c. 6a (s~g~). ‘Britton’s Tr., Baldwin’s Edition, spar, p. 148. ~ I Jac. c. ag; Dalton, Country Justice, p. 35 (1643).

THE OLD COMMON LAW AND THE NEW TRUSTS 121: Pillory and brewers having to stand in the tumbrel or dung cart as punishment for brewing bad beer in the time of Edward the Confessor. By act of 1604 the price of one full quart of fest beer was fixed at i d. and two small quarts at i d.8 Persons selling beer for higher prices than those fixed by the justices were punished.7 So was an innkeeper who sold beer, etc., for more than i d.5 In the time of Henry VIII the price of beer was still assessed by the justices and persons were punished for selling it at higher prices.8 Incidentally, brewers were prohibited from making their own barrels, so as not to be led into temptation, and it was provided that no cooper “shall enhance the price of any such barrels * ~ but keep the rates of such prices as hereafter ensueth and not above * that is to say, for every beer barrel 9 d. * * * and the ale barrel 14 d.”’0 It was likewise provided that every beer brewer and ale brewer shall take “after such prices and rates as shall be thought convenient and sufficient by the discretions of the justices of the peace, within every shire” and similarly in the towns, and that “the said ale brewers or beer brewers, at any time here- after, shall not sell their beer nor ale at any higher rates or prices than shall be to them assigned.””’ By the time of George III these provisions were somewhat relaxed.’2 The court leet was also to inquire against great prices and excess of ~vines.”1 By act of Henry VIII”4 it was provided that “no person or persons shall sell Gascoin, Guyon, or French wines above v ii j d the gallon, that is to say, a penny the pint-and that no malmaeys, romneys, sacks nor other sweet ~vines shall be sold by retail above x i j the gallon.” And a later act of Elizabeth’1 provided that all persons “shall and may from henceforth sell xvines-at such price or prices and in such form as shall be limited by the queen’s majesty’s proclamation in that county or place, made with the assent of such lords and other persons, as by the statute”8 were authorized to set price upon ~vines in gross.” And “every justice of the peace, within the precinct of his office, at the request of the subject to whom denial of sale shall be made of any wine, on full payment thereof offered according to the prices set down by the lords, etc., ~a3 H. 5, c. 4; Lombard, Justice, 455. I J’ac. c. g; 4 Jac., c. 5; 7 Jac., c. xo; Lombard, 459; Fitzherbert, 68. ~ Farrington v. Kemarre, Trin. 4 Car. Coin. Bane.; Sir Thomas Hetley’s Reports, 1657. ~I. 101; 23 H. 5, c. 4. 10 ~ H. 8, c. 4; Dalton, Ca:~titry Justice, p. ss. ~ 23 H. 8, C. 4, Sec. s. ss a Ceo. 3, c. 14; Bac. Abr. V., 23!. 517 Edov. 6, c. ~ Coke IV., a6x, a6~, Ed. 1797. ~‘ aS H. 8, c. 74, 7536. 5I~ Eliz., c. s, a. a5, xs6a. ~ 28 H. 8, c. 14 Css36), which fixed retail prices.

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW: may enter into the places where such ~vine shall lie, and may sell and deliver the same ~vine desired to be bought to the persons requiring to buy the same, taking the buyer’s money toward the satisfaction of the forfeiture.”’1 This, it will be seen, was virtually a condemna- tion proceeding in favor of a private person who required the ~vine. The courts were likewise to inquire “if any butcher, fish monger, inuholder, tippler, brewer, baker, powlter or other seller of victuals have not sold the same at reasonable prices and for moderate prices.””8 The price of candles was fixed by act of Henry VI,’9 which recited that “the wax chandlers in divers parts of England sell candles-after the rate of a pound of wax for ijs and more,where one pound of wax is no more worth than vjd so wrought xxiij d or more, by which means divers of the people be defrauded of their good interest and devotion.” This act regulated the price of all waxworks, but concludes “provided that this statute do not extend to hearses to- be made for nobles that do die.”10 - Further, every justice was to examine and search (by his discre- tion) such “as had sold or set forth to be sold any candles or other works of wax at higher price than after the rate of 4 d. the pound, over the common price of plain wax between merchant and mer- chant, and may punish them.2” The manufacture and price of cloth was severely regulated in every detail.11 It was provided, for instance, that a yard of broad- cloth of finest making, scarlet grayned or other cloth grayned, what colour so ever it be, should not be sold above the value of i6 s. a broad yard, etc.21 Innkeepers also were from time immemorial bound to sell at rea- sonable prices: “He is in the nature of a public person, and his house and occupation a thing of necessity,” “he is bound to sell for a reasonable price, and may not sell or refuse or set his own price upon his goods ‘~ ‘~‘ for he is in the nature of a public officer for the reception of travellers.”24 Innholders were further compelled to sell oats at reasonable prices and to charge nothing for litter.21 They were compelled to sell horse bread according to the assize and hay, oats, beans, peas and provenders and all kind of victuals for man and beast at reasonable gain, but were alloweII Dalton, 776, 7643. - 1823 Edw. 3, c. 6; 73 R. a, c. 8; Lombard, Justice, P~ 454’5. II H. 6, c. ia (7433). 15Rep. 21 Jac. I., c. a8 (7623). ~‘ Dalton, p. 34; Comjskat Justice, 36!. ~ King v. ‘Worrall, 35 Car, a, Skinner, io5. 114 H 7, c. 8; repesled as Jac., c. 78; Coke, Vol. IV., p. 774, Ed. 7797. 141.uton v. Bigg, ~ xv. & M., Skinner, 276, 297, 1728. 15 13 R. a, c. 8; Fitzhugh, Justice, 7o; cf. ~ H. 4, c. 25.

THE OLD COMMON LAW AND THE NEW TRUSTS 123: to charge ,Y2 d. for hay and oats over the market price.10 If they extorted any greater or larger sums than those rates and prices that had been imposed on their commodities, they could be indicted.ar In the County of Middlesex, for instance, a proclamation was made- in court (19 Car. 2) fixing the price of hay, oats, etc.28 It was usual that all residents and inhabitants should grind at the lord’s mill, the mill of the manor, and the rate paid for the grind- ing was invariably fixed by custom of the realm—usually from 1-20’ to 1-24 of the grain or more if the miller returned the bran to the owner. It was sometimes held that after a man had waited forty- eight hours without being able to get his grain ground he could take’ it elsewhere.10 This condition continued for many centuries. Sometimes no doubt an oppressive charge was made at the mills, and as traffic developedi it became possible to take the grain to other mills and the prohibi- tions against shipping grain were relaxed, but for centuries the courts prevented grasping lords and mill owners from charging the peasants excessive prices for grinding their grain into flour. Ferries usually had a monopoly, and the rate of passage was fixed by law.10 Vessels coming to load butter and cheese were compelled, by act of 1692, “to take on board any such butter and cheese as shall be tendered to be shipped on’penalty of a fine.”1’ By the same statute warehouse keepers, weighers and searchers or shippers of butter and cheese in any borough were appointed and the masters of vessels were compelled to receive the butter and cheese and take care thereof and ship the same successively, and the fees of weighers of cheese were fixed. In some places other things besides mills had a monopoly, and must have had their rates of charges fixed by custom, such as the dye house at Beverly mentioned by Bulstrode (p. 196). That the prices charged by blacksmiths or common farriers were similarly fixed by custom cannot be doubted.12 When by custom of London the mayor had the “ordering of the car-men, carters and car-rooms of the city” it was held that he could both limit the num- ber of carters and teamsters to be licensed and could regulate the ~~az Jac. I, c. 2!, 1623; Bac. Abr., V. 227. 330. 11 Carth. iso; Skin. api. 15 Raym. 76a; Bacon, V. a3r; cf. Co,upleot Justice, p. laS, 7661; also Dalton, p. 68, cit~uig I Jac. a, C. 70. ~ Hix v. Gardiner, a Bulst. 195, II Jac.; Statute 3 Edw. I, de victualarils; Dalton, 183; Robertson v. Shaw, 1742, Elchies’ Dec. I., Article Multures; Lockhart v. Vassels, Elchies’ Dec. II., p. 295. - 15a Bulst. 195-796. 154 & s \V. & M., C. 7, 7692; Dalton, 63. 17 Jackson v. Rogers, a Show. 332.

124 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW: price and punish deceits.11 Even such matters as the fees to be charged by loan brokers were fixed by statute in I623,~~ and brokers could only charge 5 shillings for procuring a loan of ioo pounds and 4 shillings for renewing a bond. In fact, the rate of wages also was quite generally fixed by custom and by statute, or by the justices. “Clothiers and masters who shall refuse to pay such wages (to their spinsters, weavers or their work- men whatsoever) as shall be assessed at the sessions by the jus- tices” shall forfeit io s. to the party aggrieved.11 By statutes 5 Eliz. C. 4 & 5’ and ‘ Jac. c. 6, the justices were to fix and certify wages of laborers yearly into chance~y.1e This worked both ways. As late as I72o~~ we find that journeymen tailors agreeing to advance their wages above the amount at which they had been fixed under the statute of laborers of 1562 could, on conviction thereof, be punished by commitment to the house of correction at hard labor for two months.18 And, while the statute of 1720 and the statute of laborers of 156210 providing for the fixing of the wages of agricul- tural and other laborers by the justices and preventing them’ from moving without a testimonial and compelling them to work, seem contrary to modern ideas, it is evident that they cannot have been impracticable or have worked altogether badly since they continued in force for several hundred years. In administering them it was provided that the justices of the peace and the mayors and other head officers should at Easter sessions call together, “such discreet and grave persons of the county as they shall think meet, and conferring together concerning the plenty or scarcity of the times and other circumstances necessary to be considered,” should fix the wages for hoeing, reaping or thrashing of corn and grain, hay, ditching and hedging, etc., and certify the same to the court of chancery.40 The wages of by far the greater number of workmen were undoubtedly fixed by custom and not by competition. The usury laws do not in principle differ from all these other laws fixing the price that might be charged. It is true, that ordinarily all usury was prohibited. Glanville4’ speaks of all the effects of the usurer being forfeited to the king upon his death, and it was an offense at 55 Player v. Jenkins, a Keble, 27. 24a7 )‘ac., c. 17. - Jac., c. 6; Co,npleat Justice, 66; Dalton, p. 6s4. ~ Compleat Justice, p. ~5a; Jenkins Exch. Rep., p. 232, 7734. 577 Geo. 7, c. 73. “s Eliz., c. 4, Sec. is; r Jac. I., c. 6; Geo. s, c. 17; P. Jus. 66; Dalton, pp. 75-79’97. ‘~ Book 7, c. 76; cf. Grand Custom de Nonn., C. 20.

THE OLD COMMON LAW AND THE NEW TRUSTS 125: common law, but once regulated by statute the provisions were retained as a protection of the weak against the strong. The Sheriff’s Tourn had jurisdiction of “all common oppressors, as usurers, etc,”42 It is curious to note that while most of this old law has been repealed in England it has never been formally repealed here, although largely transplanted with the rest of the common law, and it certainly suggests ~vide powers both in the state and United States Courts and in the legislatures,—and in congress as well-- to deal with the question of the trusts. In medi~val England the various branches of industry in the towns were usually governed by the trades unions or guilds or companies. Many towns were governed by the heads of these trades unions, such as by “seven deacons of trades,” frequently with an addition of a certain number of merchants.41 People frequently had to go to one certain market, and if they ~vent to another market the owner of such market was liable to an action at the suit of the grantee of the market to which they prop- erly should have gone.44 The custom of the City of London, according to which no freeman could sell his goods unless they had been weighed at the city beam was held good.” Innkeepers were sometimes required to wear a livery and pay a license fee.48 It was held a good custom that the porterage of corn, roots, etc., belonged to the city, and none but the con’ipany of free porters were allowed to handle it.47 Masters of ships had to pay weighage on every ton of cheese landed by them.48 The transportation of grain was forbidden with- out a license unless the price was below 6 5. 9 d. for wheat, etc.49 Soap barrels had to be of designated size.10 The bakers company of London caused x8oo spiced cakes to be seized and sent to the city prisons because they had not been baked by the company.1” It was held proper to restrict the number of wood mongers “and the same assess.”12 “The city may restrain any trade whose excess may obstruct the government.” The number of spindles which a silk 47 Bac. Abr., Vol. a, p. 777; cf. 73 Eliz., c. 8; 37 H. 5, c. g; 27 Jac. 77; Sanderson v. Warner, Palm. (‘688) api. 43 Elchies’ Dec. 3, Article Burgh Royal. “Bac. 4, p. ss6. ‘5 Bac. Abr. 3, p. 38, citing cases. “Sayer’s Rep., p. 275, 1775. 41 Bac. Abr. 3, p. 38, citing cases. “Bac. Abr. 3, p. 30. “~ P. & M. Stat. a, c. 5, 1554, lasting substantially to aa Car, a. ‘~a~ H. 5, c. 4. 85 Palmer v. Barfoot, Lut~v. 447, 2 Jac. II., Ed. 7778. 77 Player v. Jenkins, a Keble, 27.

7126 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW: throwster could run was limited.1’ Only ~po carters were allowed in London ;54 they “might obstruct the streets if too many.” Butchers were made to dress veal “with the kidneys exposed like .sheep.”51 Leather had to be dressed in such way as the company of curriers provided.50 Shoes were seized when not made of well tanned leather.17 The manufacture of cloth was regulated by elab- -orate statutes15 In fact, every conceivable business was subject to regulation in -the interest of the community, and the length of time during which .all these laws remained on the statute books and were enforced by -the courts indicates that the conditions cannot have been as intoler- able as one would at first sight suppose. Regulation was for cen- ‘tunes the rule, and free competition the exception. II. In modern jurisprudence where has all this law gone to, how has it been modified and how much of it is still alive? As a result of the -extremist doctrines of Adam Smith, most of it appears to have fallen into desuetude. The more recent decisions appear to have -~been- built upon the narrower and consequently weaker foundation -of the doctrine of “public callingS.” As occasion arose, when prices ‘exacted by practical monopolies had to be fixed, the law of “pub- lic callings” has been stretched .by the courts so that this now -embraces a wide variety of occupations. In brief, the present rule of law has been stated as follo~Vs “When the owner of property devotes it to a use in which the :public has an interest, he in effect grants to the public an interest in - such use, and must to the extent of that interest submit to be con- trolled by the public for the common good, as long as he maintains ‘the use.” “The obligations of public callings are found to be’ four- fold: to serve all, with adequate facilities, for a reasonable compen- ~sation, and without discrimination.” The right of a public service -company “to carry on• its business in its own way: to make regula- tions for the use of its property by the public, and to modify its undertaking by contracts with individuals” has also been limitedY~ And courts and legislatures have in the case of many industries ss Silk Throwster v. Freemantel, a Keble, 309. ~‘Player v. Jenkins, sup. I Bulst. 71, (~ Jac.). ~‘ Dalton, 794, 7604. ‘~ Blackwell a. Asdill, Lutw. sq. Ed. 1718. ~ 39 Elis., c. 20, 1597. -55Beale, eases an Public Service Companies, p. IV.

THE OLD COMMON LAW AND THE NEW TRUSTS 127: actually gone so far as to say what prices should be and how the services should be conducted. As the law stands today, what industries then are “public call- ings”? Common carriers who publicly solicit employment and hold them- selves out to the public as carriers and carrying for every one are said to exercise a sort of public office or public employment.60 Even a tow-boat has been held to be a common carrier.6” At common law railroads cannot discriminate, “every person, under identical condi- tions, has an equal right to the service of their commercial agents.” “A merchant who can transport his wares to market at a less cost than his rivals will soon acquire, by under-selling them, a practical monopoly of the business. * * A railroad is not in general subject to much competition ;“ “the calling is a public employment— the compulsion to serve all that apply could be justified in no other way, as the right to accept or reject an offer of business is neces- sarily incident to all private traffic.” “Every trust should be admin- istered so as to offer the cestui qne trust, the enjoyment of the use intended, and these railroad trustees must be held, in their relation to the public, to such a course of dealing as will insure to every member of the community. the equal enjoyment of the means of transportation provided.”62 The courts can enjoin discriminations.61 Express companies are common carriers.64 Bridge companies can be regulated as public highways.65 So in the case of turnpike com- panies.66 Subway companies have been created subject to public regulations.67 Log drive companies, chartered, have been charged to carry logs for all.68 Water and irrigation companies, having furnished water to the public, have become public agencies.60 Sewer companies have been held to be for the public at large.76 Gas com- panies, furnishing natural or artificial gas, even without special charter provisions, hold the streets in trust for the benefit of the ~‘ Ingate v. Christie, Queen’s Bench, i8so, 3 Car. & K. 61; City Bank v. Nantucket Steam Boat Co., C. C. U. 5., 7811, a Story 16; C. & N. xv. R. R. v. People, s6 IlL 363, 7870. 81 Bussey v. M. V. Transportation Co., 24 La. An. i6~, 7872. ‘~‘X~fessenger s,. Pa. R. R. Co., 36 N. j. L. 407, 3~ N. j. L. ~3i (1874). ~ Scofield v. Lake Shore, 43 0. St. 571; cf. Burlington v. Fuel Company, 31 Fed. 6sa; Louisville v. ‘Wilson, 732 md. 517. ~‘ Buckland v. Adams Express Co., 97 Mass. 124 (7867); cf. The Express Cases, 717 U. 5. r, i886. “Thompson v. Matthews, a Edw. Ch. aia, N. Y. 7834. “Covington v. Sanford, 164 U. 5. 378, ~p6, 597. ‘~ Brush Electric Co. v. Consolidated, etc., s~ N. Y. Sup. 87, iSpi. “Weymouth v. Penobscot, 71 Maine, 29, 7880. “Slosser v. Salt River Canal Co.. 65 Pac. Rep. 332, Ariz. Igos; Haugen v. Albina, 21 Ore. 471, 7897. ~‘ City of Mobile a. Bienville, 30 Southern Rep. ~s, Ala. 1901.

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW: public, and owe a duty to supply gas i~o all.”' “The nature of. the article made, the objects of the company, its relation to the com- munity and the rights and privileges it must necessarily exercise, -give the company a public character, and, to a certain extent, a monopoly which can be tolerated only upon the ground of some corresponding duty to meet the public want.”12 - Electric companies have been denied the power to arbitrarily fix a price higher than fixed by the village authorities, subject to revision by the courts.71 Telephone and telegraph companies have been held to be quasi com- mon carriers of news.74 Innkeepers and hotel companies must pro- vide for all travellers alike.’5 Stockyards companies are subject to state regulation - and can make no unreasonable exactions.76 Ceme- tery associations hold their property for a public use.” The associ- ated press, by selling its news to various newspapers, by which the publication of that news became of vast importance to the public, charged its business with a public interest and became subject to regulation.’8 The leading case on the question seems to be Allnutt vs. Iisglis.’9 In this case the court say “If for a particular purpose, the public have a right to resort to his premises and make use of them, and he have a monopoly in them for that purpose, if he will take the benefit of that monopoly, he must as an equivalent perform the duty attached to it on reasonable terms. The question then is, whether circumstanced as this company is by the combination of the warehousing act with the act by which they were originally constituted, and with the actually existing state of things in the port of London, whereby they alone have the ware- housing of these wines, they be not, according to the doctrine of Lord Hale, obliged to limit themselves to a reasonable compensation for such warehousing? And according to him, wherever the acci- dent of time casts upon a party the benefit of having a legal monop- oly of landing goods in a public port, as where he is the owner of ~-‘ Portland Natural Gas v. State, 735 md. 54, 1893; State v. Consumers Gas Co., 157 md. 345, 1907. ~ williams v. Mutual Gas Co.. ~a Mich. 499, 7884. “ C. H. & D. v. Bo~vling Green, ~ 0. St. 336, 7879. 14 State v. City Tel. Co., 6s S. C. 83, 1907; Shepard v. Gold Stock Co., 38 Hun ~ N. Y. 1885; State v. Nebr. Tel. Co., 77 Neb. sa6, s88~ Cheaspeake v. B. & 0. Tel. Co., 66 Md. ~gg, 7887; ‘Western Union a. Call, i8x U. 5. 92, 7901. ~ Rex a. Ivens, Monmouth Assizes, 7835, 7 C. & P. 273; Lamond a. Gorden Hotels, 7897, I Queen’s Bench, 547. 18 Cotting a. Kansas City Stock Yards Co:, 783 U. 5. ~g (7907). ~1 Evergreen Asan. a. Boceher, 53 Coun. 557, 1885. 75lnter Ocean v. Associated Press, 784 Ill. 438, 7900. But see 759 Mo. 470. 72 East, 527, King’s Bench, 7870.

THE OLD COMMON LAW AND THE NEW TRUSTS 129: the only wharf authorized to receive goods which happens to be built in a port newly erected, he is confined to take reasonable com- pensation only for the use of the wharf. * * * And it is enough that there exists in the place and for the commodity in question a virtual monopoly of the warehousing for this purpose, on which the principle of law attaches, as laid down by Lord Hale in the passage referred to. * * As long as their warehouses are the only places which can be resorted to for this purpose, they are bound to let the trade have the use of them for a reasonable hire and reward.” This has been followed in Illinois in Dock Co. vs. Garrity,50 and in Washington by Barrington vs. Dock Co.,5’ in which the court cite Gould on Waters (2d Ed. § I 19) as follows “When wharves belonging to individuals are legally thrown open to the use of the public, they become affected with a public interest, and the wharfage must be reasonable.” The court say: “We think that in determining the character of appellant’s wharf, regard should be had to the use to which it has been devoted, rather than its private ownership-as well might the proprietor of a stage coach claim the right to discriminate upon the ground that the property employed in his business was private property. The doctrine, if maintained, would tend to promote and further monopolies, which it is not the policy of our law to favor.” The principal American cases on the question are the grain eleva- tor cases. In Munn vs. People, 69 Ill. So, at page 89 (1873), the court say:-- “If, in their examination of it, they find the owners and mana- gers of these warehouses are an organized body of monopolists, possessing sufficient strength in their combination, and by their con- nection with the railroads of the state, to impose their own terms upon the producers and shippers of these cereals, to the great detri- ment of the latter, who are under a kind of moral duress in resort- ing to them, can it be said to be usurpation of power on the part of the Legislature to bring them in subjection to law, so to regulate their conduct and charges by law, as to prevent oppression and extor- tion? Can there be a more legitimate subject for the action of a legislative body? We think not.” This was sustained in Munn vs. Illinois, 94 U. S. i i~ (1876), in xvhich the court holds that the business of elevating grain is one in 85775 III. ‘55. ~ 75 xvash. 770, 775.

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW: which the whole public has a direct and positive interest. It makes no difference that the elevators were built before the regulations were put into effect. What is a reasonable compensation or a maxl- mum rate is not an’improper matter for the Legislature to fix, and if the common law rule vests the right to regulate such charges in the courts, this itself can be changed by statute and the Legislature has - the right to “limit the rate of charge for services rendered in a public employment, or for the use of property in which the public has an interest.” (Page 134). Equally important is the case of People vs. Budd, i i7 N. Y. I, (1889), where the right to regulate is based not merely upon the fact of the company’s being chartered, but upon “the nature and extent of the business, the existence of a virtual monopoly, the benefit derived from the canal, creating the business and making it possible, the interest to trade and commerce, the relation of the busi- ness to the prosperity and welfare of the state and practice of legis- lation in analogous cases.” The court cite with approval (at page 537) Justice Bradley’s dissenting opinion in the Sinking Fund cases, 99 U. 5. 700, 747, as follows “When an employment or business becomes a matter of such public interest and importance as to create a common charge of burden upon the citizen, in other words, when it becomes a practical monopoly, to which the citizen is obliged to resort, and by means of which a tribute can be exacted from the community, it is subject to regulation by the legislative power.” Tobacco warehouses also have been held to be public agents who must deal with all alike.82 But as to cotton warehouses, it was held in Ladd vs. Cotton Press,81 that this was not a public business until the Legislature had declared it so. The grounds for this regulation in the interest of the public appear to be: First, public necessity; second, the fact that these concerns often exercise a natural monopoly; thir~I, the fact that they have been specially franchised or chartered, and so assumed obligations to the public. The common law power, however, remains unques- tioned, independently of any charter or franchise. A number of decisions rest entirely or in part upon the fact of having a virtual monopoly of the business.84 ~ Nash v. Page, So Ky. 53p, s88a. ~53 Tex. 772, 1880. ~4 Messenger v. Pa. R. R., sup.; C. H. & D. v. Bowling Green, sup.; State v. Neb. Tel. Co., sup.; Inter Ocean v. Associated Press, sup.; ‘Wheeler v. Northern Cob. Irriga- tion Co., so Cob. sSa, 1887; Allnutt v. Inglis, sup.; Munn v Illinois, sup.; Griffin v. Goldaboro Waler Co.,. 522 N. C. ao6, 1898; Willlams a. Mutual Gas Co., sup.; Spring Val- ley ‘Water Works a. Schottler, 110 U. 5. ~ 1883.

THE OLD COMMON LAW AND THE NEW TRUSTS: ~ “The light and power company have acquired in the village rights that are in the nature of a - monopoly. The use to which it has devoted its property is one in xVhich the public have an interest, and it requires the use of the streets and alleys of the village to conduct and distribute electricity to its lamps for illuminating purposes; and, in addition to this, poxver to appropriate private property has been conferred on it. Section 3471, Revised Statutes. Both reason and authority deny to a corporation clothed with such rights and powers, and bearing such relations to the public, the power to arbi- trarily fix the price at xvhich it will furnish light to those who desire to use “While there is no law giving it a monopoly of the business in the territory covered by its xVires, yet it must be apparent to all that the mere fact of this territory being covered by the ‘plant’ of respondent, from the very nature and character of its business gives it a monopoly of the business which it transacts. No two companies will try to cover this same territory. The demands of the commerce of the present day make the telephone a necessity.”86 “For news gathered from all parts of the country the various ‘newspapers are almost solely dependent on ~such an association, and if they are prohibited from publishing it or its use is refused to them, their character as newspapers is destroyed and they would soon become practically worthless publications. The Associated Press, from the time of its organization and establishment in busi- ness, sold its news reports to various newspapers, who became mem- bers, and the publication of that news became of vast importance to the public, so that public interest is attached to the dissemination of that news. The manner in which that corporation has used its franchise has charged its business with a public interest. It has ~devoted its property to a public use, and has, in effect, granted to the public such an interest in its use that it must submit to be con- trolled by the public for the common good, to the extent of the interest it has thus created in the public in its private property.”sr “The carrier voluntarily engages in the enterprise; it has, in most instances, from the nature of things, a monopoly of the business along the line of its canal; its vocation, together with the use of its property, are closely allied to the public interest; its conduct’in con- nection therewith materially affects the community at large.”ss Citing cases—C. H. & D. v. Bowling Green, sup. “State a. Neb. Tel. Co., sup. “Inter Ocean Pub. Co. a. Ass. Press, sup. Contra: State a. Associated Press, isp Mo. 470. “ ‘Wheeler a. N. C. Ir. Co., sup.

132 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW: “The nature of the article made, the objects of the company, its relations to the community, and the rights and privileges it must necessarily exercise, give the company a public character, and, to a certain extent, a monopoly which can never be tolerated, only upon the ground of some corresponding duty to meet the public want.”80 “Property does become clothed with a public interest xvhen used in a manner to make it a public consequence, and affect the com- munity at large.” * * “It is apparent that all the elevating facilities through which these vast productions ‘of seven or eight great states of the West’ must pass on the way ‘to four or five of the states on the sea shore’ may be a ‘virtual monopoly.’ “86 “The third element of publicity which tends to distingui.sh the business of elevating grain from general commercial pursuits is the practical monopoly which is or may be connected with its prosecu- tion. In the city of Buffalo. the elevators are located at the junction of the canal with Lake Erie. The owners of grain are compelled to use them in transferring cargoes. The area upon which it is prac- ticable to erect them is limited. The structures are expensive, and the circumstances afford great facility for combination among the owners of elevators to fix and maintain an - exorbitant tariff of charges, and to bring into the combination any new elevator which may be erected, and employ it or leave it unemployed, but in either case permit it to share in the aggregate earnings. It is evident that if such a combination in fact exists the principle of free competition in trade is excluded. The precise object of the combination would be to prevent competition. The result of such a combination would necessarily be to subject the lake vessels and canal boats to any exaction which the elevator owners might see fit to impose for the service of the elevator, and the elevator owners would be able to levy a tribute on the community, the extent of which would be limited only by their discretion.”0” For these and other reasons the acts limiting prices xvere sus- tained. III. Once an occupation is classed as a public calling, the legislature and the courts have the right to fix the price that may be charged. Maximum rates on railroads are the most familiar instance.Oa ‘~ ‘Williams a. Mutual Gas Co., sup. 55Munn a. Illinois, sup. 55People a Budd, 177 N. Y. I, r88p. ~ Jackson a. Roger, a Show. 332; (35 Car, a); Ruggles a. People, 97 III. a56; affr. by Ruggles a. Illinois, xo8 U. S. sa6; C. R. a. People, 708 U. 5. s~r; Stephenson a. Great Northern, 6g Minn. 3s3, 7897; C. B. & Q. a. Iowa, p4 U. 5. I~~ Mc’Whorter a. P. & A. R. R. (Fla. 7888), 2 L. R. A. 504.

THE OLD COMMON LAW AND THE NEW TRUSTS 133: “In the absence of statutory regulations upon the subject, it is necessarily implied from the occupation of a railroad corporation that it shall exact only a reasonable compensation for carriage.”81 “Ifs then, the General Assembly may fix a maximum rate of charges by indviduals as common carriers, warehousemen or others exercising a calling or business public in its character or in which the public has an interest to be protected against extortion or oppres- sion, that body may do the same thing and fix the maximum charges of corporations exercising the same business. Of this there can, we ~apprehend, be no doubt.”94 This fixing of rates is a legitimate exercise of the police power of the state, and does not violate the constitution of the United States.91 “It is a rule of the common law that parties carrying on business which is public in its nature or which is embraced with a public interest, cannot select their patrons arbitrarily, but must serve all who apply on equal terms and at reasonable rates!’86 “If they are so bound to carry, then in the absence of any legisla- tive rule fixing their compensation I maintain that that compensation is a judicial question.” * * * “That the legislature may in proper cases fix the rule or rate of compensation, I do not deny. But, until this is done, the court must decide it when it becomes a matter of controversy.”87 Acts fixing the rates to be charged by grain elevators have been passed, and upheld by the courts, in a number of states.98 The rate charged by a chartered subway may be lawfully, under the charter, fixed by a commission.~ The charges of bridge com- panies are subject to revision xvhen shown to be unreasonable in any particular instance,’00 although this has been held a legislative and not a judicial function.’0” The rates of water companies may, under statute, be revised by the courts or be fixed by a municipal “Ruggles z’. IlL, xo8 U. 5. 525, 537 CiSsa). 5’ Ruggles v. The People, ~‘ Ill. 262. “Budd v. New York, 743 U. 5. 577, 535, 7892; C. M. ‘& St. P. v. Miun., 134 U. S. 478. “Waggoner v. City of Rock Island, 146 Ill. 739-156 (7893); Peoples Gas Co. z’. Hale, 94 Ill. App. 406, 322, 7900. ~ Justice Miller’s dissenting opinion, the Express cases, supra. ssMunn v. Illinois, supra; People v. Budd, supra; Budd v. Ne~v York, supra; Brass v. N. D., supra; S. P. v. R. R. Comrs., 78 Fed. 236, 7896. “Brush Elec. L. Co. v. Consol. Tel. Co., is N. Y. Sup. 8r, 1897. “'Canada Southern v. mt. Bridge Co., Privy Council, 7883; 8 Ap. Cas. 723. “‘Thompson v. Matthews, a Edwa. Ch. 272, 7834.

34’ MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW: commission.’02 The gas rates of a private corporation may, under the statute, be fixed by the legislature or village authorities.’01 The Indiana act limiting telephone charges to $3 per month was upheld by the court as a legitimate exercise of the police power.’04 The Colorado constitution has provided for a tribunal to which the maxi- mum amount of water rates may be referred in case of dispute between the irrigation company and the consumer, and the courts have prevented the companies from charging an advance fee of $io per acre upon furnishing ‘Water.”01 The courts have passed upon the reasonableness of stockyards rates fixed by the legislature.’06 An especially interesting ca~e is the Alabama act, conferring the power to make all necessary police regulations and pass all by-laws necessary for the government and the city; “to license bakers and regulate the weight and price of bread, and prohibit the baking for sale except by those licensed,” which was upheld in 1841. In Mayor of Mobile vs. Yuille,’0’ the court say:-- “In a town or city a regular supply of wholesome bread is a mat- ter of the utmost importance; and whatever doubts may have been thrown over the question by the theories of political economists expe- rience has shoxvn that this great end is better secured by licensing a sufficient number of bakers and by an assize of bread, than by leav- ing it to the voluntary acts of individuals. ‘~ ‘~ The interest of the city in always having an abundant supply will be a sufficient guaranty against any abuse of the right to regulate the weight, the consequence of which would be to drive the baker from the trade.” Similarly, in Alabama, tavern keepers xvere licensed and the County Court was required at least once a year to settle the rates of inn- keepers.”08 The prices charged by mills have frequently been fixed by statute or by commissions and upheld by the courts.’08 In a Maine case ““o it is stated that common grist-mills and common lumber mills are of public nature no matter xvhat the motive power is. Turnpike tolls also have been similarly fixed.”’ 785 Brymer v. Butler, 179 Pa. St. 237, 5597; Spring Valley v. Schottler, supra. 183 Peoples Gas Co. v. Hale, 94 III. App. 407; C. H. & D. v. Bowling Green, supra. ‘85Hockett a. State, so~ md. 250, 254, i88~. “~ ‘Wheeler a. Northern Ir. Co., so Cob., ~8a, 2887. ‘~ Cotting a. Kansas City Stock Yards Co., 283 U. 5. 79. 1853 Ala. 737-739. 705 Mobile a. Yuille, 3 Ala. 740. 185 Woolrycb, Law of Waters, C. 6; State ‘v. Ed~vards, 86 Me. 705, 7893; cf. Griffin a. Goldsboro ‘Water Co., ‘22 N. C. ao6, 7898; cf. Burlington a. Beasley, g~ U. 5. 370. 118 State a. Edwards, sup. “‘ Covington a. Sandford, 764 U. 5. s~S, ss6, 597.

THE OLD COMMON LAW AND THE NEW TRUSTS 135: In the New Orleans slaughter house cases, the granting of a twenty-five-year monopoly and fixing the fees for landing and kill- ing cattle and hogs, was held a proper police regulation.”2 The usury laws and pawn brokers’ acts, by which the price a lender may charge for the use of his money is limited, have a different history, but are to the same effect. These cases all point toward the conclusion, even under the modern decisions, that whenever a person or a corporation enjoys a virtual monopoly and the business is one of material consequence to the public, then the price to be charged must be reasonable and is subject to revision and determination by the legislature and the courts. The Northern Securities case very much enlarges the meaning of the words interstate commerce. That Congress has the power to prescribe the rates of interstate caf riers seems to be intimated in this case,”’1 and as all other trust regulation, except through maximum rates, seems visionary or for political effect merely, it is important to know that in these cases Congress or the State Legislatures, as the case may be, have ample power to fix maximum rates and prices. Many will doubt whether this regulation is feasible and will say that prices must be regulated by supply and demand and not by law or by the courts. Given free competition both by vendors, and by buyers, this is true, but if the vendor owns the entire xvorld’s—or the entire locality’s—supply, the law of supply and demand does not come into play, since it is the demand alone, or the buyer’s necessity, which fixes the price. The vice of the trusts is to substitute for the law of supply and demand the law of demand merely, and it is in such cases only that regulation by law or by the courts would seem to be necessary. The Supreme Court of Indiana in upholding the maximum price for telephone charges say: “There is nothing in the act which requires a telephone company to construct a new line against its will, or to maintain an old line longer than it may feel inclined to do so.””4 Ordinarily, so long as the maximum price fixed is above the aver- age or “economic~~ cost of production, the manufacture and sale will continue, although one may imagine cases when the owner of all the wheat or of all the anthracite or all the kerosene oil of the com- munity may refuse to sell at the maximum price fixed, in which case proceedings in the nature of condemnation proceedings or the “com- mandeering” of the Boers—a proceeding like the enforced sale of ~ Slaughter house cases, 16 xvallace 36, 7872. ~ zg~ U. 5. 3~3; cf. Dissenting Opinion, ~j68. “4Hacket v. State, so~ md. 250, 264, 2886.

136 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW: wine described above to consumers who needed it at a reasonable price—may, as an ultimate resort, become the only remedy. The difference between state ownership and this control, such as was formerly exercised for centuries, is that the companies will con-’ tinue to manage their own business. The regulation and control will not mean socialism or management by anyone else, but merely a certain restraint against oppression by mEans of excessive prices. At present all ‘that the courts have insisted on in the case of the public service companies practically is that they must not in their charges exceed the rates fixed by law and must serve all the public alike. This applies to stage coaches, railroads, steamships, cities furnishing water, water companies, etc. They cannot make unrea- sonable distinction between large and small shippers. They cannot charge more for the same gas when used for lighting than when used for heating, etc. Damages have been freely axvarded where the facilities were not adequate and loss has resulted. The courts have gone so far as to order railroads where to estab- lish stations,”5 and to admit the poxver of the Legislature to regulate them, and have ordered them to deliver cattle to all stock yards alike when similarly situated,”6 or grain to all elevators when under like conditions.”’ They have held the railroads cannot disregard the shippers routing instructions,”’8 nor can a steamship line say what shovellers a shipper shall employ.”'0 But they have denied the right of all express companies to obtain the same privileges on railroads as long as the right of the public to service at reasonable rates of charges is not impaired.”0 And the right of public service com- panies to make reasonable regulations for their own business has been repeatedly upheld. In the exercise of the police power the state may regulate the internal commerce, such as liquor traffic,”” insurance,’2’ slaughter houses,”’1 etc. There is “little reason, under our system of govern- ment, for placing a close and narrow interpretation on the police ~“ People v. C. & A., 230 III. 275 (s88p); Concord v. B. & M., 67 New Hamp. 465, 7893. 728No~eru Pac. v. ‘Washington, 242 U. 5. 492, 1892; A. T. & S. F. v. D. & N. 0., “o U. 5. 667, 2884; Little Rock v. St. L. S. ‘W., 63 Fed. 775. “~ C. & N. ‘W. z’. People, ~6 Ill. 365, 7870; Coc v. L. & N., 3 Fed. 775, x88o. 258 D. & R. G. v. Hill, 23 Cob. 35, i88g. 118 378~ tons of coal, ~~ Blatch, 453 (7878). 278 Express cases, 777 U. S. i; ef. da. opinion Old Colony v. Tripp, 747 Mass. 35. 7888. See also, Memphis News v. Southern Ry., 75 5. XV. Rep. 947 (Tenn. 2903), and New ‘Warehouse v. Oregon, 32 ‘Wash. ai8 (7903). ‘-i’ License Cases, s How. U. 5. 504, 523. ~“ Paul v. virginia, S Wall. 268. 1’~ i6 ‘Wall. 36.

THE OLD COMMON LAW AND THE NEW TRUSTS: ~37 power, or restricting its scope so as to hamper the Legislature’s power in dealing with the various necessities of society under nexv circum5tance5.””’4 The Inter-State Commerce Commission, as a court to deal with the railroads appears to have been put upon a shelf, through the two Supreme Court decisions by Justice Shiras denying the com- mission the right to fix~.rates that shall be prima facia reasonable; as the only right of the commission is now to commence a suit against a railroad- to compel it to revise the rate while the company can con- tinue charging such rates as it shall deem best pending a lengthy litigation.”’ Instead of a special court its powers are noxv more like those of a special attorney general. As was said by Justice Harlan in his dissenting opinion in the latter case: “The present decision goes far to make that commission a useless body, for all practical purposes, and to defeat many of the important objects designed to be accomplished by the various enactments of Congress relating to interstate commerce. The Commission was established to protect the public against the improper practices of transportation companies engaged in commerce among the several states. It has been left, it is true, with power to make reports and issue protests. But it has been shorn, by judicial interpretation, of authority to do anything of an effective character.” The act has not yet been amended by Congress, and as the law now stands it is to the general courts that we must look for regula- tion of the railroads and other virtual monopolies. Such control as they have exercised is of course far different from the control exercised prior to Adam Smith and the commer- cial revival of England in the middle of last century, but it is safe to say that regulation is especially needed so that all may be served alike and at reasonable prices, and in these respects the modern decisions are not entirely unsatisfactory, even though based on the idea of “public service” and virtual monopoly instead of on the broad ancient common law power to deal with “oppressors” and fix the price of necessaries. IV. The old English authorities abound in prohibitions against fore- stalling necessaries, such as corn, grain, butter, cheese, fish, etc.”0 Wholesale dealing in victuals was practically prohibited, as “a rich man might engross into his hands a whole commodity, and then sell ~ Budd v. N. Y. 243 U. 5. ~ “~ C. N. 0. & T. v. Inter-State Corn. Coin., i6a U. 5. 234 CiSos); Inter-State Coin. Corn. v. Ala. Midland, i68 U. 5. 244, 2397. 2~5 Coke, Ch. 8g, Vol. 3, p. sg~, Ed. 2797.

138 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW: it at what price he should think fit.””” We thus read of a grocer at Norwich being indicted for buying grain with the intent to resell -‘ it, but the jury let him off.”’8 In modern law these old provisions of forestalling, regrating and engrossing have also been comparatively lost sight of, and have been over-shadowed by the laws against com- binations and agreements in restraint of trade. In reality they fur- -nish a safer means of regulating the trusts, as combinations and conspiracies are hard to prove, and the injunctions forbidding them are, if possible, still harder to enforce. The laws against forestalling, regrating and engrossing apply equally well to one person or corporation as to an aggregation or combination of concerns, and would be applicable in many cases where the conspiracy, combination or “anti-trust” laws would not be applicable. In applying these laws of former times the courts were not inclined to mince matters, and no ‘rigid distinction appears to have been drawn between such things as false weights and cheating on the one hand and unreasonable prices and forestalling on the other. The old law had in it an element of fair dealing and business moral- ity betxVeen man and man which has obtained a less weight as the law has crystallized and assumed distincter forms. The laws against forestalling, regrating and engrossing may not be applicable to others than wholesale dealers, and may not cover the case where one business concern owns all of the land from which the products are taken in the first place, so that they do not change hands and are not bought and sold at any intermediate stage between the earth from which they spring and the consumer into whose hands they are finally placed. But these laxvs, and especially the numerous laws and decisions of ancient and more modern times by which the price of goods is fixed and regulated in the interest of the public would seem to deserve the closest study at the present time. - V. Most of the present anti-trust laws can hardly be called intelligent. People are there forbidden to combine and ordered to compete. Ordinary acts of leading citizens are called crimes, and are from the nature of things left unpunished. We have developed and are harping upon the criminal laws against combinations, and con-

I2~ King v. ‘Waddington, East, 767; cf. 2 East, 743; Bac. Abr. 3, 37 4, 335, citing cases; s and 6 Ed~v. 6, c. 24, repealed by sa Geo. 3, c. 77; a and 3 Edw. 6, c. 75; 5 and 6 Edw. 6, c. 74; 27 Jac. s, c. 4; Holt’s Rep. 363. 2738; Dalton, p. 237; a Keble, 752; Fits- herbert, Office of Justice, 7584, p. 6o. 225 Sir J. Bridginan’s Rep., p. 6, s6sg.

THE OLD COMMON LAW AND THE NEW TRUSTS 139: spiracies, and have overlooked the old civil laws regulating prices and profits. If the rates themselves of the Northern Pacific and Great Northern were always reasonable and proper, it would not matter who held their shares. They could in fact be more easily regulated when combined into one. Historical, economic and legal development moves in xvaves, and swings from one extreme to the other. The development of modern industry beginning in the middle of last century, when steam and coal were applied to modern machinery, revolutionized former methods of production and trade, and commenced a period of free competition - and “laissez faire” under which our modern law has grown up and developed until the laws applicable to conditions where monopoly was the rule have been in part forgotten. The new trusts, world xvide in their power and extent, into which modern manufacturing and mercantile business seems to be gradually con- solidating, have sprung up so rapidly that they seem to have out- stripped the laws of their own time. The pendulum is now swinging back towards conditions resembling those outlined above and the legal development must fbllow in the same direction and find prece- dents among these old laws and decisions or the very foundations of the republic may be shaken. Our Iegislature~ and courts have made a false start in being led off in the direction of conspiracy, combina- tion and “anti-trust” laws, when the true remedy is to fix maxi- mum rates and to regulate and control profits and business methods. But some of the “public service” decisions point the other way, and if these are followed in the future the satisfactory regulation of the trusts may perhaps yet be expected. DITLEW M. FREDERIRSEN. CHICAGO, NOVEMBER, 1904.