The Law of Contracts, in its widest extent, may be regarded as including nearly all the law which regulates the relations of human life. Indeed, it may be looked upon as the basis of human society. All social life presumes it, and rests upon it; for out of contracts, express or implied, declared or understood, grow all rights, all duties, all obligations, and all law. Almost the whole procedure of human life implies, or, rather, is, the continual fulfilment of contracts.
Even those duties, or those acts of kindness and affection. Which may seem most remote from contract or compulsion of any kind, are nevertheless within the scope of the obligation of contacts. The parental love which provides for the infant when, in the beginning of its life, it can do nothing for itself, would seem to be so pure an offering of affection, that the idea of a contract could in no way belong to it. But even here, although these duties are generally discharged from a feeling which borrows no strength from a sense of obligation, there is still such an obligation. It is implied by the cares of the past, which have perpetuated society from generation to generation; by that absolute necessity which makes the performance of these duties the condition of the preservation of human life; and by the implied obligation on the part of the unconscious objects of this care, that when by its means, they shall have grown into strength, and age has brought weakness upon those to whom they are thus indebted, they will acknowledge and repay the debt. Indeed, the law recognizes and enforces this obligation, to a certain degree, on both sides, as will be shown hereafter.
It would be easy to go further, and show that in all the relations of social life, its good order and prosperity depend upon the due fulfilment of the contracts which bind all to all. Sometimes these contracts are deliberately expressed with all the precision of law, and are armed with all its sanctions. More frequently they are, though still expressed, simpler in form and more general in language, and leave more to the intelligence, the justice, and honesty of the parties. Far more frequently they are not expressed at all, and for their definition and extent we must look to the common principles which all are supposed to understand and acknowledge. In this sense, contract is co-ordinate and commensurate with duty; and it is a familiar principle of the law, of which we shall have much to say hereafter and which has a wide, though far from a universal application, that whatsoever it is certain that a man ought to do, that the law supposes him to have promised to do. “Implied contracts,” says Blackstone (vol. ii. P. 443), “are such as reason and justice dictate, and which, therefore, the law presumes that every man undertakes to perform.” These contracts form the warp and woof of actual life. If they were wholly disregarded, the movement of society would be arrested. And in so far as they are disregarded, that movement is impeded or disordered.
If all contracts, express or implied, were carried into full effect, the law would have no office but that of instructor or adviser. It is because they are not all carried into effect, and it is that they may be carried into effect, that the law exercises a compulsory power.
Hence is the necessity of law; and the well-being of society depends upon, and may be measured by, the degree in which the law construes and interprets all contacts wisely; eliminates from them whatever is of fraud or error, or otherwise wrongful; and carries them out into their full and proper effect and execution. These, then, are the results which the law seeks. And it seeks these results by means of principles; that is, by means of truths, ascertained, defined, and so expressed as to be practical operative. There are many of the rules of law which do not come within this definition of principles. They are formal or technical; but they are in force because they are believed to be subsidiary to, and needed or useful for the comprehension, application, and enforcement of principles; and these rules derive their whole power and value from the principles which they explain or enforce and carry into effect.
It is said that the law seeks these results by means of principles; and these again, in their most general form, may be said to be, first, those rules of construction and interpretation which have for their object to find in a contract a meaning which is honest, sensible, and just, without doing violence to the expressions of the parties, or making a new contract for them; and, secondly, those which discharge from a contract whatever would bring upon it the fatal taint of fraud, or is founded upon error or accident, or would work an injury. And if these elements of wrong are so far vital to contract, that when they are removed it perishes, then the law annuls or refuses to enforce that contract, unless a still greater mischief would thereby be done.
Subsidiary to these are the rules and processes of the law, by means whereof a contract, which in itself is good, and has been properly construed and is free from all removable elements of wrong, is enforced, or carried into execution.
The word “contract” is of comparatively recent use, as a law term. Formerly, courts and lawyers spoke only of “obligations,” --- meaning thereby “bonds,” in which the word “oblige” is commonly used as one of the technical and formal terms, --- “covenants,” and “agreements,” which last word was used as we now use the word “contract.” The word “promise” is often used in instruments, and sometimes in legal proceedings. “Agreement” is seldom applied to “specialties; “contract” is generally confined to simple contracts; and “promise” refers to the engagement of a party without reference to the reasons or consideration for it, or the duties of other parties.
(LAW OF CONTRACTS, by THEOPHLUS PARSONS, LL.D.,
Volume I., SIXTH EDITION, Boston: LITTLE, BROWN, AND COMPANY, 1873, pages 3,4,5,6.)
=========================================================================================
"If all contracts, express or implied, were carried into full effect, the law would have no office but that of instructor or adviser."
==============================================================================================
The only people who, ------------------ provide for the poor of their society, are people known by the name of Quakers. ------ They assemble quietly in their places of meeting, and do not disturb their neighbours --------.
"I have already spoken of the Quakers ------- and that they are remarkable for their care of the poor of their society. They are equally as remarkable for the education of their children. I am a descendant of a family of that profession; my father was a Quaker; and I presume I may be admitted an evidence of what I assert. The seeds of good principles, and the literary means of advanceinent in the world, are laid in early life.
Thomas Paine
QUAKER ELECTRONIC ARCHIVE & MEETING PLACE
Equity had precedence over the common law because its degrees applied to the person
of the defendant and disobedience to a decree was a contempt of court.
Home Page