US Supreme Court Rulings

Rulings on Children's Rights Is your child at Risk?

MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS said, "Neither man nor child can be allowed to stand condemned by methods which flout constitutional requirements of due process of law."10 To the same effect is Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962). Accordingly, while these cases relate only to restricted aspects of the subject, they unmistakably indicate that, WHATEVER MAY BE THEIR PRECISE IMPACT, NEITHER THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT NOR THE BILL OF RIGHTS IS FOR ADULTS ALONE." ' In re Gault, 1967, 387 U.S. 1, 13," ibid., U.S. Supreme Court ________________________________________________________________ LOCHNER v. PEOPLE OF STATE OF NEW YORK, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) 198 U.S. 45 JOSEPH LOCHNER, Plff. in Err., v. PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK. No. 292. Argued February 23, 24, 1905. Decided April 17, 1905. " But I do not conceive that to be my duty, because I strongly believe that my agreement or disagreement has nothing to do with the right of a majority to embody their opinions in law. It is settled by various decisions of this court that state constitutions and state laws may regulate life in many ways which we as legislators might think as injudicious, or if you like as tyrannical, as this, and which, equally with this, interfere with the liberty to contract. THE LIBERTY OF THE CITIZENT TO DO AS HE LIKES SO LONG AS HE DOES NOT INTERFERE WITH THE LIBERTY OF OTHERS TO DO THE SAME, which has been a shibboleth for some well-known writers, is interfered with by school laws, by the Postoffice, by every state or municipal institution which takes his money for purposes thought desirable, whether he likes it or not. The 14th Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics. The other day we sustained the Massachusetts vaccination law. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 358, 49 L. ed. _____ United States and state statutes and decisions cutting down the liberty to contract by way of combination are familiar to this court. Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 48 L. ed. 679, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 436. SOME OF THESE LAWS EMBODY CONVICTIONS OR PREJUDICES WHICH JUDGES ARE LIKELY TO SHARE. SOME MAY NOT. BUT CONSTITUTION IS NOT INTENDED TO EMBODY A PARTICULAR ECONOMIC THEORY, WHETHER OF PATERNALISM AND THE ORGANIC RELATION OF THE CITIZEN TO THE STATE OR OF LAISSEZ FAIRE. {198 U.S. 45,76} It is made for people of fundamentally differing views, and the accident of our finding certain opinions natural and familiar, or novel, and even shocking, ought not to conclude our judgment upon the question whether statutes embodying them conflict with the Constitution of the United States." [Footnote 15] "Although the State has considerable latitude in enacting laws affecting minors on the basis of their lesser capacity for mature, affirmative choice, Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969), illustrates that it may not arbitrarily deprive them of their freedom of action altogether. The Court held in Tinker that a schoolchild's First Amendment freedom of expression entitled him," U.S. Supreme Court ________________________________________________
CZAR
GENNY
"WV GrandChildren/GrandParents HOME"
"Children and Divorce"
Signs of Domestic Violence

SMITH v. ORGANIZATION OF FOSTER FAMILIES, 431 U.S. 816 (1977) 431 U.S. 816 SMITH, ADMINISTRATOR, NEW YORK CITY HUMAN RESOURCES ADMINISTRATION, ET AL. v. ORGANIZATION OF FOSTER FAMILIES FOR EQUALITY & REFORM ET AL. APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK No. 76-180. Argued March 21, 1977 Decided June 13, 1977* Much the same can be said in response to the District Court's statement: "[I]t may be advisable, under certain circumstances, for the agency to appoint an adult representative better to articulate the interests of the child. In making this determination, the agency should carefully consider the child's age, sophistication and ability effectively to communicate his own true feelings." 418 F. Supp., at 285-286. But nothing in the New York City PROCEDURE PREVENTS CONSULTATION OF THE CHILD'S WISHES, DIRECTLY OR THROUGH AN ADULT INTERMEDIARY. We assume, moreover, that some such consultation would be among the first steps that a rational fact finder, inquiring into the CHILD'S BEST INTEREST, WOULD PURSUE. Such consultation, however, does not require that the child or an appointed representative must be a party with full adversary powers in all preremoval hearings.59 [431 U.S. 816, 853] *** NOTE*****REMOVING A CHILD FROM THE ONLY PARENTS OR FAMILY OR HOME EVEN BY IT'S NATURAL PARENT SHOULD ONLY BE DONE "IN THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD" AND AFTER A HEARING TO DETERMINE THIS. THIS IS TRUE IF IT IS VOLUNTARY PLACEMENT.***** (ii) (McKinney Supp. 1976-1977). BUT THE STATE HAS OPTED FOR FOSTER CARE AS ONE RESPONSE TO THOSE SITUATIONS WHERE THE NATURAL PARENTS ARE UNABLE TO PROVIDE THE "POSITIVE, NURTURING, FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS"BUT THE STATE HAS OPTED FOR FOSTER CARE AS ONE RESPONES TO THOSE SITUATIONS WHERE THE NATURAL PARENTS ARE UNABLE TO PROVIDE THE "POSITIVE, NURTURING, FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS" AND "NORMAO FAMILY LIFE IN A PERMANENT HOME" THAT OFFER " THE BEST OPPPORTUNITY FOR CHILDREN TO DEVELOP AND THRIVE." 384-b (1) (b), (1) (a) (i). ***NOTE*** FOSTER CARE IS SUPPOSE TO BE THE LAST RESORT ONLY IF THEY CAN'T BE PLACED WITH FAMILY. The expressed central policy of the New York system is that "it is generally desirabe for the child to remain with or be returned to the natural parent because the child's need for a normal family life will usually best be met in the natural home, and …parents are entitled to bring up their own children unless the best interests of the child would be thereby endangered," Soc. Serv. Law 384-b (1) (a) .20 The natural parent has not only the right but the obligation to visit the foster child and plan for his future; failure of a parent with capacity to fulfill the obligation for more than a year can result in a court order terminating the parent's rights on theground of neglect. 384-b (4), (7). See also 384-b (5); N. Y. Dom. Rel. Law 111 (McKinney Supp.1976-1977); N. Y. Family Court Act 611 (McKinney Supp. 1976-1977).21 Foster care has been defined as "[a] child welfare service which provides substitute family care for a planned period for a child when his own family cannot care for him for a temporary or extended period, and when adoption is neither desirable nor possible." Child Welfare League of America, Standards for Foster Family Care Service 5 (1959).8 Thus, [431 U.S. 816, 824] the distinctive features of foster care are, first, "that it is care in a family, it is noninstitutional substitute care," and, second, "that it is for a planned period - either temporary or extended. This is unlike adoptive placement, which implies a permanent substitution of one home for another." Kadushin 355. ***NOTE**** THIS IS WHERE THE LAW WANT TO PUT US AS GRANDPARENTS THAT HAVE THE GRANDCHILDREN LIVE WITH US WITHOUT GOING THROUGH THE COURTS TO MAKE IT LEGAL THIS IS WHERE LIBERTY INTEREST COMES IN FOR US AND THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD .***** U.S. Supreme Court _____________________________________________________ BOARD OF REGENTS v. ROTH, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) 408 U.S. 564 BOARD OF REGENTS OF STATE COLLEGES ET AL. v. ROTH CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT No. 71-162. Argued January 18, 1972 Decided June 29, 1972 "Liberty" and "property" are broad and majestic terms. They are among the "[g]reat [constitutional] concepts . . . purposely left to gather meaning from experience. . . . [T]hey relate to the whole domain of social and economic fact, and the statesmen who founded this Nation knew too well that only a stagnant society remains unchanged." National Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Co., 337 U.S. 582, 646 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). For that reason, the Court has fully and finally rejected the wooden distinction between "rights" and "privileges" that once seemed to govern the applicability of procedural due process rights.9 The Court has also made clear that the property interests protected by [408 U.S. 564, 572] procedural due process extend well beyond actual ownership of real estate, chattels, or money.10 By the same token, the Court has required due process protection for deprivations of liberty beyond the sort of formal constraints imposed by the criminal process.11 While this Court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty . . . guaranteed [by the Fourteenth Amendment], the term has received much consideration and some of the included things have been definitely stated. Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized . . . as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men." Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399. In a Constitution for a free people, there can be no doubt that the meaning of "liberty" must be broad indeed. See, e. g., Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499-500; Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645. [408 U.S. 564, 573] U.S. Supreme Court __________________________________________________ LEHR v. ROBERTSON, 463 U.S. 248 (198