Nationalism and Ethnic Conflicts in Transcaucasia in Comparative Perspective
Nationalism and Ethnic Conflicts in Transcaucasia in Comparative Perspective
In 1992, I.Bremmer and R.Taras wrote: “Soviet nationalities are
highly differentiated, and comparisons, to the extend that they
may be made at all, are often appropriate with nations lying
outside* the USSR. We would expect, for example, Turkmen
nationalism in Turkmenistan to resemble Turkmen nationalism in
Iran or Afghanistan [...] more closely than Latvian nationalism.”
[1] Indeed,
despite the fact that in the 1970s the Soviet leaders declared
emergence of a new national identity, Sovetskii narod,
communism failed to remove national distinctions in the Soviet
Union. The USSR remained ethnically diverse with uneven
development and different levels of intensity of national consciousness.
Not surprisingly, both perestroika and glasnost were
met differently in the Soviet republics depending on the level of
development in the particular republic: the higher it was, the
more readily the new ideas were accepted. Nevertheless, the comparative
analysis of nationalisms in the Soviet Union should not be neglected,
particularly when it comes to the issue of the Soviet disintegration.
In this case we need to compare not different nationalisms as such, but
rather the role they played in, and the contribution they made to,
the process of decentralisation. Parallels drawn between the Baltic
and the Transcaucasian nationalist movements can show common features
and differences between them with regard to the Soviet dissolution.
1. Transcaucasian Nationalism
Three former Soviet republics - Armenia, Azerbaijan
and Georgia - are situated in the area between the Main Caucasian
Range and the River of Araz. In Russian the region is called Zakavkaz’ie,
which literally means Transcaucasia or the Transcaucasus. Despite
the ongoing debates over the borders of Europe, most of the scholars
tend to consider the region to be the south-eastern angle of
Europe. Unlike the Baltics, the Caucasus is extremely heterogeneous
in terms of its ethnic composition. It is unique for the great number
of nations living in the comparatively small area. However, only
three of them - Armenians, Azeris and Georgians - have achieved
statehood. The three nations speak totally different languages.
Azerbaijani belongs to the Turkic group of the Altay linguistic
family, Georgian is one of the Caucasian languages, while
Armenian constitutes a separate tongue within the Indo-European
family. The Azeris are Muslim, the overwhelming majority of
which is Shiite, although there are few Sunnis in
the North. The Armenians and Georgians are Orthodox with their
religious centres in Echmiadzin and Tbilisi.
In contrast with the Balts who achieved national consolidation
within the area of historical settlement, the Transcaucasians
are extensively spread. Eight million Azeris live in the homeland
which is also known as North Azerbaijan.[2]
Up to 21m Azeris live in South Azerbaijan which is the part of
Iran. 1.26m Azeris live in Eastern Anatolia (Turkey) and 1.21m of the
so-called Turkamans (who basically speak Azerbaijani) share with
the Kurds the Iraqi provinces of Kirkuk and Mosul. 307,600 Azeris
constitute the population of the four Georgian regions (Marneilu,
Dmanisi, Bolnisi, Gardabani)[3] and some
150,000 Azeris live in Derbend - the Russian region in Daghestan bordering
on Azerbaijan.[4]
Until the outbreak of the conflict with Armenia in 1988, about 200,000
Azeris lived in this neighbouring country. Thus, only a
quarter of all Azeris lives in Azerbaijan Republic. The
Armenians are spread as well. Due to historical circumstances,
the Armenians moved from the historical homeland in Eastern
Anatolia to the Middle East, Transcaucasia, Russia, Western
Europe and America. Armenian colonies were urban with the
exception of those in Transcaucasia, where after the Russo-
Iranian and Russo-Turkish wars of 1826-28 and 1828-29 they
settled in the rural areas of the Erivan, Nakhichevan,
Karabakh Khanates in Azerbaijan and in the Georgian regions of
Akhalkalak and Akhaltsikh.[5] According to the Armenian historian
G.A.Bournoutian, prior to the Russian incorporation of
Transcaucasia, the Armenians barely formed 20 percent of
contemporary Armenia’s population.[6] “[I]t was only after the
Russo-Turkish Wars of 1855-1856 and 1877-78, which brought more
Armenians from the Ottoman Empire - and the eventual emigration
of more Muslims, that the Armenians established a solid majority
in the region. Even then, and up to the twentieth century, the
city of Erevan had a Muslim majority.”[7] Today along with the
great number of Armenian communities all over the world, 145,450
Armenians live in the Azerbaijani region of Nagorno-Karabakh[8] and
437,000 - in southern Georgia.[9] Contrary to their neighbours and
similarly to the Balts, the Georgians are compact: 3.787m Georgians
live in the homeland and only insignificant minority lives outside -
1,400 in Armenia and 14,200 in Azerbaijan.[10]
Out of the three countries, only Armenia resembles the Baltic
states by its homogeneity. After the expulsion of the Azeris in
1988, Armenia became a monorespublika: with the exception
of the small Russian and Yesid (non-Muslim Kurdish) minorities,
the republic is overwhelmingly Armenian. In contrast, the
ethnic make-up of Georgia and Azerbaijan is heterogeneous. Apart
from the indigenous populations, thousands of Russians and
Ukrainians live in the big cities. In Azerbaijan Talishs live
in Lenkoran and Astara, Lezgins in Kusar and Khachmas, Armenians
in Nagorno-Karabakh, the Georgian-speaking Ingilois in Kakh, the
Kurds lived in Qubatly, Zangelan and Kelbajar prior to the
Armenian occupation, and tens of other ethnic groups live in the
different parts of the country. In Georgia the Abkhazians,
Osetins, Adzhars live in their respective autonomous regions, the
Armenians and Azeris live in the south, and the Greeks, Kurds,
Jews, Chechens and Daghestani peoples populate different parts of
the country. Georgia and Azerbaijan have always been diverse and
multi-cultural states. There are about 70 minority groups in
Azerbaijan, which is rather large for such a small republic.[11]
The emergence of nationalism in Transcaucasia was closely tied
to its incorporation into Russia in the early 19th century.
Russian domination had had the negative effect for the
development of the moderately industrialised Baltics, but this
was not the case in the backward Caucasus. Russian rule had
become profound in the socio-economic progress of once inferior
Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan. Intensive development of the
oil industry since the 1860s had significantly changed the look
of Baku and turned it into one of the world’s oil centres.
Rapid industrialisation and the increasing need for the world
oil markets accelerated construction of the Baku-Batum railroad,
facilitated growth of Tiflis and Batum which became the important
trade and port centres in the Caucasus. Armenia, however,
remained largely rural and backward. Urbanisation of the Armenians
assumed a form of migration to the growing towns of Georgia and
Azerbaijan. In 1803, nearly 74.3 percent of the inhabitants of
Tiflis had been Armenian, though by the end of the century the
influx of Georgians and Russians had decreased the percentage of
Armenians to 38%.[12] At the turn of the century, Armenians
constituted 17 percent of the population of Baku.[13] Armenian
merchants enjoyed steady monopoly in Tiflis, and the share of
Armenian capital in Baku oil industry was considerable as well.
The emergence of the strong Armenian bourgeoisie outside Armenia
was accompanied by the decline of the local Georgian and
Azerbaijani nobility in the countryside. The Georgian nobles
and Azerbaijani beks turned away from their estates to
find refuge in state service, but when they came into the towns
they found that they were forced to compete with an already well-
entrenched Armenian bourgeoisie and rich middle class.[14]
R.G.Suni argues that “[t]he urban and bourgeois character of
the Tiflis Armenians contrasted sharply with the rural
background and agrarian orientation of most Georgians, and the
familiar attitudes about the inherent character of these two
nationalities grew into racial stereotypes.”[15] In 1873, a
Russian observer, S.Maksimov, compared the Georgian hatred
toward the Armenian entrepreneurs with the one the Poles felt
toward the Jews.[16] In Baku mutual intolerance had resulted in
the so-called “Tatar-Armenian War” in 1905.[17]
Thus, the emergence of nationalism in Transcaucasia took place
in the complicated socio-demographic conditions. As one can see,
the historical background of Transcaucasian nationalism was
different from that in the Baltics. An even course of
industrialisation in the Baltics prevented massive ethnic
migration to the neighbouring lands and preserved the
homogeneity of the population. Due to the privileged status
the Baltic provinces enjoyed within the Russian Empire, the
national bourgeoisie established undisputed control of the
political and economic institutions in Lithuania, Latvia and
Estonia. Hence, the peaceful coexistence between the Balts.
Furthermore, nationalism in the Baltics emerged as a political
movement aimed at the achievement of greater autonomy and, in
perspective, full independence from Russia. These factors
coupled with the common goal for the national liberation had
become a solid ground for the Baltic co-operation. On the
contrary, nationalism in the Caucasus was a response both to
the Russian rule and the inter-ethnic clashes. The historical
conditions predetermined character of the nationalist movements
in the two regions for more than one hundred years.
Despite the peaceful coexistence, Baltic nationalists did not
envisage development of their co-operation further into the
political integration. Paradoxically, it was the Caucasus with
all its inter-ethnic contradictions where the idea of the
Caucasian federation became popular in the early 20th century.[18]
Following the Bolsheviks’ dispersal of the Constituent
Assembly in January 1918, the Georgian Mensheviks,
Azerbaijani Musavats and Armenian Dashnaks
proclaimed on 22 April a unification of the three nations into
the Transcaucasian Federation which, however, had existed only
five weeks. Internal strife and external pressures led to its
dissolution on 26 May, which marked the emergence of three
independent states in Transcaucasia.[19] Thus, by 1918 the Baltic
and Transcaucasian national-liberation movements had resulted in
the creation of the first republics there. Moreover, the
Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (ADR, 1918-1920) had become the
first republic in the Muslim world recognised by tens of
countries.[20]
The acquisition of independence was a final goal of the
ethnically consolidated Balts. During the entire period of
independence, the Baltic nation-states set an example of
regional co-operation. The situation was different in the
Caucasus. Once the Azeris, Armenians and Georgians became
independent, an explosion of the old inter-ethnic clashes
followed. The 1915 civil war in the Eastern Anatolia radicalised
Armenian nationalism. Having lost their homeland in the Ottoman Empire, the Dashnak government in Yerevan attempted to
expand the territory of newly independent Armenia at the
expense of the Caucasian neighbours. This led to the
Armenian-Georgian and Armenian-Azerbaijani wars in 1918-1920.[21]
The Azeri-Georgian relations remained good despite the existence
of the significant Azeri and Georgian minorities there. The
Armenian territorial intentions and the lack of co-operation
between Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan facilitated the Soviet
intervention and the occupation of the countries one by one. In
contrast, national accord between the Balts promoted the security
co-operation in the region, and after the Soviet failure in the
Polish operation in 1921 the Bolsheviks withheld from
intervention. Seven decades later, the fact of the Red Army’s
occupation of the Transcaucasian states would give to the
popular fronts a strong argument for the restoration of
independence. Similarly to the Balts’ condemnation of the
Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, the Georgians in 1989 would declare
their entry into the USSR illegitimate and the status of the
Soviet Army occupational because of Moscow’s breach of the
Russo-Georgian peace treaty of 1920 and the country’s occupation
in February 1921.[22]
During the Soviet rule, nationalist parties in the Caucasus were
suppressed and communism was imposed by Moscow. The Bolshevik
leaders proved to be completely unaware of the complex
historical conditions and of the national peculiarities of the
Transcaucasian peoples. Acting without the knowledge of the
region, they had laid a foundation for the future outbreak of
ethnic conflicts there. A prominent Georgian politologist,
S.Tsintsadze, referred the reasons behind those conflicts to
the 1920s when the Soviet Union was created: “From the very
beginning the state was not based on the principles of equality,
and therefore it had become a delayed-action mine which was to
explode one day.”[23] Nonetheless, the cataclysms in Transcaucasia
appeared to be completely unexpected for the majority of the
1980s generation.