INTRODUCTION
This police pursuit study
was conducted in the state of Illinois from January through December of 1991.
Due to the lack of research in this area of law enforcement, and the importance
of this deadly force issue, the researchers designed the s~udy to provide
a data base helpful to government officials, police administrators, and police
personnel. With this information more informed decisions can be made by responsible
government officials regarding police pursuit legislation, policies, and
procedures.
SURVEY INSTRUMENTS
TO deal with the
common methodological limitations of research on police pursuits, this study
used a strategy of triangulation. That is, a variety of data collection techniques
were incorporated in the study to limit the failings of any one method. With
the assistance of the Illinois State Police the researchers developed three
separate data collection instruments. The Officer Survey was designed to
obtain officer attitudes and impressions regarding pursuit issues. The survey
was mailed to the 2,780 officers likely to become involved in a pursuit on
the 51 departments selected to be included in the purposive sample. A total
of 784 (28%) usable officer surveys were returned to the research staff.
Forty-four of the 51 departments (86%) had officers respond to the survey.
The Administrative Survey was designed to recover "official"
pursuit data, as well as administrative attitudes regarding pursuits, and
official policies and procedures. This survey was sent to the department
head of each of the 51 departments included in the sample.
The Police Field Interview Form involved a qualitative
data collection procedure developed not only to augment both the officer
and administrative surveys, but to provide a method for the researchers to
check responses provided on each of these questionnaires. In addition, this
method allowed the research staff to probe for additional explanatory data.
A total of 107 interviews of officers at all ranks were conducted in 29 different
departments. The sample represented 1,584 years of police experience.
The final questionnaire, the Administrative Telephone
Survey, was developed by the research staff solely. This form was designed
to retrieve information regarding organizational characteristics. These included
such variables as departmeI~tal structure, agency mission, type of pursuit
policy, and political atmosphere. A total of 35 departments responded to
this telephone interview.
This study differs significantly from previous efforts.
It was designed to collect data on the organizational response to the pursuit
issue, and to provide a basic understanding of how officers and administrators
operationalize police pursuits in the real world. This aspect of the pursuit
question has heretofore not been addressed.
ORGANIZATION OF THE REPORT
The study
report was divided into two separate volumes for the readers convenience.
Volume I consists of five sections: a general overview of the pursuit question,
the research methodology, police liability and appellate case law as they
relate to vehicle pursuits, a review of the prior research literature, and
conclusions and recommendations. Volume II provides the results of the empirical
data collection phase of this project. In an effort to present the data in
a succinct and readable format Volume II was divided into seven sections:
introductory materials, a brief overview of past research to reintroduce
the reader to this relevant research, the Officer Survey, the Administrative
Survey, the Police Field Interviews the Administrative Telephone Survey,
and the conclusions and recommendations resulting from the data collected
from the surveys.
VOLUME I
The National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration /NHTSA reported for 1990, that there were 314 fatalities
resulting from police pursuits. Data collection methods used by the NHTSA
in establishing this data base, however, indicate that this is an underestimation
of the actual number of deaths that occur as a result of pursuits. In 1989,
the NHTSA reported that the highest fatality rates were in California with
55, Texas with 37, Georgia with 21, and Illinois with 17. It has been estimated
that 20,000 injuries occur annually, and that over 50,000 pursuits take place
yearly; however, our research indicates that the number of pursuits could
be considerably higher.
It was also found
that some states are increasing the penalty for eluding the police, and that
New Jersey, for example, has implemented a "rebuttable presumption" clause
for the owner of the vehicle. The New Jersey statute allows for the confiscation
of vehicles used to elude the police under certain circumstances. Pennsylvania
and other states are considering these tougher standards, and in increasing
the penalty for those found guilty of attempting to elude the police. It
was also discovered that some states such as Illinois are utilizing video
and still camera photographs in an effort to catch speeding violators without
having to pursue them to issue a citation.
PUBLIC SAFETY
The importance of a
highly restrictive and discouraging pursuit policy for police agencies was
emphasized in an effort to protect innocent third party victims, the police,
and the occupants of the vehicle being used to elude the police. It was also
argued that for departments to control pursuits in their agency they must
not only have highly restrictive pursuit policies and procedures, but these
highly restrictive policies and procedures must be accompanied with good
supervision and pursuit training. Supervisory personnel must be properly
trained themselves in pursuits if they are to effectively control officers
under their command. Further, supervisors must incorporate appropriate sanctions,
including remedial training, for those officers that violate pursuit policies,
procedures, er the state vehicle code regarding pursuits. Officer training
should include not only the technical skills needed to pursue, but attitude
development and proper decision making must be taught at the academy and
in the department that they serve.
Discussion
included the acceptable risk factor that must be considered before and during
any police pursuit. Disagreement regarding the acceptable risk decision will
always exist. It must be pointed out that even a "no pursuit" policy can
result in the injury or death, of parties actively involved in the pursuit
and uninvolved innocent third parties. Despite the restrictiveness of pursuit
policies, appropriate officer training, and good supervision of the police,
accidents will arise. The issue the~ becomes not so much if pursuits should
or should not be al]owed, for there inevitably will be some circumstances
where the po]ice are required to pursue. Rather, it concerns the conditions
and the manner in which pursuits should be authorized and how ~hey can be
conducted with the greatest margin of safety.
POLICE LIABILITY
Police officers and
their employing agencies, supervisors, and the responsible units of government
can be held liable fo~~ accidents and deaths that occur as a result of a
pursuit. While state statues differ, and case law is yet to be settled regarding
the officers responsibility in a pursuit, officers must show "due regard"
in their actions during a pursuit. Courts have not established definitive
standards discouraging pursuits; however, it is clear from available appellate
decisions that officers must abide by existing state vehicle code requirements
for tho operation of emergency vehicles, and police must avoid beinq negligent
in the performance of their duties. Pursui~ driviuq is considered a deadly
force issue by many writers, and the c~>u~ts have, under specific conditions,
construed the use of road bl~cks as a deadly force issue. Police agencies
should take a proactive approach in developing highly restrictive (discouraging)
pursuit policies and procedures and in making pursuits as safe a possible.
PAST RESEARCH
Relevant literature
regarding police pursuits falls prey to several methodological shortcomings.
Despite these failinqs, which are discussed at length in the report, these
data represent the only quantifiable picture of pursuits that we have at
this time. From our review of the literature (see Table 1) reveaJed that
approximately 1% to 3% of pursuits end in death, 5% to 24% end in injuries,
18% to 44% end in accidents, and 68% to 82% end in an arrest. Contrary to
popular images, only a small fl act ioi~ (9% to 30%) of pursuits are initiated
for felony crimes; th~' majority (between 52% and 63%) of pursuits are initiated
by th~, police for a traffic violation. While these data provide a useful
statistical reference point, it seems equally, if not more, important to
understand how officers actually interpret pursuit situations and carry out
pursuit activities in the world. How officers act and define policy on the
streets does not always coincide with the "official" picture represented
by quantitative data.
VOLUME II
ADMINISTRATIVE SURVEY
The administrative
survey originally targeted 51 police agencies, selected to be substantively
representative of the types and sizes of departments found throughout Illinois.
Thirty-five departments returned their administrative questionnaires, yielding
a return rate for the administrative questionnaire of 68.6%. Although the
bulk of police agencies in Illinois are very small, we purposely oversampled
relatively large departments to enhance analysis of those agencies who have
well-developed pursuit policy and procedures.
While
97 percent of the 35 responding agencies reported a formal written policy
to provide general operating principles and criteria for their department,
only 74% of these reported codified pursuit policy and procedures. Departments
were categorized into three types according to the restrictiveness of their
pursuit policies: (1) discretionary policy (26%), (2) restrictive policy
(57%), and (3) highly restrictive and discouraging policy (17%). We found
that what departments termed "policy" mostly referred to lists of specific
pursuit procedures and techniques, rather than to broader statements of goals,
mission, and operating philosophy. We also found that they were not generally
comprehensive. These included issues such as communication protocol, types
of vehicles allowed (marked vs. 8 unmarked), specific driving tactics (e.g.,
ramming, boxing ii1), and the use of stationary roadblocks. Most did not
address other specific issues such as: the appropriate number of police vehicles
involved in a pursuit, reasonable distances between pursuit vehicles, or
maximum allowable speeds during pursuits. Almost all departments reported
some strategic alternatives to pursuits, including identifying drivers for
later arrest aI~d use of radios to pass identification of suspects to other
officers.
The survey found that vehicle pursuit data were diffficult
for administrators to collect, and the quality and content of data collection
methods were quite varied. Furthermore, tthe findings from these data are
generally not used in any systematic way to inform pursuit policy generation
or evaluation. Of the 25 agencies participating in the survey, 18 were able
to provide specific numeric data on pursuits and their outcomes during the
previous year. They reported a total of 149 pursuits or approximately 8.1
pursuits per agency per year.
Our administrative survey provided an empirical description
of police vehicle pursuits very consistent with other studies using official
record data; see Table 1 for a comparison.
These data show that most vehicle pursuits are short--the
median pursuit lasted about 5 minutes and traveled about 3.2 miles. Only
14% of the pursuits reported were initiated for felony reasons, although
administrators generally predict (incorrectly~ a very different pattern in
which most pursuits result from felony incidents. The administrative data
also indica2ed that most pursuits are self-initiated by officers within the
department; only 3% of the recorded pursuits were responses to outside calls
for assistance.
Reported outcomes from
vehicle pursuits were comparable to those reported by other studies. Using
data provided by 18 reporting departments, 26% of the pursuits resulted in
an accident; these mostly occurred to the suspect vehicle (80% of the pursuit-related
accidents), with 16% of the accidents involving a bystander vehicle. Pursuit-related
injuries occurred in 9% of the reported vehicle pursuits, again mostly to
suspects, with injuries to officers or bystanders much less frequent. The
departments in the administrative sample reported no deaths due to police
pursuits during the prior year. Disciplinary actions against officers for
inappropriate or unauthorized pursuits were noted in 31% of the reporting
departments during the prior year, mostly resulting in a verbal reprimand
of the officer.
Pursuit training does
not seem to exist in any substantial form at this time in Illinois. Most
departments seem to equate to Emergency Vehicle Operations Course training
(EVOC) with pursuit training. The lack of systematic pursuit training, including
judgmental and decision-making elements, is a surprising and unfortunate
omission. A majority (55%) of the sampled agencies report maintaining a running
record of vehicle pursuits within the department, mostly in some form of
manual file. However, these files are not systematically used Oy departments
for evaluation of policies or for setting new policies.
POLICE OFFICER SURVEY
The police officer
survey represents the application of a data collection method not previously
been used to study police pursuit practices. The survey targeted 2780 sworn
officers in the same 51 Illinois police agencies covered by the administrative
survey and included all personnel who were potentially exposed to vehicle
pursuit situations in their police duties. Each officer questionnaire was
anonymous, contained no unique individual identifying information, and included
questions about officers' knowledge of departmental pursuit policies and
procedures, the officers' attitudes and perceptions about pursuits, and their
personal experiences in vehicle pursuits during the previous year. In all,
784 usable questionnaires were returned to the research project by officer
respondents.
In brief, the principal findings of our police officer survey in Illinois agencies are as follows:
1. The officer survey suggested that formal policies regulating
vehicle pursuits are more prevalent than administrative surveys show or than
analyses of departmental documents would indicate. This reflects the small
number of officers in our sample from small departments, which are less likely
to have formal pursuit policies. We discovered that officers interpret the
term "policy" more loosely than administrators to include not just written,
codified principles and rules, but also customary practices that are widely
understood but not actually written down.
2. Officers perceived departmental policy as more restrictive
and discouraging of pursuits than did administrators. This seems to reflect
the sense among officers that departmental policy is used primarily for disciplining
officers and the suspicion that it exists to make things more difficult for
officers in the field.
3. A substantial percentage of officers report receiving
training in pursuit driving -- 55% for basic training, 47% for advanced training.
These numbers are virtually identical to the numbers reported on the Administrative
Survey. However, the training received by police officers in Illinois invariably
deals only with emergency vehicle handling. The percentage for pursuit training
also is noticeably lower than the percentage of officers who received training
in firearms and deadly force, even though vehicles are an everyday instrument
of deadly force while guns are rarely used.
4. Survey data revealed substantially more vehicle
pursuits than administrative or official record data indicated. The 12 officers
in our survey reported an average of slightly over one pursuit per officer
during the previous year. That ntm~er, whil~ not large, is six times higher
than the estimates from our administrative survey and fifteen times higher
than the estimated from Auten's 1991 study of comparable Illinois police
departments. That corresponds directly with our field interviews with officers
in the field indicating that many (if not most) pursuits are never reported
to their departments or supervisors. This suggests a sizeable "dark figure
of police pursuits" [to adapt a common phrase) and that we must move beyond
convent ional administrative data in order to see it illuminated.
5. The distribution of officers' participation in vehicle
pursuits is very lopsided, with over 70% of the officers reporting none or
only one during the previous year and only ~% of officers reporting more
than five.
6. Pursuit-related accident, injury, and arrest rates
from officer reports agree closely with those estimated from administrative
data. While overall levels of pursuits are rely discrepant, the different
forms of pursuit outcomes are strikingly similar across the different kinds
of data. The only outcome discrepancy found in the officer survey involved
pursuit related deaths where officers reported noticeably more dearlis du~}
to pursuits than administrator or departmental records did roi the same time
period.
7. Officers' descriptions of many features of their vehlcle
pursuits agreed with the descriptions provided by administrative 1 record
data -- e.g., the short lengths of most pursuits, the likelihood that nonfelony
offenses are the initiating causes of most pursuits. They disagreed on how
many pursuits occur as a result of calls for assistance or backup from outside
agencies. Officers reported many more pursuits prompted by requests for help
by outside officers than were indicated by official reports or administrators.
8. Officers, like administrators, tend to misperceive
or misjudge the initiating causes of most pursuits. If asked to guess, a
majority of the officers said that pursuits were initiated most frequently
for felony offenses. Yet, when askod to report on their own experiences,
most officers indicated tt~at at least three-quarters of their own pursuits
were initiated [o~~ nonfelonies.
9. Most police officers believe that vehicle pursuits
have value in controlling crime and maintaining order, but there is considerable
variation in how valuable or central pursuits are to this mission and whether
the costs outweigh the benefits. Most officers believe that failure to pursue
fleeing offenders would have negative effects on safety and legal order,
with 85% saying that crime would undoubtedly increase if pursuits were not
allowed. They also felt that public respect for the law and for police officers
would decline if nonpursuit were the policy.
10. Beyond their belief in the benefits of pursuits, officers
were also aware of the liabilities and risks. Officer respondents divided
fairly evenly on whether the benefits 14 outweighed the liabilities -- 28%
felt that the positives were greater than the negative outcomes, 37% indicated
that the costs were higher than the benefits.
11. Substantial variations were found between and within
police departments in the frequency of pursuits reported by officers. Campus
police departments reported much lower levels of vehicle pursuits than other
types of agencies. Smaller departments (with 10 or less sworn officer) reported
a substantially higher frequency of pursuits (per officer) than other size
departments. Officers in patrol and traffic duty reported higher frequencies
of pursuits than officers in other duty areas. Younger offricers with less
experience in police work reported higher average levels of pursuits than
older, more experienced officers. Officers' attitudes toward the importance
of pursuits for law and order also correlated with their participation in
vehicle pursuits.
12. Formal departmental policy regarding vehicle pursuits
and formal pursuit training experiences did not appear to reduce the number
of pursuits. In fact, officers in departments with formal policies and formal
training requirements reported slightly higher levels of pursuits. In addition,
the occurrence of ~o~uu~i pursuit policy and existing pursuit training (EVOC)
did not have any empirically observed beneficial effect on pursui~ outcomes
such as lower accident or injury rates, higher arrest rates.
13. Negative consequences of pursuits, such as accidei~ts,
and injuries, did not show significant variation by departmental 15 characteristics
or by officer experience or duty assignment. However, the results do clearly
show that younger, less experienced officers do not have higher accident
or injury rates, as frequently suggested.
14. Positive outcomes of pursuits, such as arrests of
the fleeing suspects, vary directly with officer's propensity to engage in
pursuits. Those characteristics of departments and officers that predict
higher levels of pursuits also predict higher numbers of pursuit-related
arrests. It suggests that the high percentage of pursuits resulting in arrests
that are reported in administrative data are not an artifact of recordkeeping
(where only successful pursuits are recorded). The same high percentage shows
up in officers' self-reports.
15. Officers' involvement in high speed pursuits also
showed significant variation across departments and officer characteristics.
Police agencies that patrolled open, less urbanized areas with large amounts
of highways/freeways reported significantly higher top speeds during vehicle
pursuits. Simply having a formal policy or existing formal" pursuit training"
made no difference in the top speed reported during pursuits.
However, the type of pursuit policy did matter; discretionary
policies were associated with noticeably higher top pursuit speeds. Age and
experience of officers were not consistently associated with higher speed
pursuits, as might be expected; the younger officers did not drive significantly
faster. However, officer attitudes about the need for pursuits in law enforcement
were significantly related to higher pursuit top speeds. Predictably, officers
who saw nonpursuit of fleeing suspects as more harmful also reported higher
top speeds than officer viewing nonpursuit as less vital.
FIELD INTERVIEWS
The overriding purpose of the field interviews was to
both validate our quantitative efforts and to clear up ambiguous and seemingly
contradictory responses to both the administrative amd officer surveys. These
interpretative data greatly enriched the researchers' fundamental understanding
of the complexities surrounding the pursuit phenomenon at both the individual
as well as the organizational level. This was of vital importance to unlocking
the causal factors underlying pursuit behavior (both individual and organizational),
in that policing consists of ,~ network of closed and seemingly impenetrable
institutions. 'Ft~� field interviews, in large measure, became the key to
unlocking the police subcultural value system and its concomitant behavioral
implications and ramifications.
What was learned from these interviews? First, we found
that some supervisors and administrators, i.e., sergeants and above, verbalized
an unwillingness to engage in pursuits except for extraordinary reasons,
and that they knew that their officers engaged in unauthorized pursuits and
corresponding deception concerning their behavior -- often in violation of
department policy.
At the same time, officers
under reported their pursuits Next, researchers learned that both officers,
supervisors, and administrators generally do not know their department's
pursuit policy and procedures. There could be several reasons for this; however,
it seems that when pursuit policy and attendant procedures do exist they
are unnecessarily complex. That is why officers perceive of their pursuit
policy as being more restrictive than it actually is, and that is why officeus
often feel policy serves only to protect the organization, especially when
they have a negative outcome as a result of a pursuit.
The
field interview stage of our investigation was an integral part of the research
process. And, although interview data was not systematically entered into
the data set, it was not viewed as an unnecessary adjunct to the project.
Field interviews served to add an element of quality control to the research
project. Lastly, field interviews enriched and enlivened our survey data.
Using the information gleaned from the field interviews in such a way, validates
the assumption that: high quality research is often best derived from a highly
integrated combination of qualitative and quantitative resea:~ch 18 methodologies,
techniques, and practices.
GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS
The data collected in this project led the researchers
to six major recommendations. These recommendations are based o~ past research,
applicable legal standards, and the results o� the quantitative and qualitative
data collected throughout this study. It is important to keep in mind, however,
that this research project was not designed to test our recommendations as
specific hypotheses, but was exploratory in nature. Consequently, while the
recommendations provided are based o~ what we presently know about pursuits,
on case and statutory law, and on customary standards of acceptable risk,
empirical studies should be developed to test these recommendations empirically.
Given this caveat, the following recommendations are provided:
1. Perhaps the single most important recommendation is
that police agencies should have well developed, highly restrict:ivo and
discouraging police pursuit policies, as well as clear and simple procedures
for regulating pursuits. The policy should be extremely cautious of any pursuit,
except in the most extyem~ circumstances where the risks of nonpursuit clearly
outweigh the risks of pursuit. This is a more conservative standard thaI~
the restrictive policy proposed by the International Association of Chiefs
of Police. This standard provides maximum safety to third parties, to suspects
being pursued, and to police officers themselves. Pursuit procedures should
be clear and concise, itud, to the extent possible, complement already established
departmental policy and procedures. This will help to avoid confusion under
stressful circumstances, and allow for increased officer retention of procedures.
2.
Police officers who are given authority to participate in vehicle pursuits
must be trained properly before they are allowed to engage in pursuits, and
they must receive inservice pursuit training on a regular basis. This
training mus~ include not only emergency vehicle handling, but also attitude
development and decision making skills in pursuit situations, as well as
knowledge of legal limitations and liabilities.
3.
Police agencies should be required to collect and maintain relevant and reliable
data on police pursuits conducted by their officers. This data base will
allow police officials, and researchers, to more effectively evaluate pursuit
policies and officer actions during pursuits.
4.
To ensure compliance with pursuit policies good supervision by administrative
staff is essential. That supervision includes consistent monitoring of officer
compliance with departmental pursuit guidelines, administration of appropriate
training for pursuit responses, and the use of meaningful sanctions for violations
of department policies. An integral part of the sanctioning process must
include remedial pursuit training so that the sanctions are constructive
and net simply punitive.
5. Departments should develop a critical incident review
board to review all police vehicle pursuits engaged in by th~,i~ officers.
The review board should consist of patrol and command officers charged with
the responsibility of evaluating pursuits in relation to department policy
and state law. The information gleaned from such an effort could be used
to improve the department's pursuit policy, and to enhance the pursui~ traini~g
of their officers.
6. There is a need
for states to review their statutes pertaining to police vehicle pursuits.
These statutes should encourage safety and require alternatives to police
pursuits for less serious offenses. In reviewing existing policy, states
a~e encouraged to evaluate experimental legislation being attempted in other
jurisdictions. For example, New Jersey recently adoptod the nation's first
"rebuttable presumption" statute, under which the officer are permitted to
confiscate a vehicle used to elude police. The utilization of video and still
cameras in police vehicles represents a viable alternative to pursuits and
would aid in a rebuttable presumption approach given that enabling legislation
is provided.
Table under construction
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Alpert, G. P. & Dunham, R. G. (1990). Police Pursuit Driving Controlling
Responses to Emerqency Situations. NY: Greenwood Press.
Alperr, G. P. & Fridell, L. A. (1992). Police Vehicles and
Firearms. Prospect Heights, Illinois: Waveland Press, Inc.
Auten, J. H. (1990). Police Pursuit Driving Operations In Illinois: 1990.
Urbana: University of Illinois Police Training Institute.
Beckman, E. (1985). A Report to Law Enforcement on Factors in Police Pursuits. Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Justice.
Brune, T. & Nelson, D. (1991). Suburban Chase Peril Greater Than in City. Chicago Sun-Times 2 July 1991, 1, 16.
California Highway Patrol. (1983) . California Highway Patrol Pursuit Study. Sacramento, CA.
IACP/BJA National Law Enforcement Policy Center. (1990) .
Vehicular Pursuit: Concepts and Issues Paper. IACP/BJA, 1
(August), 1-5.
Nelson, D. & Brune, T. (1991) . In Hot Pursuit: One-Third of Police
Chases End in Crashes--and Some Elude Rules. Chicaso Sun-Times 30 June 1991,
1, 18.
Oechsli, A. (1990). Kentucky State Police Pursuit Study, 1989 1990. Kentucky
State Police, Research and Development Section. unpublished report.
Patinkin, H. P. & Bingham, H. (1986) . Police Motor Vehicle Pursuits: The Chicago Experience. The Police Chief, 55, 61 62.
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