|
Robert H. Bass
Department of Philosophy |
AOS: Moral Theory Decision and Game Theory Political
Philosophy |
AOC: Environmental
Ethics Animal Ethics Philosophy
of Religion |
Education
Ph.D in Philosophy: Towards a
Constructivist Eudaemonism, directed by Edward F. McClennen. Bowling Green
State University, 2004.
M.A. in Philosophy, Bowling Green State University,
1996.
B.A. in Philosophy, Wofford College, 1979.
Positions Held
2006-present Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, Coastal Carolina
University, Conway, SC.
2001-2006 Visiting
Assistant Professor, Visiting Lecturer, Adjunct Professor, Department of
Philosophy, University of North Florida, Jacksonville, FL.
Select Scholarly Work
Book (Edited):
Readings on the Ultimate Questions, 3e, coedited with Nils Ch. Rauhut, Prentice-Hall, 2009.
Selections in Edited Books:
"Reflective Equilibrium," in Readings on the Ultimate Questions, 3e, edited by Nils Ch. Rauhut and Robert Bass, Prentice-Hall, 2009.
“Lives in the
Balance: Utilitarianism and Animal Research,” in The Ethics of Animal
Research: In Theory and Practice,
edited by Jeremy Garrett, Basic Bioethics Series, MIT Press, 2010
(forthcoming).
Articles:
“Omniscience and the Identification Problem,” in Florida Philosophical Review, Summer
2007, available at http://philosophy.ucf.edu/fpr/files/FPR-7_1.pdf.
“Undermining Indirect Duty
Theories,” in Between the Species, 6, August 2006, http://cla.calpoly.edu/bts/issue_06/06bass.pdf.
“Pure
Contractarianism: Promise, Problems, Prospects,” in Journal of Value
Inquiry, 34, No. 2-3, September 2000, 319-332.
Reviews:
“Book
Review: David Schmidtz, The Elements of Justice” in Journal of
Libertarian Studies (forthcoming).
“Book Review: Mark
Bernstein, Without a Tear: Our Tragic Relationship with Animals” in Journal
of Value Inquiry, 39, No.2, June 2005, 273-277.
Papers
and Presentations:
“Knowledge
Without Truth?” American Philosophical Association, Central Division, Chicago,
IL, February 20, 2009.
“Quotidian Medical
Epistemology,” 35th Value Inquiry Conference, The College of New Jersey,
Ewing, New Jersey, April 5, 2008.
“Joyce as a Moral
Anatomist,” South Carolina Society for Philosophy Conference (Joint Meeting
with the North Carolina Philosophical Society), University of North Carolina,
Chapel Hill, NC, February 29, 2008.
“Small
Contributions,” 34th Value Inquiry Conference, Adrian College,
Adrian, MI, April 13, 2007.
“Sunk Costs,”
South Carolina Society for Philosophy Conference, Coastal Carolina University,
Conway, SC, February 24, 2007.
“Indirect Duty Theories: Even if They’re Right,
They’re Wrong,” Society for the Study of Ethics and Animals, American
Philosophical Association, Eastern Division, Washington, DC, December 27, 2006.
“Comments on
Aaron Simmons’ ‘A Critique of Warren’s Weak Animal Rights View,’” Society
for the Study of Ethics and Animals, American Philosophical Association,
Eastern Division, New York, NY, December 28, 2005.
“The
Impossibility of Omniscience,” Florida Philosophical Association Conference,
Cocoa Beach, FL, November 11, 2005.
“Maximizing,
Satisficing and the Normative Distinction Between Means and Ends,” 32nd
Value Inquiry Conference, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, LA, April 8,
2005.
“Deciding Where to
Meet for Dinner: Simple Problems and Joint Intentionality,” Department of
Philosophy Colloquium, University of North Florida, Jacksonville, FL, March 30,
2005.
“Chalmers and the
Self-Knowledge Problem,” Department of Philosophy Colloquium, Bowling Green
State University, Bowling Green, OH, March 2000.
“Restoration
Projects and the Tragedy of the Commons,” Society for Ecological Restoration
conference, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, November 1997.
Work
in Progress
“A Game-Theoretic Approach to Agent-Neutrality”
“Between Sustainability and What?”
“Can Instrumental
Reasoning Stand Alone?”
“How Equalization
Upsets Equality”
“How Not to Resolve
the Backward Induction Paradox”
“Many Inscrutable Evils”
Professional
Affiliations
American Philosophical Association
American Society for Political and
Legal Philosophy
Association for Political Theory
International Society for
Environmental Ethics
Society for Philosophy and Animal
Minds
Society for the Study of Ethics and
Animals
South Carolina Society for
Philosophy
Teaching Experience
In addition to standard introductory courses, I have taught bioethics, environmental ethics, business ethics, and symbolic logic. I have also taught an upper-level seminar in ethical theory as well as our department’s Capstone seminar in ethics, which I organized around the theme of evolution and moral theory, focusing primarily on meta-ethics. In addition, I have experience with distance teaching, and regularly make use of on-line resources and teaching tools. Syllabi and other teaching materials are available upon request.
Professional Service
Public
Talks:
“Why It's Hard to Change the Environment One Person at a Time,” Celebration of Inquiry, Coastal Carolina University, Conway, SC,
February 18-19, 2010 (forthcoming).
“Stories About Animals: What They're Like, Why They
Matter,” Celebration of Inquiry, Coastal Carolina University, Conway, SC,
February 12, 2009.
“Animal Minds, Animal Rights,” Friends of Philosophy,
Coastal Carolina University, November 18, 2008.
“Understanding Animal Minds,” Conway Public Library,
Conway, SC, May 14, 2008.
“Understanding Animal Minds,” Board of Visitors
Community Dialogue Series, Coastal Carolina University, Conway, SC, February
20, 2008.
“Endangered Minds,” Celebration of Inquiry, Coastal
Carolina University, Conway, SC, February 14, 2008.
“Morality and Animal Research: Lives in the Balance,”
for Philosophy Club, Coastal Carolina University, March 29 and September 20,
2007.
“Is ‘Doin’ What Comes Naturally’ Ethical?” with Nils
Rauhut, for Tea and Ethics, Jackson Ethics Center, Coastal Carolina University,
September 14 and 28, 2006.
“What Meat-Eating is Good For,” for Diversity Program,
University of North Florida, Jacksonville, Florida, November 14, 2005.
“Why Your Religious Beliefs Are Probably Mistaken,”
for Philosophy Slam, Jacksonville, Florida, October 2002.
“Christianity and Politics,” for Food for Thought, a
University of North Florida student group, Jacksonville, Florida, February
2002.
Chair:
Session on Theodicy, South Carolina Society for
Philosophy Conference, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, NC, February
29, 2008.
Session on Clinical Ethics, 32nd Value
Inquiry Conference, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, LA, April 9, 2005.
Referee:
American
Philosophical Quarterly
Journal of
Libertarian Studies
Journal of
Value Inquiry
Simon and Schuster
Springer
Administrative Service
2006-2009 Departmental
Library Representative
2007-2009
Advisor to Phi Sigma Tau chapter, International Philosophy Honor Society
2008-2009
Member, Religious Studies Search Committee (Second search, in progress)
2007-2008
Member, Religious Studies Search Committee (First search, successfully
completed in 2008)
2007-2008 Member,
Committee on Revising the Philosophy Major
2007-2008 Member,
Pre-Med Advisory Committee
Dissertation: Towards a Constructivist
Eudaemonism
Committee:
Edward
F. McClennen (Chair), Loren E. Lomasky, Fred D. Miller, Jr., Catherine Cassara
Abstract
I seek to lay the groundwork for an approach
to eudaemonism, where that is understood as holding that the central moral
conception is of the agent living well or having a good life, and in which the
moral virtues are essential to her doing so.
More specifically, I seek an approach grounded in practical reasoning –
and especially in instrumental reasoning – rather than in eudaemonism’s
traditional moorings in natural teleology.
In the first chapter, I argue that an
approach based in natural teleology will not work. Though we can make scientifically respectable
sense of natural ends, they are suited at most to play a supporting rather than
a leading role in moral theory.
In the second chapter, the claims of decision
theory to be an adequate formal representation of instrumental reasoning are
examined and found wanting. In
particular, it is shown, first, that maximizing the satisfaction of a set of
preferences is not plausibly a rational requirement upon action, because it is
often not well-defined what maximization amounts to, and second, that decision
theory does not adequately capture a central feature of ordinary instrumental
reasoning, the normative distinction between ends and means.
In the third chapter, I develop an account of
ordinary instrumental reasoning.
Beginning with the simplest cases, I identify two normative control
conditions, that an end serves as a principle of selection from among options
available to the agent and that reason-giving force flows uni-directionally
from end to means, that together are both necessary and sufficient for a tract
of reasoning to count as instrumental.
In these terms, I show that constitutive reasoning is a species of
instrumental reasoning. I also address
questions about the normative standing of instrumental reasoning and argue that
it has reason-giving force that does not derive from the value of the ends to
which it is directed.
In the fourth chapter, I discuss the structure
of eudaemonism, with the aim of showing that there is an intelligible and
attractive doctrine that can be disentangled from the natural teleology. Building on the analysis of instrumental, and
especially of constitutive reasoning, in Chapter Three, I classify and explain
the relations among objectives, ultimate and final ends, constitutive and
external means, and that which is pursued or sought for its own sake. In these terms, we can characterize a form of
eudaemonism as proposing that an agent should have or develop towards having an
ultimate end of living well, with the virtues being partially constitutive of,
and therefore necessary to, the ultimate end.
In the fifth chapter, I sketch an argument
showing that instrumental reasoning, of the kind explicated in my third
chapter, can bear on the selection of final and ultimate ends, and that it is
plausible that the instrumental approach to moral theory that I am urging
yields conclusions with a eudaemonistic structure. The argument shows that there can be
instrumental reason for acquiring an ultimate end, and that, partially
constitutive of the ultimate end will be practical principles functionally
equivalent to the virtues. I also
indicate directions for further development and exploration, having especially
to do with the reach of instrumental reasoning, whether there is any scope for
non-instrumental practical reasoning, and the connection of eudaemonist or
virtue-ethical approaches to politics.
Professional
References
E.F. McClennen
Professor of Political Philosophy and Political
Science
Department of Philosophy
Syracuse University
Syracuse, New York
(315) 443-5822
Loren E. Lomasky
Cory Professor of Political Philosophy, Policy and Law
518 Cabell, Department of Philosophy
University of Virginia
Charlottesville, Virginia 22904
Office: (434) 924-6925 Fax:
(434) 924-6927
Fred D. Miller, Jr.
Professor of Philosophy and Executive Director of the
Social Philosophy and Policy Center
Department of Philosophy
Bowling Green State University
Bowling Green, Ohio 43403
(419) 372-2536
Donald Scherer
Professor of Philosophy Emeritus
Department of Philosophy
Bowling Green State University
Bowling Green, Ohio 43403
(419) 372-7142
David E. W. Fenner
Associate Dean, College of Arts and Sciences
University of North Florida
Jacksonville, Florida 32224
(904) 620-1360
Michael S. Ruse
Associate Professor and Chair
Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies
Coastal Carolina University
Conway, South Carolina 29526
(843) 349-2548
Nils Ch. Rauhut
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies
Coastal Carolina University
Conway, South Carolina 29526
(843) 349-2547