In the first days of January, however, the situation of the Russian Southern Front seemed to be stabilized, after that the Sovietic troops’ thurst had been controlled, thanks to a series of measures that had well showed the strong 6^th Panzer Division’s counterattacks, shifted from the 4^th Pz. Army area, that had caused heavy losses to Gen. Badanov's XXIVth Armored Corps and the stubborn durability of the hurried line, created along that held by Italian Alpine Corps, by units gathered in XXIVth Panzer Corps, whose were parts:

The air support had been provide by 2^nd Air Army.

The Russian Plan was very simple: a double encirclements, with 2 lateral and divergent thrusts. From North, Russian IVth Armored Corps had to cover the plan's development, advancing forward, while Russian 40^th Army had to push from the Uryw bridgehead in two encirclement’s directions:

a) towards Alexejewka ( exterior wing), where it had to link with Russian 3^rd Armored Army, arriving from South and, more exactly with XVth Armored Corps;

b)towards Ostrogoshsk (internal wing), where it had to link with XVIII Indipendent Armored Corps. This last, in fact, starting from the Schtschutschje bridgehead had to breakthrough in the middle of the great pocket, creating more internal enciclements towards North (Ostrogoshsk) and towards South (Karpenkowo) and then linking XII Armored Corps of 3^rd Armored Army, that was come in from South.

a) internal, that linked XVIII Indipendent Fusiliers Corps;

b)external, that had to link 40^th Army at Alexejewka.

The Southern flank had covered by VII Cavalry Corps, whose target was Walujki.

Finished the preventived encirclement, 3^rd Army had to face at West and clear up the pocket.

And, in detail:

On the rear of Ungarian 2nd Army there was Cramer Il Corps, but whose employ was heavy conditioned because Hitler had reserved to decide on its employ.

In the center of the line interested from the operation, there was the Italian Alpine Corps, that was so formed:

On January 12^th 1943, at hours 10.00 Gen. Moskalenko's men started the attacks with the usual reconnaissance in force, in front of the Utyw's bridgehead, after an a hour heavy artillery shelling. The usual salvo of katiusha rocket launchers marked the preparation’s end. The head battalions of 4 Infantry divisions, supported by tanks, soon gained the upper hand over Ungarian outposts in the right wing. The breackthrough happened in the 4^th Infantry Regiment / 7^th Light Division's sector, in the attack sector of Russian 107^th Fusiliers Division and 86^th Armored Brigade. Russians took about 1,000 prisoniers, while during the attack had only 5 dead and 42 wounded.( In accord Russian sourches; The Ungarian reconstruction is very different….). Seen the progress of the first day, Gen. Moskalenko obtained by his Front's commander to take the next day the true attack.

On January 13^th , Russian 40^th Army started its preparation fire, carring to attack its 4 Infantry Divisions on the first line (141^st Infantry Division, 25^th Guard Fusiliers Division, 340^th Fusiliers Division and 107^th Fusiliers Division) with its 3 Armored Brigades. The preparatory shelling was very efficient and the attempt of counterattack by the German 700^th Armored Detachment had blocked by Russian 150^th Armored Brigade. At the end of the day, the breach in the Ungarian front was 10 kilometers in wideness and in depht. The sending of Cramer Corps was refused by B ArmyGroup Headquartier, but at dusk German 168^th Infantry Division moved towards Ostrogoshsk.

On January 14^th , Russians, failing to disloge German 149^th Infantry Regiment, carried on their own reserves, 305^th Fusiliers Division and 253^rd Fusiliers Division and, it seems, also elements of Russian IVth Armored Corps. Encircled the German regiment, Russians drove forward also in the northern sector of the bridgehead, seizing Storoschewoje, while in the center Russian 25^th Guard Fusiliers Division seized Matjugino. Towards South Russians reached Potudan River, a Don's River tributary.

On January 14^th , at hours 06.00, also Russian XVIIIth Indipendent Corps started its drive from the Stschutschje bridgehead with an artillery preparation made by 700 field guns. Here the attack headed against Ungarian 12^th Light Division. Its two Infantry regiments, 18^th Infantry Regiment and 48^th Infantry Regiment suffered heavy losses, respectively, by Russian 129^th Brigade and by Russian 304^th Fusiliers Division. About 15.30 p.m. Russians brocke through the 18^th Infantry Regiment's positions and, nearly in that time, Russians, overwhelming the 48^th Infantry Regiment's sector and the German tactics reserves, readly rushed, also destroie Division's Headquartiers. At evening, Ungarian Division had lost 70 per cent of its force and also all reserves of Ungarian VIIth Corps had been emploied and destroied, so Russians could exploit the breach, continuing theye drive for all night. Russian operations, however, didn't quietly occur. In fact, while in the North they met a strong resistence by the Ungarian 18^th Infantry Regiment's remainders and in the center their advance had notably delaied by Ungarian Muzsay combat team, They, on the contrary, managed to reach with their avangards the Woltschje's village, towards South-West. But, just here and in the Krutez's village, they engaged two German battalions of 77^th Infantry Regiment of 26^th Infantry Division belonging to Cramer Korps, that had just arrived and they had to stop. During all the night Russians and Germans fought at Krutez and finally Germans managed to block Russians, thanks to the artillery's arrive. At Woltschj, Russian 161^st Fusiliers Division and 309^th Fusiliers Division managed to seize the village.

On January 15^th , The Russian drive reached Kolibella - Chrestiki - Koski line, but the resistence of Ungarian 19^th Light Division's elements and remainders of the smashed 12^th Light Division prevented further exploit. Thanks to German 26^th Infantry Division's arrival, it seemed that the Russian XVIIIth Indipendent Corps's drive had finished, but on January 16^th the situation changed.

On January 16^th , Russian 40^th Army managed the Ungarian Front's breackthrough with its 340^th Fusiliers Division and 25^th Guard Fusiliers Division, that headed towards South-West, with 150^th Armored Brigade that pointed from Ostrogoshsk towards rears. At this moment the Ungarian units began to withdraw, in a not co-ordinate way. After a series of arguments between Gen. Jàny, Ungarian Army's commander, and Gen. Cramer, the last had decide to launch his counterattack towards North, along the road coming from Rossoch, with the hope of blocking the armored attacks. However, the German 26^th Infantry Division's counterattacks from Wolschj and those of Ungarian 1^st Armored Division from Arki had blocked and they didn't porsue. On the contrary, Russians counterattacked and the same evening, the already wasted German 77^th Infantry Regiment of 26^th Infantry Division started evacuation from Wolschj, opening in this way the route to Russian attacks on the Italian Alpine Corps’ rear. Moreover, the right wing of Ungarian 1^st Armored Division, that had held till to Don by Ungarian 13^th Infantry Regiment, suddenly mained open because this unit had a total scattering, opening so the encirclement’s way to Russian 219^th Fusiliers Division and 96^th Armored Brigade. These units so could follow the Don river and came in on the rear of Ungarian VII Corps towards the Alpini's positions.

On January 17^th , Russian 107^th Fusiliers Division reached Ostrogoshsk, when to Italian Alpine Corps had been permitted to withdraw, linking with Russian XVIII Indipendent Corps that came from other bridgehead.

On January 18^th , Russian XVth Armored Corps of 3^rd Armored Army, coming from south, that meanwhile had brockenthrough the XXIVth Panzer Korps's front, met near Alexejewka (making a larger turn than that of XIIth Armored Corps) the 40^th Army's body. At this time, 40^th Army started to create the esternal encirclement line, using two Divisions and 1 Infantry Brigade, continuing the barrage created souther by VIIth Cavalry Corps along Waluiki - Rossoschka - Istobnoje - Karajeschnik - Krestjanski -Chemelejowe line.

The state in the Ungarian Army's sector was heaviest, that its commander, Gen. Jàny addressed to B Army Group Command an incontrovertible question: non lather of hours 20.00 of this day or Headquartiers gave him the withdraw's order for Ungarian VIIth Corps and for 1^st Armored Division or he had act by his own initiative.

In the evening of January 18^th Cramer Corps began to withdraw towards Kamenka to gather and then to attack towards Ostrgoshsk, in accord to the OKH' orders, issued by B Army Group, to block the Russian exploiting in the army rear, by a lateral attack. It was clear that Russians had forces far by far superior to the B Army Group's reserves and that the Axis positions on the Don River didn't defensible for long time. In fact, in front of positions held by the Italian "Vicenza"Infantry Division and by Ungarian 23^rd Infantry Division, some Russian fixing attacks had been, but they had failed. Already, Ungarianl VIIth Corps, after the 12^th Infantry Division's shattering, the 13^th Infantry Regiment's disappear, had only 23^rd Infantry Division and 1 regiment (43^rd Infantry Regiment) of 19^th Infantry Divivision. But, above all, its faith had signed, because Cramer Corps had moved, by upper orders, in the Ostrogoshsk area for a possible use towards Rossoch and therefore couldn't cover the Ungarian VIIth Corps' withdraw.

The XXIVth Panzer Korps breackthrough.

Also on January 14^th 1943 the attack against XXIVth Panzer Korps' lines started, on the front held by Fegelein Group and by the 27^th Panzer Division's Fuhrer Begleit Battalion. Thanks to the fog, Russian tanks and infantry filtered in the German line and at hours 14.30, they had penetrated with about 20-30 tanks, that continued towards North, mantaining at west of railway. However discovered, they didn't have attacked, because there weren't Axis’available reserves. The Korps' command only ordered a front's shortening to obtain as reserves German 385^th Infantry Division and ordered to German 320^th Infantry Division to prepare a task force to move to Nowo Markowka. It also ordered to 19^th Panzer Division to attack on the flank the enemy advancing, but this division had already too pressed by Russian. This request then had shifted to B Army Group, together the request to withdraw XXIVth Pz. Korps towards Rossoch. Menawhile, in the evening, a part of German 387^th Infantry Division had been encircled together Fuhrer Begleit Batallion and Fegelein Brigade.

The same evening, about hours 20.00, Gen. Nasci, Italian Alpine Corps' commander, in very vague terms had been informed by Gen. Schlemmer about Russian penetration. In the same evening, also Italian 8^th Army's command issued order that foresaw the 19^th Panzer Division's and 320^th Infantry Division,s attack, but clearly understimating enemy's strenght and intentions. However, the breackthrough's seriousness was not clear to the same XXIVth Panzer Korps' command; in fact,in the same evening, Russian tanks and infantry by surprise fell on XXIVth Panzer Korps' tactic headquartiers at Shilin. Commander, Lt. Gen. Martin Wandel, unconscious went to meet Russians. From this sudden attack only the Staff Chief, Col. Heidkamper, the O5 Lt. Hans Koch, Lt. Melms and Intelligence officer, May. von Platen escaped. Losses ammounted to 10 officers and 68 noncom and men. All were shotted on the village's square.

On January 15^th , the situation became serious also for Italian Alpine Corps, because at hours 05.30 about 20 Russian tanks with mounted infantry entried in Rossoch, carring a full surprise. Thanks to headquartiers men, but over all to Monte Cervino Alpine Battalion, to two German selpropelled guns and to Stukas, 12 Russian tanks had knocked out and others withdrew. 40 Russian soldiers had made prisoniers and too much killed in battle. At this time, the situation seemed serious to same Gen. Gariboldi, that asked B Army Group's Command for move back the Italian 8^th Army in harmony with Ungarian 2^nd Army. Meanwhile, in the morning of same day Russian tanks had reached Alexejewka.

Gen. Gariboldi had two meetings with Gen Tippelkirch to obtain the XXIVth Panzer Korps' withdraw on the Kalitwa River, but B Army Group, consulted, didn't authorize this move. In the evening, on the contrary the B Army Group's command accepted the request, but Gen. Gariboldi on his own initiative had already issued it. To the Gen. Nasci and his Alpine Corps arrived a radiotelegram.

Meanwhile, at XXIVth Panzer Korps, whose command had been taken by Gen. Eibl, there was a great alarm, because believed that Alpine Corps Command had ordered to withdraw to its own divisions. However, XXIVth Panzer Korps started his move towards the Kalitwa River at hours 20.00 of January 15th. In the same hours Cramer Corps, at north of Italian Alpine Corps, started a counterattack against Russian, but it failed.

On January 16^th the XXIVth Panzer Korps' withdrawal continued, but other news of breackthrough in the south and in the north continued to arrive. During this day Russians launched theyr XII Armored Corps against Rossoch, that in evening fell in Russian hands, with heavy losses of Italian Monte Cervino Battalion,the 1^st Alpini Regiment's Reserve Battalion, XXXth Alpine Engenners Batttalion, and a battalion of Vicenza Infantry Division. At hours 20.00, Gen. Nasci met Gen. Eibl, who confirmed the seriousness of the situation also because the German troops were in a bad way by numbers and without ammunition. These soldiers couldn't esecute the German General Tippelkirch's order: "Eibl Group dislink from enemy and in accord to alpine Corps and breckthrouh towards W or SW near Rossoch".

On January 17^th , however, XXIVth Panzer Korps actually tried to seize Rossoch, but failed and therefore, during the withdrawal its columns mixed with those of Italian Alpine Corps that withdrew, often creating some problems of co-ordination and some conflicts among parts. Well, also if Rossoch had been seized by Russians of Armored Brigade, it had arrived very wasted, but in compensation Russian XVth Corps ran at full speed to complete the external encirclement, passing through Olichowatka and arriving in the evening to Kudeschowka - Marjewka.

At hours 17.30 of this day, Italian 8^th Army'Command dispatched to Alpine Corps order to hold on the Don River, giving to Gen. Nasci the responsibily for its respect. To this order, clearly impossible to esecute, and moreover issued when the Northern wing, formed by Ungarian Army, was dissolving, had been ascribed the disaster and the break up's responsibility in whom Italian Alpine Corps incurred in the pocket. It need say, however, that already on January 16^th a such order had arrived to Gen. Jàny by Field Marshal Von Weichs, to held on Don River to permit German reinforcements' arrival. This was the same order that Italian 8^th Army's command had given to Alpin Corps. It is clear, was the stubborn decision of Hitler to refuse of manoeuvring or falling back, that will be the cause of all the disaster. In fact this order pointed to hold a defensive line towards East, when Russian tanks of over two armored corps already ran in depht in the rear of Axis' divisions marshalled on The Don River, that were, pratically encercled. Perhaps German Command seemed convinced that the XXIVth Panzer Korps' strength was much greater than that actual, or it had underconsidered the Russian attack.

Gen Sokolov's VIIth Cavalry Corps could quietly head for Waluiki town, where 'll come in on January 19^th , attacking in the same day the town.

On alpine front Russian attacked in force on January 15^th , 16^th , 17^th Vestone and Edolo Battalions of Tridentina Alpine Division; only Vestone Battalion had 800 dead in fronts of its line, on January 15^th , when had attacked for much than six times.

On January 17^th , while Cramer Corps was returning on its starting positions and Russians already blocked the withdrawal's directrix of Alpine Corps, German Gen. Jàhr ordered to German 385^th Infantry Division and to German 387^th Infantry Division to attack Rossoch, but failed. But the scattered German forces reconquested the eastern part of railway (it was the famous Col. Mielke's 318^th Grenadier Regiment). However, the Rossoch depots, especially the fuel's depots, fell in Soviet's hands, who counterattacked also with tanks, thanks to 48^th

Guard Fusiliers Division and 180^th Fusiliers Division.

The Alpine corps' Ungarian flank.

On January 17^th , at hours 03.00, Gen. Nasci understood by German laison officer at Tridentina Alpine Division that Ungarian VIIth Corps had received the withdrawal's order. He waited for his withdrawal's order, but, on the contrary, at hours 09.00, he received the order to hold on the Don River with the whole Alpine Corps. Finally, after two hours, he received by radio from Italian 8^th Army's Headquartiers the permit to withdraw his troops.

During this night, the withdrawal of the three Ungarian surviving regiment started. They were 43^rd (19^th Division), 21^st and 51^st (23^rd Division). 21^st Infantry Regiment meet strong partisans' element (about 400) and it had open its way fighting and turning towards South, where it found the Tridentina Alpine Division' soldiers. Sister regiment of Ungarian 23^rd Infantry Division, because of the hasty withdrawal from Kamenka by German 77^th Infantry Regiment, had destroied by Russian XVIIIth Corps' tanks that were attacking from North on the road heading to Rossoch.

It was clear che the situation of Italian Army's northern flank was throwing and this worried all Italian commands. In fact only Cramer Corps, that was enough far away from Don River, was withdrawing with order.

Ungarians informed Tridentina Alpine Division about their own witdrawal, in accord with Alpine Corps, also if officers sendt by Gen. Nasci reached Ungarian Corps only at hours 15.00 of January 17^th at Karpenkowo and from there they informed Gen Reverberi about happened Ungarian withdrawal. Their meeting with Ungarian VIIth Corps' Commander, Gen. Legeza happened the next morning at Budiennj, about 100 kilometrs at West of Don River, far away from fightings.

The Alpine Corps' withdrawal happened by Gen. Gariboldi's order, that next day B Army Group's Command denied with its "Army Group's order". It's clear that the delay in the withdrawal's order for Alpine Corps, also if attributed to Hitler's intentions and also B Army Group's command to gain time and to carry out to Eastern Front reserves comind from far away France, had been also originated by XXIVth Panzer Korps's pressure on the Alpine Corps' command, in the fear to main alone to withdraw. But of German corps was also part Julia Alpine Division, that just to cover the German corps' withdrawal crossed Kalitwa River only in the morning of January 17^th (the withdrawal's order was of hours 12.00 on January 16^th ), that's just in time to follow the withdrawal, while Tolmezzo Alpine Battalion held on other rivers's bank as rearguard, fighting for a whole day and lossing at the end half of its men of two companies ( 12^th and 72th ), while its 6^th company had to open its way fighting with bayonets.

The poor organization that had characterized the Italian troops' withdrawal in the last December seemed to can avoid by Alpine Corps' command by arrangement till from January of a withdrawal's notice. The esecutif withdrawal's order had issued by Gen. Nasci by phone between hours 11.00 and 11.30 on January 17^th , order directed to subsidiary divisions and confirmed byhis phonogram at hours 12.30. This order trasmitted by Gen. Martinat had received by Tridentina's Commander, by Vicenza's Staff Chief and by Cuneense's Commander. In this order had been indicated the next held positions and the move sectors for the units, to avoid dangerous mixes. But the order's limit was that the move began when Russians already held in the corps' largest logistic base and along the Armeestrasse, that is the Italian army's retreat road. Moreover, to three Cops' divisions soon joined German divisions' and Julia remainders.

For luck of Italian and German troops also the Russian situation didn't seem so easy, for fuel lack, that Russian found at Rossoch, and for wearing by XII Armored Corps. In fact, its 106^th Armored Brigade couldnot attack towards Postojalli. This thanks to XXIVth Panzer Korps' stubborn resistance at south of the Kalitwa River, but also for mistake to attack the town of Rossoch with tanks, that caused to Russians a wearing of their strenghth and a delay of march time. Howover, the XXIVth Panzer Korps' divisions and Julia withdrawing could outflank Rossoch towards north, to turn at left towards West. The remanider part of Russian XIIth Armored Corps, meanwhile, with its body pointed on Ostrogshsk, while Russian XVth Armored Corps already was at Sheljiakino and pointed towards north, with Alexejewka as its target.

At NorthWest of Rossoch it happened the great mistake of the confluence into the Cuneense Alpine Division's columns of the Julia Alpine Division and of German units. This move had been agreed by German Gen.Eibl and Italianl Gen Battisti, with the result that only Tridentina Alpine Division managed to well get out from, while for others units the situation became more and more chaotic. The problem now was that the Gen. Nasci's hypothesis, worded before the withdrawal and trasmitted to subordinated division's commanders weren't good because the enemy's presence, while the routes followed by German corps now intersected those of Italian divisions, increasing their march's problems.

At hours 23.15 on January 17^th , while alpine troops started towards West, it came in by courier, to Italian 8^th Army headquartiers the B Army Group's order issuing that Italian Alpine Coprs had been hold on the Don River to cover the action on Rowenki by German XXIVth Panzer Korps. This order was ignored because clearly not carried out, just as it happened for the Ungarian Army. At in the beginning of this order, sure there was OKH (that's Hitler), but B Army Group's Command, didn't feel to ignore it and therefore trasmitted it. In the night of January 18^th the temperature farther fell, arriving to 45degrees C under Zero.

During this night German XXIVth Panzer Korps marched on two columns towards North, whose one, that Germans called Gruppe Jahr, joined Italian alpine divisions, that's Julia and Cuneense, The last, That of Gen. Eibl, ran a large turn towards North to reach Postojalyi. At 30 Kilometrs norther Russian tanks, already crossed through this village, waited on the road the withdrawing German 23^rd Infantry Division and little by little that it passed they pulled to pieces.

On January 18^th , all divisions marched to cross the valley where the Rollbahn ran from Rossoch trough Podgonoje and took to Kamenka. At hours 10.00 Gen. Nasci issued Operation Order n. 2, that was an clear agreement with German Geb. Eibl. This order issued that units continued their march towards West with a strong defence directed towards Rossoch, where all Russian infantry and part of XIIth Armored Corps mained.

Meanwhile, Tridentina Alpine Division was forward, because more free to move and on January 19^th it became to fight to open its way. In this turn, 6^th Alpine Regiment( Vestone, Verona, Val Chiese Battalions) covered the right flank of withdrawing Alpine Corps, meeting a hard and increasing resistance in front of both march columns. The crossing area was a Russian march directix, and therefore, the resistance soon seemed better organized. The roads from Rossoch had defended by Italian Julia and Cuneense Divisions and by German Gen. Jahr's 387^th Infantry Division. All these units had continuosly attacked by Russians coming by Rossoch and they suffered heavy losses.

On Jaunary 20^th , at hours 07.00, Alpine Corps and XXIVth Panzer Korps's Headquartiers had benn attacked at Opyt, missing all command vehicles and all radio sets available, except German 385^th Infantry Division's radio set.

The Opyt fightings' importance is not for losses, also heavy and in the delay caused to withdrawal's move, but in the result that all radio set of Alpine Corps' Headquartiers had destroyed, so from this moment it was impossible to broadcast with other divisions and a little less to broadcast out the pocket. Luckily, the German 385^th Infantry Division's radio set saved, but this fact made the big Italian corps still more dipendent by few German means on the place.

It needs to say that no security position of Alpine Corps, except the rearguard that had a couple of 75 mm. antitank guns, was able to block a tank assault. The Russian barrage formed by march directrix of Russian XIIth Armored Corps had crossed easily by Tridentina Alpine Division, while Vicenza Infantry Division arrived to Samoilenkoff, without big problems, because it was in a central position in that bottleneck between Popowka- Podgornoje. On the contrary, Italian Cuneense and Julia alpine Divisions, and German Jahr Gruppe suffered all the strenght of Russian units gathered in the Rossoch area. Received by Italian 8^th Army Command a message that authorized to continue towrds NothWest rather than SouthWest, the units'i commanders got ready to force the barrage formed by a long spur, transversal to their move, marked by Kopanki and Nowo Postojalowka villages. First Julia Alpine Division move towards West with its 8^th Regiment in first echelon, while its sister regiment, 9^th Alpine Regiment mained as second echelon. At Nowo Postojalowka, 8^th Regiment tried along all the day to open its way towards West by its scattered Gemona, Tolmezzo and Cividale Battalions, but in vain. Cuneense Alpine Division, that moved next about hours 17.00, arrived in this area at dusk and in the next mornig took part to fightings with its. Ceva and Mondovì Battalions. Now in the area also had arrived Julia Alpine Division's Headquartiers and 3^rd Engeneers Battalion. These bloody and continuated fightings marked the end of Julia and Cuneense, as fighting units. Few Russian tanks managed not only to held Nowo Postojalowka, but also to counterattack and impunitly to play havoc with Italian soldiers. In fact, the 75 mm. Howitzer's EP shelling of Alpine Artillery showed their whole ineffectiveness. At dusk, the only passable way to avoid obstacle, was disengage from enemy heading towards North, with the Dronero Battalion of 2^nd Alpine Regiment alone as effectiveness detechment. The pride and reitered attacks of alpinis and the Russian armored counterattacks caused in fact the formal shattering of the two divisions, because also 9^th Regiment of Julia Division, held as rearguard in the Popowka area suffered several russian attcks that caused heavy losses, but it prevented that Russians coming from Rossoch to fall on the rear of units committed at Nowo Postojalowka. In the evening, also 9^th Alpine Regiment approached the barrage a little souther of Nowo Postojalowka, at Kopankim with its three Battalions L'Aquila, Val Cismon, and Vicenza. With the artillery support by Udine e Val Piave Groups and the Nowo Postojalowka script repeated. Only in the night, a last, hopeless attack of Vicenza Battalion bent Russian resistance, but the conquered hamlet by a so expansive price couldn't be held. So, also 9^th Alpine Regiment's remainders headed towards North. Meanwhile, German Jahr Group, had crossed the barrage during the night of January 20^th , near Sowchose Lessitchanskijm village, that's norther of strong obstacle that was wiping out Italian soldiers. This Group that gathered the remainders of Fuhrer Begleit Battalion and of SS Fegelein Division, plus 387^th Infantry Division's elements, had a dreary end at Nowo Postojalowka. Russians had managed to found the German column near Nowaja Postojalowka. They hardly attacked, succeding to destroy almost fully the German troops. Gen. Jahr trew with several hundreds men towards Sowchose Lenissnitschansckij, but he ended aginst a Russian tanks barrage. Before to be taken prisonier, he shot himself.

From this moment, The withdrawal's paths of all divisions joined to Tridentina Alpine Division's route and of German selfpropelled guns. But Julia Alpine Division's regiments had encircled: at Lessnitschanskij the 9^th Regiment, but the Division's Headquartiers managed to cross the barrage, and at Nowo Georgiewskij the 8^th Regiment. Both the sister regiments had destroied as fighting units together the 3^rd Alpine Artillery Regiment's groups. Also the Division's remainders passed through Nowo Charkovka, but Tridentina Alpine Division had already open its way fighting, and from there all divisions passed. Vicenza Infantry Division followed Tridentina Alpine Division, at the head Pieve di Teco Battalion of Cuneense Alpine Division and two German selfpropelled guns. The same happened for Cuneense Alpine Division's remainders, about 7,000 men that bore rearguard fightings. Tridentina Division could count on the support of four German selpropelled guns and on XXIVth Panzers Korps' radio links and therefore also on German air reconnaissance.

The main column, formed by XXIVth Panzer Korps and Alpine Corps' shattered Headquartiers, by Tridentina Alpine Division, by German heavy weapons, and by German division's trains and sleds and in addiction a numberless tail of shattered men, headed quickly after the Postojalli seizure till Nowo Charkowka. This village had reached in the late afternoon on January 20^th and had seized in the same evening, against the resistance of about two Russian battalions by Val Chiese and Vestone Battalions, supported by Bergamo and Vicenza Alpine Artillery Groups and by German selpropelled guns, with a so brilliant action that any Russian soldier could run away.

While it was fighting at Nowo Chrkowka, Gen. Eibl, who was at the end of column with rearguard, tried to climb up the column on a half-track, sitting upper a mudguard. He wished that column advanced most quickly and he cried out "go on!!": At hours 04.30 Genereal had wounded by a bomb’s busting. About his death there are several accounts. For a few had been a trumple up mine to wound Gen. Ebl, for others the reason is unknown. Gen. Nasci’s version told about a unexploded bomb, while Col. Heidkamper referred that had been an Italian granade to wound him. Italian reporter Corradi told that nobody helped him, but 5th Health Section’s Doctor, Lt. Adelfo Crosta soon operated together his fellow-worker Lt. Aldeghi of 5^th Alpine Regiment Headquartiers Company, but couldn’t much, because they were lacking even of morphine. In doctor’s opinion the wound had been caused by a large sliver, that excludes the granade. Moreover, 5^th Alpine Regiment Commander, Col. Adami, referred in that situation about several losses caused by casual enemy shelling of artillery and mortars that fell on the column from surrounding hills. But Germans mained persuaded of Italian responsability, at point that Gen. Schmundt, Hitler’s Wehrmacht adviser, carried out a search about details of Gen. Eibl’s death. Col Heidkamper, meanwhile become 3^rd Panzer Army Staff Chief, closed his report saing that, for him, the busting was of an Italian granade. In every way, Gen Eibl had be amputate his leg and at hours 18.45 on January 21^st , after confessed, he died. However, it was a great loss for withdrawing armies, because Gen Eibl had been a very good officer that had well worked with Julia Alpine Division in the fightings made by this division together German 385^th Infantry Division in the Kalitwa plain.

On January 21^st , at hours 01.00, column retook its march and came in at Krazowka that had to be conquered, to continue towards Lymoriwka. In that envening an important radiomessage arrived to XXIVth Panzer Korps, that the mouth of the pocket wasn’t now Waluiki, but Nikitovka, norther. Gen. Nasci than decided didn’t follow the road forwards Warwarowka and ordered to head for Scheljiakino, that had reached on January 22nd and forced by 6^th Alpine Regiment with German selpropelled guns and heavy weapons, putting back a Russian counterattack. So it had also broketrough the barrage on the Russian XVth Armored Corps’ penetration way, that through Olchowatka- Warwarowka road had reached Alexejewka. Because all comunications had been interrupted, it had been need also advise orher divisions about the move’s change, but this didn’t make nor by Alpine Corps, nor by Italian 8^th Army. Gen Nasci met at Ladomirowka Col. Moro who noticed him that in the Scheljiakino area there was also Cuneense Alpine Division’s commander, Gen. Battisti, therefore he believed that also Cuneense Alpine Division followed the Tridentina,’ way.

At this point Gen. Nasci decided a large turn towards South before to head on his final target, the Nikitowka area. In its way towards NorthWest The avangard had forced, after a short fighting at Nikolajewka, also the Malakejewka village, on January 24^th, in the middle of snowstorm, where two German selfpropelled guns had damaged. Here the fighting had been successed thanks to Val Chiese and Vestone of Tridentina Alpine Division. The last battalion outflanked Russian to prevent that they avoided. On January 25^th Nikitowka had reached and had seized against a light enemy resistance. During this day B Army Group sent a Storch aircraft that took news and maps. It was als a dropping of supply. The column’s avangard ( 6^th Alpine Regiment) went forwards and passed the night at Arnautowo and Tereschow. The pocket’s exit was near to come in.

The B Army Group dissolves.

Meanwhile, B Army Group Commander, Gen. Von Weichs reported to Hitler about military situation on his front, that with men and materials losses couldn’t to be defended. The problem now was how cover the north flank of Don Army Group to avoid the accomplishment of Russian strategic target to outflank whole Axis’ southern front. In withdrawal’s case, therefore, it needed withdraw towards SouthWest with front’s right wing. In fact, all available units were Cramer corps, that’s a force of about an Infantry division, plus Grossdeutschland Armored Division, tha was unloading by trains and in few days an Italian German mixted division. Moreover, the German 2^nd Army’s situation, desplaced at north of Ungarian Army, eroused heavy worry because it had almost encircled and Gen. von Weichts did’nt know if it had witrdrew managed to exit from pocket without heavy losses.

About the end of January IInd SS Panzer Korps’ first units began to come in.

The withdrawal of Alpine Corps’ other units.

The Italian Vicenza Infantry Divison, under command of Gen. Pascolini, in the night of January 23th headed towards Warwarovka, along the barrage created by Russian XVth Armored Corps, with a detachment of Morbegno Alpine Battalion of Tridentina Division. But this division had forced by strong Russian resistance to turn back. Maining its target Waluiki, division’s remainders arrived about hours 13.00 on January 26^th in front of Russian VIIth Cavalry Corps, that was waiting them from a week arraied along the railway. This happened, ironically, after that Vicenza Division had crossed the Tridentina Alpine Division’s route at Malakejewka.

Also Cuneense Alpine Division’s body arrived at Waluiki , convinced that this was the pocket’s exit. Some distant groups, for example an Italian German mixed column, that received a message by a German laison aircraft headed towards Nikolajewka, managed avoid the bitter fate of this division. The routes of these detachments often had more and more off road to avoid Russian armored barrages. But Russians followed these units’ march by air reconnaissance and therefore was enable to attack, shifting their forces on the roads controlled where it was necessary.

Between January 26^th and 28^th withdrawing Italian divisions came in in front of the barrages that Russian VIIth Cavalry Corps, become VI Guard Corps for its success and Moskalenko’s 40^th Army had stretched on the rear of Italian and Ungarian armies. After have marched for 250 kilometers, in the tall snow, with extremly cold temperatures, without regular feeding, Italian Cunneense and Vicenza Division, plus Julia’s remainders, at hours 17.00 were to had cross a strong barrage, whose nothing did know. At Wailuki they lacked of their heawy weapons because they had left in the snow during the march, except few mortars or 47/32 mm. Guns. Ammunition shortened. In a typical Kriegspeel did’nt foresee that these units could be in activity.

The conclusion was inevitable, because coming in Waluiki they believed to can cross the Russian barrage. The Pieve di Teco Battalion’s last drive on January 26^th ,( the battalion was Vicenza Division’s avangard), was also epic, but it couldn’t change the forces ratios. Vicenza Infantry Division’s remainders had taken prisioniers together their commander. In the next two days Julia Alpine Division and Cuneense Alpine Division Headquarteris had taken prisoniers, plus a part of this last division, pratically 2^nd Alpini Regiment’remainders and a part of 4^th Mountan Artillery Regiment. Other column, that of 1^st Alpine Regiment, with Mondovì and Val Po Battalions’ remainders, that had alwaiys marched by its own and had separated from unit’s body, arrived southern, where its men ended prisoniers or killed in action. Also their stubborn resistance tried against cossack cavalry, didn’t can endure nbecause ammunitions’ shortage.

The things went better for the norther column, that of Tridentina Alpine Division, because leaded by air reconnoissance, it came out between the position of Russian VIIth Cavalry Corps and 40^th Army, that’s where the Russian encirclement was weaker. But, just at hours 00.00 Italian avanguard situated in Arnatowo village, formed by 253^rd Company of ValChiese Battalion and by 33^rd Bactery of Bergamo Mountain Artillery Group had been attacked by Russians, who wished to separate the Tridentina column from its vanguard. Russians had pushed back only after the whole night of fightings thanks to 5^th Alpine Regiment and to other artillery groups, and the only IInd Battalion/71^st Artillery Detachment.

The Nikolajewka attack began at hours 10.00 of next morning with a only part of 6^th Alpine Regiment, while 5^th Alpine Regiment’s battalions and artillery hadn’t arrived; therefore it blocked. Most late Alpine battalions entried in the village but had to strongly fighting to avoid to be overwhelmed. The artillery support was too poor, being limited to few 47/32 pieces; the mainig two German selpropelled guns, after the damage of other two at Malkejewka, stopped when found in front of an antitank barrage and a gun had damaged. When Tridentina Division Headquartiers and Gen. Nasci, arrived and also 5^th Alpine Regiment’s remainders the commander of Tridentina, Gen. Reverberi disposed Vicenza Mountain Artillery Group and II/71^st Artillery Detachment and most late Val Camonica Mountain Artillery Group, and rinforced the attack with 5^th Alpine Regiment’s remainders.

Of a initial force formed by 55,000 men, plus Vicenza Infantry Division and other smaller detachments as Horse Artillery, that were together Alpine Corps, that’s about 70,000 men, only 27,500 came out from the pocked, minus than 40 per cent. Losses ammounte abaut 40,000 men. Russian had claimed that with Ostrogoshsk-Rossoch Operation they took 86,000 prisoniers. Of whom Gen. Moskalenko told 71,000 by his men . It seems logical thought that 15-20.000 were alpinis ( at Waluiki 11,000 tell Kazakov, Voronesh Front Staff Chief), with a high per cent of wounded. Italian killed in action were specially in the long fightings for Nowo Postojalowka and Kopanki, for distruction of Julia’s remainders and finally for cold, tiredness and flus.

For german we know that XXIVth Panzer Korps had about 10,000 men, but it’s difficuld say how many had saved. Gen. Nasci told about 8-9.000, but on February 13^th the German force reported only 3,239 men. But of these 713 had just arrived from Germany, therefore it mains only 2,526 men to whom had summed the wounded. Of wounded we know that about 3-4000 men had saved.

In each case on March 14^th German 385^th Infantry Division has disbanded. And only joining the three divisions’ remainders, that’s 387^th , 385^th and 298th German Headquartiers managed to form a new 387^th Infantry Division.