Answering
Arguments for Abortion Rights
Part Three –
Is The Unborn Human Less Than Human?
by Francis J. Beckwith
Christian
Research Journal, Spring, 1991, Page 8.
Realizing that
many popular arguments for abortion rights -- such as some of the ones found in
the first two installments in this series -- have little logical merit, many
philosophers, ethicists, and theologians have presented more sophisticated
arguments for abortion rights. These radical and moderate pro-choice thinkers
agree with pro-life advocates that the abortion debate rests on the moral
status of the unborn: if the unborn are fully human, then nearly every abortion
performed is tantamount to murder. They argue, however, that although the
unborn entity is human, insofar as belonging to the species homo
sapiens, it is not a person and hence not fully human.
Those who argue
in this fashion defend either a decisive moment or gradualist approach to the
status of the unborn. Those who defend a decisive
moment view argue that, although human life does begin at the moment of
conception, it is at some later stage in the unborn human's development that it
becomes worthy of our protection. It is at this moment that it becomes a person.
Other
philosophers take a gradualist
position and argue that the unborn human gradually gains more rights as it
develops. Hence, a zygote has less rights than a
6-month-old fetus, but this fetus has less rights than an adult woman.
In order to understand
decisive moment and gradualist theories, it is important that we carefully go
over the biological facts of fetal development. In this third installment of my
four-part series I will cover the facts of fetal development and some decisive
moment theories. In Part Four I will critique some
more decisive moment theories and the gradualist view, concluding with
responses to common questions asked about the pro-life view that full humanness
begins at conception.
LIFE BEGINNING AT CONCEPTION AND THE FACTS OF
PRE-NATAL DEVELOPMENT [1]
While going
over the facts of prenatal development I will present the case for the pro-life
view that full humanness begins at conception. I will deal with objections to
this view when I critique the decisive moment and gradualist views in both this
article and the final part of this series.
First Month
Pregnancy
begins at conception, the time at
which the male sperm and the female ovum unite. What results is called a zygote, a one-celled biological entity,
a stage in human development through which each of us has passed (just as we
have passed through infancy, childhood, and adolescence). It is a misnomer to
refer to this entity as a "fertilized ovum." For both ovum and sperm,
which are genetically each a part of its owner (mother and father,
respectively), cease to exist at the moment of conception. There is no doubt
that the zygote is biologically
alive. It fulfills the four criteria needed to establish biological life: (1)
metabolism, (2) growth, (3) reaction to stimuli, and (4) reproduction. (There
is cell reproduction and twinning, a
form of asexual reproduction, which can occur after conception. For more on
twinning, see below.) But is this
life fully human? I believe that the
facts clearly reveal that it is.
First, the human conceptus
-- that which results from conception annd begins as a zygote -- is the sexual product of human parents. Hence, insofar as having human causes, the conceptus is human.
Second, not
only is the conceptus human insofar as being caused
by humans, it is a unique human individual, just as each of us is. Resulting
from the union of the female ovum (which contains 23 chromosomes) and the male
sperm (which contains 23 chromosomes), the conceptus
is a new -- although tiny -- individual. It has its own unique genetic code (with forty-six chromosomes), which is neither
the mother's nor the father's. From this point until death, no new genetic information is needed to
make the unborn entity a unique individual human. Her (or his) genetic make-up
is established at conception, determining her unique individual physical
characteristics -- gender, eye color, bone structure, hair color, skin color,
susceptibility to certain diseases, etc. That is to say, at conception, the
"genotype" -- the inherited characteristics of a unique human being
-- is established and will remain in forrce for the entire life of this
individual. Although sharing the same nature with all human beings, the unborn
individual, like each one of us, is unlike any that has been conceived before
and unlike any that will ever be conceived again. The only thing necessary for
the growth and development of this human organism (as with the rest of us) is
oxygen, food, and water, since this organism -- like the newborn, the infant,
and the adolescent -- needs only to develop in accordance with her
already-designed nature that is present at conception.
This is why
French geneticist Jermoe L. LeJeune,
while testifying before a Senate Subcommittee, asserted: "To accept the
fact that after fertilization has taken place a new human has come into being
is no longer a matter of taste or opinion. The human nature of the human being
from conception to old age is not a metaphysical contention, it is plain
experimental evidence." [2]
There is hence
no doubt that the development of a unique individual human life begins at
conception. It is vital that you -- the reader -- understand that you did not come from a zygote, you once were a zygote; you did not come from an embryo, you once were an embryo; you did not come from a fetus, you once were a fetus; you did not come from an adolescent, you once were an adolescent. Consequently,
each one of us has experienced these various developmental stages of life. None
of these stages, however, imparted to us our humanity.
Within one week
after conception, implantation
occurs -- the time at which the conceptus
"nests" or implants in her mother's uterus. During this time, and
possibly up to fourteen days after conception, [3] a
splitting of the conceptus may occur resulting in the
creation of identical twins. In some instances the two concepti
may recombine and become one conceptus. (I will
respond below to the argument that the possibility of the conceptus
twinning and the subsequent concepti recombining
refutes the pro-life claim that full humanness begins at conception.) At about
three weeks, a primitive heart muscle begins to pulsate. Other organs begin to
develop during the first month, such as a liver, primitive
kidneys, a digestive tract, and a simple umbilical cord. This developing
body has a head and a developing face with primitive ears, mouth, and eyes,
despite the fact that it is no larger than half the size of a pea. Toward the
end of the first month (between 26 and 28 days) the arms and legs begin to
appear as tiny buds. A whole embryo is formed by the end of the first month.
From the
eighteenth day after conception, substantial development of the brain and
nervous system occurs.
·
This is
necessary because the nervous system integrates the action of all the other
systems. By the end of the twentieth day the foundation of the child's brain,
spinal cord, and entire nervous system will have been established. By the sixth
week, this system will have developed so well that it is controlling movements
of the baby's muscles, even though the woman may not be aware she is pregnant.
At thirty days the primary brain is seen. By the thirty-third day the cerebral
cortex, the part of the central nervous system which governs motor activity as
well as intellect, may be seen. [4]
Second Month
Despite its
small size, the unborn child by the beginning of the second month looks distinctly "human"
(although -- as this article maintains -- it is human from conception). At this point it is highly likely that
the mother does not even know she is pregnant. Brain waves can be detected in
the unborn at about forty to forty-three days after conception. During the
second month, the eyes, ears, nose, toes, and fingers make their appearance;
the skeleton develops; the heart beats; and the blood -- with its own type --
flows. The unborn at this time has reflexes and her lips become sensitive to
touch. By the eighth week her own unique fingerprints start to form, along with
the lines in her hands.
A vast majority
of abortions are performed during this time, despite the scientific facts which
clearly show that an individual human life is developing, as it would after
birth, from infant to child to adolescent to adult.
In an important
article, Professor John T. Noonan argues that it is reasonable to infer that
toward the end of the second month of pregnancy the unborn has the ability to
feel pain. [5] It is crucial to remember that the
end of the second month (7 to 8 1/2 weeks) is in the first trimester, a time at
which a great majority of abortions are performed and at which the Supreme
Court said a state may not prohibit abortions performed by a licensed
practitioner. From the facts of brain and nerve development, the pained
expressions on the faces of aborted fetuses, the known ability to experience
other sensations at this time, and the current methods by which abortions are
performed, Noonan concludes from his research that as soon as a pain mechanism
is present in the fetus -- possibly as early as day 56 -- the methods used will
cause pain. The pain is more substantial and lasts longer the later the
abortion is. It is most severe and lasts the longest when the method is saline
poisoning.
Whatever the
method used, the unborn are experiencing the greatest of bodily evils, the
ending of their lives. They are undergoing the death agony. However
inarticulate, however slight their cognitive powers, however rudimentary their
sensations, they are sentient creatures undergoing the disintegration of their
being and the termination of their vital capabilities. That experience is
painful in itself. [6]
Third Month
Movement is
what characterizes the third month of pregnancy. Although she weighs only one
ounce and is comparable in size to a goose egg, the unborn begins to swallow,
squint, and swim, grasp with her hands, and move her tongue. She also sucks her
thumb. Her organs undergo further development. The salivary glands, taste buds,
and stomach digestive glands develop -- as evidenced by her swallowing and
utilization of the amniotic fluid. She also begins to urinate. Depending on the
unborn's sex, primitive sperm or eggs form. Parental
resemblance may already be seen in the unborn's
facial expressions.
Fourth and Fifth Months
Growth is
characteristic of the fourth month. The weight of the unborn
increases six times -- to about one-half her birth weight. Her height is
between eight and ten inches long and she can hear her mother's voice.
In the fifth
month of pregnancy the unborn becomes viable.
That is, she now has the ability, under our current technological knowledge, to
live outside her mother's womb. Some babies have survived as early as twenty
weeks. The fifth month is also the time at which the mother begins to feel the unborn's movements, although mothers have been known to
feel stirrings earlier. This first movement was traditionally called quickening, the time at which some
ancient, medieval, and common-law scholars thought the soul entered the body.
Not having access to the biological facts we currently possess, they reasoned
that prior to quickening it could not be proven that the unborn was
"alive." Current biology, by conclusively demonstrating that a
biologically living human individual
is present from conception, has decisively refuted this notion of
"quickening," just as current astronomy has refuted the geocentric
solar system.
During the
fifth month, the unborn's hair, skin, and nails
develop. She can dream (rapid eye movement [REM] sleep) and cry (if air is
present). It is, however, perfectly legal under Roe v. Wade and Doe v.
Bolton to kill this unborn human being by abortion for any reason her
mother so chooses.
In the
remaining four months of pregnancy the unborn continues to develop. The child's
chances of survival outside the womb increase as she draws closer to her
expected birthday. During this time she responds to sounds, her mother's voice,
pain, and the taste of substances placed in the amniotic fluid. Some studies
have shown that the child can actually learn before it is born. [7]
The child is born approximately 40 weeks after conception.
In summary, the
pro-life advocate believes that full humanness begins at conception for at
least four reasons, which were evident in the above presentation of fetal
development: (1) At the moment of conception a separate unique human
individual, with its own genetic code, comes into existence -- needing only
food, water, shelter, and oxygen in order to grow and develop. (2) Like the
infant, the child, and the adolescent, the conceptus
is a being who is in the process of becoming. She is
not a becoming who is striving toward being. She is not a potential human life
but a human life with great potential. (3) The conceptus
is the sexual product of human parents, and whatever is the
sexual product of members of a particular mammalian species, is itself a
unique individual member of that species. And (4) the same being that begins as
a zygote continues to birth and adulthood. There is no decisive break in the
continuous development of the human entity from conception until death that
would make this entity a different individual before birth. This is why it
makes perfect sense for any one of us to say, "When I was conceived..."
DECISIVE MOMENT THEORIES: A CRITIQUE
Throughout the
history of the abortion controversy, many have put forth criteria by which to
judge whether a human organism has reached the point in its development at
which it is fully human. Some criteria are based on so-called
"decisive" moments in fetal development. Others are based on certain
conditions any entity -- born or unborn -- must fulfill in order to be considered
"fully human." And others argue that there is no "decisive"
moment but that the unborn's rights increase as its
body develops. I believe that all these views are flawed. I will argue that the
pro-life view that full humanness begins at conception is the most coherent and
is more consistent with our basic moral intuitions. In order to defend this
position adequately, I will -- both in this article and in the final
installment of this series -- critique a number of decisive moment and
gradualist theories, whose defenses contain many objections to the pro-life
view.
Agnostic Approach: "No One Knows When
Life Begins"
It is often
claimed by abortion-rights advocates that "no one knows when life
begins." Right away it must be observed that this formulation is imprecise.
For no one who knows anything about prenatal development seriously doubts that
individual biological human life is present from conception (see above). What the abortion-rights
advocates probably mean when they say that "no one knows when life begins"
is that no one knows when full humanness
is attained in the process of human development by the individual in the
womb. Thus, from a legal perspective they are arguing: since no one knows when
full humanness is attained, abortion should remain legal. I believe, however,
that there are at least four problems with this argument.
(1) It is a
two-edged sword. If no one knows when full humanness is attained, then we
cannot prevent a Satan-worshipping neighbor, who believes that full humanness
begins at the age of two, from sacrificing his one-and-a-half-year-old son to
the unholy one. After all, who knows when life begins?
(2) If it is
true that we don't know when full humanness begins, this is an excellent reason
not to kill the unborn, since we may be killing a human entity who has a full right to life. If game hunters shot at
rustling bushes with this same philosophical mind-set, the National Rifle
Association's membership would become severely depleted. Ignorance of a being's
status is certainly not justification for killing it.
(3) As the
above biological facts of prenatal development indicate, we have excellent
reason to believe that full humanness is present from the moment of conception, and that the nature of prenatal and postuterine existence is merely the unfolding of human
growth and development which does not cease until death. In other words, the
unborn -- like the rest of us -- are not potential
human beings, but human beings with much potential.
(4) By
permitting abortion for virtually any reason during the entire nine months of
pregnancy, abortion-rights advocates have decided,
for all practical purposes, when full
humanness is attained. They have decided that this moment occurs at birth,
although some of them -- such as Peter Singer and Michael Tooley
-- also advocate infanticide. [8] The very
abortion-rights advocates who claim that "no one knows when life
begins" often act as if protectable human life begins at birth. Since actions speak
louder than words, these "pro-choicers" are not telling the truth
when they claim they "don't know when life begins."
Some
abortion-rights literature, which I am certain is quite embarrassing to the
more sophisticated proponents of this cause, claims that "personhood at
conception is a religious belief, not a provable biological fact." [9]
What could possibly be meant by this assertion? Is it claiming that religious
claims are in principle unprovable scientifically? If
it is, it is incorrect -- for many religions, such as Christianity and Islam,
believe that the physical world literally exists, which is a major assumption
of contemporary science. On the other hand, some religions, such as Christian
Science and certain forms of Hinduism, [10] deny the
literal existence of the physical world.
But maybe this
"pro-choice" assertion is simply claiming that biology can tell us
nothing about values. If this is what is meant, it is right in one sense and
wrong in another. It is right if it means that the physical facts of science,
without any moral reflection on our part, cannot tell us what is right and
wrong. But it is wrong if it means that the physical facts of science cannot
tell us to whom we should apply the
values of which we are already aware. For example, if I don't know whether the
object I am driving toward in my car is a living woman, a female corpse, or a
mannequin, biology is extremely important in helping me to avoid committing an
act of homicide. Running over mannequins and corpses is not homicide, but
running over a living woman is.
Maybe the
"pro-choice" assertion is saying that when human life should be
valued is a philosophical belief
that cannot be proven scientifically. Maybe so, but this cuts both ways. For
isn't the belief that a woman has abortion rights a philosophical belief that cannot be proven scientifically and over
which people obviously disagree? But if the pro-life position cannot be enacted
into law because it is philosophical (or religious), then neither can the
abortion-rights position. Now the abortion-rights advocate may respond to this
by saying that this fact alone is a good reason to leave it up to each
individual woman to choose whether she should have an abortion. But this
response begs the question, for this is precisely the abortion-rights position.
Furthermore, the pro-lifer could reply to this abortion-rights response by
employing the pro-choicer's own logic. The pro-lifer
could argue that since the abortion-rights position is a philosophical position
over which many people disagree, we should permit each individual unborn human
being to be born and make up his or her own mind as to whether he or she should
or should not die. In sum, it seems that the appeal to ignorance is seriously
flawed.
Implantation
There are some
pro-life advocates, such as Dr. Bernard Nathanson, [11]
who argue that full humanness begins when the conceptus
is implanted in its mother's womb, which occurs within one week after
conception. There are four basic arguments for this position to which I will
respond.
(1) Nathanson argues that at the moment of implantation the
unborn "establishes its presence to the rest of us by transmitting its own
signals -- by producing hormones -- approximately one week after fertilization
and as soon as it burrows into the alien uterine wall." For Nathanson implantation is significant because prior to this
time the unborn "has the genetic structure but is incomplete, lacking the
essential element that produces life: an interface with the human community and
communication of the fact that it is there." [12] So,
for Nathanson the unborn's
hormonal communication to its mother is essential for humanness.
I believe that
this argument is flawed for at least two important reasons. First, how is it
possible that one's essence is
dependent on whether others are aware of one's existence? It seems intuitively
correct to say that it is not essential
to your being whether or not anyone knows
you exist, for you are who you are regardless of whether others are
aware of your existence. One interacts with a human being,
one does not make a being human by interacting with it. In philosophical terms,
Nathanson is confusing epistemology (the study of how we know things) with ontology (the study of being or
existence).
A second
objection, which supports my first objection, is mentioned by Nathanson himself. He writes, "If implantation is
biologically the decisive point for alpha's [the unborn's]
existence, what do we do about the 'test-tube' conceptions? The zygote in these
cases is seen in its culture dish and could be said to announce its existence
even before it is implanted." Nathanson responds
to these questions by asserting, "It seems to me that when it is in the
dish the zygote is already implanted, philosophically and biochemically,
and has established the nexus with the human community, before it is 're'-implanted into the mother's womb." [13]
This response, however, does not support Nathanson's
position, for he is admitting that there is no real essential difference between the implanted and the nonimplanted zygote, just an accidental difference (the former's existence is known while the latter's is not).
Hence, just as there is no essential
difference between a Donald Trump who is an unknown hermit and a Donald Trump
who is an entrepreneur and billionaire (there are only accidental differences
between the two Trumps), there is no essential difference between an unknown conceptus and a known conceptus.
In sum, it seems counterintuitive to assert that one's essence is dependent on
another's knowledge of one's existence.
(2) There is a
second argument for implantation as the decisive moment: If we say that full
humanness begins at conception, we must respond to the observation that
"some entities that stem from the union of sperm and egg are not 'human
beings' and never will develop into them," and that there may be some
human beings who come into being without the union of sperm and egg. [14]
Concerning the former, Nathanson gives examples of
nonhuman entities that result from the sperm-egg union: the hydatidiform
mole ("an entity which is usually just a degenerated placenta and
typically has a random number of chromosomes"), the choriocarcinoma
("a 'conception-cancer' resulting from the sperm-egg union is one of
gynecology's most malignant tumors"), and the blighted ovum ("a
conception with the forty-six chromosomes but which is only a placenta, lacks
an embryonic plate, and is always aborted naturally after implantation").
Concerning the latter, a clone is an example of a human entity that may come
into being without benefit of a sperm-egg union. [15]
The problem
with Nathanson's argument is that he confuses
necessary and sufficient conditions. One who holds that full humanness begins
at conception is not arguing that everything which results from the sperm-egg
union is necessarily a conception. That is, every conception of a unique
individual human entity is the result of a sperm-egg union, but not every
sperm-egg union results in such a conception. Hence, the sperm-egg union is a necessary condition for conception, but
not a sufficient condition.
Furthermore, Nathanson is correct in asserting that it is possible that
some day there may be human beings, such as clones, who come into existence
without benefit of conception. [16] But this would
only mean that conception is not a necessary
condition for full humanness, just as the sperm-egg union is not a sufficient condition for conception. In
sum, Nathanson's argument from both nonhuman products
of sperm-egg unions and the possibility of clones is inadequate in overturning
the pro-life position that full humanness begins at conception.
(3) It is
estimated that twenty to fifty percent of all conceptions die before birth.
Thirty percent, it is estimated, die before implantation. [17] Some
people argue that these facts make it difficult to believe that the unborn are
fully human in at least the very earliest stage of their development prior to
implantation. But this is clearly an invalid argument, for it does not
logically follow from the number of
unborn entities who die that these entities are not by nature fully human. To cite an example, it does not follow from the
fact that underdeveloped countries have a high infant mortality rate that their
babies are less human than those born in countries with a low infant mortality
rate.
Suppose the
pro-choice advocate responds to this by arguing that if every fertilized ovum
is human, then we are obligated to save all spontaneous abortions as well. But
if we did, it would lead to overpopulation, death by medical neglect, and
starvation. The problem with this response is that it confuses our obvious prima facie moral obligation not to
commit homicide (that is, to perform an abortion) with the questionable moral
obligation to interfere with natural death (that is, to permit the conceptus to abort spontaneously). "Protecting life is
a moral obligation, but resisting natural death is not necessarily a moral
duty...There is no inconsistency between preserving natural life, opposing
artificial abortion and allowing natural death by spontaneous abortion." [18]
Admittedly, the
question of interference in spontaneous abortions provokes the pro-life
ethicist to think more deeply and sensitively about his or her position and to make
distinctions and nuances that may not be pleasing to all who call themselves
pro-life. But just as the difficult question of whether to pull the plug on the
irreversibly comatose who are machine-dependent does not count against the
position that murdering healthy adults is morally wrong, the question of how we
should ethically respond to spontaneous abortions does not count against the
pro-life ethic which says that we should not directly kill the healthy and normally developing unborn.
(4) Some people
argue that since both twinning (the division of a single conceptus)
and recombination (the reuniting of two concepti)
occur prior to implantation, individual human life does not begin until that
time. However, a careful examination of the nature of twinning and
recombination reveals that there is no reason to suppose that the original
pre-twinned conceptus or any pre-recombined conceptus was not fully human.
First,
scientists are not agreed on many aspects of twinning. Some claim that twinning
may be a nonsexual form of parthenogenesis or "parenting." This
occurs in some animals and plants. Others claim that when twinning occurs, an
existing human being dies and gives life to two new and identical human beings
like himself or herself. Still others claim that since
not all human concepti have the capacity to twin, one
could argue that there exists in some concepti a
basic duality prior to the split. Hence, it may be claimed that at least in
some incipient form two individual lives were present from the start at
conception. In any event, the fact of twinning does not seem to be a sufficient
reason to give up the belief that full humanness begins at conception. [19]
Second, every conceptus, whether before twinning or recombination, is
still a genetically unique individual who is distinct from his or her parents.
In other words, if identical twins result from a conceptus
split or one individual results from two concepti
that recombine, it does not logically follow that any of the concepti prior to twinning or recombining were not human. [20]
To help us understand this point, philosopher Robert Wennberg
provides the following story:
·
Imagine
that we lived in a world in which a certain small percentage of teenagers
replicated themselves by some mysterious natural means, splitting in two upon
reaching their sixteenth birthday. We would not in the least be inclined to
conclude that no human being could therefore be considered a person prior to becoming
sixteen years of age; nor would we conclude that life could be taken with
greater impunity prior to replication than afterward. The real oddity -- to
press the parallel -- would be two teenagers becoming one. However, in all of
this we still would not judge the individual's claim to life to be undermined
in any way. We might puzzle over questions of personal identity... but we would
not allow these strange replications and fusions to influence our thinking
about an individual's right to life. Nor therefore does it seem that such
considerations are relevant in determining the point at which an individual
might assume a right to life in utero. [21]
The Appearance of "Humanness"
Some argue that
the unborn becomes fully human at the time at which it begins to take on the
appearance of a child. Professor Ernest Van Den Haag [22] is
sympathetic to this criterion, though he combines it with the criterion of
sentience which I will deal with below. He writes that when the unborn acquires
a functioning brain and neural system soon after the first trimester (though
brain waves can be detected at 40 to 42 days after conception, which Van Den
Haag does not mention), it
"starts to resemble an embryonic human being." After this point
"abortion seems justifiable only by the gravest of reasons, such as the
danger to the mother; for what is being aborted undeniably resembles a human
being to an uncomfortable degree." [23]
There are
several problems with this argument. First, though appearance can be helpful in
determining what is or is not fully human, it is not a sufficient or a
necessary condition for doing so. After all, mannequins in stores resemble
humans and they are not even remotely human. On the other hand, some human
oddities -- such as the bearded lady or the elephant man, who more closely
resemble nonhuman primates -- are nonetheless fully human. The reason why we
believe that the bearded lady and the elephant man are fully human and the
mannequin is not is because the former are functioning individual organisms
that genetically belong to the
species homo sapiens. The latter is an inanimate
object.
Second,
It may be true
that it is psychologically easier to kill something that does not resemble the
human beings we see in everyday life, but it does not follow from this that the
being in question is any less human or that the executioner is any more humane.
Once we recognize that human development is a process that does not cease at
the time of birth, then "to insist that the unborn at six weeks look like
the newborn infant is no more reasonable than to expect the newborn to look
like a teenager. If we acknowledge as 'human' a succession of outward forms
after birth, there is no reason not to extend that courtesy to the unborn,
since human life is a continuum from conception to natural death." [25]
Hence, Van Den Haag, by confusing appearance with reality, may have
inadvertently created a new prejudice, "natalism."
And, like other prejudices such as sexism and racism, natalism
emphasizes nonessential differences ("they have a different
appearance") in order to support a favored group ("the already
born").
Human Sentiment
Some pro-choice
people argue that since parents do not grieve at the death of an embryo or
fetus as they would at the death of an infant, the unborn are not fully human.
As a standard
for moral action, this criterion rests on a very unstable foundation. As Noonan
has observed, "Feeling is notoriously an unsure guide to the humanity of
others. Many groups of humans have had difficulty in feeling that persons of
another tongue, color, religion, sex, are as human as they." [26]
One usually feels a greater sense of loss at the sudden death of a healthy
parent than one feels for the hundreds who die daily of starvation in
underdeveloped countries. Does this mean that the latter are less human than
one's parent? Certainly not. Noonan points out that
"apart from reactions to alien groups, we mourn the loss of a ten-year-old
boy more than the loss of his one-day-old brother or his 90-year-old
grandfather." The reason for this is that "the difference felt and
the grief expressed vary with the potentialities extinguished, or the
experience wiped out; they do not seem to point to any substantial difference
in the humanity of baby, boy, or grandfather." [27]
Quickening
Quickening has traditionally referred to the first movement of the unborn felt by
her mother. It was at this time in fetal development that some ancient,
medieval and common-law scholars thought it could be proved that the unborn was
"alive" or that the soul had entered her body. Not having access to
the biological facts we currently possess, they reasoned that prior to
quickening it could not be proved that the unborn entity was "alive"
or fully human. Current biology, which has conclusively demonstrated that a
biologically living human individual
is present from conception, has decisively refuted this notion of
"quickening," just as current astronomy has refuted the geocentric
solar system.
Now, does this
mean that our ancestors were not pro-life? Not at all.
Legal scholar and theologian John Warwick Montgomery notes that when our
ancient, medieval, and common-law forefathers talked about quickening as the
beginning of life, "they were just identifying the first evidence of life
they could conclusively detect...They were saying that as soon as you had life,
there must be protection. Now we know that life starts at the moment of
conception with nothing superadded." [28] Hence, to be
consistent with contemporary science, legal protection must be extended to the
unborn entity from the moment of conception.
Furthermore, we
now know that the ability to feel the unborn's
movement is contingent upon the amount of the mother's body fat. It seems silly
to say that one's preborn humanness is contingent
upon whether one is fortunate to have been conceived in a body that frequents
aerobics classes.
Birth
Some people
argue that birth is the time the human entity becomes fully human. They usually
hold this position for two reasons: (1) our society calculates the beginning of
one's existence from one's day of birth; and (2) it is only after birth that a
child is named, baptized, and accepted into a family.
This argument
is subject to several criticisms. First, that our society counts one's
beginning from one's birthday and that people name and baptize children after
their births are simply social conventions. One is not less human if one is abandoned, unnamed, and not baptized. Some
cultures, such as the Chinese, count one's beginning from the moment of conception.
Does that mean that the American unborn are not fully
human while the Chinese unborn are? Second, there is no essential difference between an unborn entity and a newborn baby,
just a difference in location. As Wennberg writes,
"surely personhood and the right to life is not a matter of location. It
should be what you are, not where you are that determines whether
you have a right to life." [29] In fact,
abortion-rights philosophers Peter Singer and Helga Kuhse
write, "The pro-life groups are right about one thing: the location of the
baby inside or outside the womb cannot make such a crucial moral difference. We
cannot coherently hold that it is all right to kill a fetus a week before
birth, but as soon as the baby is born everything must be done to keep it
alive." [30] Third, as Wennberg
points out, a newborn chimpanzee can be treated like a human newborn (i.e.,
named, baptized, accepted into a family), but this does not mean that it is
fully human. [31]
NOTES
[1] The facts in this section are taken from the
following: F. Beck, D. B. Moffat, and D. P. Davies, Human Embryology, 2d ed. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985); Keith L.
Moore, The Developing Human: Clinically
Oriented Embryology, 2d ed. (Philadelphia: W. B. Saunders, 1977); Andre E. Hellegers, "Fetal Development," in Biomedical Ethics, ed. Thomas A. Mappes and Jane S. Zembaty (New
York: Macmillan, 1981), 405-9; and Stephen M. Krason,
Abortion: Politics, Morality, and the
Constitution (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1984), 337-49.
[2] Subcommittee on Separation of Powers, report to Senate
Judiciary Committee S-158, 97th Congress, 1st Session, 1981, as quoted in
Norman L. Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options
and Issues (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1989), 149.
[3] James J. Diamond, M.D., "Abortion, Animation and
Biological Hominization," Theological Studies 36 (June 1975): 305-42.
[4] Krason, 341.
[5] John T. Noonan, "The Experience of Pain by the
Unborn," in The Zero People, ed. Jeff Lane Hensley
(Ann Arbor, MI: Servant, 1983), 141-56.
[6] Ibid.,
151-52.
[7] See
Mortimer Rosen, "The Secret Brain: Learning Before Birth," Harper's, April 1978, 46-47.
[8] See Michael
Tooley, Abortion
and Infanticide (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983); and Peter Singer and Helga
Kuhse, "On Letting Handicapped Infants
Die," in The Right Thing to Do,
ed. James Rachels (New York: Random House, 1989).
[9] This is from a pamphlet distributed by the National Abortion
Rights Action League, Choice -- Legal
Abortion: Abortion Pro & Con, prepared by Polly Rothstein and Marian
Williams (White Plains, NY: Westchester Coalition for Legal Abortion, 1983), n.p.
[10] On Christian Science, see Walter R. Martin, Kingdom
of the Cults, 2d rev. ed. (Minneapolis: Bethany House, 1977), 111-46. On
the Hindu denial of the physical world, see
Elliot Miller, A Crash Course on the New
Age Movement (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1989), 16-18, 22.
[11] Bernard Nathanson, M.D., Aborting
[12] Ibid., 216.
[13] Ibid., 217.
[14] Ibid., 214.
[15] Ibid.
[16] For a summary of the philosophical and scientific
problems surrounding human cloning, see
Andrew Varga, The
Main Issues in Bioethics, 2d. ed. (New York: Paulist Press, 1984), 119-26.
[17] As cited in John Jefferson Davis, Abortion and the Christian (Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian and
Reformed, 1984), 60. Cf. Thomas W. Hilgers, M.D.,
"Human Reproduction," Theological
Studies 38 (1977):136-52.
[18] Geisler, Christian
Ethics, 153.
[19] See Varga, 64-65.
[20] Ibid., 65.
[21] Robert Wennberg, Life in the Balance: Exploring the Abortion
Controversy (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans
Publishing Co., 1985), 71.
[22] Ernest Van Den Haag, "Is There a Middle Ground?", National
Review,
[23] Ibid., 30.
[24]
[25] Ibid., 59.
[26] John T. Noonan, "An Almost Absolute Value in
History," in The Morality of Abortion, ed. and intro.
John T. Noonan (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), 53.
[27] Ibid.
[28] John Warwick
[29] Wennberg, Life in the Balance, 77.
[30] Singer and Kuhse, 146.
[31] Wennberg, 77-78.