The Campaign of
1890
by
Andrew Preziosi
The Fon Army Attacks
With the declaration and
subsequent stand of "King"
Tofa, the friction between
France and Dahomey was now coming to a head. France now
considered the sea-lake
and
the mouth of the L'Oueme River to be fair game and began to
establish small
trading
posts, run by local black merchants and protected by a few
Senegalese or
Gabonais
Tirailleurs and the tricolour, at various
locations along the banks of
the lake and river. At
one village, an incident occurred in which, allegedly, a
young Amazon warrior
strolled
nonchalantly up to a Tirailleur and literally beheaded him,
while snatching the
flag away
from him as an act of defiance and carrying it back to King
Gle'Gle' in
d'Abomey.
The King had enough and in
February 1889 sent a strong
column into Tofa's
village state with full power to loot, rape and destroy
anything in their path.
Tofa's
soldiers melted away and the very small garrison of
Senegalese Tirailleurs
stationed in
the village proper was not about to take on such numbers.
The population fled to
English
territory and, escorted by the Tirailleurs, the merchants
withdrew to Lagos. The
Dahomeans systematically began to destroy the palm oil
plantations and took
everything
they could get a hold of, including some 1,800 prisoners,
during their campaign.
Amazingly enough it was a British merchant who sent
word of this Campaign
of
Terror to the Chief Administrator at Benin proper, who in
turn contacted the
Commander
of the Atlantic Naval station, Admiral Colstoun for
assistance. He arrived off
Cotonou
with two ships
(1) and immediately
dispatched a senior officer and two mixed companies of
marines & sailors (marins fusiliers) to take
control of Porto-Novo
and to restore calm.
This was done in short notice with direct naval support and
the population soon
returned
to the town and close lying villages, but this did not stop
the Dahomean
destruction of the
outlying palm oil plantations throughout the basin.
With calm restored and the Navy now backing their
claims, merchants
returned to
Porto-Novo. At the same time, Dr. Jean Bayol was assigned
as the Civil Governor
of the
Coast of Benin and instructed to demand an explanation for
such disloyal acts
from King
Gle' Gle' and to ratify the Treaties of 1868 & 1878.
Gle' Gle' refused to go
to the coast
to meet with Bayol, but did invite him to d'Abomey, where
Bayol traveled and met
with
Crown Prince Kon-Do' to negotiate. Shortly afterwards, King
Gle' Gle' passed
away and
Prince Kon-Do' now took over as King Behanzin of Dahomey.
Both men stuck to
their
guns and Bayol left quite secure in the knowledge that the
only way to stop the
raids and
to restore peace (and the flow of trade) to the coastal
region would be to bring
in an
expeditionary force to garrison Porto-Novo and seize
Cotonou and its
environs.
The French Colonial Secretary of State, being
appraised of the situation by
Bayol
and Naval Captain Fournier began to set the wheels in
motion for a campaign and
while
there was some argument in favor of using just naval and
marine forces to
protect the
coast, it was decided to send an expeditionary force from
Senegal to the Benin
coast in
order to secure Grand Popo, Cotonou, Porto-Novo and the
coastal environs.
However, it
must be noted here that Captain Fournier had sent in a
report which advised that
an
expedition of some 3,200 men, half of them Europeans,
should be launched upriver
against d'Abomey proper in order to let the Fon government
and army know once
and for
all who calling the shots. While this subsequent campaign
was supposed to be
launched
mainly for defensive reasons (at least from the outset), it
was to change into
an offensive
soon enough. The lack of men, money, supplies and public
support would limit the
Campaign of 1890, but it would portend things to come.
The French Expeditionary
Corps
Accordingly, on February 7, 1890, The Benin
Expeditionary Corps passed in
review for Colonel Dodds, the Military Commandant at Dakar,
Senegal, enroute for
their
ship and voyage to Benin. Commanded by Chef de Battalion
Terrillon, the force
consisted of two companies of Senegalese Tirailleurs and a
mountain artillery
detachment; a company of Tirailleurs Gabonais would be
available as
reinforcements if
needed. (2)
Arriving first at Whydah, the Expeditionary corps
proceeded overland to
Cotonou
where they began to build a fort on February
21st for protection
against landward attacks.
Two halfhearted assaults by what some claim to be
"renegade" Dahomean troops
were
now launched against Cotonou. On the 23rd, local
levies from the
Province of Cotonou
made the first attack against the incomplete defenses and
were beaten off with
relative
ease by both the garrison and naval artillery support in
the form of FNS
Sane' and the
steam sloop Emeraude which caused much disorder
within the Dahomean
ranks as they
retreated into a forest that seemed to offer little or no
protection against
bombardment.
On February 28th, a strong French
reconnaissance force was sent
in the direction
of Zobbo village. They were partially ambushed by the
Dahomean troops who fired
one
large but ineffective volley against them. The Tirailleurs
quickly charged
forward, forced
the enemy back, stormed through the village and finally
made the Fon troops
retreat in
disorder. With that they returned with thirty casualties,
most of them slight,
to Cotonou,
quite pleased with their performance.
On March 1st, a larger force of both levies
and at least some
provincial troops
from the environs of Lama attacked Cotonou, only to be
repulsed once again.
On March 4th, the standing Fon army proper,
which must have
moved very
quickly in order to arrive in time, launched a pre-dawn
attack against Fort
Cotonou. It
had rained during the night and the troops were able to get
close to the
stockade without
being noticed. Numbering well over 1,200 troops in the
first wave alone
(including a
contingent of Amazons), the Fon soldiers did gain some
initial surprise against
the
guards, made their way over the walls and headed straight
for the guns.
Fortunately, the
senior officers and NCOs of the battery were present at the
time and valiantly
went to
meet their assailants. Unfortunately, two of the senior
most NCOs literally lost
their
heads fighting Amazons in the defense of their guns. The
actions and bravery of
the
European officers on the ramparts, some of whom were
wounded numerous times
throughout the course of the day, initially almost
single-handedly against the
Dahomean
troops, took place in full view of the Tirailleurs rushing
to their aid.
Encouraged by the
examples of the European officers, the Senegalese troops
forced the enemy back.
In turn
the enemy opened a terrific fire upon the troops, but
again, firing from the hip
or holding
their firearms out in front for fear of the recoil, they
did little damage.
Fighting now
became general and often hand-to-hand, as the Dahomean
troops resolutely held
their
ground against the Tirailleurs. Three times the Fon
attacked and three times
they were
eventually repulsed. As bad as the initial assault had
been, most agree that the
third
assault was the fiercest, with the Fon leaving behind some
125 dead (including
the She-Gaou) inside the French lines. But in the end, up
against overwhelming
fire-power, the
espirit de corps of the French troops and naval
gunfire support, the
Dahomeans gave up
and retreated in haste, leaving the bulk of their dead and
wounded behind to be
dealt with
by the French as they felt appropriate (the lightly wounded
captives were given
rudimentary care, but it has been claimed the dead and
seriously wounded were
heaped
together and burned on the spot).
For the next month or so, Terrillon worked to build up
his defenses and
received a
few promised reinforcements. It was now determined to
transfer the bulk of his
troops to
Porto-Novo while the Emaraude continued to cruise
up and down the coast
and lagoon
bombarding enemy villages and troop concentrations. Upon
reaching Porto-Novo it
was
decided that small columns of Tirailleurs would be sent out
into the immediate
interior of
the coast in order to stop the damage to the palm oil
plantations and crops
until enough
supplies could be collected for a larger punitive
expedition.
Time after time, the small columns were attacked from
out of nowhere with
an
initial volley of firearms. While casualties were caused
(including the mortal
wounding
of Captain Oudard who commanded the Gabonais Tirailleur
company), the scene
would
continuously repeat itself with the Tirailleurs firing
back, charging forward
and
prevailing in short order, even though they were almost
always outnumbered. No
matter
how successful though, the French columns always had to
return to their base,
because
they had no real logistical support and the majority of the
Dahomean army was
close by.
As news of defeat after defeat reached King Behanzin, he
began to wonder what
was wrong with his heretofore-vaunted army. Bravery did not
seem to be too much
of an
issue, at least in initiating conflict, but his troops had
no luck with their
ancient weapons
against the modern firepower of the French soldiers and the
vessels cruising the
lagoon.
It was therefore decided to collect the bulk of his army
& levies, advance
on Porto-Novo
and deal with the French one final time. By staying away
from the coastal areas
as much
as possible and keeping his troops concentrated, they could
not be ignored and
would
either have to be attacked or they would continue to wreak
havoc with the local
economic
base.
The Battle of
Atchoupa
Terrillon, now a Lieutenant Colonel for his efforts, was
not fazed by the
Dahomean presence and decided to bring the situation to a
conclusion.
Accordingly, he
marched out just before dawn on April 20th, with
his two companies of
Tirailleurs
Senegalese, three 80mm mountain guns, "King" Tofa's "army"
of 350 men (and some
women) and a detachment of European disciplinaires
(punishment troops,
in this case
mainly marines and sailors, though there were supposedly
some army troops
involved
also) from the squadron offshore; while the Gabonais troops
and the bulk of his
artillery
remained behind to garrison the village. With less than 700
men and over half of
them
belonging to his "ally', he was going to tackle anywhere
from 4,000 to 8,000
Dahomean
troops.
Approaching the village of Atchoupa, some four miles
away from Porto-Novo, at
around 7:30 AM, he once more ran into a fierce but largely
ineffective volley of
bullets,
rocks and nails from the Fon troops lying in ambush. One
slug did hit the
"Prince" who
commanded Tofa's army, killing him on the spot and causing
his troops to flee in
panic
and fear. (3)
The Tirailleurs, who had already been marching in a
loose "lozenge"
formation, quickly tightened ranks and formed square in
what used to be a palm
tree
plantation, but which was now a fairly open meadow with
short stumps and clear
fields
of fire;"
For two hours, superior discipline, marksmanship and
firepower (the troops
were
armed with the Gras 1874 pattern rifle) on the part of the
Tirailleurs,
Disciplinaires and
gunners kept the Dahomean army of some 8,000 warriors
(2,000 of which were
Amazons) at bay. Assault after assault was launched, only
to be repulsed. Some
warriors
did make contact and caused casualties with their razor
sharp hwisu & panga
swords, but
steady firing, the bayonet and some help from the allied
levies kept the enemy
well
outside the square.
Only the fact that ammunition was running low and word
reaching him that
another 2,000 or so Fon troops were preparing to cut him
off from Porto-Novo (or
at least
his supplies and ammo reserves), forced Terrillon to fall
back to his jump off
point and
naval gunnery support. Time and time again his square was
forced to halt and
fire volleys
in order to keep the Dahomean troops at bay but by 10:00 AM
the column was in
sight of
the village. Calm cool courage, training and superior
firepower on the part of
some 300
French troops, the vast majority being Senegalese, defeated
almost 8,000 Fon
troops and
inflicted approximately 1,500 casualties. In turn the
French column suffered
some eight
dead, and nearly 40 wounded; Tofa's army receiving some 20
casualties. No one
could
ask more from their soldiers (4).
Cessation of
Hostilities
At the same time though, it must be admitted that
despite this victory and
several
successful skirmishes, the French did not have enough
troops or inland reach
with their
artillery (both naval and land) to prevent the Dahomeans
from continuing to
wreak havoc
with the interior village-states and their crops. King
Behanzin was also smart
enough to
realize he could not do too much more damage to the local
economy before it
began to
affect his markets. Coupled with mounting threats from the
Egba's and other
internal
matters, peace overtures were made. For the French, the
Fire-eating Bayol was
replaced
by the much more diplomatic Governor Ballot, who was under
orders to straighten
matters out and restore peace quickly so that trade might
resume and redress the
balance
for the cost of the campaign.
It was a hard treaty to come by and the Fon government
was not at all happy
with
losing their trade centers, but Behanzin pushed it through,
realizing that he
needed time
to import new weapons and to train his army in their use.
In his mind, the war
was not
over, he had just bought himself some breathing room and
time.
Accordingly, on October 4th, 1890 a treaty
was signed bringing an
end to the war
and re-establishing trade contacts. French suzerainty over
Porto-Novo and
Contonou was
agreed upon, Whydah would still be the major business
center for the Kingdom of
Dahomey proper and on top of that, King Behanzin would be
paid some 20,000
Francs in
the form of reparations.
For their part the French pretty much thought the war
was over and resumed
normal business soon afterwards. While diminutive military
posts were
established in the
new treaty centers and a small squadron of gunboats now
patrolled the lagoon and
coast
in one's or two's on a regular basis (supported by the
larger vessels offshore),
the bulk of
the troops were withdrawn to Senegal and life went on.
But in all truth, things were not as they seemed. While
the French government
and armed forces figured the matter more or less closed
(though they certainly
stayed on
their toes), the French people began to revel in the recent
campaign and to see
the
Dahomeans more of an enemy, instead of trading partner.
While this did not mean
much
at the moment, it did mean that if war broke out again,
French citizens would
support a
larger punitive expedition and the money would be available
to do it right the
next time.
Behanzin wasted no time either; contacts with European
gun runners (legit and
not so legit) were provided by the "agent provocateurs"
still in country and
within a few
short months modern (or at least relatively current)
weapons were steadily
streaming into
the country, along with Krupp artillery pieces, technicians
and instructors to
show his
troops how to use the new technology correctly. At the same
time, Behanzin
enlarged his
army to some 12,000 troops, dealt with his old enemies on
the borders and did
everything
he could to prepare for the next war. When it came, both
sides would be
ready.
1.
1 It is unclear whether this was an
Anglo-French squadron or
entirely French. With names like Rear
Admiral Brown de Colstoun, Commander Thomas and "Arethusa",
it certainly points
in that direction, but
then again the names are just "off" enough to be French. As
Captain Fournier
afterwards remained on duty
as Chief Naval Officer and no further mention is made of
the other participants,
I am going to go with the
mixed squadron gathered together for humanitarian reasons.
2.
2 See Order of Battle, Dahomey1890.00 for
details
3.
3 There is another story where Tofa's army
had detached scouts and
skirmishers into the surrounding jungle
to keep any Dahomean flanking attempts in check while the
bulk of the army
formed the fourth "away" side
of the square and held on until the end when they finally
"broke" and went off
in pursuit of their enemies.
As this pursuit would be against an army that had dogged
Terillon's retrograde
march every step of the way
and would be out of range of the naval & garrison
artillery, it is highly
doubtful it occurred. Reports do say
that some braver and loyal men did hang around the flanks
in order to provide
information on enemy
movements after the "army" fled and some evidence does bear
this out.
4.
4 Terrillon's men fired off some 25,000
rounds of ammunition at
Atchoupa. Before anyone thinks that this
would be impossible (or at least damned hard to do), you
might want to
reconsider. Each soldier carried at
least 36 rounds of ammunition on his person; there was at
least an additional
100-120 rounds per man being
carried in the ammo train and park (presumably by native
porters). There were a
good solid 300 Tirailleurs
present and an additional 25-30 disciplinaires. If
325 men fired off at
least 36 rounds that would mean some
11,700 rounds were fired. During a two hour battle, this
would mean that the
troops would fire an average
of 100 rounds a minute which while steady, would certainly
not be daunting, at
least in the eyes of the
Dahomean troops. Allowing for Dahomean assaults and
concentrations in order to
deliver their firepower,
the faster rate of 200 rounds per minute sounds much more
plausible and would
also account for lulls in the
action. This faster firing rate, which still means that
only about 200 of the
325 men present on the field of
battle would be firing at least once a minute, now brings
the total up to 23,400
shots. Add to this the solid
rounds and explosive shot fired off by the artillery and we
easily fall within
the realm of 25,000 rounds
mentioned in other accounts. (The artillery certainly did
not fire some 1,600
rounds, but if we toss in a few
more officers and an additional five or ten
disciplinaires we are over
the 24,000 mark and easily within the
range of the rounded off number we were originally
given).
However, it must be noted that the Dahomean troops
suffered some 18%
casualties during the
battle and never really gave up the fight. They might have
eased off towards the
end and not pursued, but
they certainly stayed game for two hours as their
casualties mounted. They may
not have been the best
troops in the world, but few can question their bravery. We
don't know the scale
of killed to wounded but
the traditional one to four or five, modified for this type
of combat should
leave us with some 400 minus
dead and 1,000 plus wounded. Much has been made of the
steadiness and discipline
of the Tirailleurs and
modern firepower, one in every sixteen bullets found its
mark. This pretty much
averages out to ten
wounded for every time a company fired a volley.
Finally, about 2,000 Fon troops were equipped with
some type of firearm. A
few were new
(relatively speaking), most were ancient, but if just 1,500
Dahomean warriors
fired one round every ten
minutes during the battle it means that some 18,000
projectiles were fired at
the French square during the
two hour battle and only 48 French troops were killed and
wounded (and the vast
majority of these wounds
were from firearms), then only one out of 375 bullets (or
equivalent thereof)
found their mark from Fon
weapons.
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