WARRIORS IN HEART OF DARKNESS : THE NANDI
RESISTANCE 1850
1897
by Dennis Bishop
PROLOGUE: THE ARAB TRADER WARS
Isolated from the outside world, one might only
speculate at the wonder of
the first
Nandi warriors who discovered the Arab caravan in the
1850's. Those warriors
might
not have known of earlier Arab caravans, because this was
the first notable
one in Nandi oral tradition. It was the time when the Sawe
sub-sets were
warriors and by 1854, the name Marmar ("to ornament a
dress") had been conveyed
upon a sub-set. The significance of this title might be
derived from the major
Arab defeat at Kipsoboi, but
may have been attributed to the very successful raiding
of Arab caravans by
the Nandi.
These were good years for the Nandi.
Part of the reason for the Nandi success was the limited
access. The easiest
approach
was from the north-east, but a caravan had to travel two
or three days before
reaching
principal Nandi settlements. This evidently was not
preferable as the Arab
caravans
diverted east to Kavirondo and Mumias where food and
protection was located.
Since
direct trade contact was not possible, the caravans after
the 1850's rarely
entered or
camped in Nandi, a strange "middle man" system evolved.
Due to the casualties to the caravans, trusted Sotik and
Dorobo agents were
employed
to act as "middle men". These agents would trade ivory
and other coastal
goods for
cattle to the Nandi for a large commission. Enterprising
Arab traders hoping
to
circumvent this arrangement often fell victims to a Nandi
ploy. A few old
Nandi
warriors would meet the armed caravan and tell them that
a large supply of
ivory was
only two or three days journey from the caravan.
However, the Nandi were only
willing
to entertain a small Arab party to negotiate a trade.
Dutifully, a party of
twenty men
would be dispatched with cloth, wire, and other trade
goods only to be
ambushed by the
Nandi and massacred. Another ruse used by the Nandi was
to send a small party
of
warriors to lead the prospective caravan into the depths
of Nandi by the wrong
road and
then conduct a night attack. The Arab traders even
attempted a tactic that
had worked
with other tribes, blood brotherhood. This consisted of
sitting opposite one
another,
cutting the back of each other's hand and sucking the
blood from one another's
hand.
The Nandi held no credence to such a foreign ceremony,
and it only became
another ploy
to easily acquire coastal goods.
The Nandi developed tactics to overcome the
effectiveness of a large number
firearms
during this time. Like the Masai, the warriors drew the
enemy's fire by a
sudden rush at
which time they went "go to ground." Then the warriors
charged the caravan
porters
before the muzzle loading weapons could be recharged.
The porters bolted into
the
reloading riflemen followed closely by the Nandi
warriors. In the confusion,
the Nandi
warriors could spear the panicked men. This tactic
worked until the battle of
Kimondi in
1895.
Frustrated by failures, the Arab traders attempted one
last tactic. They
established a
series of fortified stations at Kimatke, Kibigori,
Chemelil, Kipsoboi, and
Kobujoi, and
began a campaign of intimidation. Donkeys were let loose
to trample the
millet fields,
Nandi warriors were humilitated, Nandi boys were
imprisoned, and Nandi women
and
girls were compromised. At Kipsoboi four Nandi shields
were propped against a
tree and
the Nandi were offered the chance to shoot arrows into
the shields. Once this
was
accomplished, the Arabs fired musket balls through the
shields that had
stopped the
arrows. The Arabs then poured gruel over the attending
Nandi's heads and
shaved off
their cherished locks.
The Nandi warriors had had enough. They sought
permission from the Kaptalam
liabon (leading ritual expert) to kill the Arabs. He
gave permission, and the
post was
stormed. Some accounts credit the laibon with making the
defender's
ammunition
disappear, while others credit the error of the garrison
commander to provide
ammunition
to the riflemen. Regardless of the reason, the garrison
was destroyed. The
Nandi
kiptaiyat (raiding bands) then successfully attacked and
slaughtered the
garrison at
Kobujoi. This was enough to force the Arab traders to
withdraw from Nandi and
to
avoid the area.
The defeat of the Arabs created the "Nandi legend." The
Nandi were
undefeatable.
Porters could not be hired and expeditions could not be
launched into Nandi
for nearly
forty years. The Nandi warriors stood proudly aloof from
the events that were
swirling
around them confident to defend their independence.
DOOMED CARAVANS AND FAILED EXPEDITIONS
Like many of indigenous cultures, several Kalenjin
prophets foretold the
coming of the
white man. Among the Nandi, the prophesies of Mongo and
Kimnyole are best
examples. However, it was only Mongo who foretold the
arrival of white people
who
possessed a great power, and warned against fighting
against them. Kimnyole,
before his
assassination, only predicted that the confrontation
would have a significant
effect upon
the peoples of Nandi. Flushed with the victories against
the other tribes and
Arabs, the
Nandi warriors believed that they would succeed in
protecting their homeland.
This faith was substantiated in November 1883 when a
European caravan under
Joseph
Thomson crossed Masailand into North Nandi. Thomson was
part of a Royal
Geographical Society expedition that numbered 100 men in
a pioneer company.
The
confused and sketchy evidence of this expedition stopped
the dispatch of
European
caravans from Mombasa from 1883 84.
Evidently, Thomson had negotiated the west wall of the
Kerio Valley and
reached the
top of the Elgeyo escarpment shortly after leaving Njemps
on 16 November 1883.
Thomson sent out scouts to prevent his caravan from being
surprised as he
continued
forward five days without contacting any Nandi. However,
the column must have
been
attacked by Masai seeking revenge for the cattle disease
spread from European
bovines
in the area. This insignificant event attributed to a
Nandi attack, actually
broke the back
of the Masai without any acknowledgement. Thomson
returned to Naivasha in
March
1884, and Nandi remained a blank spot on the European
colonial maps.
The next European to cross Nandi was James Hannington,
the first Bishop of
Eastern
Equatorial Africa. Hannington was an experienced
explorer and employed the
aid of
other explorers like Thomson and Jones. The caravan left
Rabai in July 1885,
and
arrived in Kabras on October 3. He left soon after to
enter Nandi, but never
returned.
Thinking that he was opening a road to salvation for the
Buganda, he could not
know that
his christian goals were the cause of his murder. The
Mwanga believed that
such an
establishment of contact would open the Buganda to an
invasion from the east.
Independently, Dr. Gustav Fischer entered North Nandi
unobserved and passed
through
unmolested in March 1886. This was the first German
expedition into Nandi and
was so
rushed that no notes were kept regarding the Nandi. The
German Colonial
Office also
launched a powerful caravan led by Count Teleki and
Hauptman Hohnel in 1887-88
that
turned back before entering Nandi.
Three small European caravans had entered Nandi, but
the only solid
information was
gathered from the Masai who Hannington related regarded
the Nandi tribes "to
be the
most difficult to deal with from its fighting powers."
Seven years passed
before the
next Church Missionary Society (CMS) caravan crossed
Nandi.
Part of the reason that the Nandi were ignored
during this period was
that Emin Pasha
and Stanley had to be retrieved and that used up the
military, porters, and
supply
available in the area. Another part of the reason was
that the British sphere
of influence
beyond the land of the Masai was being attempted.
The Imperial British East Africa Company (IBEA)
launched a 535 man
caravan led by
F. J. Jackson into the unexplored area on August 6, 1889.
The Sotik were
friendly at
first, but later attacked the caravan. The Sotik were
defeated losing 40
warriors and
forfeiting 170 head of cattle and 2000 sheep and goats.
Jackson then
continued to
Mumias on November 7, 1889. Refusing to help the Mumia
against the Ugenya,
Jackson
continued to Turkana to collect ivory to defray the cost
of the expedition.
When the Jackson expedition reached the land of the
Sebei it became
acquainted with
the Nandi. The expedition happened to be in the exact
area that was being
raided by
Nandi kiptaiyat numbering possibly 1000 warriors. The
Nandi attacked several
Sebei
villages and carried off 200 to 300 head of cattle in one
day. The villages
attacked were
destroyed and the inhabitants killed. The expedition's
hopes of being
attacked by the
Nandi never developed, and with the area devastated, the
expedition had no
hopes of
remaining. It returned to Mumias on March 4, 1890. It
was at Mumias that
Jackson
negotiated a treaty that replaced the German flag with
the British flag.
In 1892, the railway survey party was appointed to
determine the possibility
of
expanding the rail system through Nandi. The survey went
slowly as the
surveyors were
in constant peril. It was estimated by some that "men
armed with Winchester
rifles
would have to be stationed at every 100 yards in order to
keep off the attacks
of the
natives."
The Europeans created a large amount of movement on the
periphery of Nandi
between 1890 and 1895. For instance, in 1894 twenty-six
caravans passed
through North
Nandi and in the latter half of 1895 more than forty
passed over the same
tracks
unmolested. The Nandi may have ignored this movement
because it didn't
directly
threaten them or because the caravans did not offer
enough plunder to make
them
worthwhile attacking. However, the Nandi watched the
caravans with a
suspicious eye.
The coming of war was only a matter of time.
THE UNLIKELY BEGINNING OF A WAR
The unlikely beginning of a war began with two British
adventurers, Peter
West and
Andrew Dick. West arrived at Mumias on March 20, 1895.
He was a continual
drunk
and had been accused of being a gun-runner. He entered
into a trading
partnership with
the choleric Dick who had already established a chain of
stores and transport
posts from
the coast to Lake Victoria. These two men set about to
independently
establish
domination and a trade monopoly with the Nandi.
The two began this escapade on June 23, 1895 by
organizing two caravans. The
expeditions began poorly when three rifles were stolen
from Dick by the
Kikelewa and
one of West's men was murdered. Dick drew first blood
when two Nandi warriors
surrendered and he had them whipped. Later, Dick had the
warriors bound and
drowned.
A Nandi reconnaissance party was later fired upon by Dick
and dispersed after
losing one
warrior.
While Dick was busy antagonizing the Nandi, West had
pitched his camp two
hours
from the nearest Nandi houses. West's total arms
included fifteen guns, two
privately
owned rifles, and a revolver. West unsuccessful
attempted to negotiate for
the ivory that
he sought upon his first contact with the Nandi.
Although warned of the
Nandi, West
persisted in his attempts to negotiate by treating the
Nandi delegates well.
West's efforts were repaid at two o'clock on the morning
of July 16th, when
the camp
was rushed by Nandi warriors and all but eight of the
expedition were killed
without a
shot being fired. West's last words were reported as,
"Give me my gun."
West's
unprotected camp of fifty individuals, twenty-five head
of cattle and
forty-six sheep and
goats had occupied the unprotected camp in safety for
twenty days. West's
death can
only be contributed to his partner being a Dick.
The East Africa Protectorate, Foreign Office, and
missionary societies
administrations
had no choice but to react militarily to West's murder.
All roads bordering
the Nandi
were closed until military escorts could be organized
from the scant resources
at Mumias
and Ravine. This disrupted several commercial
enterprises and two major
missionary
efforts.
Before West's murder the various European
administrations were content to
ignore the
unknown Nandi, and the Nandi were content to ignore the
Europeans. After
West's
murder, the Nandi tribal morale and self-confidence
increased. The Nandi
warriors had
proven that the European guns were no match for the Nandi
spears. The
warriors must
have believed that the Laibon had rendered the guns
useless. Maybe the
ancient
prophesy meant that the Nandi would begin the end of the
"white man" in
sub-Sahara
Africa. This idea was reinforced by the reactions of
neighboring tribes, most
notably the
Wanga and Kabras. The other tribes to join included the
Kamasia, Kitosh and
Kikelelwa.
The Ravine garrison received news of West's murder on
July 30, 1895. The
commander, Martin, had only a staff of forty invalided
porters and a partly
completed
fort defended by ten askari. Fearing an attack, J.
Martin enlisted seven
Sudanese
"settlers" and sent for help from Mumias. C. W. Hobley
at Mumias could not
comply
because his scant military assets were being thinly
spread. Port Victoria
under A. Brown
of Smith had been attacked on July 13, 1895. Hobley was
forced to send twenty
five
askari of The Imperial British East Africa Company
(IBEAC) to support Brown of
Smith.
William Grant had been ordered to assist Hobley, but
Grant was busy restoring
order in
Kavirondo. F. J. Jackson at Entebbe was also able to
offer little help.
Acting
Commissioner Hobley did put together fifty Sudanese
askaris of the IBEAC and
some
Baganda irregulars who he sent to aid Grant. Twenty-five
reservists were
enlisted in
Singo to replace those men sent to Grant, and Singo
became defended by
released
prisoners from Kampala. This was all that could be done.
Meanwhile, the Nandi roamed freely seeking likely
targets. On July 15, a
caravan
under G. W. Lewis of Smith, Mackenzie and Company left
Ravine with two
European
mechanics, twenty Indian artisans and over 400 porters.
The caravan finally
reached
Mumias on July 26 having lost over twenty loads to a
Nandi attack on the Uasin
Gishu
Plateau. Another Nandi ambush captured two rifles, a
shotgun and a loaded
donkey from
the Uganda Commissioner's caravan near Kabras. Still
another ambush on Bishop
H.
Hanlon's caravan captured the religious relics of Father
Prendergast. News of
these
ambushes did not reach Ravine in time to stop a small
advance party of the
Boustead,
Ridley and Company from departing with beads to purchase
food for the Church
Missionary Society main caravan of T. Munro and urgent
letters for Mengo. The
advance party consisted of twenty-five contract men and
six porters. Two
hundred Nandi
warriors ambushed the unprotected camp at 2:00AM on
August 22. Only seven
members
of the party survived and reached safety.
By July 30, the IBEAC agents knew that the Nandi had
been incited to a war
and took
the appropriate measures, but could not warn other
caravans in time. On
October 2, a
caravan under Mohamed Bau consisting of thirty rifles,
two loads of spare
ammunition,
fifty head of cattle and twenty sheep and goats left
Guasa Masa for Ravine.
Two days
out from Ravine the caravan was attacked during the night
by ten Nandi
warriors and
suffered the loss of eight porters and a woman. Six men
were wounded and four
guns
captured with 250 rounds of ammunition after only ten
shots had been fired.
Forty-two
of the cattle were captured with the small stock and
mail. The mail was
returned sixteen
days after the disaster.
Another well armed caravan under F. Pordage of 160 men
were threatened by a
large
Nandi kiptaiyat on October 13 at their camp on the
Kamasai River. During the
night of
October 14-15 the camp was surrounded by Nandi warriors,
but Pordage was up to
the
task and order three volleys fired into the darkness by
his askari. The
result was the
confirmation of two dead Nandi and several blood trails.
After leaving Guasa
Masa, ten
Sudanese askari joined the caravan on the 15th and when
the Portage caravan
camped,
several Nandi were discovered attempting to set fire to
the grass surrounding
the caravan.
During the afternoon of the 16th a water porter party
was attacked by thirty
Nandi
warriors, but the rush was stopped by a volley from the
five askari escorting
the party.
The Nandi retired without loss and contented themselves
to watch the progress
of the
caravan outside of gunfire range until it reached Ravine
on October 21, 1895.
Although there was one more successful attack by the
Nandi on a fortified
Kabras
village, the Nandi appear to have been content with the
success of their raids
on the
Uganda Road. The operations had been well planned and
executed as the
warriors had
defeated several European caravans with the loss of only
two warriors. When
provided
the opportunity, the warriors had decisively struck.
When the Europeans had
the
advantage, the Nandi warriors possessed the discipline to
avoid a costly
attack. And all
this was accomplished by raiding parties, not the
combined might of the Nandi
tribes.
The last months of the IBEAC forces was expended against
the threats from
tribes
neighboring Nandi. The Protectorate military
establishment numbered 1,200
Sudanese
troops, 250 of which were reservists. The porter
establishment was chaotic,
and the arms
and ammunition supply system was forwarded through Mumias
from German East
Africa or Kampala. Food stuffs were an entirely
different problem as local
purchases
were minimal and the arrival of caravans was haphazard.
The Nandi clearly
presented a
threat that the IBEAC could not effectively counter.
THE FIRST INVASION OF NANDI
In 1895, the crown took from the IBEAC the
responsibility for the area
including
Nandi. Uganda became a separate protectorate and the
Sudanese troops were
reorganized into the Uganda Rifles Regiment (URR) under
the Foreign Office
administration. Established at 800 men, it was organized
into ten companies.
The 27th
Bombay (Baluch) Light Infantry Regiment (BLI) was also
deployed to the
protectorate
with ten companies.
After considering several options, Major G. G.
Cunningham decided to invade
Nandi
with a field force of 400 askari of the I, IV, V, IX URR,
with a Maxim, 600
porters, and
800 followers from Kampala. The huge caravan attracted a
lot of attention as
it marched
to Mumias. The local natives were awed by the spectacle
that was arrayed
against the
Nandi. At Mumias on October 29, Cunningham was joined by
Dr. Mackinnon. The
total
column consisted then consisted of five Europeans, seven
native officers, 367
askari, 23
Baganda "drilled and disciplined" auxiliaries, and a few
armed "Swahili"
porters in the
Maxim detachment. After Captain C.H. Sitwell's column
arrived, the number of
askari
increased to 428. This was more than one third of the
total regular troops
available in the
protectorate.
All of the URR were rearmed with Martini-Henry rifles
and one Maxim
machinegun
was allotted to each of the reorganized columns. There
was plenty of
ammunition and
supplies, but one of the main problems was providing
carriers. The local
populations at
Kavirondo and Mau were not willing to offer their
services. In the end, only
110
Swahilis and 80 Lendus were available. As most of the
Swahli were specialist
carriers
for the Maxim guns, and the logistics of supporting over
a thousand people
forced
Cunningham to reduce the number of followers to 350.
Even then, the size of
the
columns would force them to depend upon raiding ripened
millet fields in
Nandi.
Another problem Cunningham faced was the lack of
irregulars acting as guides
and a
shield for the columns. Bribed with gifts of Nandi
cattle, even the Masai
refused to offer
their services. This was most disconcerting as this had
never before been a
problem
against other tribes neighboring the Nandi. Cunningham
was forced to enter
unexplored
territory without the benefit of guides or skirmishers.
Undaunted, Major Cunningham sent the small force of a
few Baganda irregulars
under
Sgt. Chongo with fifty Sudanese regulars to chastise the
irreconcilables in
the Kikelelwa
forest. The forest was deserted and the houses were
burned. The Nandi appear
to have
expanded to create a "burned" no man's land between the
British protectorate
and Nandi.
Cunningham then marched his column out of Mumias on
November 4th. He
detached
F. G. Foaker with I Company (90 men), twenty reservists,
and a number of
porters to
Guasa Masa as the main column continued east to the
Kabras food depot. After
marching south on November 8th, the column turned east
again and reached the
first
Nandi huts on an escarpment 6,000 feet above the column.
A patrol dispersed a
number
of Nandi warriors and continued southwards to a dense
forest. This first
encounter with
the Nandi resulted in two askari shot, and sixteen Nandi
cattle and nine goats
captured.
On November 9th, the column retraced its path seeking a
way either around the
escarpment or the forest. Two miles to the north,
Cunningham discovered a
path which
was used contested by Nandi snipers who rained arrows and
rifle fire into the
flanks of
the column. Cunningham claimed four Nandi dead with a
loss of one wounded
Sudanese
follower. However, Cunningham once he had reached the
plateau, turned north
and a
party of Nandi were dispersed by his Maxim. He then sent
a patrol to find
Captain C. H.
Sitwell's missing column.
Sitwell and Foaker left Guasa Masa on November 10th with
168 Sudanese askari,
51
porters, a Maxim, and a number of followers with
directions to progress south
for fifteen
miles to join the Cunningham column at Kabiyet. Captain
Sitwell was deceived
by his
Masai guides and ended his first day's march west instead
of south. Sitwell
believed that
he had reached Kabiyet within a six hour march, and not
finding Cunningham's
main
column, he camped over night.
While both Cunningham and Sitwell were ineffectively
searching for each
other's
column, both became embroiled in increasing Nandi
resistance. The Cunningham
Column was running low on food by November 13th, and he
decided to move back
to
where he thought the Sitwell Column might be. Patrols
from Cunningham's
column
skirmished with Nandi attempting to protect the grain
rich country the column
had
entered. The Nandi skirmished, but were dispersed by the
Maxim losing one
warrior
killed by a patrol and another captured by foraging
porters near Kombe, and
foraging
patrols accounted for three more warriors and one rifle
southeast of the
Kipsomoitei
camp.
Then the Nandi Kiptaiyet main force fell upon the column
near dark Company
IV
received the brunt of the Nandi attack when the Nandi got
between a patrol
sent west by
that company and the company. The Company IV was forced
to retire and send
for
reinforcements. IX Company was left to guard the camp and
the battered IV and
fresh V
Company were sent to relieve the Baganda irregulars who
had accompanied the IV
company section southeast of the camp near the Kimondi
River.
The relief companies could hear heavy firing as they
neared the battlefield.
Company
V was held in reserve while a section of Company IV was
detailed to secure the
bridge
across the river. The remaining three sections of IV
Company covered by the
Maxim
crossed the bridge and began climbing up the left bank.
It was then that the
Nandi
Kiptaiyet of 500 warrriors appeared. The warriors ran
straight at IV Company
wheeling
to the left. Ignoring the effects of the Maxim, the
warriors continued
forward until just
thirty yards from the Company IV line, they broke. The
section left at the
bridge crossed
over at the first warning and fired into the fleeing
warriors. V Company was
sent to cut
off the warrior's retreat, but was recalled due to the
growing darkness.
It had been a near run battle. It had looked at the
moment by observers that
the IV
Company sections would be over-run. But, the Sudanese
askaris and their
British
officers had stood their ground and both participants had
experienced the
capabilities of
the one another. The British learned something of the
Nandi discipline, elan,
and tactics,
and the Nandi learned something about the effectiveness
of the gunfire they
had never
experienced before. However, it had come at a cost to
both sides. The Nandi
lost over a
hundred warriors killed and the British lost fourteen
askaris and irregulars
killed,
including Sergeant Chongo.
On the morning of the 14th, IV and IX Companies were
sent out, but saw few of
the
enemy. Cunningham decided to move his camp across the
Kimondi to Kapkobis.
The
move was made with the loss of only one porter. The
column constructed a a
five foot
thorn enclosure which proved invaluable.
Just before dawn on the 17th, an alarm was given by the
sentries who
discovered a
large Nandi kiptaiyet that had crept within a hundred
yards of the enclosure.
Incredibly,
the warriors were not impressed by the earlier battle,
and were now attempting
a night
attack that had been so successful in the past. This
time however, the Nandi
discovered
that the fire power and thorn enclosure was too much to
overcome. Leaving one
dead
warrior, the Nandi retreated, but succeeded in carrying
off the wounded into
the night.
After determining that there were no Nandi close, the
column moved again on
the 17th
to a camp at Kipture. At this point large numbers of
Nandi warriors were
seen, and the
local villages were looted for food, but the Nandi did
not attack the column
as it moved.
On the 18th large demonstrations were made by the Nandi
that were dispersed by
skirmishers as the column moved forward to cross the
Mogong and Choimin
Rivers.
Pieces of bloodied cloth hung from the bridges as a sign
of defiance by the
Nandi. As the
column climbed up the valley of the Choimin large bodies
of Nandi were seen
and
disbursed by the Maxim and skirmishers from the IX
Company. The column
continued
until it was in a heavily populated area and camped on
Teito Hill. No attack
was
launched, but large herds of sheep and goats were seen
moving away from the
column.
The Nandi changed their tactics beginning on the 19th,
when the warriors
began
harrassing the column as it moved east through thick
forest., and wounded
several
animals and one man in an arrow attack on the column
during the night. On the
20th,
huge boulders were rolled upon the column as it descended
down a narrow trail
in the
Sagane Valley. That evening arrows rained down upon the
camp wounding one man
and
a cow. The Nandi arrows ceased when the Sudanese
returned fire into the
darkness.
The Nandi managed to spear two followers at a water hole
by evading the
sentries on the
21st.
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