William F Owen
“Organisation should be an expression of doctrine and doctrine should be an expression of experience.”
Lt Col Robert Leonhard –20031
A small amount of study will reveal that the vast majority of the world’s infantry units are organised along roughly the same lines. This is often interpreted as being indicative of certain well-founded principles. Close examination shows this to be less than certain.
Modern infantry organisations are essentially arbitrary, and underpinned with a rationale that supports the status quo. The size and shape of squads, platoons and companies, as we see them today, were and are far more shaped by cost, career, and manpower issues than they are by doctrine or tactics. For example, the operationally proven four-section platoon of 1918 had sunk to three sections by 1938, purely to satisfy economic constraints and the need to procure less automatic section weapons2.
This leads to a debate between soldier and accountant, where the soldier states that a section must be eight men, and the accountant then asks “can 6 men with the right equipment, do the same job as 8?”
Few have yet asked, “how do I best organise infantry to perform operations?” In fact the British Army did ask this question, but only in relation to operating in Northern Ireland, where they re-organised the platoon into the multiple, which was based on “bricks” of 4 men. This was only ever done in Northern Ireland and the question has to be asked, that if the platoon cannot operate in that environment, then how valid an operational grouping is it? Do you need to re-organise for urban operations? Current operational analysis strongly suggest that you might be forced go from rural to urban as part of the same action.
The first question that has to be asked is how many men can leaders control effectively? “Regardless of the technical ability to communicate with every formation or unit within the span of command, studies have shown that a ratio of more than four or five subordinates of command to one headquarters is the maximum that a commander can effectively manage.” – Army Doctrine Publication 2 – Command, paragraph 0411.
The above is telling, in two ways. Firstly it was the product of some detailed research by the British Army in the early 1980s and secondly because it reached exactly the same conclusions as the General Ivor Maxse, who was responsible for the British Armies pre-WW1 reorganisation.
So the first principle we have is that there should be a maximum of 5 sub units under each HQ.
The second key question to be asked is what is it I want my various units to be able to do? This is near impossible to answer, unless you have a method of operation already defined. But resources also limit what you can do, so this quickly becomes a circular argument. The answer would seem to lie in looking at existing practices and drawing conclusions from them, but beware. How operationally valid is it to have platoon advancing across country, bunker busting as it goes? This might be good training, but is it a good model for your organisation?
The third question is how will we know if we are achieving our aim - that is to seek effective principles on which to organise infantry? The answer would appear to be that you do not need to re-organise for different operations or conditions, and that operations have become quicker and simpler. If not, then perhaps the principles are not coherent.
It really isn’t important how many men are in a platoon or if you call X number of men a platoon. Making statements that “you cannot have 16 men in a platoon, because a platoon is 32,” gets the process nowhere. Therefore we aim for broad principles, not absolute numbers.
Every infantry training pamphlet since 1917 states that platoons and sections will have to be able to operate with less than the optimum number of men, so we should be able to organise any number of men into viable groupings.
The Fire-Team
The smallest viable grouping of men is 3. You would not give a task or mission to a smaller group. Take any number between 3 and 15 and see how you can organise that many into viable fire-teams of 3-5 men.
Examples:
6 men – worst case, and can either remain as one team or split to 2 x 3 teams.
11 men – 2 x 4 man teams with 1 x 3 man team.
There is good evidence this works. Special forces operate for extended periods of time in 4 or 5 man teams. The British Army recommended 3-5 men as the basis for a reconnaissance patrol for many years and this is certainly borne out by men like Sidney Jary, who, based on his operational experience, is emphatic that exercising control over more than 4 others at night, on a complex and dangerous task is asking for trouble3. ‘You, you and you’ is a powerfully simple basis. Since the first core function is “FIND”, it may be very sensible to base everything on a reconnaissance function.
We know that a 4-man team can maintain 24-hour observation4, indefinitely, using one man observing and one man on guard. Five men would find the task less arduous, but 3 would find it too arduous and would have to conduct the task with less security.
A basic infantry fire-team should have one belt fed weapon and a variety of others that complement each other. In terms of the current issue 5.56mm weapons: a belt fed weapon, such as FN-Minimi, SA-80, plus SA-80 with UGL and an LSW would seem about right.
Other weapons systems can also benefit from a fire-team approach. The GPMG is often crewed by 2 men in the light role. The No1 carries the gun at 10.9kg + 50 rounds = 12.37kg and the No2 carries 360 rounds 7.62mm link at 10.6kg plus his own weapon, so he’ll have close to an equal load. But, this means that the gun has only 410 rounds immediately available. If there were a No3 and 4, also carrying 360 rounds, then the gun would have 1,130 rounds immediately available.
If you use the same 4 men to crew 2 guns, then there are 820 rounds between the two guns. And, if one of the gun team loses a man it becomes impossible to support and fire the gun over much time and distance. In other words, the 4-man gun team has true redundancy and more fighting power. The penalty is the partial loss of the services of the two riflemen as specialist riflemen. It depends on whether you see the team as a rifle force supported by a machine gun or a machine gun force supported by riflemen.
Almost any support weapon system benefits from being grouped with 3-5 men.
The Fire-Team Group (FTG) (Platoon)
The fire-team group is 4 x fire-teams and a weapons-team. Four fire-teams allow for a 1st Echelon, a 2nd Echelon and a reserve. This adheres to the core functions of find, fix, strike, and exploit.
So, based on this, a full strength FTG is 30 men, - 6 groups of 5 men. (See diagram):
This suggests that a useful FTG is 4 x fire-teams, a fire GPMG support team, with an HQ. Does this mean a smaller platoon? The current establishment for the platoon is between 36 and 28 officers and men dependant on role5, so 30 men is not a manning challenge. Amateur mathematicians will note that if each group in a FTG is 4 men, then you have a total of 24. 4 x 24 is 96, and thus the same as 3 x 32. A 24 man FTG gives a company commander 4 manoeuvre units, rather than 3, and thus he can constitute a true reserve.
Nothing suggested here, is new6. It is merely an attempt at codifying an approach, already well examined by others, and proven in trials to have some considerable, though not absolute, merit7.
To those who say, “well there must be something to the 8-man section. Look at the Roman contubernium” a quick history lesson may prove useful. A contubernium 8 was in rough translation, a mess unit or “tentful”. This was purely an administrative grouping, for eating sleeping and the use of a mule for transport (one hopes). It was nothing to do with fighting. 8 men would not have lasted long on the battlefield of the day, and the basic manoeuvre unit was the cohort (460 men approx). Add to this that a contubernium was, in fact anywhere from 4-10 men and we see those who say, “Well look at the Romans,” are barking up the wrong tree.
Wilf Owen is a freelance writer and broadcaster. He is the author of Blackfoot Is Missing, Hutchinson, Pbk, £9.99.
Words:
1 Interview with author. Lt Col Leonhard is the author of “The Art of Manoeuvre”, “Fighting in Minutes” and “Principles of War for the Information Age.”
2 By 1918 each section had a Lewis Gun. By 1938 the BREN gun was introduced, but at only 3 per platoon.
3 Interview with author. Sandhurst Jan 14th 2003
4 HQ Infantry, Support Weapons Wing, Netheravon. Close Recce Course handbook 1989. and Hugh McManners, Falklands Commando.
5 This covers a description ranging from Armoured Infantry (36) to Lt Inf (V) (28)
6 Major (now Lt Col) A D Mason PARA, “Debate: Infantry Low Level Tactics”, ADTN 6. – and Maj (now Lt Col) Jim Storr KINGS “Exercise Sea Wall” BAR 119.
7 Op cit
8 William Smith, D.C.L., LL.D.: A Dictionary of Greek and Roman Antiquities, John Murray, London, 1875.