Joint Venture for the Restoration of Democracy in Haiti: the Organization of American States and United Nations Experience: 1991-1995 *

by William M. Berenson **

On September 29, 1991, the Haitian military under the command of General Raoul Cedras forcefully deposed the constitutionally elected government of President Jean Bertrand Aristide, who had taken office just eight months earlier. During the 1960s and 70s, when the golpe de estado was commonplace in Latin America, the change of government by extra-constitutional means in the OAS Member States, and particularly in Haiti, would have provoked little reaction by either the United Nations ("UN") or the Organization of American States ("OAS"). Yet the forceful removal of President Aristide in 1991 was to test the legal and structural capacity of those two institutions to become actively involved in efforts to restore constitutional democracy in Haiti as part of their evolving role in the post-Cold War order.

Although the response of the OAS was immediate, three long years of suffering for the Haitian people -- punctuated by broken promises, human rights violations, failed diplomatic efforts, and ineffective embargoes -- followed. Even the initial measures later taken by the UN Security Council to force the military to retreat to the barracks by requiring a world-wide embargo of Haiti together with the UN Secretary General's involvement in promoting a diplomatic solution proved futile. In the end, the Security Council had to resort to brute force -- the intervention in Haiti of a multi-national force directed by the United States acting pursuant to the Security Council's mandate -- to dislodge the usurpers and restore constitutional government to Haiti.

Some might be cynical about the length of time it took the UN and OAS to re-establish constitutional government in Haiti and the fact that it took the resources of the superpower to the north to place the knockout punch that brought Haiti's military dictatorship to its knees. Yet, there were too many positive developments in this less than perfect but ultimately successful joint UN/OAS response to the Haitian case to merit such cynicism.

First, the OAS, which had recently renewed its commitment to promote, nurture and protect democratic institutions in the hemisphere, demonstrated to the skeptics that it would not let traditional notions of "anti-interventionism" and sovereignty detract from its resolve to take actions consistent with that commitment. Second, the OAS and UN showed that they could work together under the existing legal machinery of the UN system to respond to threats to peace and security brought about by the unlawful usurpation of constitutional authority in a Member State. Third, the UN and OAS, by way of the OAS/UN Civilian Mission in Haiti, proved that they could mount a joint/venture -- drawing upon the comparative advantages of each Organization to the benefit of the over-all Mission to protect (to the extent possible) human rights pending the restoration of constitutional government. And most important, both the OAS and the UN showed that for the first time ever, the UN system, working within the framework of Chapters VII and VIII of the UN Charter could restore to authority a constitutionally elected government which had been forcefully removed from office. To understand the significance of these developments, it is useful first to summarize the legal/institutional context in which they occurred.

1. Structure

Although the OAS is a "regional agency" within the UN System, it is also the oldest public international organization in the World.2 The OAS traces its origins to the International Union of the American Republics established in 18893 and the Pan American Union ("PAU") established in 1910.4 At the Ninth Inter-American Conference held in Bogota in 1948, the American Republics adopted the OAS Charter, thus establishing the Organization of American States largely as we know it to day. Under Article 78 of that Charter, the PAU became the "central and permanent organ" of the OAS. As a result of the 1967 Buenos Aires Protocol to the Charter, the PAU disappeared and was replaced by the OAS General Secretariat ("GS/OAS").5

The OAS is made up of a number of Organs charged with carrying out its enumerated functions.6 The Supreme Organ is the General Assembly, which establishes general policy initiatives for the Organization and considers political questions of hemispheric significance as presented by the Member States and other OAS Organs.7 There is also a Permanent Council made up of permanent representatives (ambassadors) from the Member States. The Permanent Council is responsible for overseeing the ongoing administration of the Organization, treating policy questions entrusted to it by the General Assembly, and convoking meetings of other deliberative organs -- e.g., Special Meetings of the General Assembly, Meetings of Consultation.8 Its headquarters is in Washington, D.C. The executive organ is the General Secretariat, whose legal representative is the Secretary General elected by the General Assembly.9 An important organ for understanding the OAS' Role in the Haitian Crisis is the Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs ("Meeting of Consultation"). The function of that organ is to "consider problems of an urgent nature and of common interest to the American States and to serve as the Organ of Consultation."10 Other Organs of the Organization include, inter-alia, the Inter-American Human Rights Commission; the Inter-American Human Rights Court, the Inter-American Commission of Women, the Pan American Health Organization, Inter-American Children's Institute, the Inter-American Drug Control Commission, the Inter-American Telecommunications Commission ("CITEL"), and the Inter-American Juridical Committee.11

2. Commitment to Democracy

In Santiago in 1991, the OAS undertook a commitment to strengthen, preserve, and promote democratic governance and institutions in the hemisphere. Specifically, the Organization adopted Resolution AG/RES. 1080 (XXI-O/91) which requires the Secretary General to convoke a meeting of the Permanent Council

in the event of any occurrences giving rise to the sudden or irregular interruption of the democratic political institutional process or of the legitimate exercise of power by the democratically elected government in any of the Organization's Member States, in order, within the framework of the Charter, to examine the situation, decide on and convene an ad hoc meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, or a special session of the General Assembly, all of which must take place within a ten day period.

The Resolution goes on to provide that the Special General Assembly or ad hoc meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs convened by the Council shall "look into the events collectively and adopt any decisions deemed appropriate, in accordance with the Charter and international law.

The significance of this Resolution for the Organization was not that it recognized the critical importance of democracy for the inter-American System. Indeed, unlike the UN Charter, which makes no express commitment to defending democracy as a form of government, the OAS Charter establishes "the promotion and consolidation" of representative democracy as one of the Organization's "essential purposes" and reaffirms that the political organization of each Member State on the basis of representative democracy is a sine quae non of inter-American solidarity and the other "high aims" expressed in the Charter.12 Rather, the significance of Resolution 1080 was that it institutionalized a legitimate and viable procedure by which the Organization may consider taking measures to restore a democratic government or process which has been interrupted by extra-constitutional means.13

3. Rethinking of Traditional Notions of Non- interventionism

Without knowing more about the OAS Charter and the history of the Organization, one might still fail to see the significance of a General Assembly Resolution which simply establishes a process by which the Organization will determine what action to take, if any, in the case of a golpe de estado against a democratic government. The significance of the Resolution becomes clearer when viewed against the Organization's traditional commitment to non-interventionism and sovereignty.

Article 18 of the OAS Charter states:

No state or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any State. The foregoing principle prohibits not only armed force but also any other form of interference or attempted threat against the personality of the State or against its political, economic, and natural elements.

Similarly, the second paragraph of Article 1 of the Charter states:

The Organization of American states has no powers other than those expressly conferred upon it by this Charter, none of whose provisions authorize it to intervene in matters that are within the internal jurisdiction of the Member States.

Even the Organization's obligation to promote democracy under Article 2 of the Charter is tempered by the imperative of non-interventionism. Specifically, Article 2(b) provides that the Organization's purpose is to promote democracy, "with due respect for the principle of nonintervention."14

To those familiar with the long history of interventions by the United States Government in the internal affairs of the American republics, the emphasis on the inviolable sovereign rights of States and the principle of nonintervention in the Charter comes as no surprise. Unfortunately, however, unequivocal adherence to those principles has traditionally thwarted the ability of the OAS, by itself, to defend democracy or restore it in countries where it has been interrupted. And although Article 28 of the OAS Charter ("Collective Security") authorizes the OAS Member States collectively to redress any action which "endangers the peace of America" under prevailing treaties, and Article 22 of the Charter overrides the prohibition against nonintervention for the purpose of taking "measures adopted for the maintenance of peace and security in accordance with existing treaties," the OAS has been reluctant to construe inter-American treaties presently in force as permitting it to take coercive "measures" to restore a democratic constitutional government in a Member State where it has been forcefully deposed.15

Thus, there is an inherent tension within the Charter between the principle of nonintervention and the commitment to democracy. Up until recently, the tendency within the countries of the hemisphere has been to favor non-interventionism at the expense of democracy. The adoption of Resolution AG/RES. 1080 indicates the beginning of a possible shift in the balance towards democracy. The Haitian crisis provided the first test of that possibility.

4. Rethinking of Traditional Notions of State Sovereignty

The overwhelming commitment of the hemisphere to representational democracy has brought with it a rethinking of the concept of State sovereignty in the inter-American system. In that regard, Dr. Domingo Acevedo has observed:

For the members of the OAS, the notion that the illegal replacement of a democratically elected government is still a matter essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of its member states, and thus immune from international scrutiny, is no longer the axiomatic precept it once was, as recent practice unequivocally shows; the OAS dealt with the coup in Suriname in December 1990, the attempted coup in Venezuela in February 1992, and the so called autogolpe by the constitutional president of Peru in April 1992, and of Guatemala in May 1993.16

In each of those incidents cited by Dr. Acevedo, the OAS undertook collective action in varying degrees in the form of condemnatory resolutions and diplomatic mediation in response to threats against democratic governance.

The cases cited by Dr. Acevedo, the Haitian experience, the adoption of Resolution AG/RES. 1080, the signing of the Protocol of Washington, and related developments in the Inter-American system since 1989 are all proof that the governments of the Inter-American system may now take into account the manner by which a regime comes to power before recognizing it as the duly constituted authority of a Member State. This represents a significant departure from the traditional concept of State sovereignty, for which the existence of democratic governance is not a determining factor. Moreover, it reflects movement towards the notion that sovereignty derives exclusively from the will of the people expressed through the democratic process, and that a government that does not reflect that will by way of the democratic process cannot claim to be the sovereign authority of the State.17 Thus, no longer can the representatives of usurpers of representative democracy reasonably expect, as of right, to be accorded the recognition and rights of representatives of sovereign States within the Inter-American system.

Between the OAS and UN for Exercising Collective Action

Chapter VIII of the UN Charter (Articles 52-54) recognizes the important role of regional agencies, like the OAS, in the solution of regional controversies. Section 2 of Article 52 exhorts UN Member States who are also members of regional agencies to "make every effort to achieve the pacific settlement of local disputes by . . . such regional agencies before referring them to the Security Council."18 Article 53 encourages the Security Council, where appropriate, to utilize regional agencies for enforcement actions; however, it goes on to prohibit regional agencies from taking enforcement actions without the permission of the Security Council.19 Finally, Article 54 requires that regional agencies undertaking activities directed at maintaining international peace and security keep the Security Council informed of those activities at all times.

The OAS Charter gives full recognition to OAS' status as a regional agency in the UN system and its duty to act within the guidelines established under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter when taking action to resolve controversies affecting the peace and security of the region.20 The OAS' status as a regional agency in the UN System, however, does not make it subordinate to the UN. In fact, because it is the elder of the two organizations and because it can boast of a century-long record of providing an institutional structure in the Americas for promoting hemispheric solidarity and promoting the pacific solution of inter-American controversies, the OAS has insisted on equal status in the hemisphere with the Global Organization. In this regard, former Secretary General Joao Baena Soares has emphasized:

Cooperation between the OAS and the United Nations cannot be based on principles of hierarchy, for neither is dependent on or subordinate to the other. Nor may it be based on specialization, since both organizations are general in nature. To the contrary, it must recognize as its basis the community of purposes and principles between the two and the diversity of their competence . . . Collaboration between the OAS and the United Nations is a relationship of mutual support and benefit between organizations that operate independently in two different spheres of competency. It is the diversity of their competencies that makes it possible for them to cooperate.21

In the case of Haiti, the diversity of competencies of the two agencies noted by Baena Soares became ever so evident as the institutional response to the situation unfolded.22

A. Diplomacy, Recommended Sanctions, and Negotiations: The Initial Regional Effort of the OAS to Resolve the Problem: September 30, 1991 - December 13, 1992

The OAS was the first of the international organizations to react to the October 29, 1991 coup in Haiti. At the request of the Secretary General, the Permanent Council convened the very next day and adopted a resolution condemning the coup, demanding adherence to the constitution and respect for the democratically elected government, and convoking an ad hoc Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs pursuant to the mechanism established under Resolution AG/RES. 1080.23

The Ad Hoc Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs on Haiti ("Meeting of Foreign Ministers") met on October 2nd to begin for the first time in the OAS's history the process of facilitating the return of to power of a wrongfully deposed democratically elected head of State. After hearing President Aristide's recounting of the events, the Foreign Ministers adopted Resolution MRE/RES. 1/91 calling for a full restoration of the rule of law in Haiti and reinstatement of President Aristide; it also recommended that the Member States and other inter-American international organizations suspend their economic, financial, and commercial ties with Haiti. The Resolution requested the Secretary General to go to Haiti with a group of the Foreign Ministers "to inform those who hold power illegally that the American states reject the disruption of constitutional order and to advise them of the decisions adopted by the meeting." Finally, the Resolution urged the United Nations and its specialized agency "to consider its spirit and aims."24

Between October 4th and 8th, then Secretary General Baena Soares, accompanied by a distinguished group of Foreign Ministers, made three separate trips to Haiti. General Cedras and his supporters proved intransigent. On October 8th, the Meeting of Consultation renewed its deliberations in Washington, D.C., and at the urging of President Aristide, adopted MRE/RES. 2 authorizing the creation of a Civilian Mission ("OEA-DEMOC") to reestablish and strengthen constitutional democracy in Haiti. Resolution MRE/RES. 2 reaffirmed the provisions recommending an embargo and the virtual political, diplomatic, and economic isolation of Haiti. Significantly, it declared "that no government that may result from this illegal situation will be accepted," by the Organization, nor would any representative of that government be accepted, thereby reducing Cedras regime and its progeny to the status of "de facto" authorities. It also urged Member States to freeze the assets of the Haitian State, and impose an economic embargo.25

On October 11, 1991, the UN General Assembly reacted to the Haitian Crisis and the OAS Resolutions sent to it by adopting its own resolution strongly condemning the coup and violations of human rights in Haiti and urging UN Member States "to consider adoption of measures in keeping with those agreed on by the Organization of American States."26 The UN General Assembly specifically requested that the UN Secretary General consider providing support to the Secretary General of the Organization of American States in implementing the mandates arising from the OAS Meeting of Foreign Ministers. Like the OAS, it deemed any entity resulting from the coup illegal and called for restoration of the legitimate government of Aristide.

Subsequently, OAS Secretary General Baena Soares appointed former Colombian Foreign Minister Augusto Ram¡rez Ocampo to coordinate the OEA-DEMOC Mission authorized under MRE/RES. 2. The formal mandate of the mission was to "facilitate the reestablishment and strengthening of democratic institutions, the full force and enforcement of the Constitution, respect for the human rights of all Haitians, and to support the administration of justice and the adequate functioning of all the institutions that will make it possible to achieve these objectives."27 The Mission set out on the seemingly impossible task of paving the way for president Aristide's return. Early on, the mission established an ongoing dialogue with officials of the Haitian Parliament. Notwithstanding the indefagitable efforts of the OAS Secretary General, Minister Ocampo, and other members of the Mission, however, and several positive developments, the efforts of the Mission proved futile.28

In January 1992, the Secretary General took the initiative to invite to Washington for further discussions President Aristide, the President of the Senate, the President of the Chamber of Deputies, and Prime Minister designate Ren‚ Th‚odore. The result was the Protocols of Washington, which consisted of two separate agreements. The first, was signed by Aristide, the President of the Senate, and the President of the Chamber of Deputies. It called for the reinstatement of Aristide as president (without a fixed date for the return), the selection of a prime minister by Aristide in consultation with the President of the Senate and President of the Chamber of Deputies, the reestablishment of democratic institutions and civil liberties, a general amnesty, and the separation of the armed forces from the police. It further called for the lifting of the sanctions imposed under MRE/RES. 2 upon the installation of the Prime Minister and Government of "national consensus," assistance from the international community to revitalize the Haitian economy, and the establishment of OEA/DEMOC in Haiti to guarantee civil liberties and the oversee the observance of basic human rights.

President Aristide and Ren‚ Th‚odore signed the second Protocol. Like the first, it recognized President Aristide as the legitimate Chief of State and the need to form a national government of consensus. It also provided that the President and Prime Minister would closely collaborate in forming a new government, professionalizing the military, seeking economic support from the international community, and lifting the embargo recommended by MRE/RES. 2/91. The Parties executed the Protocols in the presence of Secretary General Baena Soares on February 25, 1992.

The protocols raised hopes in the OAS of an imminent solution to the Haitian Crisis which could be credited to the Organization's speedy and dedicated response within the framework of Resolution 1080. But those hopes were unexpectedly dashed when a Haitian court declared the Protocols illegal in March 1992, and the protocols were not ratified by the Parliament.

In reaction to these events, the OAS Permanent Council convened on April 1st and issued a Resolution condemning the de facto government's failure to ratify the protocols. It further recommended that Governments take measures to tighten the embargo and to deny port facilities to any ship that failed to observe it.29

The Ministers of Foreign Relations met again in May 1992 to re-evaluate the situation. They adopted Resolution MRE/RES. 3 urging the strengthening of the embargo and additional sanctions, including the denial of entry visas issued to perpetrators and supporters of the coup, the freezing of their assets, and the denial of port facilities to any vessel that ignores the embargo. This Resolution, like its predecessors, had little impact on the intransigence of the de facto authorities.

Early in September 1992, OAS Secretary General Baena Soares finally succeeded in negotiating with the de facto authorities arrangements for the establishment of a resident civilian OEA-DEMOC mission in Haiti. The mandate of the mission was "to contribute to the reduction in violence, to encourage respect for human rights, to assist in the distribution of humanitarian aid, and to assess the progress made towards a political solution of the crisis."30 Although there were initial plans to send as many as five hundred observers to be stationed throughout Haiti, the de facto government limited the initial contingent to eighteen. The OAS Secretary General appointed a diplomat from Trinidad and Tobago, Colin Granderson, as chief of mission. The mission proved largely ineffective during 1992 because of its number and because the de facto authorities prohibited its movement outside of Port-au-Prince.

Frustrated by the poor results of the mission and the persistence intransigence of the de facto authorities in Haiti, the OAS Permanent Council adopted Resolution CP/RES. 594 on November 10, 1992, requesting United Nations participation in the OAS Civilian Mission. The Resolution encouraged "the United Nations Secretary General to continue collaborating with the OAS Secretary General in distributing humanitarian assistance to the Haitian People" and requested the Secretary General of the United Nations to keep the OAS Secretary General informed of UN resolutions relating to the Haitian question. The Resolution also called for additional UN support for the Embargo, as permitted within the framework of the UN Charter.

The Response of the United Nations to this Resolution was two-fold. First, on November 24, 1992, the General Assembly adopted Resolution A/47/20. That Resolution reaffirmed the provisions of its Resolution 45/7 of October 11, 1991, affirmed that the solution of the crisis in Haiti should take place within the framework established by the Resolutions adopted by the OAS Ministers of Foreign Relations, urged UN Member States to support the embargo, called for increased humanitarian aid, and requested the UN Secretary General "to take the necessary measures in order to assist, in cooperation with the Organization of American States, in the solution of the Haitian crisis." Second, on December 11, 1992, the UN Secretary General appointed former Foreign Minister Dante Caputo to serve as his personal envoy in seeking the solution.31 OAS Secretary General Baena Soares, who had initially resisted increased UN involvement, went along with the appointment and announced on January 13, 1993, that he had made Dante Caputo his special envoy as well.32

Partially in reaction to the UN General Assembly Resolution A/47/20, the OAS Meeting of Foreign Ministers met again in mid-December 1992 and adopted Resolution MRE/RES. 4. In that Resolution, the Foreign Ministers directed the Secretary General to explore the possibility and advisability of bringing the Haitian situation to the attention of the UN Security Council as a means of bringing about global application of the trade embargo recommended by the OAS." (Emphasis added). It further instructed the Secretary General "to make an additional effort with all Haitian sectors, as a matter of urgency and in close cooperation, if need be, with the UN Secretary General, to facilitate serious dialogue among them." Finally, it called for a tightening of the recommended embargo, a substantial increase in the OAS civil presence in Haiti, and increased support from the UN in all those objectives. Like Permanent Council CP/RES. 594 of November 10, 1992, Resolution MRE/RES. 4 recognized that regional efforts alone were not sufficient to end the crisis in Haiti, and that a more concerted Global effort with the active participation of the United Nations was necessary for bringing closure to the crisis.

The adoption of Resolutions CP/RES. 594, A/74/20, and MRE/RES. 4, together with the appointment of Dante Caputo as the special envoy of both the UN and OAS Secretaries General marked the end of the first stage of the response of the UN system to the Haitian Crisis. Up until that time, the tone of the response and the measures taken were dictated by the regional agency -- the OAS -- within the context of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. The UN had been content to sit patiently on the sidelines and to voice its symbolic support of the efforts taken by the OAS. By the end of November 1992, however it was clear that the OAS, working within the limits of the inter-American system alone, could not achieve its prime objectives of restoring the constitutionally elected government of President Aristide to power or of protecting the human rights of the Haitian people pending that restoration. The reasons were several. First, the sanctions set out in the several Resolutions of the OAS were non-compulsory. The Member States were unwilling to stretch the limits of the Charter or TIAR so as to permit the use of mandatory sanctions in the case of the overthrow of a Member Government by internal elements. Second, even if mandatory economic sanctions by the OAS Member States could have been applied, it is unlikely that they would have brought the de facto authorities to their knees. In a world-economy, of which Haiti is a part, an effective embargo requires world-wide participation. Third, no amount of rhetoric condemning or deploring the removal of Aristide by way of the coup was going to persuade General Cedras and those who supported him to permit President Aristide's return.

Notwithstanding the failure of the inter-American system to achieve the desired result, however, its efforts were not entirely futile. Through the negotiations spearheaded personally by Ambassador Baena Soares and several Foreign Ministers, the basic framework of the response to be followed by the UN, acting as the "managing partner" in a joint venture with the OAS to address the Haitian crisis, was firmly established. In the months that followed, the UN would pursue jointly with the OAS the effort to strengthen the presence of the Civil Mission in Haiti for protecting the human rights of the Haitian people. The embargo recommended by the OAS would ripen into a mandatory sanction imposed with the authority of the UN Security Council. And the dialogue initiated by the OAS with the Parliament and other civilian politicians would extend to include the de facto authorities and would result in tentative solutions markedly similar to that which the OAS had first mediated in the February 1992 Protocols of Washington.

It cannot be denied that as of January 1993, there was a shift in the overall management of the crisis from the OAS, the regional agency, to the UN.33 Nonetheless, the OAS continued to serve as an active partner in the process -- proposing measures through its Permanent Council, the Meeting of Foreign Ministers, and its Secretary General; promoting negotiations with the de facto authorities for the return of Aristide; and most significantly, participating as an essential partner in the Human Rights monitoring of the OAS/UN Civilian Mission which evolved for OAS-DEMOC in April 1993. Before turning to a discussion of UN/OAS joint venture in operating that mission, a discussion of the primary decisions of the UN and OAS during the January 1993-June 1995 period is in order.

Meeting in Managua in June 1993, the OAS Foreign Ministers adopted MRE/RES. 5/93 which urged the Member States to tighten the embargo, particularly with regard to petroleum and related products. It also encouraged the institutionalization of a Special Committee within the Permanent Council to oversee compliance with the Embargo and make regular reports to the Permanent Council on its implementation. Finally, it urged intensified efforts in the area of human rights monitoring, humanitarian assistance, and support for the work of the special envoy and the OAS/UN Civilian Mission.

Several days later, on June 16, 1993, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution S/RES/841. Adopted at the urging of France, the United States, and Venezuela, President Aristide, and the OAS, that Resolution imposed an embargo on the shipment of petroleum-related products, arms, and military equipment to Haiti.34 In promulgating that Resolution, the Security Council emphasized that it was acting in accordance with Chapter VII of the UN Charter and in light of "the need for effective cooperation between regional organizations and the United Nations" reflected in Chapter VIII of that Charter. It further noted that the application of sanctions in this instance "defines a unique and exceptional situation warranting extraordinary measures by the Security Council in support of the efforts undertaken within the framework of the Organization of American States.35

The force of the embargo proved sufficient to persuade General Cedras to come to New York and negotiate under the auspices of the United Nations the Governor's Island Agreement. Signed on July 3, 1993, that Agreement provided for the return of President Aristide to Haiti as its constitutionally elected President by October 30, 1993, the resignation of General Cedras shortly before that return, the establishment of a temporary international police force in Haiti to "modernize" and professionalize the army, and the appointment of a new Police Chief in Port-au-Prince by Aristide, Most of the other provisions were strikingly similar to those set out in the Protocol of Washington negotiated with the assistance of OAS Secretary General Baena Soares some sixteen months earlier in February 1992: i.e., the appointment of a "consensus" prime minister by Aristide and the Parliament; amnesty for the political coup leaders; a significant increase in international economic assistance for rebuilding Haiti; suspension of the embargo following appointment of the new Prime Minister of consensus. Finally, it called for the establishment of a political dialogue between the political parties represented in Parliament and a Presidential Commission "under the auspices of the United Nations and the Organization of American States" in order to agree on a political truce to enable a peaceful transition to democratic government, and for verification of compliance by the OAS and UN. 36

On July 17th, representatives of the Haitian "political forces," meeting at the UN in New York, reached an Agreement for a six-month political truce in Haiti known as the "New York Pact." The purpose of the Pact was to enable the Parliament to resume its normal functioning. It included provisions for the early confirmation of the Prime Minister of consensus; the release of persons detained for political offenses, the establishment of a compensation commission for victims of the coup, a commitment to adopt emergency measures for the establishment of a new Police Force, amnesty, the abolition of all paramilitary forces, the establishment of an ombudsman's office, and the reform of the administration of justice system. The Pact called for the resignation of members of Parliament elected under the illegitimate elections held in January 1993. Finally, it entrusted the OAS and UN with verification of compliance.37

By the end of August 1993, significant progress had been made towards compliance with the Agreement and New York Pact. Aristide had nominated, and the Parliament had confirmed, the appointment of Robert Malval as the Prime Minister of Consensus. On August 27th, the OAS Secretary General, after consulting with the Permanent Council and the President of the Meeting of Foreign Ministers, announced the lifting of the OAS embargo. On that same day, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution S/RES. 861 suspending the UN embargo imposed under Resolution S/RES. 841 the previous June.38

At the request of the Government of Haiti, the UN began preparations for establishing a Mission in Haiti ("UNMIH") to implement the provisions in the Governors Island Agreement for the professionalization and modernization of the military and police force. On August 30th, the Security Council authorized the deployment of an advance team to assess UNMIH's requirements,39 and on September 23, 1993, it adopted Resolution S/RES. 867 authorizing the establishment of the mission in accordance with the UN Secretary General's recommendations based on the advance team's report.40 That Resolution called for a Mission of 567 UN police monitors, a military construction unit of approximately 700, and 60 military trainers. It characterized the Mission as a "Peace-keeping mission" within the UN and accepted the UN Secretary General's recommendation to place UNMIH under the control of the Special Envoy of the UN and OAS Secretaries-General, Dante Caputo. The Resolution went on to express the Security Council's "appreciation for the constructive role of the Organization of American States in cooperation with the United Nations in promoting the solution of the political crisis and the restoration of democracy in Haiti," and stressed "the importance of ensuring close coordination between the United Nations and the Organization of American States in their work in Haiti."41

Notwithstanding the good-faith efforts of the civilian authorities and the OAS and UN to keep to the time-table established in the New York Pact and Governors Island Agreement, the level of violence against civilians and disregard for basic human rights in Haiti escalated during September and October 1993. On September 11th, a financial supporter and friend of President Aristide, Antoine Izm‚ry, was assassinated. The Front for the Advance and Progress of Haiti ("FRAPH"), a paramilitary group with links to elements of the military and police, stepped of activities of intimidation against members of Parliament, merchants, and other civilians.42 On October 11th, a group of armed civilians prevented the landing of members of the UNMIH dispatched on board the US Harlan County in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution S/RES/867. On October 14th, the Minister of Justice, Guy Malary, was assassinated, shortly after having made public the draft law on the separation of the police from the military.

During the September/October period, the OAS Permanent Council met several times to issue declarations repudiating these events of violence.43 The United Nations Security Council met on October 13th to reimpose the embargo it had lifted on August 30th.44 At the request of President Aristide, it met again on October 16th and strengthened the embargo by making it compulsory.45 Also, as a result of these events, the UN Secretary General made the decision to evacuate OAS/UN MICIVIH on October 15th because the security of the observers was no longer guaranteed.46 The return of President Aristide to Haiti, programmed under the Governors Island Agreement to occur by October 30th, was indefinitely postponed.

From the end of October through to early May 1994, there was no significant progress in implementing the Governors Island Agreement. The OAS and UN continued contacts with the civilian authorities in order to view alternative solutions, but President Aristide stood firm in his insistence on the terms of the Governors Island Agreement and the military refused to participate in the dialogue.47

On May 6, 1994, in response to a proposal to the United States to place more pressure on the Haitian military, the Security Council adopted Resolution S/RES. 917 expanding the embargo on petroleum products to cover not only petroleum products, military equipment, and arms, but also most other goods. Resolution S/RES. 917 called for denying visas to and freezing the assets of any participants in the coup of 1991, police and military offices, and their families and employees. It called for all flights to and from Haiti, except for regularly scheduled commercial flights. It further called for extending the UN embargo to include measures previously recommended by the OAS Ministers of Foreign Relations in their resolutions. As it had done in its earlier Resolutions, the Security Council expressly based its decisions on its authority under both Chapters VII and VIII of the Charter.48

The increase in the intensity of the embargo had no perceptible impact on the intransigence of the military in Haiti. Thus, at the urging of Argentina, Canada, France and the United States, the Security Council adopted Resolution S/RES. 940 on July 31, 1994, authorizing formation of a multinational force under unified command and control to "use all necessary means to facilitate the departure from Haiti of the military leadership consistent with the Governors Island Agreement."49 The Resolution also provided for the creation of a small advance team of UNMIH so as to develop a plan for taking over from the Multi-national Force ("MNF") once the environment was sufficiently secure in Haiti to continue with UNMIH's original objectives. Finally, the Resolution broadened UNMIH's mission to include assisting the Haitian government "in establishing an environment conducive to the organization of free and fair legislative elections . . . monitored by the United Nations, with the Cooperation of the Organization of American States."

One and one half months passed before the MNF, under the central command of the United States, entered Haiti on September 18, 1994.50 The arrival of the MNF was unopposed by the Haitian military as the result of a last minute agreement worked out between a special team of high-level negotiators sent by U.S. President William Clinton and General Raoul Cedras. The agreement provided that the MNF would enter Haiti under conditions of mutual respect and with the close cooperation of the Haitian Military and police; that high ranking offices of the military were to retire upon the earlier of Parliament's enactment of a general amnesty law or by October 15th; and that the sanctions under UN resolutions would be lifted.

Accordingly, on September 29, 1993, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution S/RES. 948 lifting all "measures imposed against Haiti" under its earlier Resolutions. The Security Council Resolution suggested that the OAS adopt a similar measure, and by October 14, 1994, the OAS had lifted all sanctions against Haiti imposed under its prior resolutions.51 President Aristide returned to Port-au-Prince the following day to pick up the pace of creating a more hospitable environment for democracy in Haiti already initiated through the joint efforts of the OAS and UN.

On January 30, 1995, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution S/RES. 975 welcoming "positive developments in Haiti" and concluding that "a secure and stable environment appropriate to the deployment of UNMIH . . . now exists in Haiti." The Resolution went on to extend the mandate of UNMIH and called for the Secretary General to work closely with the MNF commander towards transferring the MNF's remaining responsibilities to UNMIH by March 31, 1995.52 Furthermore, the Resolution recognized the importance of the work of the OAS in creating a more stable environment in Haiti through its participation in the MICIVIH and requested that the UN Secretary General "bearing in mind the expertise and potential of the OAS, consult with the Secretary General of the OAS regarding other appropriate measures which might be taken by both organizations consistent with this resolution."

On March 31, 1995, the transfer of responsibilities from the MNF to UNMIH took place in an official ceremony at the National Palace at Port-au-Prince. President William Clinton, the UN Secretary General, and President Aristide attended the ceremony. Since then, UNMIH has continued its work police and military training.53 Moreover, UNMIH has continued to help in providing a more secure environment throughout the country to facilitate reconstruction, democratic institution building, investment, and the observance of human rights.54

Meeting at the OAS General Assembly in Haiti in June 1995, the Ad Hoc Meeting of Ministers, which had first convened on October 2, 1991, to engineer the OAS Response to the Crisis, met for the last time. In its final resolution on the Haitian question, it noted that Resolution AG/RES. 1080 had provided the framework through which the OAS Member States had been able to respond immediately to supporting the "Haitian People's heroic resistance to the dictatorship." It noted that the international community, through the UN and OAS, "had responded to the appeal of the Haitian Government by taking the necessary steps to reinstate the constitutional government of the people of Haiti," and noted that with the return of President Aristide on October 15, 1994, the rule of law had been restored in that country. The Resolution congratulated all the participants in the international community who had contributed to the successful restoration of democracy in Haiti, and called upon the international financial institutions to reinvigorate the Haitian economy. Finally, it ratified the lifting of the Sanctions which had been authorized by the Permanent Council back in October 1994, and it formally closed "the Ad Hoc Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs on Haiti."55

No review of the OAS/UN Joint Venture in Haiti would be complete without a discussion of the OAS/UN Joint Civilian Mission in Haiti, the so-called MICIVIH.56 The organization of and management of the Mission was a case of "first impression" for both UN and OAS management. Never before had either organization engaged in a joint operation of this magnitude and nature with another international organization.57

The MICIVIH was the successor to OAS-DEMOC, the commission of 18 human rights observers sent to Port-au-Prince by Secretary General Baena Soares in September 1992. In February 1993, Dante Caputo, the joint envoy of the UN and OAS Secretaries Generals began negotiating with the de facto authorities for the establishment of a much larger mission of human rights monitors and observers in Haiti -- approximately 200 observers and additional support staff. On the basis of an understanding reached by Caputo on February 9, 1993, with the de facto Prime Minister, the OAS Secretary General dispatched 40 observers to begin the substantive work of for the Mission.58 In the meantime, the UN Secretary General sent an advance team including three human rights experts, security personnel, and field operations experts for the purpose of developing a plan for the employment of the much larger mission.

While the UN continued its meticulous planning of the operation, the OAS observers were already in the field. In one well-known incident which occurred on February 25th, their intervention allowed participants in a Mass in memory of the victims of the tragic sinking of the ferry Neptune escape physical violence from a gang of over fifty ruffians.59

In early April, the UN Secretary General presented his proposal for the joint OAS/UN MICIVIH to the Fifth Committee of the UN General Assembly. At that time, as the UN Secretary General's presentation indicated, the OAS already had 100 observers in the field and had rented offices in most of the provinces.60

The Plan stated that the Mission's main objective would be "to verify respect for human rights as laid down in the Haitian Constitution and in the instruments to which Haiti is a party, in particular, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the American Convention on Human rights." It proposed that the Mission "would include a United Nations and an OAS contingent of observers of equal strength, and every effort would be made to coordinate and to harmonize the functioning of both groups in carrying out the mandate of the mission. It further suggested that each organization would be responsible for the costs of its own international staff and would work out an arrangement for sharing other costs. The Mission staffing, according to the Plan, could expand to include as many as 133 human rights observers from each organization and an additional seventy international administrators from the UN. The Budget for 1993 was estimated to be approximately $23 million.

The UN General Assembly approved the Secretary General's Plan in mid-April,61 and the UN began its mobilization efforts in earnest. One of the first tasks was establishing the structure for coordinating the mission. To that end, the OAS General Secretariat and the United Nations entered into a Memorandum of Understanding on May 6, 1993("MOU"). Article I of the MOU established the official name of the Mission as the "International Civilian Mission to Haiti OAS/UN" and stated that the headquarters of the mission would be Port-au-Prince, Haiti.

Article II of the MOU specified who would be responsible for appointing key personnel in the Mission. It stated that the Special envoy would be jointly appointed by both Secretaries General, but would be under contract with the United Nations. The Executive Director position was similarly to be filled by the appointee of both Secretaries General, but would be under Contract with the GS/OAS. The Director of Human rights was to be appointed by the UN Secretary General, in consultation with the OAS Secretary General, and would be a UN employee. The Agreement went on to state that other substantive officers -- i.e., administrators, public relations officers, legal officers -- would be apportioned between both Organization, and each would contract with those apportioned to it. Each Party would contract with the human rights observers that each provided, and each was obligated to provide and contract with regional coordinators in equal numbers. Similarly, each party was to be responsible for contracting with its own administrative staff, and local staff was to be contracted in accordance with a mutually acceptable salary scale to be agreed upon later. Each Organization would apply its own personnel rules to those persons it contracted.

As for goods and services consumed by the Mission, Article III provided that the Executive Director would determine the Mission's procurement needs and the decision as to which party would be responsible for providing what goods would be taken "on an ad hoc basis subject to available resources." Each party would apply its own rules in procuring goods and services for the mission, and goods purchased by a Party, such as vehicles and other machinery, would be owned by the purchasing Party but made available for the entire mission. Each party assumed the obligation of insuring its own property and carrying sufficient insurance against third-party claims.62

To negotiate the MOU, each Secretary General had appointed a team of specialists and ranking officials. After the MOU was signed, the teams continued to meet periodically as a joint management oversight committee to resolve issues requiring joint decisions not entirely addressed in the MOU. For example, early on in the mission, the OAS absorbed a disproportionate amount of the expenses because it was able to mobilize a large number of observers and vehicles in the field and rent offices for the Mission long before the UN had any significant presence. After exploring a number of alternatives for cost sharing on vehicles, local staffing, and other common concerns, it was agree in July 1993 that costs would be allocated on the assumption that the OAS would assume approximately thirty percent. As for local personnel, the Parties agreed that the UN would administer and pay local staff and that the OAS, instead of reimbursing 30% of the cost to the UN, would assume full responsibility for the rent of the offices and accommodations of the Mission, to the extent that cost did not exceed 30% of the local personnel costs.

In the field, the Executive Director, who was an OAS contractor appointed by both Secretaries General, was responsible for decisions involving day-to-day problems. Teams of observers deployed in the nine departments and several branch officers in Port-au-Prince (13 in all) were integrated with relatively equal numbers of UN and OAS observers. At first, because of the higher salaries paid by the UN to its personnel, there was some tension between personnel from the two missions. A decision by the OAS to adjust the salaries of its personnel to approximate more closely the salaries of the corresponding UN staff resolved that problem.

By the summer of 1993, the UN observers had begun to arrive in large numbers and the size of the mission approached 200 observers. Still, there was a shortage of vehicles caused by the delays in the shipment of UN vehicles assigned to the Mission in route from Cambodia and unexpected delays in UN procurements. The vehicle shortage limited maximum deployment of observers in some of the regional offices.

The success of the mission was mixed due largely to lack of support by the military. In many instances, the presence of the observers saved Haitians from violent physical abuse and other human rights violations. In general, the number of illegal arrests decreased as a result of the observers' presence. Nonetheless, many attempts to inspect prisons and other locals were thwarted by the military. Similarly, efforts to have prosecutors and judges investigate crimes failed, most likely because of military or paramilitary intervention.63

Relations with the military deteriorated markedly after the signing of the Governors Island accord, and after the first UNMIH deployment was turned back by armed civilians on October 11th, the UN made the decision to evacuate the Mission to the Dominican Republic until such time as its security could be better guaranteed. In January 1994, a small advance team of 25 observers returned to Haiti. Nonetheless, the military refused to recognize the legality of the Mission, refused to respond to its correspondence, and limited its movement. Under those circumstances, the Mission could have little impact. On July 13, 1994, the de facto authorities expelled the Mission, largely in a show of protest over the UN Security Council's decision to impose a full embargo against Haiti a month earlier.64

After the intervention of the MNF in September 1994, the MICIVIH returned to Haiti on October 1994 with 13 observers. It proceeded to open 12 regional offices, together with a headquarters in Port-au-Prince. The number of observers reached 196 in September 1995, but by February 1996, its number had been reduced to 64 -- 32 each from UN and OAS respectively.

During 1994, the MICIVIH's mandate expanded from monitoring and documenting the human rights situation to include the implementing of a pilot civil education programme, assisting a Truth Commission and the newly established Human Rights Bureau in the Ministry of the Interior, participating in a Solidarity Plan for communal governance, and contribution to the election observation efforts. MICIVIH has also been monitoring judicial and penal reforms, and making recommendations as appropriate for improved judicial training. For 1996, the reduced MICIVIH will focus on two programs: technical assistance in creating institutions for observing and evaluating human rights; and the development of a program for the promotion and protection of human rights. Its former human rights monitoring functions are likely to be absorbed by other domestic and international human rights organizations.65

No one can deny that the Mission's presence in the February to October 1993 period had an impact on improving the human rights situation for many Haitians. Their plight during that period was deplorable; but without the Mission, it would have been worse. Similarly, since its full return to Haiti in October 1994, the accomplishments of the Mission in making recommendations for the reform of the judicial system and other institutions related to human rights and its participation as human rights observers in five elections has made a difference to the status of human rights and improved the climate for democratic development in that country.

Equally significant about the Mission, however, is the role it has played in establishing improved linkages for cooperation between the OAS and the UN. The Mission demonstrated that a joint venture between the regional agency and global agency was not only possible, but could function taking into account the comparative advantages of both. In the beginning of the operations, the OAS General Secretariat was quick to obtain personnel, supplies, and vehicles and move them into the field. It showed its agility -- operating as an initial strike force in establishing the beachhead for the Mission. In the meantime, the UN was slowly building up its momentum and establishing a more detailed substantive work plan and guidelines for staffing and managing logistical problems for a more mature and more securely funded operation. The Mission benefitted from the UN's planning, its resources, and its experience. But it also benefitted by the flexibility and agility of the smaller and more wiry OAS General Secretariat. Certainly, during the course of the operations, the Organizations have had their differences. But none have proved insurmountable, and as of this writing, the joint venture is still a going concern.

The experience of the OAS and UN in Haiti potentially represents a milestone in the development of international organizations for several reasons. First, as stated at the outset, it shows that international organizations are capable of mobilizing to restore and rebuild democracy in Member States where it has been wrongfully usurped, notwithstanding the prohibitions of non-interventionism and concerns of state sovereignty contained both in the OAS and UN Charters. Second, it demonstrates that the system established in Chapters VII and VIII of the UN Charter for redressing a breach of the peace and threats to security through partnership with a regional agency can work. The Haitian situation provided an opportunity to test the limits of the system, and it now stands as a textbook case. Finally, the Haitian case presented both the UN and OAS General Secretariat with the challenge of entering into new areas of cooperation in establishing a joint enterprise, through the OAS/UN MICIVIH, to take on the vital and most sensitive task of monitoring human rights in Haiti. And to the surprise of many, both institutions demonstrated that they were equal to that challenge.

April 10, 1996

* This paper was presented at the Conference on the United Nations Regional Organizations and Military Operations, co-sponsored by the Center on Law Ethics and National Security, Duke University School of Law, and The Center for National Security Law, University of Virginia, on April 13, 1996.

** The author is currently Acting Assistant Secretary for Legal Affairs and Director of the Department of General Legal Services of the Organization of American States. The views expressed are his alone and do not necessarily reflect those of his employer. The author wishes to express his deepest thanks to Dr. Ruben Farje of the Department of General Legal Services, who assisted in collecting and organizing the primary sources referenced in this article.

2 See the Charter of the Organization of American States ("OAS Charter"), Art. 1.

3 The full name, adopted by Resolution of the First Inter-American Conference on March 29, 1990, was "the International Union of the American Republics for the Prompt Compilation and Distribution of Data on Commerce," and its permanent Secretariat in Washington was the "Commercial Office of the American Republics." See L. Rowe, Conferencias Internacionales Americanas 1889-1936 (Washington, 1938), at p. 36.

4 See Minutes of the Fourth Inter-American Conference, Buenos Aires, 1910, in Id., at pp. 181-88.

5 Since 1967, the OAS Member States have voted to amend the Charter three more times. The Protocol of Cartagena of the Indies was adopted in 1985 and went into force in November 1988. That Protocol gave the OAS Secretary General authority similar to that held by the UN Secretary General under Article 99 of the UN Charter. Article 99 authorizes the Secretary General to bring to the attention of the UN Security Council "any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security." Similarly Article 109 of the OAS Charter, as amended by the Protocol of Cartagena and subsequent Protocol of Managua (which entered into force on January 29, 1996) authorizes the OAS Secretary General to "bring to the attention of the General Assembly or Permanent Council any matter which in his opinion might threaten the peace and security of the Hemisphere or the development of the Member States."

The Member States adopted the Protocol of Washington in 1992; and at the time of this writing, it requires six additional ratifications to take effect. That protocol provides that a Member State "whose democratically constituted government has been overthrown by force may be suspended from the exercise of the right to participate" in the OAS by a two-thirds vote of the Member States. See Protocol of Amendments to the Charter of the Organization of American States, "Protocol of Washington," adopted at Washington, D.C. on December 14, 1992, at the Sixteenth Special Session of the General Assembly (OAS 1996).

6 OAS Charter, Art. 52.

7 Each Member State has one vote in the General Assembly. The General Assembly has one regular meeting each year, where the Organization's budget is established and other issues of hemispheric importance are considered. The Charter allows for additional meetings of the General Assembly, which are called "Special Meetings." OAS Charter, Arts. 53-59.

8 OAS Charter, Article 90.

9 OAS Charter, Arts. 108-12.

10 OAS Charter, Arts. 60-68. Each Member State has one vote at the Meeting of Consultation and is represented by its Minister of Foreign Affairs or a "special representative" in the event the minister is unable to attend. OAS Charter, Art. 63. The Meeting of Consultation also serves as the Organ of Consultation under the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance ("TIAR"), which provides a legal basis for taking "measures", including "armed force." to counter armed aggression or any "other fact or situation than may endanger the peace of the Americas." OAS Charter, Art. 64; See Rowe, op. cit., Segundo Supplemento, 1945-54, "Conferencia Interamericana para el Mantenimiento de la Paz y la Seguridad del Continente, Rio de Janeiro," Agosto 15-Setiembre 2, 1947, pp. 92-98

11 The Member States cannot agree on whether the Inter-American Defense Board is indeed an Organ under Art. 52 of the Charter. Regardless of its status, however, the Defense Board is a player in the Inter-American System. It receives most of its budget from the OAS General Assembly and its offices are in a building owned by the OAS General Secretariat in Washington, D.C.

12 The third and fourth preambles states:

Convinced that representative democracy is an indispensable condition for stability, peace and development of the region.

(Emphasis added).

Confident that the true significance of American solidarity and good neighborliness can only mean the consolidation on this continent, within the framework of democratic institutions, of a system of individual liberty and social justice based on respect for the essential rights of man.

Similarly, Article 2 of the OAS Charter states:

The Organization of American States . . . proclaims the following essential purposes . . . b) to promote and consolidate representative democracy, with due respect for the principle of nonintervention . . . .

Article 3 of the OAS Charter provides:

The American States reaffirm the following principles:

. . . .

The solidarity of the American States and the high aims which are sought through it require the political organization of those States on the basis of the effective exercise of representative democracy.

13 The Protocol of Washington, which authorizes the Organization to suspend a Member State whose government has been overthrown by force, will provide the Organization with yet another tool for discouraging irregularities in representative democracy.

14 Article 18 is just one of several articles in Chapter IV of the Charter on the "Fundamental Rights and Duties of States" which limit measures that may be taken by one State against another. They include:

Article 20: The territory of a State is inviolable; it many not be the object, even temporarily, of military occupation or of other measures of force taken by another State, directly or indirectly, on any grounds whatever . . . .

Article 21: The American States bind themselves in their international relations not to have recourse to the use of force, except in the case of self-defense in accordance with existing treaties or in fulfillment thereof.

Article 19: No state may use or encourage the use of coercive measures of an economic or political character in order to force the sovereign will of another State and obtain from it advances of any kind.

15 There is a reasonable legal argument, however, that TIAR permits such action. Articles 6 and 7 of TIAR authorizes the Organ of Consultation to meet immediately in the event of, inter alia, "any other fact or situation that might endanger the peace of the Americas" to adopt "measures which should be taken for the common defence and for the maintenance of the peace and security of the continent." Those measures include "recall of chiefs of diplomatic missions; breaking of diplomatic relations; breaking of consular relations; partial or complete interruption of economic relations or of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, telephonic, and radiotelephonic or radiotelegraphic communications; and the use of armed force." The third preamble of the OAS Charter states that "representative democracy is an indispensable condition for the stability, peace, and development of the region." (Emphasis added). Thus, it follows that the interruption of democracy -- an "indispensable condition" for peace -- is a "fact or situation that might endanger the peace of the Americas" under Articles 6 and 7 of TIAR. Nonetheless, to date, the OAS Member States have been unwilling to apply such an argument to justify the use of TIAR in order to restore a forcefully deposed democratic government. Simply put, the Member States have not reached consensus on the use of TIAR for that purpose.

16 D. Acevedo, "The Haitian Crisis and the OAS Response: A Test of Effectiveness in Protecting Democracy," in L.F. Damrosch, ed., Enforcing Restraint, Collective Intervention in Internal Conflicts (New York 1994).

17 For a general discussion of more traditional notions of sovereignty and the state, see B. Ramacciotti de Cubas, Derecho Internacional Publico (Lima 1991), at pp. 291-344.

18 The UN Charter confers upon the Security Council "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security," including the pacific Settlement of Disputes under Chapter VI (Articles 33-38), and the application of force by way of economic and military sanctions to resolve threats of the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression under Chapter VII (Articles 39-51).

The Security Council in recent years has construed its authority to take coercive measures to resolve threats to the peace more broadly to justify armed intervention in support of humanitarian relief caused by a breakdown in the internal governmental institutions in a Member State. Thus, in the summer of 1992, the Security Council adopted Resolution 794 authorizing the Secretary General and member states "to use all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia" pursuant to its authority under Chapter VII of the Charter. Similarly, the Security Council used Chapter VII to authorize the use of armed force to assure humanitarian relief to Kurds in Iraq in 1991. See J. Fink, "From Peacekeeping to Peace Enforcement: The Blurring of the Mandate for the Use of Force in Maintaining International Peace and Security," 19 Md. J. Int'l & Trade 1 (Spring 1995).

19 There is an exception to this requirement for measures against states that were enemies to Charter signatories in World War II under certain circumstances.

20 Article 130 of the OAS Charter states that none of the provisions of the OAS Charter shall "be construed as impairing the rights and obligations of the Member States under the Charter of the United Nations." Similarly, the obligation of the OAS Member States to submit to the peaceful procedures for the resolution of disputes as provided in Article 23 of the Charter "shall not be interpreted as an impairment of the rights and obligations of the Member States under Articles 34 and 35 of the Charter of the United Nations." Article 34 of the UN charter authorizes the Security Council to "investigate any dispute or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute or to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security." Article 35 of the UN Charter authorizes any UN Member State to bring a dispute or situation of the type described in Article 34 to the attention of the UN Security Council or of the UN General Assembly.

21 V. Vaky, "The Organization of American States and Multilateralism in the Americas," in V. Vaky and H Mu¤oz, The Future of the Organization of American States (New York, 1993)

22 In recent years, the OAS and UN have intensified their efforts to collaborate in areas of joint interest. Beginning in 1987, the General Assemblies of both Organizations adopted a series resolutions urging the UN Secretariat and OAS General Secretariat to consult with each other in planning and implementing development projects and to increase their level of cooperation. See, e.g., UN General Assembly Resolutions 42/11, 43/4, 45/10, 47/11, and 49/5; OAS General Assembly Resolutions AG/RES. 880 (Xvii-O/87), AG/RES. 941 (XVIII-O/88), AG/RES. 1126 (XXI-O/93), and AG/RES. 1289 (XXIV-O/94). In April 1995, both the UN Secretariat and the OAS General Secretariat subscribed to a Cooperation Agreement in which they agreed "to act in close collaboration and hold consultations regularly on all matters of common interest." The Agreement includes specific commitments for the exchange of legal and statistical information, and establishes a broad framework for pursuing consultations and other exchanges. See Cooperation Agreement Between the Secretariat of the United Nations and the General Secretariat of the Organization of American States, signed April 17, 1995.

The joint venture of the two Organizations in Haiti is the best known example of the heightened level of cooperation between the two agencies and their special relationship. Other areas of cooperation include joint programs on social policies in Latin America and the Caribbean; Joint OAS/ECLAC meeting on statistics; participation of the OAS in the World Summit for Social Development; joint participation in a number of environmental management projects throughout the hemisphere; joint projects between UNEP and the OAS Department of Regional Development; the development of hemispheric-wide institutional networking networks to encourage and facilitate the exchange of scientific information; informal exchanges on administrative law issues, the development and codification of international law, and treaty information services; and joint participation in Drug Abuse Control. See Report of the General Secretariat on Cooperation Between the Organization of American States and the United Nations System, AG/doc. 3184/95 corr.1 (May 10, 1995).

23 CP/RES. 567 (870/91). This was not the first time in 1991 that the OAS Permanent Council had acted to condemn a threat to democracy in Haiti during 1991, but it was the first time it had done so within the framework of Resolution 1080. Three weeks after the December 16, 1990 elections which had brought President Aristide into power, but prior to his installation, a rebel force took the then President Ertha Pascal-Troillet prisoner and forced her resignation "in order to bring peace to the country after the fraudulent elections of December 16." The Council adopted Resolution CP/RES. 555 deploring those actions, Fortunately, that coup failed.

24 The Resolution contained a series of additional provisions designed to bring about the diplomatic isolation of Haiti and strengthen the solidarity of the Organization's response. See MRE/RES. 1, corr. 1 (Oct. 3, 1991). A long-time observer of the OAS, Domingo Acevedo, has characterized Resolution MRE/RES. 1 as "undoubtedly the strongest resolution the OAS has adopted against any government."

25 The economic embargo excepted humanitarian aid, which was to be channeled through international agencies of non-governmental organizations ("NGOs").

26 A/RES./46/7 (Oct. 11, 1991).

27 The mission was to be financed by voluntary contributions. Unlike the UN, the OAS has no formal mechanism for compulsory cost sharing for such missions.

28 For an excellent first-hand account of the negotiations and exploits of OEA-DEMOC following the coup, see Joao Clemente Baena Soares, Profile of a Mandate, Ten Years at the OAS (Washington 1994), at pp. 84-113.

29 CP/Dec. 2 (896/92).

30 See William G. O'Neill, "Recent Development: Human Rights Monitoring vs. Political Expediency: The Experience of the OAS/UN Mission in Haiti," 8 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 101 (1995); J. Baena Soares, supra, at p. 110.

31 See UN Doc A/C. 5/47/93 (13 April 93)

32 See Stephen J. Schnably, "The Santiago Commitment as a Call to Democracy in the United States: Evaluating the OAS Role in Haiti, Peru, and Guatemala," 25 U. Miami Inter-Am. L. Rev. 393 (1994), at pp. 421-427; J. Baena Soares, op cit., at p. 115.

33 S. Schnably, "The Santiago Commitment as a Call to Democracy in the United States: Evaluating the OAS Role in Haiti, Peru and Guatemala, 25 U. Miami Inter-Am. L. Rev. 393 (1994), at p. 429.

34 An exception was made for non-commercial containers and propane for cooking so as to reduce hardship on the civilian population. See J. Baena Soares, op cit., at p. 118.

35 The Resolution also established a Committee to oversee the embargo, report back to the Security Council on compliance, and to recommend "measures" to be taken to assure greater noncompliance.

36 See "Agreement of Governors Island", signed by the Constitutional President of Haiti, his Excellency Jean-Bertamd Aristide and by General Raoul Cedras, on July 3, 1993, MRE/INF.39/93 (7 July 1993); Schnably, supra, at p. 434.

37 Transcript of oral report of UN Secretary General to the UN Security Council, July 1993.

38 The UN Resolution went on to provide for the immediate reimposition of the embargo "if, at any time, the Secretary-General, having regard for the views of the Secretary-General of the Organization of American States, informs the Security Council that the parties to the Governors Island Agreement or any other authorities in Haiti have not complied in good faith with Agreement."

39 Resolution S/Res/862 (1993).

40 S/RES/862 (1993).

41 Notwithstanding the appointment of the Special Envoy as Chief of the UNMIH, special measures were taken to assure that the largely military (though non-combatant) UNMIH would maintain a separate identity from the civilian MICIVIH established for protecting and monitoring Human Rights almost six months earlier. The segregation of the missions was largely the result of the insistence of OAS Secretary General Baena Soares in view of the absence of a mandate from the OAS regarding military intervention of any kind in this situation.

42 See Informe del Secretario General a la Reuni¢n Ad Hoc de Ministros de Relaciones Exteriores Sobre Haiti, MRE/doc.8/94 (June 5, 1994)(OAS).

43 See CP/DEC. 15 (976/93)(Oct. 12, 1993); CP/RES. 610/968/93)(re-implementing the OAS embargo, and corresponding oversight measures; condemning the assassination of the Minister of Justice).

44 S/RES/873 (1993).

45 S/RES/875 (1993). This Resolution takes note of an October 15th note from President Aristide requesting measures to strengthen the embargo, and like S/RES/841, makes reference to Chapters VII and VIII of the UN Charter. It "confirms' that the Security Council "is prepared to consider further necessary measures to ensure full compliance with the provisions of the relevant Security Council resolutions."

46 OAS Secretary General Baena Soares initially opposed this decision because it abandoned the civilian population at a time when they were most vulnerable to human rights abuses. See Baena Soares, op.cit., at p. 121.

47 See Informe del Secretario General a la Reunion ad Hoc de Ministros de Relaciones Exteriores Sobre Haiti, MRE/doc.8/94 (June 5, 1994).

48 Meeting in Belem de Para on June 9, 1994, the OAS Foreign Ministers adopted Resolution MRE/RES. 6/94 urging the need "to support and reinforce such embargo measures as suspension of commercial flights and the freezing of assets of the Haitian de facto regime and its supporters, as provided in resolutions MRE/RES. 2/91 of October 1991, MRE/RES/3 of May 1992, and MRE/RES. 4/92 of December 1992, and to suspend international financial transactions with Haiti." It also called for, inter alia, support of UNMIH, MICIVIH, assistance in training judges and the Haitian police force, and for the implementation of a human rights education program for the Haitian people.

49 In the Resolution, the Security Council made it clear that it was authorizing the MNF pursuant to its Chapter VII authority.

50 Likely reasons for this lapse between the Resolution and its execution are: (1) a general lack of public support in the United States; (2) lack of full support in the U.S. Congress; (3) and lack of consensus for the invasion among key Members of the OAS, including Brazil, which was reportedly opposed, and Chile, Columbia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela, who appeared lukewarm towards the idea of an invasion. See S. Schnably, "The Santiago Commitment . . . ., supra, at pp. 456.

51 The lifting of the OAS sanctions was done by the Permanent Council, and ratified some seven months later by the Ad Hoc Meeting of Foreign Ministers on Haiti. See CP/INF.3683/94; MRE/RES. 7/95. See S. Schnably, "The Santiago Commitment . . . .", supra, at. p. 460.

52 Resolution S/940 had authorized the Secretary General to include within UNMIH up to 6000 troops and 900 civilian police officers. Resolution S/975 reaffirmed those deployment limits.

53 Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Mission in Haiti, S/1995/305 (April 13, 1995).

54 See Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Mission in Haiti, S/1995/992 (Nov. 6, 1995).

55 See MRE/RES. 7/95 (June 5, 1995).

56 Unfortunately, in light of time and space limitations, we have had to omit from this paper all discussion of the joint UN/OAS efforts in delivering humanitarian aid, which was another area of joint cooperation between those Organizations during the Haitian Crisis. Similarly, we have not discussed in any detail the OAS Electoral Observation Mission ("OAS/EOM") which observed and provided technical assistance for five elections in Haiti during 1995 at the invitation of the Haitian Government. OAS/EOM was assisted by observers from MICIVIH in matters relating to freedom of expression, freedom of assembly, and intimidation and violence during the election campaigns. See Final Report of the OAS Electoral Observation Mission to the Legislative and Municipal Elections in Haiti, CP/doc.2703/96 (Feb. 20, 1996).

57 See W.G. O'Neill, Recent Development: Human Rights Monitoring vs. Political Expediency: The Experience of the OAS/U.N. Mission in Haiti, 8 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 101 (1995).

58 The Agreement with the de facto authorities guaranteed the observers the right to communicate freely in accordance with "the privileges and immunities that are guaranteed to diplomatic emissaries and couriers;" the right to use transportation freely in Haiti, and the right to freedom of movement of personal property and means of transport throughout the country. Moreover, they agreed to provide security for the mission and not to obstruct its work. See "La Mission Civile Internaionale," reprinted as Annex V in "Report of the Secretary General to the Ad Hoc Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs on Haiti, MRE/doc. 6/93 (June 6, 1993).

59 Baena Soares, op. cit., at p. 116.

60 Programme Budget for the Biennium 1992-93, Programme budget implications of draft resolution A/47/L.56, Statement submitted by the Secretary-General in accordance with rule 153 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly, A/C.5/74/93 (April 13, 1993).

61 See A/47/20B; The Situation of Democracy and Human Rights in Haiti, Draft Resolution, A/47/l.56 (April 13, 1993).

62 See MOU Between GS/OAS and UN for the International Civilian Mission to Haiti, reprinted in Report of the Secretary General . . . , supra, MRE/doc.6/93, at p. 13.

63 See O'Neill, supra.

64 Id.

65 See The Work of the OAS/UN International Mission in Haiti, CP/doc.2668/95 rev. 1.

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