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Case Name: HAYNES V. UNITED STATES, 390 U.S. 85 
 
 
       HAYNES V. UNITED STATES. 
 
        CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
 
           FIFTH CIRCUIT. 
 
        NO. 236.  ARGUED OCTOBER 11, 1967.-- DECIDED JANUARY 29,
 
           1968. 
 
 
PETITIONER WAS CHARGED BY INFORMATION WITH VIOLATING 26 U.S.C. 5851
(PART OF THE NATIONAL FIREARMS ACT, AN INTERRELATED STATUTORY SYSTEM
FOR THE TAXATION OF CERTAIN CLASSES OF FIREARMS USED PRINCIPALLY BY
PERSONS ENGAGED IN UNLAWFUL ACTIVITIES) BY KNOWINGLY POSSESSING A
DEFINED FIREARM WHICH HAD NOT BEEN REGISTERED AS REQUIRED BY 26 U.S.C.
5841.  SECTION 5841 OBLIGATES THE POSSESSOR OF A DEFINED FIREARM TO
REGISTER THE WEAPON, UNLESS HE MADE IT OR ACQUIRED IT BY TRANSFER OR
IMPORTATION, AND THE ACT'S REQUIREMENTS AS TO TRANSFERS, MAKINGS AND
IMPORTATIONS "WERE COMPLIED WITH."  SECTION 5851 DECLARES UNLAWFUL THE
POSSESSION OF SUCH FIREARM WHICH HAS "AT ANY TIME" BEEN TRANSFERRED OR
MADE IN VIOLATION OF THE ACT, OR WHICH "HAS NOT BEEN REGISTERED AS
REQUIRED BY SECTION 5841."  ADDITIONALLY, SEC. 5851 PROVIDES THAT
"POSSESSION SHALL BE DEEMED SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO AUTHORIZE
CONVICTION, UNLESS THE DEFENDANT EXPLAINS SUCH POSSESSION TO THE
SATISFACTION OF THE JURY."  PETITIONER MOVED BEFORE TRIAL TO DISMISS
THE CHARGE, SUFFICIENTLY ASSERTING THAT SEC. 5851 VIOLATED HIS
PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION GUARANTEED BY THE FIFTH
AMENDMENT.  THE MOTION WAS DENIED, PETITIONER PLEADED GUILTY, AND HIS
CONVICTION WAS AFFIRMED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS.  HELD: 
 
1.  CONGRESS, SUBJECT TO CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, HAS AUTHORITY
TO REGULATE THE MANUFACTURE, TRANSFER, AND POSSESSION OF FIREARMS, AND
MAY TAX UNLAWFUL ACTIVITIES.  PP. 90, 98. 
 
2.  PETITIONER'S CONVICTION UNDER SEC. 5851 FOR POSSESSION OF AN
UNREGISTERED FIREARM IS NOT PROPERLY DISTINGUISHABLE FROM A CONVICTION
UNDER SEC. 5841 FOR FAILURE TO REGISTER POSSESSION OF A FIREARM, AND
BOTH OFFENSES MUST BE DEEMED SUBJECT TO ANY CONSTITUTIONAL DEFICIENCIES
ARISING UNDER THE FIFTH AMENDMENT FROM THE OBLIGATION TO REGISTER.  PP.
90-95. 
 
3.  A PROPER CLAIM OF THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
PROVIDES A FULL DEFENSE TO PROSECUTIONS EITHER FOR FAILURE TO REGISTER
UNDER SEC. 5841 OR FOR POSSESSION OF AN UNREGISTERED FIREARM UNDER SEC.
5851.  PP. 95-100. 
 
4.  RESTRICTIONS UPON THE USE BY FEDERAL AND STATE AUTHORITIES OF
INFORMATION OBTAINED AS A CONSEQUENCE OF THE REGISTRATION REQUIREMENT,
SUGGESTED BY THE GOVERNMENT, IS NOT APPROPRIATE.  MARCHETTI V. UNITED
STATES, ANTE, P. 39, AND GROSSO V. UNITED STATES, ANTE, P. 62.  PP. 99
100. 
 
5.  SINCE ANY PROCEEDING IN THE DISTRICT COURT UPON A REMAND MUST
INEVITABLY RESULT IN THE REVERSAL OF PETITIONER'S CONVICTION, IT WOULD
BE NEITHER JUST NOR APPROPRIATE TO REQUIRE SUCH NEEDLESS ACTION AND
ACCORDINGLY THE JUDGMENT IS REVERSED.  PP. 100-101. 
 
372 F.2D 651, REVERSED. 
 
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT. 
 
PETITIONER WAS CHARGED BY A THREE-COUNT INFORMATION FILED IN THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS WITH
VIOLATIONS OF THE NATIONAL FIREARMS ACT.  48 STAT. 1236.  TWO OF THE
COUNTS WERE SUBSEQUENTLY DISMISSED UPON MOTION OF THE UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY.  THE REMAINING COUNT AVERRED THAT PETITIONER, IN VIOLATION OF
26 U.S.C. 5851, KNOWINGLY POSSESSED A FIREARM, AS DEFINED BY 26 U.S.C.
5848(1), WHICH HAD NOT BEEN REGISTERED WITH THE SECRETARY OF THE
TREASURY OR HIS DELEGATE, AS REQUIRED BY 26 U.S.C. 5841.  PETITIONER
MOVED BEFORE TRIAL TO DISMISS THIS COUNT, EVIDENTLY ASSERTING THAT SEC.
5851 VIOLATED HIS PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION, AS GUARANTEED
BY THE FIFTH AMENDMENT, /1/  THE MOTION WAS DENIED, AND PETITIONER
THEREUPON ENTERED A PLEA OF GUILTY.  /2/  THE JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION
WAS AFFIRMED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT.  372 F.2D
651.  WE GRANTED CERTIORARI TO EXAMINE THE CONSTITUTIONALITY UNDER THE
FIFTH AMENDMENT OF PETITIONER'S CONVICTION.  388 U.S. 908.  FOR REASONS
WHICH FOLLOW, WE REVERSE. 
 
     I. 
 
INTERRELATED STATUTORY SYSTEM FOR THE TAXATION OF CERTAIN CLASSES OF
FIREARMS.  THE ACT'S REQUIREMENTS ARE APPLICABLE ONLY TO SHOTGUNS WITH
BARRELS LESS THAN 18 INCHES LONG; RIFLES WITH BARRELS LESS THAN 16
INCHES LONG; OTHER WEAPONS, MADE FROM A RIFLE OR SHOTGUN, WITH AN
OVERALL LENGTH OF LESS THAN 26 INCHES; MACHINE GUNS AND OTHER AUTOMATIC
FIREARMS; MUFFLERS AND SILENCERS; AND OTHER FIREARMS, EXCEPT PISTOLS
AND REVOLVERS, "IF SUCH WEAPON IS CAPABLE OF BEING CONCEALED ON THE
PERSON.  . . . "  26 U.S.C. 5848(1); TREAS. REG. SEC. 179.20, 26 CFR
179.20.  THESE LIMITATIONS WERE APPARENTLY INTENDED TO GUARANTEE THAT
ONLY WEAPONS USED PRINCIPALLY BY PERSONS ENGAGED IN UNLAWFUL ACTIVITIES
WOULD BE SUBJECTED TO TAXATION.  /4/ 
 
IMPORTERS, MANUFACTURERS, AND DEALERS IN SUCH FIREARMS ARE ABLIGED
EACH YEAR TO PAY SPECIAL OCCUPATIONAL TAXES, AND TO REGISTER WITH THE
SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY OR HIS DELEGATE.  26 U.S.C. 5801, 5802. 
SEPARATE TAXES ARE IMPOSED ON THE MAKING AND TRANSFER OF SUCH FIREARMS
BY PERSONS OTHER THAN THOSE OBLIGED TO PAY THE OCCUPATIONAL TAXES.  26
U.S.C. 5811, 5821.  FOR PURPOSES OF THESE ADDITIONAL TAXES, THE ACTS OF
MAKING AND TRANSFERRING FIREARMS ARE BROADLY DEFINED.  SECTION 5821
THUS IMPOSES A TAX ON THE MAKING OF A FIREARM "WHETHER BY MANUFACTURE,
PUTTING TOGETHER, ALTERATION, ANY COMBINATION THEREOF, OR OTHERWISE." 
SIMILARLY, TO TRANSFER ENCOMPASSES "TO SELL, ASSIGN, PLEDGE, LEASE,
LOAN, GIVE AWAY, OR OTHERWISE DISPOSE OF" A FIREARM.  26 U.S.C.
5848(10). 
 
ALL THESE TAXES ARE SUPPLEMENTED BY COMPREHENISIVE REQUIREMENTS
CALCULATED TO ASSURE THEIR COLLECTION.  ANY INDIVIDUAL WHO WISHES TO
MAKE A WEAPON, WITHIN THE MEANING OF SEC. 5821(A), IS OBLIGED, "PRIOR
TO SUCH MAKING," TO DECLARE HIS INTENTION TO THE SECRETARY, AND TO
PRIVIDE TO THE TREASURY HIS FINGERPRINTS AND PHOTOGRAPH.  26 U.S.C.
5821(E); TREAS. REG. 179.78.  THE DECLARATION MUST BE "SUPPORTED BY A
CERTIFICATE OF THE LOCAL CHIEF OF POLICE . . . OR SUCH OTHER PERSON
WHOSE CERTIFICATE MAY . . . BE ACCEPTABLE.  . . . "  TREAS. REG. SEC.
179.78.  THE CERTIFICATE MUST INDICATE SATISFACTION THAT THE
FINGERPRINTS AND PHOTOGRAPH ARE THOSE OF THE DECLARANT, AND THAT THE
FIREARM IS INTENDED "FOR LAWFUL PURPOSES."  IBID.  ANY PERSON WHO
WISHES TO TRANSFER SUCH A WEAPON MAY LAWFULLY DO SO ONLY IF HE FIRST
OBTAINS A WRITTEN ORDER FROM THE PROSPECTIVE TRANSFEREE ON AN
"APPLICATION FORM ISSUED . . . FOR THAT PURPOSE BY THE SECRETARY."  26
U.S.C. 5814(A).  THE APPLICATION, SUPPORTED BY A CERTIFICATE OF THE
LOCAL CHIEF OF POLICE, AND ACCOMPANIED BY THE TRANSFEREE'S FINGERPRINTS
AND PHOTOGRAPH, MUST BE APPROVED BY THE SECRETARY PRIOR TO THE
TRANSFER.  TREAS. REG. SECS. 179.98, 179.99.  FINALLY, EVERY PERSON
POSSESSING SUCH A FIREARM IS OBLIGED TO REGISTER HIS POSSESSION WITH
THE SECRETARY, UNLESS HE MADE THE WEAPON, OR ACQUIRED IT BY TRANSFER OR
IMPORTATION, AND THE ACT'S REQUIREMENTS AS TO TRANSFERS, MAKINGS, AND
IMPORTATIONS "WERE COMPLIED WITH."  26 U.S.C. 5841.  /5/ 
 
FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH ANY OF THE ACT'S REQUIREMENTS IS MADE
PUNISHABLE BY FINES AND IMPRISONMENT.  26 U.S.C. 5861.  IN ADDITION,
SEC. 5851 CREATES A SERIES OF SUPPLEMENTARY OFFENSES; IT DECLARES
UNLAWFUL THE POSSESSION OF ANY FIREARM WHICH HAS "AT ANY TIME" BEEN
TRANSFERRED OR MADE IN VIOLATION OF THE ACT'S PROVISIONS, OR WHICH "HAS
NOT BEEN REGISTERED AS REQUIRED BY SECTION 5841."  FINALLY, SEC. 5851
PROVIDES THAT IN PROSECUTIONS CONDUCTED UNDER THAT SECTION "POSSESSION
SHALL BE DEEMED SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO AUTHORIZE CONVICTION, UNLESS THE
DEFENDANT EXPLAINS SUCH POSSESSION TO THE SATISFACTION OF THE JURY." 
 
        II. 
 
AT THE OUTSET, IT MUST BE EMPHASIZED THAT THE ISSUE IN THIS CASE IS
NOT WHETHER CONGRESS HAS AUTHORITY UNDER THE CONSTITUTION TO REGULATE
THE MANUFACTURE, TRANSFER, OR POSSESSION OF FIREARMS; NOR IS IT WHETHER
CONGRESS MAY TAX ACTIVITIES WHICH ARE, WHOLLY OR IN PART, UNLAWFUL. 
RATHER, WE ARE REQUIRED TO RESOLVE ONLY THE NARROW ISSUE OF WHETHER
ENFORCEMENT OF SEC. 5851 AGAINST PETITIONER, DESPITE HIS ASSERTION OF
THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION, IS CONSTITUTIONALLY
PERMISSIBLE.  THE QUESTIONS NECESSARY FOR DECISION ARE TWO:  FIRST,
WHETHER PETITIONER'S CONVICTION UNDER SEC. 5851 IS MEANINGFULLY
DISTINGUISHABLE FROM A CONVICTION UNDER SEC. 5841 FOR FAILURE TO
REGISTER POSSESSION OF A FIREARM; AND SECOND, IF IT IS NOT, WHETHER
SATISFACTION OF PETITIONER'S OBLIGATION TO REGISTER UNDER SEC. 5841
WOULD HAVE COMPELLED HIM TO PROVIDE INFORMATION INCRIMINATING TO
HIMSELF.  IF, AS PETITIONER URGES, HIS CONVICTION UNDER SEC. 5841, AND
IF A PROSECUTION UNDER SEC. 5841 WOULD HAVE PUNISHED PETITIONER FOR HIS
FAILURE TO INCRIMINATE HIMSELF, IT WOULD FOLLOW THAT A PROPER CLAIM OF
PRIVILEGE SHOULD HAVE PROVIDED A FULL DEFENSE TO THIS PROSECUTION.  /6/
TO THESE QUESTIONS WE TURN. 
 
      III. 
 
THE FIRST ISSUE IS WHETHER THE ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE UNDER SEC.
5851 OF POSSESSION OF A FIREARM "WHICH HAS NOT BEEN REGISTERED AS
REQUIRED BY SECTION 5841" DIFFER IN ANY SIGNIFICANT RESPECT FROM THOSE
OF THE OFFENSE UNDER SEC. 5841 OF FAILURE TO REGISTER POSSESSION OF A
FIREARM.  THE UNITED STATES CONTENDS THAT THE TWO OFFENSES, DESPITE THE
SIMILARITY OF THEIR STATUTORY DESCRIPTIONS, SERVE ENTIRELY DIFFERENT
PURPOSES, IN THAT THE REGISTRATION CLAUSE OF SEC. 5851 IS INTENDED TO
PUNISH ACCEPTANCE OF THE POSSESSION OF A FIREARM WHICH, DESPITE THE
REQUIREMENTS OF SEC. 5841, WAS NEVER REGISTERED BY ANY PRIOR POSSESSOR,
WHILE SEC. 5841 PUNISHES ONLY A PRESENT POSSESSOR WHO HAS FAILED TO
REGISTER THE FACT OF HIS OWN POSSESSION.  IF THIS CONSTRUCTION IS
CORRECT, NOTHING IN A PROSECUTION UNDER SEC. 5851 WOULD TURN ON WHETHER
THE PRESENT POSSESSOR HAD ELECTED TO REGISTER; HIS OFFENSE WOULD HAVE
BEEN COMPLETE WHEN HE ACCEPTED POSSESSION OF A FIREARM WHICH NO
PREVIOUS POSSESSOR HAD REGISTERED.  WE NEED NOT DETERMINE WHETHER THIS
CONSTRUCTION WOULD BE FREE FROM CONSTITUTIONAL DIFFICULTY UNDER THE
FIFTH AMENDMENT, FOR WE HAVE CONCLUDED THAT SEC. 5851 CANNOT PROPERLY
BE CONSTRUED AS THE UNITED STATES HAS URGED.  /7/ 
 
THE UNITED STATES FINDS SUPPORT FOR ITS CONSTRUCTION OF SEC. 5851
CHIEFLY IN THE SECTION'S USE OF THE PAST TENSE:  THE ACT STATED TO BE
UNLAWFUL IS "TO POSSESS ANY FIREARM WHICH HAS NOT BEEN REGISTERED AS
REQUIRED BY SECTION 5841."  IT IS CONTENDED THAT WE MAY INFER FROM THIS
CHOICE OF TENSE THAT THE FAILURE TO REGISTER MUST NECESSARILY PRECEDE
THE ACCUSED'S ACQUISITION OF POSSESSION.  WE CANNOT DERIVE SO MUCH FROM
SO LITTLE.  WE PERCEIVE NO MORE IN THE DRAFTSMAN'S CHOICE OF TENSE THAN
THE OBVIOUS FACT THAT THE FAILURE TO REGISTER MUST PRECEDE THE MOMENT
AT WHICH THE ACCUSED IS CHARGED; WE FIND NOTHING WHICH CONFINES THE
CLAUSE'S APPLICATION TO FAILURES TO REGISTER WHICH HAVE OCCURRED BEFORE
A PRESENT POSSESSOR RECEIVED THE FIREARM.  IT FOLLOWS THAT THE PHRASE
FASTENED UPON BY THE UNITED STATES IS, AT THE LEAST, EQUALLY CONSISTENT
WITH THE CONSTRUCTION ADVANCED BY PETITIONER. 
 
IF, HOWEVER, NOTHING FURTHER WERE AVAILABLE, IT MIGHT BE INCUMBENT
UPON US TO ACCEPT THE GOVERNMENT'S CONSTRUCTION IN ORDER TO AVOID THE
ADJUDICATION OF A SERIOUS CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE.  SEE, E.G., ASHWANDER
V. VALLEY AUTHORITY, 297 U.S. 288, 348 (CONCURRING OPINION); CROWELL V.
BENSON, 285 U.S. 22, 62.  BUT THERE ARE PRESUASIVE INDICATIONS AT HAND
WHICH, IN OUR VIEW, PRECLUDE ADOPTION OF THE POSITION URGED BY THE
UNITED STATES.  INITIALLY, WE MUST NOTE THAT EACH OF THE OTHER TWO
OFFENSES DEFINED BY SEC. 5851 INDICATES VERY SPECIFICALLY THAT THE
VIOLATIONS OF THE MAKING OR TRANSFER PROVISIONS, ON WHICH THE SEC. 5851
OFFENSES ARE ULTIMATELY PREMISED, CAN HAVE OCCURRED "AT ANY TIME."  AN
ANALOGOUS PHRASE IN THE REGISTRATION CALUSE WOULD HAVE MADE PLAIN
BEYOND ALL QUESTION THAT THE CONSTRUCTION NOW URGED BY THE UNITED
STATES SHOULD BE ACCEPTED; IF THIS WAS INDEED CONGRESS' PURPOSE, IT IS
DIFFICULT TO SEE WHY IT DID NOT, AS IT DID IN THE OTHER CLAUSES, INSERT
THE FEW ADDITIONAL WORDS NECESSARY TO MAKE CLEAR ITS WISHES.  THE
POSITION SUGGESTED BY THE UNITED STATES WOULD THUS OBLIGE US, AT THE
OUTSET, TO ASSUME THAT CONGRESS HAS, IN THIS ONE CLAUSE, CHOSEN A
REMARKABLY OBLIQUE AND UNREVEALING PHRASING. 
 
SIMILARLY, IT IS PERTINENT TO NOTE THAT THE TRANSFER AND MAKING
CLAUSES OF SEC. 5851 PUNISH THE RECEIPT, AS WELL AS THE POSSESSION, OF
FIREARMS; THE REGISTRATION CLAUSE, IN CONTRAST, PUNISHES ONLY
POSSESSION.  UNDER THE CONSTRUCTION GIVEN SEC. 5851 BY THE UNITED
STATES, CONGRESS MIGHT HAVE BEEN EXPECTED TO DECLARE UNLAWFUL, IN
ADDITION, THE RECEIPT OF FIREARMS NEVER PREVIOUSLY REGISTERED; INDEED,
THE RECEIPT OF THE FIREARM IS, UNDER THAT CONSTRUCTION, THE CENTRAL
ELEMENT OF THE OFFENSE.  CONGRESS' PREFERENCE IN THE REGISTRATION
CLAUSE FOR "POSSESSION," RATHER THAN "RECEIPT," IS SATISFACTORILY
EXPLICABLE ONLY IF PETITIONER'S CONSTRUCTION OF SEC. 5851 IS ADOPTED. 
 
THIRD, AND MORE IMPORTANT, WE FIND IT SIGNIFICANT THAT THE OFFENSE
DEFINED BY SEC. 5851 IS THE POSSESSION OF A FIREARM WHICH HAS NOT BEEN
REGISTERED "AS REQUIRED BY SECTION 5841."  IN THE ABSENCE OF PERSUASIVE
EVIDENCE TO THE CONTRARY, THE CLAUSE'S FINAL WORDS SUGGEST STRONGLY
THAT THE PERMIETER OF THE OFFENSE WHICH IT CREATES IS TO BE MARKED BY
THE TERMS OF THE REGISTRATION REQUIREMENT IMPOSED BY SEC. 5841.  IN
TURN, SEC. 5841 INDICATES QUITE PRECISELY THAT "(EVERY PERSON
POSSESSING A FIREARM" MUST, UNLESS EXCUSED BY THE SECTION'S EXCEPTION,
REGISTER HIS POSSESSION WITH THE SECRETARY OR HIS DELEGATE.  MOREOVER,
THE TREASURY REGULATIONS ARE ENTIRELY UNEQUIVOCAL; THEY SPECIFICALLY
PROVIDE THAT "(EVERY PERSON IN THE UNITED STATES POSSESSING A FIREARM
(A) NOT REGISTERED TO HIM, . . . MUST EXECUTE AN APPLICATION FOR THE
REGISTRATION OF SUCH FIREARM.  . . . "  TREAS. REG. SEC. 179.120. 
 
THE PERTINENT LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OFFERS ADDITIONAL ASSISTANCE, AND
POINTS AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT'S CONSTRUCTION.  THE REGISTRATION CLAUSE
WAS INSERTED INTO SEC. 5851 BY THE EXCISE TAX TECHNICAL CHANGES ACT OF
1958.  72 STAT. 1428.  THE TWO COMMITTEE REPORTS INDICATE, IN IDENTICAL
TERMS, /8/ THAT THE EXISTING SECTION WAS THOUGHT INADEQUATE BECAUSE,
ALTHOUGH IT DEFINED AS AN UNLAWFUL ACT THE POSSESSION OF ANY FIREARM
WHICH HAD BEEN MADE OR TRANSFERRED IN VIOLATION OF THE FIREARMS ACT, IT
FAILED "TO SO DEFINE THE POSSESSION OF AN UNREGISTERED FIREARM."  H.R.
REP. NO. 481, 85TH CONG,, 1ST SESS., 195; S. REP. NO. 2090, 85TH CONG.,
2D SESS., 212.  THE SECTION AS AMENDED "SPECIFICALLY DEFINES SUCH
POSSESSION OF AN UNREGISTERED FIREARM AS AN UNLAWFUL ACT."  IBID.  IT
IS USEFUL TO NOTE THAT THE COMMITTEES DID NOT SUGGEST THAT THE FAILURE
TO REGISTER MUST HAVE PRECEDED THE ACQUISITION OF POSSESSION.  FURTHER,
THE REPORTS INDICATE THAT THE PROPOSED AMENDMENT WAS INTENDED TO MAKE
AVAILABLE IN PROSECUTIONS FOR POSSESSION OF AN UNREGISTERED FIREARM THE
PRESUMPTION ALREADY CONTAINED IN SEC. 5851; THEY CONCLUDE THAT THE
"PRIMARY PURPOSE OF THIS CHANGE IS TO SIMPLIFY AND CLARIFY THE LAW AND
TO AID IN PROSECUTION."  H.R. REP. NO. 481, SUPRA, AT 196; S. REP. NO.
2090, SUPRA, AT 212. 
 
WE INFER THAT THE AMENDMENT WAS THOUGHT TO HAVE TWO PURPOSES. 
FIRST, IT WOULD COMPLETE THE SERIES OF SUPPLEMENTARY OFFENSES CREATED
BY SEC. 5851, BY ADDING TO THOSE PREMISED ON A MAKING OR TRANSFER ONE
BOTTOMED ON A FAILURE TO REGISTER.  SECOND, IT WOULD FACILITATE THE
PROSECUTION OF FAILURES TO REGISTER BY PERMITTING THE USE OF THE
PRESUMPTION INCLUDED IN SEC. 5851.  IT WOULD THUS "AID IN PROSECUTION"
OF CONDUCT ALSO MADE UNLAWFUL BY SEC; 5841.  BOTH THESE PURPOSES ARE
FULLY CONSISTENT WITH THE CONSTRUCTION OF SEC. 5851 URGED BY
PETITIONER; BUT ONLY THE FIRST OFFERS ANY SUPPORT TO THE POSITION
SUGGESTED BY THE UNITED STATES. 
 
WE ARE UNABLE TO ESCAPE THE CONCLUSION THAT CONGRESS INTENDED THE
REGISTRATION CLAUSE OF SEC. 5851 TO INCORPORATE THE REQUIREMENTS OF
SEC. 5841, BY DECLARING UNLAWFUL THE POSSESSION OF ANY FIREARM WHICH
HAS NOT BEEN REGISTERED BY ITS POSSESSOR, IN CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH
SEC. 5841 IMPOSES AN OBLIGATION TO REGISTER.  THE ELEMENTS OF THE
OFFENSES CREATED BY THE TWO SECTIONS ARE THEREFORE IDENTICAL.  THIS
DOES NOT, HOWEVER, FULLY RESOLVE THE QUESTION OF WHETHER ANY HAZARDS OF
INCRIMINATION WHICH STEM FROM THE REGISTRATION REQUIREMENT IMPOSED BY
SEC. 5841 MUST BE UNDERSTOOD ALSO TO INHERE IN PROSECUTIONS UNDER SEC.
5851.  TWO ADDITIONAL DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN THE OFFENSES HAVE BEEN
SUGGESTED, AND WE MUST EXAMINE THEM.     FIRST, IT HAS BEEN SAID THAT
THE OFFENSES DIFFER IN EMPHASIS, IN THAT SEC. 5851 CHIEFLY PUNISHES
POSSESSION, WHILE SEC. 5841 PUNISHES A FAILURE TO REGISTER.  CF. FRYE
V. UNITED STATES, 315 F.2D 491, 494; CATELLANO V. UNITED STATES, 350
F.2D 852, 854.  WE FIND THIS SUPPOSED DISTINCTION ENTIRELY
UNPERSUASIVE, FOR, AS WE HAVE FOUND, THE POSSESSION OF A FIREARM AND A
FAILURE TO REGISTER ARE EQUALLY FUNDAMENTAL INGREDIENTS OF BOTH
OFFENSES.  SECOND, IT HAS BEEN SUGGESTED THAT SEC. 5841 CREATES A
"STATUS OF UNLAWFUL POSSESSION"  WHICH, IF ASSUMED BY AN INDIVIDUAL,
DENIES TO HIM THE PROTECTION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVILEGE. 
CASTELLANO V. UNITED STATES, SUPRA, AT 854.  IT HAS EVIDENTLY BEEN
THOUGHT TO FOLLOW THAT THE PRIVILEGE MAY BE CLAIMED IN PROSECUTIONS
UNDER SEC. 5841, BUT NOT IN THOSE UNDER SEC. 5851.  THIS IS NO LESS
UNPERSUASIVE; FOR REASONS DISCUSSED IN MARCHETTI V. UNITED STATES,
DECIDED TODAY, ANTE, AT 51-52, WE DECLINE TO HOLD THAT THE PERFORMANCE
OF AN UNLAWFUL ACT, EVEN IF THERE EXISTS A STATUTORY CONDITION THAT ITS
COMMISSION CONSTITUTES A WAIVER OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVILEGE,
SUFFICES TO DEPRIVE AN ACCUSED OF THE PRIVILEGE'S PROTECTION.  WE HOLD
THAT PETITIONER'S CONVICTION UNDER THE REGISTRATION CLAUSE OF SEC. 5851
IS NOT PROPERLY DISTINGUISHABLE FROM A CONVICTION UNDER SEC. 5841 FOR
FAILURE TO REGISTER, AND THAT BOTH OFFENSES MUST BE DEEMED SUBJECT TO
ANY CONSTITUTIONAL DEFICIENCIES ARISING UNDER THE FIFTH AMENDMENT FROM
THE OBLIGATION TO REGISTER. 
 
        IV. 
 
WE MUST NOW CONSIDER WHETHER, AS PETITIONER CONTENDS, SATISFACTION
OF HIS OBLIGATION TO REGISTER WOULD HAVE COMPELLED HIM TO PROVIDE
INFORMATION INCRIMINATING HIMSELF.  /9/  WE MUST FIRST MARK THE TERMS
OF THE REGISTRATION REQUIREMENT.  THE OBLIGATION TO REGISTER IS
CONDITIONED SIMPLY UPON POSSESSION OF A FIREARM, WITHIN THE MEANING OF
SEC. 5848(1).  NOT EVERY POSSESSOR OF A FIREARM MUST, HOWEVER,
REGISTER; ONE WHO MADE THE FIREARM, OR ACQUIRED IT BY TRANSFER OR
IMPORTATION, NEED NOT REGISTER IF THE ACT'S PROVISIONS AS TO TRANSFERS,
MAKINGS, AND IMPORTATIONS "WERE COMPLIED WITH."  IF THOSE REQUIREMENTS
WERE NOT MET, OR IF THE POSSESSOR DID NOT MAKE THE FIREARM, AND DID NOT
ACQUIRE IT BY TRANSFER OR IMPORTATION, HE MUST FURNISH THE SECRETARY OF
THE TREASURY WITH HIS NAME, ADDRESS, THE PLACE WHERE THE FIREARM IS
USUALLY KEPT AND THE PLACE OF HIS BUSINESS OR EMPLOYMENT.  FURTHER, HE
MUST INDICATE HIS DATE OF BIRTH, SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER, AND WHETHER HE
HAS EVER BEEN CONVICTED OF A FELONY.  FINALLY, HE MUST PROVIDE A FULL
DESCRIPTION OF THE FIREARM.  SEE 26 U.S.C. 5841; TREAS. REG. SEC.
179.120; INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE FORM 1 (FIREARMS). 
 
THE REGISTRATION REQUIREMENT IS THUS DIRECTED PRINCIPALLY AT THOSE
PERSONS WHO HAVE OBTAINED POSSESSION OF A FIREARM WITHOUT COMPLYING
WITH THE ACT'S OTHER REQUIREMENTS, AND WHO THEREFORE ARE IMMEDIATELY
THREATENED BY CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS UNDER SECS. 5851 AND 5861.  THEY
ARE UNMISTAKABLY PERSONS "INHERENTLY SUSPECT OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES." 
ALBERTSON V. SACB, 382 U.S. 70, 79.  IT IS TRUE, AS THE UNITED STATES
EMPHASIZES, THAT REGISTRATION IS NOT INVARIABLY INDICATIVE OF A
VIOLATION OF THE ACT'S REQUIREMENTS; THERE ARE SITUATIONS, WHICH THE
UNITED STATES ITSELF STYLES "UNCOMMON,"  /10/  IN WHICH A POSSESSOR WHO
HAS NOT VIOLATED THE ACT'S OTHER PROVISIONS IS OBLIGED TO REGISTER. 
/11/  NONETHELESS, THE CORRELATION BETWEEN OBLIGATIONS TO REGISTER AND
VIOLATIONS CAN ONLY BE REGARDED AS EXCEEDINGLY HIGH, AND A PROSPECTIVE
REGISTRANT REALISTICALLY CAN EXPECT THAT REGISTRATION WILL
SUBSTANTIALLY INCREASE THE LIKELIHOOD OF HIS PROSECUTION.  MOREOVER, HE
CAN REASONABLY FEAR THAT THE POSSESSION ESTABLISHED BY HIS REGISTRATION
WILL FACILITATE HIS PROSECUTION UNDER THE MAKING AND TRANSFER CLAUSES
OF SEC. 5851.  IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, IT CAN SCARCELY BE SAID THAT THE
RISKS OF CRIMINAL PROSECUTION CONFRONTED BY PROSPECTIVE REGISTRANTS ARE
"REMOTE POSSIBILITIES OUT OF THE ORDINARY COURSE OF LAW," HEIKE V.
UNITED STATES, 227 U.S. 131, 144; YET THEY ARE COMPELLED, ON PAIN OF
CRIMINAL PROSECUTION, TO PROVIDE TO THE SECRETARY BOTH A FORMAL
ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF THEIR POSSESSION OF FIREARMS, AND SUPPLEMENTARY
INFORMATION LIKELY TO FACILITATE THEIR ARREST AND EVENTUAL CONVICTION. 
THE HAZARDS OF INCRIMINATION CREATED BY THE REGISTRATION REQUIREMENT
CAN THUS ONLY BE TERMED "REAL AND APPRECIABLE."  REG. V. BOYES, 1 B.&
S. 311, 330; BROWN V. WALKER, 161 U.S. 591, 599-600. 
 
WE ARE, HOWEVER, URGED BY THE UNITED STATES, FOR VARIOUS DISPARATE
REASONS, TO AFFIRM PETITIONER'S CONVICTION.  IT IS FIRST SUGGESTED THAT
THE REGISTRATION REQUIREMENT IS A VALID EXERCISE OF THE TAXING POWERS,
IN THAT IT IS CALCULATED MERELY TO ASSURE NOTICE TO THE TREASURY OF ALL
TAXABLE FIREARMS.  WE DO NOT DOUBT, AS WE HAVE REAPEATEDLY INDICATED,
/12/  THAT THIS COURT MUST GIVE DEFERENCE TO CONGRESS' TAXING POWERS,
AND TO MEASURES REASONABLY INCIDENTAL TO THEIR EXERCISE; BUT WE ARE NO
LESS OBLIGED TO HEED THE LIMITATIONS PLACED UPON THOSE POWERS BY THE
CONSTITUTION'S OTHER COMMANDS.  WE ARE FULLY COGNIZANT OF THE
TREASURY'S NEED FOR ACCURATE AND TIMELY INFORMATION, BUT OTHER METHODS,
ENTIRELY CONSISTENT WITH CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, EXIST BY WHICH
SUCH INFORMATION MAY BE OBTAINED.  SEE GENERALLY COUNSELMAN V.
HITCHCOCK, 142 U.S. 547, 585.  SEE ALSO ADAMS V. MARYLAND, 347 U.S.
179; MURPHY V. WATERFRONT COMMISSION, 378 U.S. 52.  ACCORDINGLY,
NOTHING WE DO TODAY WILL PREVENT THE EFFECTIVE REGULATION OR TAXATION
BY CONGRESS OF FIREARMS. 
 
NONETHELESS, THESE STATUTORY PROVISIONS, AS NOW WRITTEN, CANNOT BE
BROUGHT WITHIN ANY OF THE SITUATIONS IN WHICH THE COURT HAS HELD THAT
THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVILEGE DOES NOT PREVENT THE USE BY THE UNITED
STATES OF INFORMATION OBTAINED IN CONNECTION WITH REGULATORY PROGRAMS
OF GENERAL APPLICATION.  SEE UNITED STATES V. SULLIVAN, 274 U.S. 259;
SHAPIRO V. UNITED STATES, 335 U.S. 1.  FOR REASONS GIVEN IN MARCHETTI
V. UNITED STATES, SUPRA, AND GROSSO V. UNITED STATES, ANTE, P. 62, WE
HAVE CONCLUDED THAT THE POINTS OF SIGNIFICANT DISSIMILARITY BETWEEN
THESE CIRCUMSTANCES AND THOSE IN SHAPIRO AND SULLIVAN PRECLUDE ANY
PROPER APPLICATION OF THOSE CASES HERE.  THE QUESTIONS PROPOUNDED BY
SEC. 5841, LIKE THOSE AT ISSUE IN ALBERTSON, SUPRA, ARE "DIRECTED AT A
HIGHLY SELECTIVE GROUP INHERENTLY SUSPECT OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES"; THEY
CONCERN, NOT "AN ESSENTIALLY NON-CRIMINAL AND REGULATORY AREA OF
INQUIRY," BUT "AN AREA PERMEATED WITH CRIMINAL STATUTES."  382 U.S.,AT
79.  THERE ARE, MOREOVER, NO RECORDS OR OTHER DOCUMENTS HERE TO WHICH
ANY "PUBLIC ASPECTS" MIGHT REASONABLY BE SAID TO HAVE ATTACHED. 
COMPARE SHAPIRO V. UNITED STATES, SUPRA, AT 34; AND MARCHETTI V. UNITED
STATES, SUPRA. 
 
THE UNITED STATES NEXT EMPHASIZES THAT PETITIONER HAS CONSISTENTLY
CONTENDED THAT SECS. 5841 AND 5851 ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL ON THEIR FACE;
IT URGES THAT THIS CONTENTION IS FORECLOSED BY THE INCLUSION IN THE
REGISTRATION REQUIREMENT OF SITUATIONS IN WHICH THE OBLIGATION TO
REGISTER CANNOT PRODUCE INCRIMINATING DISCLOSURES.  WE RECOGNIZE THAT
THERE ARE A NUMBER OF APPARENTLY UNCOMMON CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH
REGISTRATION IS REQUIRED OF ONE WHO HAS NOT VIOLATED THE FIREARMS ACT;
THE UNITED STATES POINTS CHIEFLY TO THE SITUATION OF A FINDER OF A LOST
OR ABANDONED FIREARM.  /13/  COMPARE UNITED STATES V. FORGETT, 349 F.2D
601.  WE AGREE THAT THE EXISTENCE OF SUCH SITUATIONS MAKES IT
INAPPROPRIATE, IN THE ABSENCE OF EVIDENCE THAT THE EXERCISE OF
PROTECTED RIGHTS WOULD OTHERWISE BE HAMPERED, TO DECLARE THESE SECTIONS
IMPERMISSIBLE ON THEIR FACE.  IN STEAD, IT APPEARS, FROM THE EVIDENCE
NOW BEFORE US, THAT THE RIGHTS OF THOSE SUBJECT TO THE ACT WILL BE
FULLY PROTECTED IF A PROPER CLAIM OF PRIVILEGE IS UNDERSTOOD TO PROVIDE
A FULL DEFENSE TO ANY PROSECTUION EITHER FOR FAILURE TO REGISTER UNDER
SEC. 5841 OR, UNDER SEC. 5851, FOR POSSESSION OF A FIREARM WHICH HAS
NOT BEEN REGISTERED. 
 
FINALLY, WE ARE ASKED TO AVOID THE CONSTITUTIONAL DIFFICULTIES WHICH
WE HAVE FOUND IN SECS. 5841 AND 5851 BY IMPOSING RESTRICTIONS UPON THE
USE BY STATE AND FEDERAL AUTHORITIES OF INFORMATION OBTAINED AS A
CONSEQUENCE OF THE REGISTRATION REQUIREMENT.  WE NOTE THAT THE
PROVISIONS OF 26 U.S.C. 6107 /14/  ARE APPLICABLE TO THE SPECIAL
OCCUPATIONAL TAXES IMPOSED BY SEC. 5801, ALTHOUGH NOT, APPARENTLY, TO
THE MAKING AND TRANSFER TAXES IMPOSED BY SECS. 5811 AND 5821.  IN THESE
CIRCUMSTANCES, WE DECLINE, FOR REASONS INDICATED IN MARCHETTI, SUPRA,
AND GROSSO, SUPRA, TO IMPOSE THE RESTRICTIONS URGED BY THE UNITED
STATES. 
 
WE HOLD THAT A PROPER CLAIM OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVILEGE AGAINST
SELF-INCRIMINATION PROVIDES A FULL DEFENSE TO PROSECUTIONS EITHER FOR
FAILURE TO REGISTER A FIREARM UNDER SEC. 5841 OR FOR POSSESSION OF AN
UNREGISTERED FIREARM UNDER SEC. 5851. 
 
        V. 
 
IT REMAINS ONLY TO DETERMINE THE APPROPRIATE DISPOSITION OF THIS
CASE.  PETITIONER HAS SEASONABLY AND CONSISTENTLY ASSERTED A CLAIM OF
PRIVILEGE, BUT THE COURTS BELOW, BELIEVING THE PRIVILEGE INAPPLICABLE
TO PROSECUTIONS UNDER SEC. 5851, EVIDENTLY DID NOT ASSESS THE CLAIM'S
MERITS.  IT WOULD THEREFORE ORDINARILY BE NECESSARY TO REMAND THE CAUSE
TO THE DISTRICT COURT, WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO EXAMINE THE MERITS OF THE
CLAIM.  WE NOTE, HOWEVER, THAT THERE CAN BE NO SUGGESTION HERE THAT
PETITIONER HAS WAIVED HIS PRIVILEGE, AND THAT, MOREOVER, THE UNITED
STATES HAS CONCEDED THAT PETITIONER'S PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF
INCRIMINATION MUST BE FOUND TO HAVE BEEN IMPERMISSIBLY INFRINGED IF HIS
CONTENTIONS AS TO THE PROPER CONSTRUCTION OF SECS. 5851 AND 5841 ARE
ACCEPTED.  BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES 8.  ACCORDINGLY, THE DISTRICT
COURT WOULD BE OBLIGED IN ANY ADDITIONAL PROCEEDING TO CONCLUDE THAT
"THERE IS REASONABLE GROUND TO APPREHEND DANGER TO THE WITNESS FROM HIS
BEING COMPELLED TO ANSWER."  REG; V. BOYES, SUPRA, AT 330.  IT FOLLOWS
THAT ANY PROCEEDING IN THE DISTRICT COURT MUST INEVITABLY RESULT IN THE
REVERSAL OF PETITIONER'S CONVICTION.  WE HAVE PLENARY AUTHORITY UNDER
28 U.S.C. 2106 TO MAKE SUCH DISPOSITION OF THE CASE "AS MAY BE JUST
UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES."  SEE YATES V. UNITED STATES, 354 U.S. 298,
327-331; GROSSO V. UNITED STATES, SUPRA.  IT WOULD BE NEITHER JUST NOR
APPROPRIATE TO REQUIRE THE PARTIES AND THE DISTRICT COURT TO COMMENCE
AN ENTIRELY NEEDLESS ADDITIONAL PROCEEDING.  ACCORDINGLY, THE JUDGMENT
OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IS
 
              REVERSED. 
 
/1/  PETITIONER'S MOTION ASSERTED MERELY THAT SEC. 5851 WAS
"UNCONSTITUTIONAL," AND THE ORDER DENYING THE MOTION DOES NOT INDICATE
MORE PRECISELY THE SUBSTANCE OR PETITIONER'S CONTENTIONS.  HIS
SUBSEQUENT ARGUMENTS, BOTH IN THE COURTS BELOW AND HERE, HAVE, HOWEVER,
CONSISTENTLY ASSERTED A CLAIM OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVILEGE.  NO
SUGGESTION IS MADE BY THE GOVERNMENT THAT THE CLAIM OF PRIVILEGE WAS
NOT SUFFICIENTLY MADE. 
 
/2/  PETITIONER'S PLEA OF GUILTY DID NOT, OF COURSE, WAIVE HIS
PREVIOUS CLAIM OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVILEGE.  SEE, E.G., UNITED
STATES V. URY, 106 F.2D 28. 
 
/3/  THE SECTION PROVIDES THAT "IT SHALL BE UNLAWFUL FOR ANY PERSON
TO RECEIVE OR POSSESS ANY FIREARM WHICH HAS AT ANY TIME BEEN
TRANSFERRED IN VIOLATION OF SECTIONS 5811, 5812(B), 5813, 5814, 5844,
OR 5846, OR SHICH HAS AT ANY TIME BEEN MADE IN VIOLATION OF SECTION
5821, OR TO POSSESS ANY FIREARM WHICH HAS NOT BEEN REGISTERED AS
REQUIRED BY SECTION 5841.  WHENEVER ON TRIAL FOR A VIOLATION OF THIS
SUCH FIREARM, SUCH POSSESSION SHALL BE DEEMED SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO
AUTHORIZE CONVICTION, UNLESS THE DEFENDANT EXPLAINS SUCH POSSESSION TO
THE SATISFACTION OF THE JURY." 
 
/4/  THE VIEWS OF A SUBSEQUENT CONGRESS OF COURSE PROVIDE NO
CONTROLLING BASIS FROM WHICH TO INFER THE PURPOSES OF AN EARLIER
CONGRESS.  SEE RAINWATER V. UNITED STATES, 356 U.S. 590, 593; UNITED
STATES V. PRICE, 361 U.S. 304, 313.  NONETHELESS, IT IS PERTINENT TO
NOTE THAT THE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, WHILE REPORTING IN 1959 ON CERTAIN PROPOSED AMENDMENTS
TO THE ACT, STATED THAT THE "PRIMARY PURPOSE OF (THE FIREARMS ACT) WAS
TO MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR THE GANGSTER ELEMENT TO OBTAIN CERTAIN
TYPES OF WEAPONS.  THE TYPE OF WEAPON WITH WHICH THESE PROVISIONS ARE
CONCERNED ARE THE TYPES IT WAS THOUGHT WOULD BE USED PRIMARILY BY THE
GANGSTER-TYPE ELEMENT."  H.R. REP. NO. 914, 86TH CONG., 1ST SESS;, 2. 
 
/5/  THE SECTION PROVIDES THAT "EVERY PERSON POSSESSING A FIREARM
SHALL REGISTER, WITH THE SECRETARY OR HIS DELEGATE, THE NUMBER OR OTHER
MARK IDENTIFYING SUCH FIREARM, TOGETHER WITH HIS NAME, ADDRESS, PLACE
WHERE SUCH FIREARM IS USUALLY EKPT, AND PLACE OF BUSINESS OR
EMPLOYMENT, AND, IF SUCH PERSON IS OTHER THAN A NATURAL PERSON, THE
NAME AND HOME ADDRESS OF AN EXECUTIVE OFFICER THEREOF.  NO PERSON SHALL
BE REQUIRED TO REGISTER UNDER THIS SECTION WITH RESPECT TO A FIREARM
WHICH SUCH PERSON ACQUIRED BY TRANSFER OR IMPORTATION OR WHICH SUCH
PERSON MADE, IF PROVISIONS OF THIS CHAPTER APPLIED TO SUCH TRANSFER,
IMPORTATION, OR MAKING, AS THE CASE MAY BE, AND IF THE PROVISIONS WHICH
APPLIED THERETO WERE COMPLIED WITH." 
 
/6/  INDEED, SO MUCH IS RECOGNIZED BY THE GOVERNMENT; IT HAS STATED
THAT "(WE CONCEDE THAT IF PETITIONER'S READING OF THE TWO PROVISIONS
WERE RIGHT . . . PETITIONER'S CONVICTION UNDER SECTION 5851 WOULD NOT
BE VALID."  BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES 8.     /7/  THE GOVERNMENT'S
POSITION IS GENERALLY SUPPORTED BY SEVERAL CASES IN THE COURTS OF
APPEALS.  SEE, IN ADDITION TO THE OPINION BELOW, FRYE V. UNITED STATES,
315 F.2D 491; STARKS V. UNITED STATES, 315 F.2D 45; MARES V. UNITED
STATES, 319 F.2D 71; SIPES V. UNITED STATES, 321 F.2D 174; TAYLOR V.
UNITED STATES, 333 F.2D 721; CASTELLANO V. UNITED STATES, 350 F.2D 852;
PRUITT V. UNITED STATES, 364 F.2D 826; DECKER V. UNITED STATES, 378
F.2D 245.  NONE OF THESE CASES, HOWEVER, UNDERTOOK AN EXTENDED
EXAMINATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SECS. 5851 AND 5841.  COMPARE
LOVELACE V. UNITED STATES, 357 F.2D 306, 309; AND MANSFIELD, THE
ALBERTSON CASE:  CONFLICT BETWEEN THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF
INCRIMINATION AND THE GOVERNMENT'S NEED FOR INFORMATION, 1966
SUP.CT.REV.  103, 158-159, N. 95. 
 
/8/  THE LANGUAGE IN THE REPORTS WAS EVIDENTLY TAKEN WITHOUT CHANGE
OR ELABORATION FROM THE RECOMMENDATIONS SUBMITTED TO THEHOUSE COMMITTEE
ON WAYS AND MEANS BY THE TREASURY.  SEE HEARINGS BEFORE HOUSE COMMITTEE
ON WAYS AND MEANS ON EXCISE TAX TECHNICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS,
84TH CONG., 1ST SESS., 185, 211. 
 
/9/  WE NOTE THAT SEC. 5841 HAS SEVERAL TIMES BEEN HELD TO REQUIRE
INCRIMINATING DISCLOSURES, IN VIOLATION OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION.  SEE RUSSELL V. UNITED STATES,
306 F.2D 402; DUGAN V. UNITED STATES, 341 F.2D 85; MCCANN V. UNITED
STATES, 217 F.SUPP.  751; UNITED STATES V. FLEISH, 227 F.SUPP.  967. 
SEE ALSO LOVELACE V. UNITED STATES, SUPRA, AT 309. 
 
/10/  IN PARTICULAR, THE UNITED STATES EMPHASIZES THE POSITION OF A
FINDER OF A LOST OR ABANDONED FIREARM.  BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES
20. 
 
/11/  WE MUST NOTE, HOWEVER, THAT CERTAIN OF THESE PROSPECTIVE
REGISTRANTS MIGHT BE THREATENED BY PROSECUTION UNDER STATE LAW FOR
POSSESSION OF FIREARMS, OR SIMILAR OFFENSES.  IT IS POSSIBLE THAT SUCH
PERSONS WOULD BE OBLIGED, IF THEY REGISTERED IN COMPLIANCE WITH SEC.
5841, TO PROVIDE INFORMATION INCRIMINATING TO THEMSELVES.  SUCH HAZARDS
WOULD, OF COURSE, SUPPORT A PROPER CLAIM OF PRIVILEGE.  SEE MALLOY V.
HOGAN, 378 U.S. 1.  FOR ILLUSTRATIONS OF STATE STATUTES UNDER WHICH
SUCH PROSECUTIONS MIGHT OCCUR, SEE CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. SEC. 53-202
(1958); DEL. CODE ANN., TIT. 11, SEC. 465 (1953); HAWAII REV. LAWS SEC.
157-8 (1955); IOWA CODE SEC. 696.1 (1966); KAN; STAT. ANN. SEC. 21-2601
(1964); LA. REV. STAT. SEC. 40:1752 (1950); MINN. STAT. SEC. 609.67
(1965); N.J. REV. STAT., TIT. 2A, SEC; 151-50 (1953).  WE HAVE
DISCOVERED NO STATE STATUTE UNDER WHICH THE PRESENT PETITIONER MIGHT
HAVE BEEN SUBJECT TO PROSECTUTION FOR ACTS REGISTRABLE UNDER SEC. 5841,
AND HE HAS NOT CONTENDED THAT REGISTRATION WOULD HAVE INCRIMINATED HIM
UNDER STATE LAW. 
 
/12/  SEE, FOR EXAMPLE, SONZINSKY V. UNITED STATES, 300 U.S. 506;
MARCHETTI V. UNITED STATES, SUPRA. 
 
/13/  AGAIN, WE NOTE THAT THESE REGISTRATNS MIGHT BE CONFRONTED BY
HAZARDS OF PROSECUTION UNDER STATE LAW, AND THAT THOSE HAZARDS MIGHT
SUPPORT A PROPER CLAIM OF PRIVILEGE.  SEE SUPRA, N. 11. 
 
/14/  SECTION 6107 PROVIDES THAT "IN THE PRINCIPAL INTERNAL REVENUE
OFFICE IN EACH INTERNAL REVENUE DISTRICT THERE SHALL BE KEPT, FOR
PUBLIC INSPECTION, AN ALPHABETICAL LIST OF THE NAMES OF ALL PERSONS WHO
HAVE PAID SPECIAL TAXES UNDER SUBTITLE D OR E WITHIN SUCH DISTRICT. 
SUCH LIST SHALL BE PREPARED AND KEPT PURSUANT TO REGULATIONS PRESCRIBED
BY THE SECRETARY OR HIS DELEGATE, AND SHALL CONTAIN THE TIME, PLACE,
AND BUSINESS FOR WHICH SUCH SPECIAL TAXES HAVE BEEN PAID, AND UPON
APPLICATION OF ANY PROSECUTING OFFICER OF ANY STATE, COUNTY, OR
MUNICIPALITY THERE SHALL BE FURNISHED TO HIM A CERTIFIED COPY THEREOF,
AS OF A PUBLIC RECORD, FOR WHICH A FEE OF $1 FOR EACH 100 WORDS OR
FRACTION THEREOF IN THE COPY OR COPIES SO REQUESTED MAY BE CHARGED." 
THE SPECIAL TAXES TO WHICH THE SECTION REFERS INCLUDE THOSE IMPOSED BY
26 U.S.C. 5801. 
 
MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL TOOK NO PART IN THE CONSIDERATION OR DECISION
OF THIS CASE. 
 
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN, DISSENTING. 
 
FOR REASONS STATED IN MY DISSENT IN MARCHETTI V. UNITED STATES AND
GROSSO V. UNITED STATES, ANTE, P. 77, I CANNOT AGREE WITH THE RESULT BY
THE COURT IN THIS CASE. 
 
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ARGUED THE CAUSE FOR PETITIONER.  WITH HIM ON
THE BRIEF WAS EARNEST E. FIGARI, JR. 
 
HARRIS WEINSTEIN ARGUED THE CAUSE FOR THE UNITED STATES.  WITH HIM
ON THE BRIEF WERE ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL SPRITZER, ASSISTANT ATTORNEY
GENERAL VINSON, BEATRICE ROSENBERG AND KIRBY W. PATTERSON. 
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