Ulysses Unbound
Studies in Rationality, Precommitment, and Constraints
Table of contents
Preface and Acknowledgments
Ulysses Revisited: How and Why People Bind Themselves
Introduction: Constraint Theory
Passion as a Reason for Self-Binding
Time-Inconsistency and Discounting
Time-Inconsistency and Strategic Behavior
Passion as a Device for Self-Binding
Variations on a Russian Nobleman
Addiction and Precommitment
Obstacles, Objections, and Alternatives
Ulysses Unbound: Constitutions as Constraints
Introduction
Disanalogies with Individual Precommitment
The Nature and Structure of Constitutions
Constraints on Constitution-Making
Two Levels of Constitutional Precommitment
Self-Binding in Athenian Politics
Interest and Passion in Philadelphia and Paris
Time-Inconsistency, Discounting, and Delays
Omnipotence, Strategic Behavior, and Separation of Powers
Efficiency
Obstacles and Objections
Ulysses Unbound
Less Is More: Creativity and Constraints in the Arts
Introduction
Daydreaming: Creativity Without Constraints
Constraints and Conventions in the Arts
Constraints, Value, and Creativity
Originality, Authenticity, and Creativity
The Hays Code
Lucien Leuwen as an Empty Set
Randomization in the Arts
Creativity and Constraints in Jazz
Obstacles and Objections
Coda
References
Index
by Jon Elster (Editor)
Table of Contents
Contributors
Acknowledgments
Introduction Jon Elster
PART 1
PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON ADDICTION
1 Disordered Appetites: Addiction, Compulsion, and Dependence (Gary
Watson)
2 Freedom of the Will and Addiction (Olav Gjelsvik)
PART II THE
NEUROBIOLOGY OF ADDICTION
3 The Neurobiology and Genetics of Addiction: Implications of the "Reward
Deficiency Syndrome" for Therapeutic Strategies in Chemical Dependency (Eliot
L. Gardner )
4 Addiction as Impeded Rationality (Helge Waal and Jorg Mørland)
PART III
ADDICTION, CHOICE, AND SELF-CONTROL
5 Hyperbolic Discounting, Willpower, and Addiction (Ole-Jorgen Skog)
6 Addiction and Self-Control (Ted O'Donoghue and Matthew Rabin )
PART IV ADDICTION
AND MOTIVATION
7 The Intuitive Explanation of Passionate Mistakes and Why It's Not Adequate (George
Ainslie )
8 Emotion and Addiction: Neurobiology, Culture, and Choice (Jon Elster )
PART V ADDICTION
AND CULTURE
9 Addicts as Objects of Study: Clinical Encounters in the 1920s (Caroline
Jean Acker )
Index
Strong Feelings
Emotion, Addiction, and Human Behavior
Emotion and addiction lie on a continuum between simple visceral drives such as hunger,
thirst, and sexual desire at one end and calm, rational decision making at the other.
Although emotion and addiction involve visceral motivation, they are also closely linked
to cognition and culture. They thus provide the ideal vehicle for Jon Elster's study of
the interrelation between three explanatory approaches to behavior: neurobiology, culture,
and choice.
CONTENTS
Series Foreword
Preface and Acknowledgments
1 Introduction
2 Emotion
2.1 How Do We Know What We Know about Emotion?
2.2 What Emotions There Are
2.3 What Emotions Are: Phenomenological Analysis
2.4 What Emotions Are: Causal Analysis
3 Addiction
3.1 How Do We Know What We Know about Addiction?
3.2 What Addictions There Are
3.3 What Addictions Are: Phenomenological Analysis
3.4 What Addictions Are: Causal Analysis
4 Culture, Emotion, and Addiction
4.1 The Concept of Culture
4.2 Culture and Emotion
4.3 Culture and Addiction
5 Choice, Emotion, and Addiction
5.1 The Concept of Choice
5.2 Choice and Emotion
5.3 Choice and Addiction
6 Conclusion
Notes
References
Index
Alchemies of the Mind
Rationality and the emotions
Jon Elster has written a comprehensive, wide-ranging book on the emotions in which he
considers the full range of theoretical approaches. Drawing on history, literature,
philosophy and psychology Elster presents a complete account of the role of the emotions
in human behavior. While acknowledging the importance of neurophysiology and laboratory
experiment for the study of emotions Elster argues that the serious student of the
emotions can learn more from the great thinkers and writers of the past, from Aristotle to
Jane Austen. He attaches particular importance to the work of the French moralists,
notably La Rochefoucauld, who demonstrated the way esteem and self-esteem shape human
motivation. The book also maintains a running dialogue with economists and rational-choice
theorists. Combining methodological and theoretical arguments with empirical case-studies
and written with Elster's customary verve and economy, this book has great
cross-disciplinary appeal.
CONTENTS
Preface and acknowledgments
Part I. A Plea for Mechanisms
1. Introduction
2. Explaining by mechanisms
3. Proverbial mechanisms
4. Mechanisms in Montaigne
5. Mechanisms in Tocqueville
6. Some elementary mechanisms
7. Molecular mechanisms
8. From mechanisms to laws
9. A plea for disaggregation
Part II. Emotions Before Psychology
1. Introduction
2. Aristotle on the emotions
3. The French moralists
4. Emotion in literature
Part III. Social Emotions in Historical Context
1. Introduction
2. Shame and social norms
3. Envy in social life
4. Honor, duels, and feuds
Part IV. Rationality and the Emotions
1. Introduction
2. The nature of emotion
3. Rationality and the emotions
Appendix
Part V. Alchemies of the Mind
1. Introduction
2. Transmutation
3. Misrepresentation
Coda.
[ Books | Articles | Reviews | Index | The main menu ]
Logic and Society
CONTENTS
Introduction 1
1. Formal Logic - An informal exposition 10
Appendix: Relational logic and social relations 20
2. Possibilistic reasoning in the social sciences 28
Social mobility 28
Finite-state grammars 30
Kinship systems and structuralist thought 33
The evaluation of real national income 35
Endogenous change of tastes 39
Appendix: An impossibility result for context-free grammars 42
3. Political possibility 48
4. Contradictions of the mind 65
Hegel's theory of contradictions 67
Contradictory desires: master and slave 70
Contradictory desires: the economics of irrationality 77
Contradictory beliefs: Hintikka 81
Contradictory beliefs: Festinger 86
5. Contradictions of society 96
The fallacy of composition 97
Counterfinality 106
Suboptimality 122
A dual theory of social change 134
Appendix 1: Some notions and problems in game theory 150
Appendix 2: Causality and intentionality: Three models of man 157
6. Counterfactuals and the New Economic History 175
Three chapters from the history of the notion 176
The problem of historical counterfactuals 181
Imperialism and colonialism 192
Optimism and pessimism [British industrialization] 196
The Navigation Acts 201
Railroads and American economic growth 204
American slaves and their history 208
References 221
Index 233
REVIEWS
Barry, Brian (1980), Superfox, Political Studies 28:136-143
Engerman, Stanley L. (1980), Counterfactuals and the new economic theory, Inquiry 23
(2):157-172
Lukes, Steven (1980), Elster on counterfactuals, Inquiry 23 (2):144-155
Markl, Karl-Peter (1980), Logic and truth finding in society and sociology, Inquiry 23
(2):173-185
Moore, Omar K. (1980), Review of Logic and Society, Contemporary Sociology 9 (1):92-92
Rorty, Amelie Oksenberg (1980), Akrasia and conflict, Inquiry 23 (2):193-212
Stinchcombe, Arthur L. (1980), Is the prisoner's dilemma all of sociology, Inquiry 23
(2):187-192
Taylor, Charles (1980), Formal theory in social science, Inquiry 23 (2):139-144 (text)
van Parijs, Philippe (1981), Sociology as General Economics, European Journal of
Sociology/Archives Europeennes de Sociologie 22 (2), 299-324
Williams, Bernard (1980), Jon Elster's Brisk Meditations, London Review of Books 2
(8):11-12
Wilson, Thomas P. (1982), Social theory and modern logic, Acta Sociologica 25 (4):431-441
[ Books | Articles | Reviews | Index | The main menu ]
This book is a 'case study in the philosophy of science'. It first sets out the main
varieties of scientific explanation: causal, functional and intentional (including
rational-choice explanations). In a second part four sets of theories of technical change
are discussed from the vantage point provided by the first part. These are the
neoclassical theory, the theory of Joseph Schumpeter, a variety of evolutionary theories
(including the theory of animal tool behaviour), and Marxist theories.
The importance of the book is to provide a more detailed empirical material than is
usually done in works on the philosophy of science. It aims at persuading economists that
the philosophy of science can have something useful to say on their topic - and at
suggesting to philosophers the need for rich empirical material.
CONTENTS
Preface and acknowledgements 7
General introduction 9
Part I: Modes of Scientific Explanation
Introduction to part I 15
1. Causal Explanation 25
a. Causal explanation: in general 25
b. Causal explanation: in the social sciences 32
2. Functional Explanation 49
a. Functional explanation: in biology 49
b. Functional explanation: in the social sciences 55
3. Intentional Explanation 69
a. Intentionality 70
b. Intentionality and rationality 72
c. Rationality and optimality 74
d. Intentionality and causality 83
PART II: Modes of Theories of Technical Change
Introduction to Part II 91
4. Neoclassical theories 96
a. The production function 96
b. Explaining the factor-bias of technical change 101
c. Explaining the rate of technical change 105
5. Schumpeter's theory 112
a. The Theory of Capitalist Development (1911) 113
b. Business Cycles (1939) 120
c. Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (1942) 125
6. Evolutionary theories 131
a. Animal tool behaviour 131
b. Eilert Sundt 135
c. Nelson and Winter 138
d. Paul David 150
7. Marxist theories 158
a. Did Marx believe in fixed coefficients of production? 159
b. The rate and direction of technical change 166
c. The falling rate of profit 178
d. The development of the productive forces 181
Appendix 1: Risk, Uncertainty and Nuclear power 185
Appendix 2: The Contradiction between the forces and relations of production
With a Mathematical Note by Aanund Hylland 209
Notes 237
References 259
Index 271
Explaining Technical Change
Preface and acknowledgements
The occasion for writing this book was provided by Bernt Schiller of the University of
Linköping (Sweden), who asked me to write a textbook in the philosophy of science that
could be suitable for their doctoral programme 'Technology and social change'. I am
grateful for the suggestions and comments offered by him and his colleagues along the way,
I should also like to thank the following for their comments on an earlier draft: G. A.
Cohen, Aanund Hylland, Michael MacPherson, Nathan Rosenberg, and an anonymous referee of
Cambridge University Press. Acknowledgements for comments on the Appendices are given at
the appropriate places. Appendix 1 was originally published in Social Science
Information 18 (1979).
Part I of the work can be read as an introduction to the philosophy of scientific
explanation. The Achilles heel of this part, clearly, is the chapter on causal
explanation. My competence in these intricate matters is not high, but since the chapter
was required by the overall architectonics of the book I felt I should state my views even
when they are not strongly grounded. I hope I have avoided saying too much that is
obviously wrong, but the reader may justifiably feel that some of what I say is not very
interesting or not as tightly argued as he might wish.
Part II is not to be read as an introduction to the theory of technical change. It
is subordinated to the epistemological purpose of showing how the distinctions and
propositions of Part I can be applied to a specific set of empirical problems. Here the
danger is that my exposition of the theories may be too compact for the non-specialist and
too sloppy for the specialist. To the first, I can only offer the advice to look up the
original works. To the second I make a plea that ambiguous statements be taken in their
most plausible sense. Even so, there will probably remain some statements that are plainly
wrong, of which the reader can justly complain.
J. E.
REVIEWS
Barry, Brian (1983), Happiness and Joe Higgins, London Review of Books, 20 Oct.-2 Nov., 5
(9):8-9
Cohen, A. J. (1985), Review of Explaining Technical Change, Journal of Economic Issues 19
(1):263- 265
Nelson, R. R. (1986), Review of Explaining Technical Change, Journal of Economic Behavior
and Organization 7 (3):336-339
Stinchcombe, Arthur L. (1985), Can the philosophy of science help science?, Contemporary
Sociology 14 (2):164-166 (text)
Schick, Frederic (1985), Review of Explaining Technical Change, American Journal of
Sociology 90 (6):1360-1362
Walt, S. (1984), Review of Explaining Technical Change and Sour Grapes, Ethics, 94
(4):680-700
[ Books | Articles | Reviews | Index | The main menu ]
Ulysses and the Sirens
revised edition
'Many philosophers and social scientists at some time in their lives have wanted to write
fiction or poetry, only to find that they didn't have what it takes. Others have chosen
philosophy or social science as a second choice when they decided that their first choice
of doing mathematics really was not within their abilities.
The present work is at the intersection of these two failures. But to fail is always to
fail at something, and it leaves you with a knowledge of the kind of thing you
unsuccessfully tried to do. In the essays collected here I have tried to exploit this
knowledge for an analysis of rational and irrational behaviour.'(Preface, p.viii)
Dr Elster arranges his studies in a descending sequence from perfect rationality, through
imperfect and problematical rationality, to irrationality. He first characterizes
specifically human rationality by its capacity to relate strategically to the future, in
contrast to the myopic 'gradient climbing' of natural selection. He trenchantly analyses
some of the parallels proposed in this connection between the biological and the social
sciences. In the chapter on imperfect rationality the crucial notion is that of 'binding
oneself', as Ulysses did before setting out towards the Sirens, when weakness of will may
prevent us from using our capacity for perfect rationality. The second half of the book
deals with rational-actor theory, comparing its logical power and success to rival
approaches, and with the varieties of irrationality expressed in contradictory beliefs and
desires.
Dr Elster here draws on, and has things of importance to say to, a very wide range of
disciplines: analytical philosophy, political science, sociology, economic theory and
animal behaviour studies. He displays a corresponding versatility in the techniques of
exposition and argument he deploys from the more formal analyses of decision-theory to
imaginative insights from literature and common experience. He writes throughout with
admirable lucidity, directness and economy.
CONTENTS
Preface to the revised edition page vii
Preface and acknowedgements viii
I Perfect Rationality: Beyond gradient-climbing 1
1 Introduction 1
2 The locally maximizing machine 4
3 The globally maximizing machine 9
4 Strategic behaviour in animals and men 18
5 Functionalist explanation in sociology 28
II Imperfect Rationality: Ulysses and the Sirens 36
1 Introduction 36
2 Towards a definition 37
3 Pascal 47
4 Descartes 54
5 Inconsistent time preferences 65
6 Endogenous change of preferences 77
7 Precommitment in animal behaviour 86
8 Abdication from power 88
9 Some conclusions and further questions 103
III Problematic Rationality: Some unresolved problems in the theory of rational
behaviour 112
1 Introduction 112
2 Games without solutions 117
3 Lexicographic preferences 124
4 Subjective probability 128
5 Maximizing, satisficing and natural selection 133
6 Traditional behaviour and random behaviour 137
7 Explaining altruism 141
8 Inconstancy 147
9 Paradox 150
10 And so what? 153
IV Irrationality: Contradictions of the mind 157
1 Introduction 157
2 Hate 161
3 Love 165
4 Self-deception 172
References 180
Index 191
Ulysses and the Sirens
Preface to the Revised Edition
The only (but major) change in the present edition is that most of chapter II.5 on
inconsistent time preferences has been completely rewritten. My friend Aanund Hylland of
the Economics Department of the University of Oslo pointed out a gross mathematical error
in the English edition, thus leaving what I thought to be a profound philosophical
conclusion without a leg to stand on. Moreover, in a note dated 26 October 1982 he
provided a detailed analysis of the correct mathematical structure of the problem. The
results are given below. My conclusions have been reformulated accordingly. I should add
that as usual his contribution goes much beyond the technical aspect of the problem; in
fact the main conceptual arguments below are also due to his suggestions.
I would like to point out to the reader an article by Rebecca Dresser, 'Ulysses and the
psychiatrists: A legal and policy analysis of the voluntary commitment contract', Harvard
Civil Rights - Civil Liberties Review 16 (1982), pp. 777-854. The article cites my
brief discussion of this issue (in II.2 below) and then goes on to provide a rich
empirical material. Also, Thomas Schelling has discussed the problem of precommitment and
strategic behaviour toward self in several recent articles, notably 'The intimate contest
for self-command', The Public Interest 60 (1980), pp. 94-118.
J. E.
Preface, First edition
[start of page vii]
Preface and acknowledgements
Many philosophers and social scientists at some time in their lives have wanted to write
fiction or poetry, only to find that they didn't have what it takes. Others have chosen
philosophy or social science as a second choice when they decided that their first choice
of doing mathematics really was not within their abilities. The present work is at the
intersection of these two failures. But to fail is always to fail at something, and
it leaves you with a knowledge of the kind of thing you unsuccessfully tried to do. In the
essays collected here I have tried to exploit this knowledge for an analysis of rational
and irrational behaviour.
The essays were written independently of each other, but have been rewritten to avoid
redundancies and to incorporate further reflection. It may be useful to explain here how
their topics relate to each other. Chapter 1 sets out the paradigm of individually
rational behaviour, which is distinguished both from biological adaptation and from
functional adaptation in societies. The main idea defended here is that the specifically human
rationality is characterized by the capacity to relate to the future, in contradistinction
to the myopic gradient-climbing in natural selection. Chapter II then introduces the
notion of imperfectly rational behaviour, the need for which arises because weakness of
will may prevent us from using our capacity for perfectly rational behaviour. The
notion of binding oneself, as did Ulysses before setting out towards the Sirens, is
the crucial concept of the chapter, though the alternative strategy of 'private side bets'
is also explored. Chapter III is essentially a list of problems in rational-actor theory,
with a view to evaluating the power of this theory compared to norm-oriented or
structuralist approaches. I conclude that the rational-actor theory is logically prior to
its
[end of page vii, start of page ix]
competitors, though not necessarily more successful in each particular case. In chapter IV
some of the problems discussed in chapter III are singled out for more intensive
discussion. In particular I try to explain how contradictory beliefs and contradictory
desires can be understood as meaningful even if irrational. There is, in
other words, a descending sequence of perfect rationality, imperfect rationality,
problematic rationality and irrationality which, in spite of the very diverse material
included, lends a conceptual unity to the essays that justifies their being collected in
book form.
Underlying all the essays is a particular view of the philosophy of science which I hope
to be able to set out more fully elsewhere. A brief outline may prepare the reader for
some of the ideas explored below.
(i) There are basically three modes of explanation in science: the causal, the functional and the intentional.
(ii) All sciences use causal explanation.
(iii) The physical sciences use only causal explanation, least-time principles and other variational formulations being merely ana- lytical artifacts without explanatory power.
(iv) There is no place for intentional explanation in biology. This statement is defended in chapter I below.
(v) There is no place for functional explanation in the social sciences. This statement is defended (and qualified) in I.5 and II.8.
(vi) In biology a distinction can be made between sub-functional causality (mutations, senescence) and supra-functional causality (beneficial or harmful spill-over effects of individual adaptations). This distinction is briefly touched upon in chapter I.
(vii) In the social sciences a similar distinction can be made between sub-intentional causality and supra-intentional causality. The former refers to causal processes taking place within the individual, forming or perverting his intentions. This is the subject of much of chapters II and III. The latter refers to causal interaction between individuals. In my Logic and Society, which is in a sense a twin volume to the present book, I discuss this subject at some length.
(viii) Animal and human behaviour should be studied with the notions of function and of intention as regulative ideas. Not all
[end of page ix, start of page x]
animal behaviour is functional, and not all human behaviour is rational or intentional, but there is a well-grounded presumption that this will typically be the case.
Chapter I was originally presented at the Fourth International Congress of the
International Organization for the Study of Human Development, Paris, 1977. The present
version has benefited from the comments of Roger Masters, Arthur Stinchcombe and George
Williams. A very much shorter version of chapter II was first presented at the ECPR
Workshop on Political Theory, Louvain, 1976. Finn Tschudi then helped me by pointing out
the closely related work of George Ainslie, from whom I later received comments and access
to unpublished manuscripts that proved very important for the development of my ideas. I
also would like to thank Francis Sejersted, Sissel Reichelt, Dagfinn Føllesdal, John
Perry, Michael Bratman, Amélie Rorty, Peter Hammond, Arthur Stinchcombe and Robert Goodin
for criticism and advice. Chapter III was presented at the Seminaire International sur
l'Economie Sociologique, Paris, 1977. I would like to thank John Harsanyi for stimulating
discussion during the gestation period of the paper, and Robert Goodin for constructive
criticism. Chapter IV partly overlaps with chapter 4 of my Logic end Society, but
there are large differences both in the material itself and in the way in which it is
organized. Among those I am in debt to here are Amelie Rorty, Eugene Genovese and Paul
Watzlawick, the first for important suggestions and the latter two for confirming that I
had indeed understood them aright.
[end of page x]
REVIEWS
Brennan, G. (1981), Review of Ulysses and the Sirens, Journal of Economic Literature 19
(1):99-100
Brennan, Timothy J. (1994), Talking to One's Selves: The Social Science of Jon Elster,
Journal of Communication 44 (1):73-81 (text)
Derksen, A. A. (1984), Elster, Rationality and the Rational Choice Approach in the Social
Sciences, Philosophy of the Social Sciences 14 (4):553-558
Gauthier, D. (1983), Review of Ulysses and the Sirens, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 13
(1):133-140
Hubin, Donald C. (1986), Of Bindings and By-products: Elster on Rationality, Philosophy
and Public Affairs 15 (1):82-95 (text)
Mongin, Philippe (1991), Rational Choice Theory Considered as Psychology and Moral
Philosophy, Philosophy of the Social Sciences 21 (1):5-37 (text)
[ Books | Articles | Reviews | Index | The main menu ]
CONTENTS
Preface and Acknowledgements vii
I Rationality 1
1 Introduction1
2 Individual rationality: the thin theory 2
3 Individual rationality: the broad theory 15
4 Collective rationality: the thin theory 26
5 Collective rationality: the broad theory 33
II States that are essentiallly by-products 43
1 Introduction 43
2 Willing what cannot be willed 44
3 Technoloqies for self-management 53
4 Commands 60
5 Trying to impress 66
6 Faking 71
7 Choice and intention in art 77
8 The impotence of power 86
9 Self-defeating political theories 91
10 The obsessional search for meaning 101
III Sour grapes 109
1 Introduction 109
2 A conceptual map 111
3 Power, freedom and welfare 125
4 Sour grapes and social choice 133
IV Belief, bias and ideology 141
1 Introduction 141
2 Situation-induced beliefs 143
3 Interest-induced beliefs 148
4 The benefits of bias 157
References 167
Index 176
Sour Grapes
[start of page vii]
Preface and acknowledgements
An action is the outcome of a choice within constraints. The choice, according to the
orthodox view, embodies an element of freedom, the constraints one of necessity. In
non-standard cases, however, these equations do not hold. The title of an earlier book on
rational and irrational behaviour, Ulysses and the Sirens, is a reminder that men
sometimes are free to choose their own constraints. Sour Grapes conversely reflects
the idea that the preferences underlying a choice may be shaped by the constraints.
Considered together, these two non-standard phenomena are sufficiently important to
suggest that the orthodox theory is due for fundamental revision.
The present book, then, supplements my earlier work. To some extent it also corrects what
I now see as an overly enthusiastic application of the idea that men can choose their own
character. The chapter on states that are essentially by-products suggests that there are
limits to what may be achieved by character planning. There is hubris in the view that one
can be the master of one's soul - just as there is an intellectual fallacy in the view
that everything that comes about by action can also be brought about by action.
The book is also an attempt to spell out some strands in the complex notions of
rationality, intentionality and optimality. Some of the issues raised in this connection
are more fully discussed in my Explaining Technical Change. This holds in
particular for the analysis of functional explanation.
My first acknowledgement is to G. A. Cohen, who has commented extensively and intensively
on successive drafts of Chs. II, III and lV. Without his ability to force me out of a
congenital intellectual laziness, the level of argument would have been much lower. Next,
I want to
[end of page vii, start of page viii]
thank the members of a Working Group on Rationality, set up under the auspices of the
Maison des Sciences de l'Homme', for helpful discussion and constant inspiration. In
particular my gratitude goes to Brian Barry, Donald Davidson, Dagfinn Føllesdal, Robert
Goodin, Serge Kolm, Amélie Rorty, Amos Tversky and Bernard Williams. Finally I should
mention what will be obvious to any reader - my immense intellectual debt to the
outstanding work by Paul Veyne, Le Pain et le Cirque. In addition I want to make
the following acknowledgements with regard to individual chapters. My ideas about
collective rationality in Ch. I have been shaped in numerous discussions with Aanund
Hylland, Rune Slagstad and the other participants in the project 'Democracy and Social
Planning' set up by the Norwegian Research Council for the Humanities. An earlier, much
briefer and somewhat confused version of Ch. II first appeared in Social Sciences
Information, 1981. I am qrateful to Elina Almasy for her editorial help, and to Wolf
Lepenies for his useful comments. A slightly different version of Ch. III appeared in A.
Sen and B. Williams (eds.), Utilitarianism and Beyond (Cambridge University Press,
1982). I received valuable comments on drafts of that version from the editors of the
volume; also from Herman van Gunsteren, Martin Hollis, John Roemer and Arthur Stinchcombe.
Ch. IV appeared - also in a somewhat different form - in M. Hollis and S. Lukes (eds.), Rationality
and Relativism (Blackwell, Oxford, 1982). I am grateful to Martin Hollis for his
editorial suggestions.
The University of Oslo, The Norwegian Research Council for the Humanities, the Maison des
Sciences de l'Homme and All Souls College, Oxford, have also contributed materially to the
writing of the book.
[end of page viii]
REVIEWS
Brennan, Timothy J., 1994, Talking to One's Selves: The Social Science of Jon Elster,
Journal of Communication, 44 (1), 73-81 (text)
Farmer, M. K. (1984), Review of Sour Grapes, Economic Journal, 94 (373):201-203
Hubin, Donald C. (1986), Of Bindings and By-products: Elster on Rationality, Philosophy
and Public Affairs, 15 (1): 82-95 (text)
Larmore, R. (1986), Review of Sour Grapes, American Political Science Review 80
(2):645-647
Mongin, Philippe (1991), Rational Choice Theory Considered as Psychology and Moral
Philosophy, Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 21 (1): 5-37 (text)
Padgett, John F. (1986), Rationally Inaccessible Rationality, Contemporary Sociology 15
(1):26-28 (text)
Ryan, Alan (1983), Reasoning with the unreasonable, The Times Literary Supplement, no.
4202 Oct. 14:1112-1112 (text)
[ Books | Articles | Reviews | Index | The main menu ]
CONTENTS
Preface and acknowledgments xiii
Introduction 1
1 Explanation and dialectics 3
1.1. Methodological individualism 5
1.2. Intentional explanation 8
1.3. Two varieties of causal analysis 18
1.4. Functional explanation in Marx 27
1.5. Dialectics 37
Part I: Philosophy and economics 49
2 Philosophical anthropology 53
2.1. Man and nature 55
2.2. Human nature 61
2.3. Social relations 92
2.4. Philosophy of history 107
3 Economics 119
3,1. Methodology 120
3.2. The labour theory of value 127
3.3. Accumulation and technical change 142
3.4. Theories of capitalist crises 154
4 Exploitation, freedom and justice 166
4.1. The nature and causes of exploitation 167
4.2. Freedom, coercion and force 204
4.3. Is exploitation unjust? 216
Part II: Theory of history 235
5 Modes of production 241
5.1. The general theory of modes of production 243
5.2. The historical modes of production 272
5.3. Marx's periodization of history 301
6 Classes 318
6.1. Defining classes 319
6.2. Class consciousness 344
6.3. Class struggle 371
7 Politics and the state 398
7.1. The nature and explanation of the state 399
7.2. The theory of revolution 428
7.3. Communism 446
8 Ideologies 459
8.1. Stating the problem 461
8.2. Mechanisms 476
8.3. Applications 493
Conclusion 511
9 Capitalism, communism and revolution 513
Capitalism 513
Communism 521
Revolution 528
References 533
Index of names 549
Index of subjects 552
Making Sense of Marx
[start of page xiii]
Preface and acknowledgments
This book has a long history. Some of it may be worthwhile recounting here. I began
serious work on Marx in 1968, when I went to Paris to study with Jean Hyppolite, who had
helped me earlier with my Master's thesis (on Hegel). He died a week before I was to meet
him. At the time I was pensionnaire étranger at the Ecole Normale Supérieure; but
I did not feel at home among the Althusserian Marxists who set the tone there. Instead,
with Gaston Fessard as an intermediary, I turned to Raymond Aron who agreed to be my
thesis supervisor. The three years I frequented his seminar were immensely stimulating.
When I arrived, I did not know there existed such a discipline as historical sociology.
Thanks to Aron and some of the other members of the seminar, notably Kostas Papaioannou, I
learned to see Marx in a historical context and in the context of historical problems. At
the same time I was discovering Marxist economic theory, in the wake of the "capital
controversy". I was excited at these rigorous formulations of Marx's theory, and then
depressed when it turned out that their main use was to prove rigorously that it was
wrong.
I completed my thesis in 1971. For a while I looked for a publisher, but ceased looking
when it occurred to me that there would probably not be any public for the kind of book I
had written. As with the present book, the emphasis was on rational-choice theory,
micro-foundations, and the philosophy of explanation. In France at the time, and to some
extent still today, my methodological commitments automatically would lead readers to
place me on the political right. Somehow methodological individualism and political
individualism (or libertarianism) had become associated with one another. Hence I could
not expect an interested Marxist readership. As for the non-Marxists, they would probably
find the residual Marxism in my own views too much for them. So I left Marx and went on to
other work, mostly but not wholly unrelated to what I had been doing. Over the following
decade I completed five books that are cited extensively in the present work. Leibniz
et la Formation de I'Espirit Capitaliste (1975) was a study in historical sociology,
an attempt to understand the preoccupations of this polymath in the light of
transformations that the European economy was undergoing at the time.
[end of page xiii, start of page xiv]
Logic and Society (1978) applied modal logic to sociological theories and problems.
This helped me, among other things, to get a grip on the elusive notion of "social
contradictions". Ulysses and the Sirens (1979) and Sour Grapes (1983)
are studies in rationality and irrationality, with the main emphasis falling on preference
formation and the scope and limits of character planning. Explaining Technical Change
(1983) is an exposition of some themes in the philosophy of explanation, including a case
study on the problem of innovation, When I finally returned to Marx, I found that I had
been greatly helped by what I had been doing in the meantime. Whatever the merits and
demerits of the present work, it has better foundations than the version I wrote thirteen
years ago.
I returned to Marx because I became aware that the intellectual atmosphere was changing.
Above all, the publication of G. A. Cohen's Karl Marx's Theory of History came as a
revelation Overnight it changed the standards of rigour and clarity that were required to
write on Marx and Marxism. Also I discovered that other colleagues in various countries
were engaged in similar work. A small group formed and met in 1979, and has later met
annually. The discussions in this group, including extensive comments on successive
drafts, have been decisive for the shaping of this book. In particular, the contributions
of John Roemer (now stated in his path-breaking A General Theory of Exploitation and
Class) turned out to be crucial. An interesting outcome of these discussions is that
the sense in which we felt able to call ourselves Marxists has undergone a change over the
years. I do not feel that I can speak for others than myself, except to say that there is
probably not a single tenet of classical Marxism which has not been the object of
insistent criticism at these meetings. Yet some kind of unstated consensus has emerged,
even though I feel neither called upon nor competent to explain it here. Perhaps it will
emerge implicitly from the other books to be published in the series in which this work
appears.
I wish to thank many institutions and persons for their assistance. The Norwegian Research
Council for the Humanities has supported my work on Marx on a generous scale, from 1968 to
1971, and then again from 1979 to 1982. The University of Oslo gave me a leave of absence
at a crucial time in 1982, which I spent in the stimulating atmosphere of All Souls
College, Oxford. The Maison des Sciences de l'Homme (Paris) has helped in many ways,
notably by supporting the meetings of the research group mentioned above. Also I want to
thank my students in the Political Science Department of the University of Chicago, to
whom, on three
[end of page xiv, start of page xv]
occasions, I taught the material that turned into this book. Their incisive questioning
forced me to rethink many issues. Cambridge University Press has proved consistently
helpful, patient and encouraging. In an act of pure friendship, Stephen Holmes read the
whole manuscript with great care to weed out infelicities of style.
G. A. Cohen read drafts of all chapters and made detailed comments that necessitated
extensive revisions. I have also learned more from discussions with him than I am able to
state, since I am sure there are many ideas that I believe to be my own and that actually
originated with him. John Roemer has been equally involved, by his comments, by his own
work and by his contributions in discussion. Their intellectual comradeship has been
invaluable. Arthur Stinchcombe also read the whole manuscript, and provided a healthy dose
of sociological scepticism. Individual chapters have been read by Pranab Bardhan, Robert
Brenner, Bernard Chavance, Aanund Hylland, the late Leif Johansen, Serge Kolm, Margaret
Levi, Claus Offe, Gunnar Opeide, Adam Przeworski, Rune Slagstad, Ian Steedman, Robert van
der Veen, Philippe van Parijs, Michael Wallerstein and Erik Wright. The attention with
which they read the work is attested by the fact that they all detected a mistake in an
earlier version of chapter 4, when I made Wilt Chamberlain out to be a baseball player.
Chamberlain, of course, played basketball. They also helped me to avoid a number of more
consequential errors. I want to thank them all for their involvement in what almost
amounts to a collective work. Almost, but not quite: although they bear some of the
responsibility for some of the remaining mistakes, I must take most of them on myself.
Oslo, January 1984
J. E.
REVIEWS
Ball, M. (1986), Review of Making Sense of Marx, Economic Journal 96 (382):576-578
Burawoy, Michael (1986), Making Nonsense of Marx, Contemporary Sociology 15 (5):704-707
Carling, A. (1985), Review of Making Sense of Marx, Science & Society, 49 (4):497-501
Foley, D. K. (1987), Review of Making Sense of Marx, Journal of Economic Literature 25
(2):749-750
Harvey, David (1986), Review of Making Sense of Marx, Political Theory 14 (4):686-690
Hindess, B. (1986), Review of Making Sense of Marx, Sociological Review 34 (2):440-442
Horowitz, G. M. (1989), Review of Making Sense of Marx, Philosophy of the Social Sciences,
19 (2): 232-235
Levine, Andrew (1986), Review of Making Sense of Marx, The Journal of Philosophy, 721-728 (text)
Louden, R. B. (1989) Review of Making Sense of Marx, Studies in Soviet Thought, 37
(3):250-253
Mandel, Ernest (1986), How to make no sense of Marx, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 15
(Supp.):135-161
Meikle, Scott (1986), Making Nonsense of Marx, Inquiry, 29 (1):29-43
Mobasser, Nilou (1987), Marx and Self-Realization, New Left Review, Iss. 161:119-128
North, Douglas C. (1986), Is it Worth Making Sense of Marx?, Inquiry 29 (1):57-63
Ryan, Alan (1986), The Marx problem book, The Times Literary Supplement, no. 4334 Apr.
25:437- 437 (text)
Ryan, Alan, 1987, Can Marxism be rescued?, London Review of Books, 17 Sep., 9 (16): 8-10
Schweickart, D. (1989), Review of Making Sense of Marx, Review of Radical Political
Economics 21 (1-2):201-204
Slaughter, Cliff (1986), Making Sense of Elster, Inquiry 29 (1):45-56
Smiley, M. (1988), Review of Making Sense of Marx, Polity, 20 (4):734-744
Taylor, Michael (1986), Elster's Marx, Inquiry 29 (1): 3-10
Walzer, Michael (1985), What's Left of Marx?, New York Review of Books, Nov. 21, 32
(18):43-46
Wood, Allen (1986), Historical Materialism and Functional Explanation, Inquiry 29
(1):11-27
[ Books | Articles | Reviews | Index | The main menu ]
An Introduction to Karl Marx
A concise and comprehensive introduction to Marx's social, political, and economic thought
for the beginning student. Jon Elster surveys in turn each of the main themes of Marxist
thought: methodology, alienation, economics, exploitation, historical materialism,
classes, politics and ideology; in a final chapter he assesses "what is living and
what is dead in the philosophy of Marx." The emphasis throughout is on the analytical
structure of Marx's arguments and the approach is at once sympathetic, undogmatic, and
rigorous.
This book draws on Jon Elster's larger and more advanced work, Making Sense of Marx
(C.U. P., 1985), which has already taken its place as the most sophisticated and
systematic modern study available. An Introduction to Karl Marx is designed for use
in undergraduate courses in social and political science, history, economics, and
philosophy, and is published in conjunction with Karl Marx: A Reader, which
contains a selection of Marx's most important writings, edited and introduced by Jon
Elster.
CONTENTS
Preface vii
1. Overview 1
Introduction 1
Marx: Life and Writings 5
Marx and Engels 11
Marxism after Marx 12
Editions of Marx's Writings 17
Bibliography 19
2. Marxist Methodology 21
Introduction 21
Methodological Individualism 22
Marxism and Rational Choice 25
Functional Explanation in Marxism 31
Dialectics 34
Bibliography 39
3. Alienation 41
Introduction 41
Alienation: Lack of Self-realization 43
Alienation: Lack of Autonomy 49
Alienation: The Rule of Capital over Labor 54
Fetishism 56
Bibliography 58
4. Marxian Economics 60
Introduction 60
The Labor Theory of Value 63
Reproduction, Accumulation, and Technical Change 70
Crisis Theory 74
Bibliography 78
5. Exploitation 79
Introduction 79
Exploitation, Freedom, and Force 81
Exploitation in History 84
Exploitation and Justice 92
Bibliography 101
6. Historical Materialism 103
Introduction 103
The Development of the Productive Forces 105
Base and Superstructure 112
The Stages of Historical Development 117
Bibliography 121
7. Class Consciousness and Class Struggle 122
Introduction 122
The Concept of Class 123
Class Consciousness 129
Class Struggle 134
Bibliography 139
8. Marx's Theory of Politics 141
Introduction 141
The Capitalist State 143
Politics in the Transition to Capitalism 153
Politics in the Transition to Communism 159
Bibliography 166
9. The Marxist Critique of Ideology 168
Introduction 168
Political Ideologies 173
Economic Thought as Ideology 176
Religion as Ideology 180
Bibliography 184
10. What Is Living and What Is Dead in the Philosophy of Marx? 186
Introduction 186
What Is Dead? 188
What Is Living? 194
An Introduction to Karl Marx
Preface
In 1985 I published a lengthy book on Marx, Making Sense of Marx (Cambridge
University Press). The present book is much shorter about 25 percent of the first. It has
virtually no exegetical discussions of the texts or of the views of other Marxist
scholars. The main intention is simply to state Marx's views and engage in an argument
with them. With two exceptions, there is little here that is not found, in some place and
some form, in the first book. In Chapter 1, I provide a brief bio-bibliographic survey
that is no included in Making Sense of Marx. In Chapter 3, I offer a discussion of
alienation that goes substantially beyond what was found in the earlier book. A fuller
development of the ideas sketched there is found in my "Self-realization in work and
politics," Social Philosophy and Policy (1986).
A companion volume of selected texts by Marx, organized along thematic lines corresponding
to Chapters 2-9, is published simultaneously with this book.
REVIEWS
Denemark, D. (1989), Review of An Introduction to Karl Marx, Political Science 40
(2):125-127
Gold, Michael (1988), Review of An Introduction to Karl Marx, Kyklos 41 (2):329-332 (text)
Ryan, Alan (1987), Can Marxism be rescued?, London Review of Books, 17 Sep., 9 (16): 8-10
[ Books | Articles | Reviews | Index | The main menu ]
Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences
This book is intended as an introductory survey of the philosophy of the social sciences.
It is essentially a work of exposition which offers a toolbox of mechanisms - nuts and
bolts, cogs and wheels - that can be used to explain complex social phenomena.
Within a brief compass Jon Elster covers a vast range of topics. Its point of departure is
the conflict we all face between our desires and our opportunities. How can
rational-choice theory help us understand our motivation and behaviour? More
significantly, what happens when the theory breaks down but we still cleave to a belief in
the power of the rational? Elster describes the fascinating range of forms of
irrationality - wishful thinking, the phenomenon of sour grapes, discounting the future in
noncooperative behaviour. He shows how these issues bear very directly upon our lives in
such concrete situations as wage bargaining, economic cartels, political strikes, voting
in elections, and court decisions involving child custody.
This is a remarkably lucid and comprehensive introduction to the social sciences for
students of political science, philosophy, sociology, and economics. It will also prove
fascinating to any nonacademic readers who want to understand a little better the forces
governing human behaviour in its social context.
CONTENTS
Preface and Acknowledgments page vii
Part One Introduction
I Mechanisms 3
Part Two Human Action
II Desires and Opportunities 12
III Rational Choice 22
IV When Rationality Fails 30
V Myopia and Foresight 42
VI Selfishness and Altruism 52
VII Emotions 61
VIII Natural and Social Selection 71
IX Reinforcement 82
Part Three Interaction
X Unintended Consequences 91
XI Equilibrium 101
XII Social Norms 113
XIII Collective Action 124
XIV Bargaining 135
XV Social Institutions 147
XVI Social Change 159
Bibliographical Essay 173
Index 183
Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences
[start of page vii]
Preface and Acknowledgment
MANY years ago I read about a book by a nineteenth-century German mathematician, Felix
Klein, called Elementary Mathematics from an Advanced Standpoint. I never read it,
but the title stuck in my mind. The present book could perhaps be subtitled Elementary
Social Science from an Advanced Standpoint.
Or should it be the other way around - advanced social science from an elementary
standpoint? In that case, my model would be a short and wonderful book by Richard Feynman,
QED, an introduction to quantum electrodynamics for the general public. The
comparison is not as presumptuous as one might think. On the one hand, Feynman's ability
to go to the core of a subject, without technicalities but also without loss of rigor, may
be unsurpassed in the history of science and is in any case beyond mine. On the other,
quantum electrodynamics is more arcane than any of the topics discussed here. On balance
therefore, the reader may find my exposition just as intelligible.
The purpose of the book is reflected in its title: to introduce the reader to causal
mechanisms that serve as the basic units of the social sciences. Though not a
do-it-yourself kit, it migh serve as a read-it-yourself kit for further study. The reader
should be wary of the chapter on reinforcement, a topic about which I know little but
which is too important to be neglected. I hope what I say is correct, but people who know
more about it may find it superficial.
A word about style. I have tried to avoid flogging dead horses or belaboring the obvious;
to be honest about the inevitable simplifications; to write simply and without jargon; to
respect the reader's intelligence as well as his ignorance. I rely on exam-
[end of page vii, start of page viii]
ples, diagrams and nontechnical expositions, since, with one exception, I don't think more
is needed. The exception is the chapter on bargaining, which stands in the same relation
to current research as a child's drawing to a photograph. My hope is that the other
chapters are like impressionistic paintings, in which light and shade make up for lack of
focus.
The many footnotes serve several functions. Mainly, they are reminders that things are
more complicated than the main text might suggest. They point to links between chapters
that might otherwise not be noticed. Or they discuss paradoxes and curiosa of the sort
that social scientists love, often to excess.
"Elster" in German is "magpie, " someone who steals other people's
silver. Since there are no references to or mention of other people's work in the book, it
may read as if all the ideas in it are my own. The Bibliographical Essay is intended
partly to dispel that impression, partly to serve as a guide to further studies.
Like some of my other books, this one began as lectures at the University of Chicago. I am
indebted to my students for pushing me to the wall whenever they got the air of an
ambiguity, inconsistency or downright error. I also thank George Ainslie, Ingrid Creppell,
Stephen Holmes, Arthur Stinchcombe and Cass Sunstein for their comments on an earlier
version.
[end of page viii]
REVIEWS
Gould, Mark (1991), Review of Nuts and Bolts, American Journal of Sociology 96
(6):1546-1548 (text)
Humphrey, Paul (1991), Book Reviews, Philosophy of the Social Sciences 21 (1):114-121 (text)
MacFadyen, Alan J. (1991), Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization, Book Reviews 15
(1): 167-169 (text)
Winston, G. C. (1991), Nuts and Bolts, BR, Economics and Philosophy 7 (2):315-322
Urry, John (1990), Book Reviews, Sociological Review 38 (4):785-788
Rosenberg, Alexander (1990), Book Review, Economic Journal 100 (403):1334-1337
Weirich, Paul (1992), The Social Sciences on Rationality, Philosophical Books 33 (1):1-9
[ Books | Articles | Reviews | Index | The main menu ]
Solomonic Judgements
CONTENTS
Preface and acknowledgements page vii
I When rationality fails 1
I.1 Introduction 1
I.2 Rational action 3
I.3 Indeterminacy 7
I.4 Irrationality 17
I.5 Alternatives to rationality 26
II Taming chance: Randomization in individual and social decisions 36
II.1 Introduction 36
II.2 Varieties of randomness 39
II.3 Randomization in individual decisions 53
II.4 Social lotteries: an overview 62
II.5 Scarce goods and necessary burdens 67
II.6 Political lotteries 78
II.7 Legal lotteries 93
II.8 Why lotteries? 103
III Solomonic judgements: Agains the best interests of the child 123
III.1 Introduction 123
III.2 Towards the best interests of the child 130
III.3 Against the best interests of the child 134
III.4 Circumventing the best interests of the child 151
III.5 Alternatives to the best interests of the child 155
III.6 Conclusion 173
IV The possibility of rational politics 175
IV.1 Introduction 175
IV.2 Individual and social choice 176
IV.3 Political indeterminacy 181
IV.4 Political irrationality 194
IV.5 Alternatives to rationalism in politics 202
References 217
Index 231
Solomonic Judgements
[start of page vii]
Preface and acknowledgements
The essays collected here form a sequel to Ulysses and the Sirens (1979) and Sour
Grapes (1983). As in these earlier books, the topic is rationality: its scope, limits
and failures. A common premise of all three books is the normative privilege of
rationality in the study of human behaviour. Chapter I of Ulysses and the Sirens
and chapter I of Sour Grapes attempted to define and defend this ideal of
rationality. In the first chapter of this volume I discuss how the ideal breaks down when
it fails to tell people what to do or when people fail to do what it tells them to do. The
latter failure, that of irrational behaviour, was extensively examined in both earlier
works and is more briefy discussed here, in I.4 and IV.4. The former failure, which arises
when the notion of rationality is indeterminate, is the main topic of the present volume.
The central argument is that rationality itself requires us to recognize this limitation
of our rational powers, and that the belief in the omnipotence of reason is just another
form of irrationality. To illustrate this proposition I consider both individual choice
(mainly in chapter's I and III) and social decisions (mainly in chapters II and IV).
The book is bound to convey a certain disillusionment with instrumental rationality. The
emphasis is not wholly negative, however. On the more constructive side, I consider
several non-instrumental grounds for action. With respect to political choices, I argue in
chapter IV that justice offers a guide to reform which is more robust than
outcome-oriented considerations could ever be. With respect to individual choice, I
mention briefy in chapter I that social norms can supplement or replace rationality
in the explanation of action. I develop the latter argument at much greater length in The
Cement of Society, a companion volume to the present
[end of page vii, start of page viii]
book in which I attempt to fill in some of the blanks left by the partial self-immolation
of rationality.
Chapter I has not been previously published. Chapter II is a revised and much expanded
version of the Tanner Lectures given at Brasenose College, Oxford, in May 1987. Chapter
III first appeared, in largely the same form, in the University of Chicago Law Review,
1987. Chapter IV is an extensively rewritten version of an article that appeared in Archives
Européennes de Sociologie, 1987.
The common origin of chapters II and III was a seminar at the Institute for Social
Research in Oslo when, in a discussion of child custody legislation, Karl Ove Moene
suggested that custody disputes might be resolved by the flip of a coin. The proposal
seemed intriguing, not only as a way of resolving custody disputes but as a way of making
up one's mind in many different contexts. In collecting examples and thinking about about
them, I was constantly helped and prompted by Fredrik Engelstad and Aanund Hylland.
Together with Akhil Amar, Robert Bartlett John Broome, G. A. Cohen, Jonathan Cole, J.
Gregory Dees, Gerald Dworkin, Torstein Eckhoff, Ed Green, Stephen Holmes, Mark Kishlansky,
William Kruskal, Isaac Levi, Karl Ove Moene, Maurice Pope, Kirsten Sandberg, Stephen
Stigler and Cass Sunstein, they also gave extremely valuable suggestions and comments on
earlier drafts of chapter II. I am also grateful for comments by the participants in
seminars at the University of California, Davis, Yale Law School, and the University of
Miami Law School.
Chapter III is part of a project on distributive justice in child custody and child
placement, financed by the Norwegian Social Science Research Council. I am indebted to my
colleague in this project, Kirsten Sandberg, for useful discussions and invaluable
guidance, and to Robert Mnookin for helpful advice and criticism. I am aIso grateful for
comments by Kirsti Strøm Bull, G. A. Cohen, Tove Stang Dahl, Torstein Eckhoff, Fredrik
Engelstad, Helga Hernes, Aanund Hylland, Karl Ove Moene, Lucy Smith and Cass Sunstein, as
well as the participants in the Seminar on Ethics and Public Policy at the University of
Chicago and in the Legal Theory Workshop at Columbia University.
Several chapters, especially II and III, make ventures into legal theory, a field about
which I knew nothing and still know next to
[end of page viii, start of page ix]
nothing. Most of what I have learned, especially about American law, I owe to Cass
Sunstein. Over the past years he has been an unfailing source of guidance, criticism and
constructive suggestions. I could not have done without his help. I am also grateful to
Tove Stang Dahl and Kirsten Sandberg for helping me to understand that the concerns of
legal scholars are much closer to those of philosophers and social scientists than I used
to think.
REVEWS
Hawthorn, G. (1990), Review of Solomonic Judgements and Nuts and Bolts, New Republic, 202
(6), 34, 38
Hollis, Martin (1991), Why Elster is stuck and needs to recover his faith, London Review
of Books, 13 (2) (24. Jan.), 13-13 (text)
Ostrom, Elinor (1991), Rational choice theory and institutional analysis: Toward
complementarity, American Political Science Review 85 (1):239-242
Rosenberg, Alexander (1990), Review of Solomonic Judgements, Economic Journal 100
(403):1334-1337
Ryan, Alan (1991), When It's Rational to be Irrational, New York Review of Books, Oct. 10,
38 (16): 19-22 (text)
Urry, John (1990), Book Reviews, Sociological Review 38 (4): 785-788
Weirich, Paul (1992), The Social Sciences on Rationality, Philosophical Books 33 (1):1-9
[ Books | Articles | Reviews | Index | The main menu ]
The Cement of Society
CONTENTS
Preface and acknowledgements page vii
Introduction: the two problems of social order 1
1. Collective action 17
Introduction 17
Defining collective action 24
The technology of collective action 27
Rational cooperation 34
Rational, selfish, outcome-oriented motivation 37
Rational, selfish, process-oriented motivations 44
Rational, nonselfish, outcome-oriented motivations 46
2. Bargaining 50
Introduction 50
Cooperative models of bargaining 54
Noncooperative bargaining theory 68
Bargaining power 75
Uncertainty, manipulation, inefficiency 82
Uncertainty and the role of information 82
Strategic manipulation of bargaining parameters 86
The inefficiency of bargaining 95
3. Social norms 97
Introduction 97
Examples 107
- Consumption norms 107
- Norms against behaviour 'contrary to nature' 108
- Norms regulating the use of money 110
- Norms of reciprocity 111
- Medical ethics 114
- Codes of honour 116
- Norms of retribution 118
- Work norms 121
- Norms of cooperation 123
- Norms of distribution 123
The reality and autonomy of norms 125
- Consumption norms 140
- Norms against behaviour 'contrary to nature' 141
- Norms regulating the use of money 142
- Norms of reciprocity 143
- Medical ethics 143
- Codes of honour 144
- Norms of retribution 144
- Work norms 145
- Norms of cooperation and distribution 146
4. Bargaining and collective action 152
Introduction 152
Collective bargaining in Sweden 155
Labour - capital bargaining 165
Capital - capital bargaining 173
Labour - labour bargaining 178
5. Collective action and social norms 186
Introduction 186
Norms of cooperation 187
Mixed motives 202
6. Bargaining and social norms 215
Introduction 215
Norms in capital - labour bargaining 221
Norms in labour - labour bargaining 224
Norms versus self-interest in bargaining 231
Norm conflicts in bargaining 244
Conclusion: the cement of society 248
Introduction 248
Envy 252
Opportunism 263
Credibility 272
References 288
Index 309
The Cement of Society
[start of page vii]
Preface and acknowledgements
This book has a complicated genesis. For many years, I have been interested in the problem
of collective action. Discussions with Brian Barry and Russell Hardin helped me to see
roughly where the main problems where located, but I never seemed to get them fully into
focus. Concurrently with this preoccupation, and spurred largely by proddings from Amos
Tversky and Fredrik Engelstad, I became increasingly puzzled by the relation between
rational choice and social norms. I discussed this problemn with Pierre Bourdieu, and
together we organized a conference on the topic. Once again, I seemed to make progress up
to a point, and then confusion descended on me. Clearly, I was going against the grain.
The catalyst for further progress came in 1985, when Nils Elvander of the Swedish Council
for Management and Work Life Issues (FA-Rådet) asked me to write a report on bargaining
and collective action in the context of their project on collective wage bargaining in
Sweden. I accepted in the belief, mistaken as it turned out, that my earlier work on
rational choice theory might help me explain the strategies, stratagems and outcomes of
collective bargaining. It soon became clear that the complexity of bargaining problems
defies explicit modelling. My analytical skills, in any case, were not sufficient to
reduce the moving, fuid process of collective bargaining to manageable proportions. In the
Swedish system of collective bargaining, as I try to explain in Chapters 4 and 6,
everything is up for grabs: the identity of the actors, the rules of the game, the set of
payoffs, the range of acceptable arguments. The more I understood what was going on, the
lower I had to set my sights. The initial aim of expla- nation was gradually transformed
into one of 'thick' phenomenological description. Yet I came to see that here was a set of
problems that lent themselves ideally to an exploration of the relation between individual
and collective rationality, and between self-intetest and social norms. Things that had
been out of focus suddenly came together.
More or less simultaneously with this work I completed two other books that complement the
present one. Each of them reflects an increasing dis-
[end of page vii, start of page viii]
illusionment with the power of reason, be it at the level of social actors or at the level
of the social scientist who is observing them. In Solomonic Judgements I argue that
rational-choice theory yields indeterminate prescriptions and predictions in more cases
than most social scientists and decision makers would like to think. In Nuts and Bolts
for the Social Sciences, written for a more general audience, I argue that the basic
concept in the social sciences should be that of a mechanism rather than of a theory.
In my opinion, the social sciences are light years away from the stage at which it will be
possible to formulate general-law-like regularities about human behaviour. Instead, we
should concentrate on specifying small and medium-sized mechanisms for human action and
interaction - plausible, frequently observed ways in which things happen. If this sounds
vague (and it does), I have to refer the reader to the substance of the three books for
proof of the pudding.
The level of discussion may puzzle some readers. It may be too technical for some and
insufficiently rigorous for others. Martin Heidegger is reported to have dismissed an
argument by saying, 'Nicht tief genug gefragt'. On the other side of the Atlantic or the
Channel, dismissal often takes the form of asserting, 'Not clear enough to be wrong'. Many
of my arguments will be dismissed on both counts. I can only hope that what is lost in
depth and clarity is partially compensated by variety and diversity.
I have benefited greatly from comments I received when presenting parts of this material
at the European University Institute (Florence), at the Ecole Normale Supérieure (Paris),
at Gary Becker and James Coleman's Rational Choice Seminar at the University of Chicago,
at the Philosophy Department of the University of California at San Diego and to the
annual meet- ing of the 'September Group' in London. I am grateful to Jens Andvig, Kenneth
Amow, Lars Calmfors, G. A. Cohen, Michael Dennis, Nils Elvander, Fredrik Engelstad, Aanund
Hylland, John Padgett, Philippe van Parijs, Adam Przeworski, Ariel Rubinstein and Michael
Wallerstein for comments on earlier drafts of several chapters. Special thanks are due to
Stephen Holmes and Cass Sunstein for making detailed written comments in the whole
manuscript, to Karl Ove Moene for unfailing patience in lecturing me the basics of
noncooperative bargaining theory and to Aanund Hylland for doing his best to keep me
intellectually honest. Steve Laymon's skilful and imaginative research assistance has been
invaluable. A final acknowledgement is owed to Thomas Schelling, whose work on bargaining
and collective action serves as a model and inspiration for all who work in this area.
[end of page viii]
REVIEWS
Giddens, Anthony (1990), Review of The Cement of Society, American Journal of Sociology 96
(1):223-225 (text)
Hampton, Jean (1991), Review of The Cement of Society, The Journal of Philosophy
88:728-738
Hollis, Martin (1991), Why Elster is stuck and needs to recover his faith, London Review
of Books, 13 (2) (24. Jan.): 13-13 (text)
Ostrom, Elinor (1991), Rational choice theory and institutional analysis: Toward
complementarity, American Political Science Review 85 (1):239-242
Rosenberg, Alexander (1990), Book Review, Economic Journal 100 (403):1334-1337
Ryan, Alan, 1991, When It's Rational to be Irrational, New York Review of Books, Oct. 10,
38 (16):19-22 (text)
Schmidtz, D. (1991), Review of The Cement of Society, Ethics 101 (3): 653-655
Sugden, Robert (1990), Review of The Cement of Society, Journal of Economic Behaviour and
Organization 14 (3):439-441
Weirich, Paul (1992), The Social Sciences on Rationality, Philosophical Books 33 (1):1-9
[ Books | Articles | Reviews | Index | The main menu ]
Local Justice
The well-being of individuals routinely depends on their success in obtaining goods and
avoiding burdens distributed by society. Local Justice offers the first systematic
analysis of the principles and procedures used in dispensing "local justice" in
situations as varied as the admission of students to college, the choice of patients for
organ transplants, tlie selection of workers for layoffs, and the induction of men into
the army. A prominent theorist in the field of rational choice and decision making, Jon
Elster develops a rich selection of empirical examples and case studies to demonstrate the
diversity of procedures used by institutions that mete out local justice. From this
revealing material Elster fashions a conceptual framework for understanding why
institutions make these crucial allocations in the ways they do.
Elster's investigation discloses the many complex and varied approaches of such decision-
making bodies as selective service and adoption agencies, employers and universities,
prison and immigration authorities. What are the conflicting demands placed on these
institutions by the needs of applicants, the recommendations of external agencies, and
their own organizational imperatives? Often, as Elster shows, methods of allocation may
actually aggravate social problems. For instance, the likelihood that handicapped or
minority infants will be adopted is further decreased when agencies apply the same
stringent screening criteria - exclusion of people over forty, single parents, working
wives, and low-income families - that they use for more sought after babies.
Elster proposes a classification of the main principles and procedures used to match goods
with individuals, charts the interactions among these mechanisms of local justice, and
evaluates them in terms of fairness and efficiency. From his empirical groundwork, Elster
builds an innovative analysis of the historical processes by which, at given times and
under given circumstances, preferences become principles and principles become procedurcs.
Local Justice concludes with a comparison of local justice systems with major
contemporary theories of social justice - utilitarianism, John Rawl s's A Theory of
Justice, Robert Nozick's Anarchy, State and Utopia - and discusses the
"common-sense conception of justice" held by professional decision makers such
as lawyers, economists, and politicians. The difference between what we say about justice
and how we actually dispense it is the illuminating principle behind Elster's latest work.
CONTENTS
Preface and acknowledgments vii
1 Introduction 1
2 Problems of Local Justice 18
Conceptual preliminaries 19
Some examples 28
3 Principles of Local Justice 62
Conceptual preliminaries 62
A classification of principles 67
Egalitarian principles 70
Time-related principles 73
Principles defined by status 76
Principles defined by other properties84
Mechanisms based on power 100
Mixed systems 103
4 Consequences of Local Justice 113
Secondary effects 114
Incentive effects 124
Local justice - global injustice? 132
5 Explaining Local Justice 135
Methodological preliminaries135
Preference formation 143
Preference aggregation 172
6 Local and Global Justice 184
The scope and depth of justice 185
The empirical foundations of justice 189
Ethical individualism and presentism 195
Equality as the baseline for justice 200
Veils of ignorance 204
Consequentialism and welfarism 208
Utilitarianism 211
John Rawl's theory of justice 223
Robert Nozick's theory 230
The Commonsense conception of justice 236
7 Conclusion: Some Unexplored Issues 246
References 251
Index 263
Local Justice
[start of page vii]
Preface and acknowledgments
This work has two main flaws, and one possible virtue. I am acutely aware of the fact that
I am stretching my competence thinly over a large number of areas. It is not just that my
treatment of the issues is selective: my knowledge is based on what may well be, in some
cases, idiosyncratically chosen, unrepresentative, or dated sources. Although I could have
gathered more, and more accurate, information, this would not have made much of a
difference for the main purpose of the book, which is to sketch a framework for the study
of the in-kind allocation of goods and burdens.
Unfortunately, that framework turned out to be messy and ugly. I have been unable to
respect the standards of simplicity and parsimony that many readers will feel they have a
right to expect. It may be that I just lack the ability or the inclination to cut through
the bewildering surface variety of local justice phenomena and find the underlying
principles that would bestow intelligibility on them all. Or it might be that there are no
such principles to be found, and that the messiness is inherent in the object. Most
probably, there is some truth in both hypotheses.
I hope that some readers, nevertheless, will share my delight
[end of page vii, start of page viii]
and exhilaration in observing the endless variety and inventiveness of human institutions.
The details are not incidental to the story I am telling: they are its essence. I am sure
I could have told the story better, and perhaps a better sort of story could have been
told; but I hope there may still be some instruction and entertainment in what follows.
My main intellectual debts are to my collaborators in the Local Justice Project at the
University of Chicago: Patricia Conley, Michael Dennis, Steve Laymon, and Stuart Romm.
Through our exchanges over the last few years they have provided me with invaluable
factual information as well as conceptual arguments and innovative explanatory
suggestions. In the present book I have drawn extensively on their working papers on
transplantation, layoffs, and college admission. I have also benefited greatly from their
detailed written comments on the present manuscript and its various antecedents. The
extent of their contributions will become clear in subsequent publications from the Local
Justice Project. I want to emphasize, however, that their share in the project goes well
beyond that of research assistance as usually conceived. If I had been able to pin down
exactly which of the ideas developed below originated in their suggestions, scores of
references would have been required. Since it is hard to identify the origin of ideas that
arise in the give and take of discussion, this collective and nonspecific acknowledgment
will have to do.
I have also benefited enormously from my collaboration with Fredrik Engelstad, Nicolas
Herpin, and Volker Schmidt, who are responsible for the Local Justice Projects in Norway,
France, and Germany, respectively. With them, too, I experienced the exciting interplay
between information-gathering on the one hand, and conceptual and causal analysis on the
other.
On the several occasions that I taught courses on the empirical study of distributive
justice at the University of Chicago I have ended up getting as much as I was giving. I am
especially grateful to Karen Lembcke, Gerry Mackie, David McIntyre, and Monica Toft for
what I learned from their papers on prison crowding, immigration, and adoption.
For comments on various working papers that eventually turned into this book I am indebted
to G. A. Cohen, Hans Fredrik Dahl, Torstein Eckhoff, Dagfinn Føllesdal, Miriam Golden,
Aan-
[end of page viii, start of page ix]
und Hylland, Raino Malnes, and Cass Sunstein. Craig Calhoun, Willem Hofstee, David Laitin,
Claus Offe, and John Roemer made detailed comments on the whole manuscript, which resulted
in substantial changes and, I hope, improvements.
I am grateful to the Russell Sage Foundation for financial support of the project.
Additional support has been provided by the Spencer Foundation, the College Board, the
Center for Ethics, Rationality, and Society at the University of Chicago, and the
Norwegian Research Council. A fellowship from the John Simon Guggenheim Foundation in 1989
provided me with time to read and think when I needed it most. I wish to thank them all.
A final acknowledgment is due to Steven Laymon and Sven Linblad for competent and
imaginative bibliographical assistance.
I dedicate this book to Kathy Anderson, Lorraine Dwelle, and Minnie Seahom in the
Political Science Department at the University of Chicago, for their invariable
helpfulness and competence.
[end of page ix]
REVIEWS
Bulpitt, Jim (1993), Review of Local Justice, Journal of Public Policy 12:409-410
Cornford, J. (1992), Review of Local Justice, New Statesman & Society, 5 (220):38-39
Dryzek, John S. (1993), Review of Local Justice, American Political Science Review 87
(1):199-199
Grafstein, R. (1994), Review of Local Justice, Annales of the American Academy of
Political and Social Science 533:215-215
Heimer, Carol A. (1993), Review of Local Justice, American Journal of Sociology 99
(2):492- 494
Lewis, David (1993), Review of Local Justice, Acta Sociologica 36 (3):300-303
McPherson, M. (1995), Review of Local Justice, Economics and Philosophy 11 (1):177-182
Miller, David (1993), Stuck with second best, The Times Literary Supplement, Jan. 8, no.
4684, 22-22 (text)
Moon, J. Donald (1994), Review of Local Justice, Political Theory 22 (1):179-181 (text)
Paul, Ellen Frankel (1993), Review of Local Justice, Journal of Politics 55 (4):1196-1198
Roth, Alvin E. (1993), Review of Local Justice, Journal of Economic Literature 31
(3):1445-1446
Weale, Albert (1993), Review of Local Justice, Journal of Social Policy 22:563-565
[ Books | Articles | Reviews | Index | The main menu ]
Political Psychology
This provocative new book takes up and develps the themes of rationality and irrationality
in Jon Elster's earlier work. Its purposes are threefold. First, Elster shows how belief
and preference formation in the realm of politics are shaped by social and political
institutions. Second, he argues for an important distinction in the social sciences
between mechanisms and theories. Third, he illustrates those general principles of
political psychology through readings of three outstanding political psychologists: the
French classical historian Paul Veyre, the Soviet dissident writer Alexander Zinoviev, the
great French political theorist Alexis de Tocqueville.
As with all Elster books, the style is succinct and readable ensuring that it will be
fully accessible to graduate students and teachers in philosophy, political science, and
the history of ideas
CONTENTS
Abbreviations page vi
Preface vii
Introduction: Why Political Psychology 1
Theories versus mechanisms 1
Methodological individualism 7
The formation of belifs and desires 11
The political psychology of revoltions 15
The political psychology of constitution making 24
1. A Historian and the Irrational: A Reading of Bread and Circuses 35
Three stages of euergetism 37
Authority in the ancient world 43
Comparative sociology 46
Veyne's theory of choice 50
Veyne as a critic and victim of functionalism 57
Ideology 60
The struggle for recognition 66
2. Internal and External Negation: An Essay in Ibanskian Sociology 70
The logic of negation 73
Some historical ancestors 78
Fundamentals of Ibanskian sociology 82
Opposition at home and abroad 88
Power and impotence 97
3. Tocqueville's Psychology I 101
A specimen of Tocqueville's reasoning 103
Tocqueville's prejudices 107
Tocqueville's contradictions 112
4. Tocqueville's Psychology II 136
Tocqueville's anatomy of the mind 139
Desires and opportunities 162
Spillover, Compensation, and Crowding-out effects 180
References 192
Index 199
Political Psychology
[start of page vii]
Preface
Ten years ago I published earlier versions of Chapters 1 and 2 of this book, in the form
of a study of Paul Veyne in Informations sur les Sciences Sociales (1980) and a
critical note on Alexander Zinoviev in Archives Européennes de Sociologie (1980).
In the first article I showed that Veyne had been profoundly influenced by Hegel and
Tocqueville, and went on to say that:
To these two intemal reference points within the book there is to be added a third, which both illumiates it and is illuminated by it: Alexander Zinoviev's The Yawning Heights. The affinities and contrasts between authoritarian, democratic and totalitarian societies will enable us to rebuild political sociology on new and solid foundations with Veyne, Tocqueville, and Zinoviev as permanent references.
In the introductory note to the second article I said much the same:
By a happy coincidence, I read Zinoviev's work at the same time as Bread and Circuses, when I was also rereading Democracy in America. From time to time I shall have the opportunity of pointing out some of the many points at which the three books converge, a subject to which I hope to be able to devote a separate study later.
I often thought of carrying out the project, but it was not until 1989
that I had the chance to do so. With my colleague Stephen Holmes, of the University of
Chicago, I was invited by the CREA of the Ecole Polytechnique (Paris) and the Institut
Raymond Aron to give a series of lectures on Tocqueville. I chose as my topic
"Tocqueville's psychology," which is the subject of Chapters 3 and 4 of this
book. I then had the idea of taking
[end of page vii, start of page viii]
up the articles on Veyne and Zinoviev, to see whether they had worn well enough to merit
inclusion, along with the more recent text on Tocqueville, in a small text in political
psychology. On rereading them, I found some obscure passages and an occasionally
grandiloquent style that set my teeth on edge but there were also sounder elements on
which, I thought, something could be built. It needed many revisions before I finally felt
that they were acceptable. I added an introductory chapter, in which I try to explain why
political psychology, long neglected and to all intents and purposes nonexistent as an
intellectual discipline, offers an especially fruitful means of understanding the great
historical events and movements of both the past and the present.
The book has been quite extensively revised for the English translation, mainly for the
same reasons that led me to revise the original articles. It turned out that various
arguments, which to my imperfect pitch sounded plausible and even compelling when stated
in French, did not survive the translation into sober English. While not exactly flaky,
they owed too much to my desire to be terse and elegant in a language that I did not fully
master. In addition, I made extensive changes to reduce the overlap with my other English
books. I apologize for the overlap that remains. It could not, I felt, be eliminated
without upsetting the balance of the book.
[end of page viii]
REVIEWS
Lakoff, S. (1994), Review of Political Psychology, American Political Science Review 88
(1):212-214
Macintyre, Alasdair (1994), Review of Political Psychology, Ethics 105 (1):183-185
Roberts, M. (1994), Review of Political Psychology, Radical Philosophy, Iss. 68:42-45
[ Books | Articles | Reviews | Index | The main menu ]