A review of Michael LaFargue's Tao and Method, by Isabelle Robinet, in T'oung Pao, 1998, p.143-153.
I have translated excerpts of
the article that is in French.
In fact, LaFargue is simply being the advocate of what we call pluralism,
by rising up against doctrinal attitudes (whether these are attributed
to an author or come from a reader-interpreter), and he proclaims
that there are several possible worlds in different times and that
have different meanings. Since he thinks that a communication can
be established between these various worlds, he intends to interpret
the Laozi by following a way that takes into account both the world
experienced by the author, the world in which he lived and to which
he was speaking, and finally the world of the reader. He calls on
philosophy, phenomenology and semiotics, but he is careful not to
systematize any of those fields. And that's how he comes to make
the Dao De Jing to be a kind of occasion work, to be put back in
the socio-political context of its times, of which he makes it depend
fairly closely, and that is intended for a small group of initiates.
It seems to me that LaFargue's position can hold its own, and that
it is convincing, specially about the calling on a "living
experience" (Lebenswelt) of those Laoists, for whom one of
the major sources of inspiration would be that "intimate experience"
that is their main topic, indeed of a more pragmatic than metaphysical
nature; in this he agrees with Chad Hansen in seeing a "practical
tone" in the Laozi (A Daoist Theory of Chinese Thought, p.
222). But I would add that this doesn't prevent the Laozi, as the
history of the text shows (and still nowadays) from being read differently
also (be it just in the name of pluralism). As an "open text",
the Dao De Jing can allow several interpretations, as the study
of its commentaries shows plentifully; and one can maintain that
if the Chinese commentators have given it a metaphysical meaning
so often, it's that it was there at least as a seed.
As to the meaning the Laoists give to the word Dao, "an intimate presence hypostatized to a cosmic dimension," rather than a metaphysical entity as one often understands it, and as the Chinese understood it, specially after Wang Bi, this seems to me to be a fairly correct view. And more correct than the interpretation of Chad Hansen (his book was published after LaFargue's), which systematically ignores the cosmic or cosmogonic connotations, that precisely make the Dao the Mother, the Origin, the Root, and that place it above Heaven (ch. 16, 25). We note that among the commentators of the Laozi, there is at least one case of an exegete that goes in LaFargue's direction (Daozang. 724 (French index), commentary of the first sentence).
When comparing these two differing
interpretations by LaFargue and C. Hansen, one sees that, if they
both reject the metaphysical dimension of the Dao entity,
one can notice an important divergence, even two opposite opinions.
Where Hansen maintains that the Laozi aims at rejecting all prescriptive
discourses, as well as language, as an instrument of social coercion
- an essentially skeptical attitude - LaFargue, on the contrary,
sees the Laozi to be precisely a discourse based on a value judgement,
resting on the importance and the living consistency of that kind
of discovery that the presence of the Dao is, that Laozi celebrates
as something new, a revelation that only those who have experienced
it, or are about to, can understand. On the basis of that experience,
the Laoists create a new concept by shifting the term and notion
of dao, that had a common meaning of 'method of behavior,' to
raise it to that of a presence, of which good behavior is merely
a sign. Where Hansen says that the Laozi is only inciting to overthrow
socially conditioned desire, to deconstruct language, to show that
there is no sure norm, not even the counter-norm, LaFargue emphasizes
the peremptory character of certain Laoist aphorisms that do not
convey general laws like Welch and Fung Yu-lan write, but a conviction,
a choice that gives them the character of a "speech-act,"
an authoritative force, nearly a declaration of faith that prescribes
a behavior. The analysis of LaFargue is certainly more advanced
than that of Hansen, who is too focused on the language problem,
and ends up doing a large part of his lectures on Chinese thought
on this question, forgetting the lesson of Zhuangzi of which he
says correctly that it teaches to take into account the multiplicity
of the possible perspectives, just as LaFargue points out the diverse
possible methods of interpretation.
*****
LaFargue
has conscientiously studied the main existing translations. His
basic principle, he explains, is to be as close to the original
as possible and, every time that it is possible to translate using
one English word for one Chinese one, and respecting as much as
possible the order of the Chinese words; a good method that everyone
ought to follow. In agreement with his thesis of a Dao De Jing written
almost in a conversational tone, he seeks to use a language that
is contemporary, almost spoken language. When the text is obscure,
he says, he chooses a translation that makes sense rather than a
literal one. He starts from the Wang Bi version, but uses the principle
of the lectio difficilor by comparing with the Heshang Gong version
and the Mawangdui manuscript, which explains a part of his translations
that are completely unusual. So he has made a choice that he explains
and that is completely sensible and defendable.
*****
Still, whatever the efforts of the interpreters are, there are sayings
in the Laozi that are undecidable, with an inexhaustible character
and so untranslatable. One of the most remarkable points of this
text is that one can hesitate indefinitely between the error of
a copyist, or an alteration, or a formulation that intentionally
has several meanings and is undecidable. It seems to me that to
try to make hesitation impossible is to amputate its richness. Nothing
says - it's good to accept this - that the Dao De Jing is not opting
voluntarily for an evocation rather than a description, for lyrism
at the same time as prescription, for an indirect meaning rather
than a clear meaning, for a general meaning that encompasses and
goes beyond the particular concrete one that one can replace in
a precise historical and ideological context like LaFargue attempts
to do. Nothing allows us to suppose either that the author was striving
to be coherent; one could say on the contrary, that discontinuity
seems to be one of the methods that is used in this text; it is
all too frequent and is also too often a part of the methods used
by many Chinese, specially in texts that are either poetic of inspired;
one finds it everywhere. And to try to give a coherence to this
text when there is nothing to prove that it exists as its foundation,
is to close it up.
May I, as a conclusion, add a few reflections
- that only present the subject in a different and complementary
way- about the "conversion," or the reversal of perspective
that LaFargue speaks about, that fan that
C. Hansen and A. Graham explain as a reversal of conventional values.
FAN:
There is a fundamental paradox
in the position that the Dao De Jing takes. It claims to win, to
conquer, and this by weakness and gentleness, and thus by the apparent
refusal of domination. This is explained by the fact that the intended
victory is not aimed at dominating, but at pacifying and balancing,
to reach that harmonious totality that LaFargue speaks of. This
must be reached by weakness and renunciation, as counterweights
to violence and power. So it is a renunciation that is in fact an
appropriation, a dispossession that is a conquest, and rather than
a reversal of values, it is an opposite value that contains, encloses,
the initial value, and balances it. It's an antithesis that starts
from the thesis that is prior to it, presupposes it (and that is
why quietness and negation, wu,
are prior to movement
and affirmation); but it is opposed to it in the sense that is an
answer to it, and so it implicitly sets down the thesis that is
said to be initial (this explains why Laozi says that affirmation
you is born of negation wu, and that they generate each other; there
is no contradiction.) "Everyone knows what is beautiful,"
that's universal common sense speaking; "and from that comes
ugliness": the antithesis that seems to follow is only apparently
subsequent, and in reality concomitant; the interlocking is mutual.
And from that follows the epoche, non-knowledge and non-speech.
One is left with silence because each value contains its counter-value
(as Hansen says); but a silence that is fecundity (wan wu zuo ch. 2), total welcome, without possession. Thesis
and antithesis face each other, support and cancel each other at
the discourse level, but not in existence. Both are maintained in
a silent experience. All in all, it is more than a tactic of seeking
that which does not weaken because already weak; and perhaps also
rather than choosing passivity because it is vital and fertile
(A. C. Graham, Disputers of the Tao, p. 224), or rather than taking
the opposite view of received values so as not to be conditioned
by the dominant social discourse, and because there is no rule that
is reliable in all situations (Hansen), one could consider that
Laozi is attempting to formulate a discourse that leaves space for
the antithesis and that contains it.