Mapping Circassian Responses

to the August 2008 Caucasian War:

Personal Musings on the Current Political Situation of the Circassians and Circassian Independence

Amjad Jaimoukha

2 October 2008

(This article will be subject to further expansion and editing. If there are voices that have not been recorded, please make them heard by dropping us a line at jaimoukha@gmail.com)

The August 2008 war between Georgia and Russia is having and is slated to have profound and long-lasting effects on the political situation and attitudes in the whole of the Caucasus. One outcome that is of fundamental importance – and a source of great joy – to the overwhelming majority (those in the diaspora who are not very impressed with this development shall be mentioned later on) of Northwest Caucasians (Circassians=Adiga, Abkhaz-Abaza=Apswa, and Ubykh=Pakhy) in the Caucasus and diaspora is the recognition of Abkhazia’s independence by Russia (and a few days later also by Nicaragua and a number of internationally unrecognized entities). The ancient Abkhaz nation, which is steeped in tradition and classical history, seems to have taken yet another big step in the arduous path towards full independence. The primordial will of a vigorous and lively nation has won yet another battle in the long war against the dark forces of hegemony and negation of the other. 

Abkhazia's claim to independence

The Abkhaz-Abaza have been struggling for their freedom and recognition for a very long time.[1] First, they had to fight the steady encroachment of the Russians starting in the 18^th century. After decades of war, the Abkhaz-Abaza suffered annexation of their lands by Russia and mass murder and expulsion by the ruthless Russian army in the second half of the 19^th century. The majority of Abkhaz-Abaza were scattered all over the Ottoman Empire in Turkey, Eastern Europe and the Middle East. Later on they were expelled from Eastern Europe to Turkey and the Middle East. They suffered with the other Circassian deportees untold horrors and difficulties. Tens of thousands perished en route and in the early years of settlement in the new unfamiliar lands. Many members of the Abkhaz-Abaza in the diapsora were assimilated into the larger Adiga communities, being much smaller in number. Those Abkhaz-Abaza left in the Caucasus were further victimized by the Russian colonialists and administrators for decades. The Abkhaz were transferred to Georgian hegemony in 1931, after their republic was demoted from a full Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR) to a mere Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic through an arbitrary edict by Stalin. In the next few decades, Mingrelian settlers, by the tens of thousands, were transferred to Abkhaz territories and Abkhazian culture and language were put under tremendous strain, in a deliberate effort to tip the ethnic balance in favour of the Kartvelians and undermine Abkhaz culture and language whose foundations had taken root in Abkhazia thousands of years ago.

The Abkhaz periodically recalcitrated against Georgia’s attempts to eradicate their identity. However, they were steadily losing ground on all fronts in face of Georgia’s indomitable colonialist drive, despite paltry concessions gained in 1978 following mass confrontations in the Abkhaz capital Sukhum. The next two landmark steps on Abkhazia’s dogged march towards freedom and independence were taken on 25 August 1990, when the Supreme Soviet of Abkhazia passed the declaration on the State Sovereignty of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Abkhazia, and on 23 July 1992, when the Supreme Soviet of Abkhazia adopted the resolution ‘On the suspension of the 1978 Constitution of Abkhazia’ and reinstated the Constitution of Abkhazia of 1925 (Jurij Anchabadze in G. Hewitt, 1999, pp 135-6 and 139, respectively).

The events following the Georgian barbaric invasion of Abkhazia in August 1992 and the eventual Abkhaz victory in September 1993 with the help of thousands of Kabardian, Adigean, Cherkess and Chechen volunteers from the North Caucasus and the diaspora are relatively well-known and meticulously recorded in international annals. The August 2008 war between Russia and Georgia demonstrated to the Abkhazians and their supporters across Turkey and the Middle East that the Georgian nationalists would have no qualms resorting (yet again) to genocide to reincorporate Abkhazia. Obviously, the Abkhaz had no choice but to bolster their position and take steps to defend their statehood against Georgian unacceptable behaviour. They retook the whole strategic Kodori Gorge and re-established control over the whole of their country. The unwavering resolve and clear vision of the Abkhazians with regard to their country’s independence and its future are paradigms that need to be emulated by their more numerous but much less organised Circassian kin.

Western response to Abkhaz claim for independence

The lack of understanding by the West and traditional friends and sympathizers of the Circassians (Poles, Ukrainians, the Baltic Peoples, etc.) of the absolute importance of Abkhazian independence and statehood for all Northwest Caucasians is very perplexing and hurtful from a Circassian point of view. It is probable that emotive factors, such as the deep-seated hatred of all things Russian felt by these peoples, play a major role in painting their perspective on the Abkhaz issue. In their international isolation and the West’s irrational adherence to an nonsensical international rule concerning the integrity of artificial countries that is arbitrarily used to decide which nations are allowed freedom and independence and which nations are lumped with other nations to make untenable states, has unfortunately driven the Abkhaz to the lap of Russia, for many a drowning man has been reported proverbially throughout history to clutch at straws. The Russians, who do not care a straw for the fate of the Abkhaz, relished this opportunity to use the desperate Abkhaz as a card in its game of geopolitics with Georgia and the West.

The stance of the majority of Western politicians on Abkhazia, namely that it is an integral part of Georgia, does not stem from a deep understanding of the Abkhazian situation. A cursory reading of an unbiased history of the Abkhaz people would soon convince all fair-minded people of the legitimacy of Abkhazian aspirations. One concludes that deep research into contentious issues is not a forte of the busy politicians. It is true there is plenty of information disseminated by the Georgians, who are infinitely more active and vocal in pushing their point of view, claiming that the Abkhaz are new-comers to Abkhazia and that they have no historical basis for their claim to their homeland. Therefore, Georgia’s claims are more accessible to a Western readership, although scholars in the know would easily humbug this drivel. The Abkhaz have lived continuously on their territory for thousands of years, definitely preceding the Georgians in their presence in the Caucasus. The small number of Abkhazians in Abkhazia is a direct result of Russian genocide and expulsion in the 19^th century. As mentioned earlier, there are hundreds of thousands of Abkhazians (and Abaza) strewn all over Turkey and the Middle East. These people’s right to return to their ancestral lands should be recognized by the Abkhaz authorities and the international community as a whole and enshrined in legislation, and all possible amenities should be made available and functional to absorb those who wish to go back in the absence of any social or political obstacles.

The myth that Kosovo is a unique case that merits bending the sacrosanct principle of the indivisibility of any country’s statehood (territorial integrity) is a figment of a twisted logic. Kosovo is historically part of the lands of the Serbs. Due to twists and turns of complex events the Albanian element in the population had become numerically dominant in the 1990s. Of course, no sane person would condone the atrocities that were committed against the Albanian Kosovars by the Serbs. Intervention by the West was most crucial in the prevention of genocide. Recognizing the independence of Kosovo was a course that the West had to adopt in face of Serbian (and Russian) belligerence and intransigence. The Abkhaz case is similar, with the added component that the Abkhaz have been living on their ancestral lands for thousands of years: Abkhazia has been the land of the Abkhaz since time immemorial. For some reason, however, the Georgian attempts for the last eighty years to eradicate Abkhaz presence on their historical homeland are overlooked in the overview and consideration of the situation. Salient points that are vigorously mentioned are the numerical minority status of the Abkhazians prior to 1993 and the Mingrelian refugees that were expelled following the 1992-1993 conflict in Abkhazia. It is highly entertaining reading (but actually tragic at a deeper level) the logic of high-ranking officials in the West (such as the one expounded by the British Foreign Secretary David Miliband in one of his newspaper articles) when negating any possible comparison between the situation of Kosovo and Abkhazia. Being logical and possessing common sense seem to be non-essential attributes at some higher level of political activism. Or perhaps realpolitik kicks in and suffocates non-important characteristics that have to do with common humanity?  

Many experts and scholars in the West (mostly in the USA) who are supportive of and sympathetic with the historical struggle of the Circassians against the Russians mysteriously change tone when it comes to the Abkhaz case, and even advocate that the Abkhazians should belong, as a subordinate group, to the Georgians. Perhaps there is a logic underlying this stance that escapes people of lesser powers of perception. Be that as it may, the Abkhaz-Abaza suffered equally with the Circassians at the hands of the ruthless Russians for many decades. Then starting from the early 1930s they had to contend with the (mini-)imperialism of the Georgians. The question as to why the pain and suffering of the Abkhazians does not register with some people is worthy of investigation.[2]

The web publication 'Window on Eurasia' is a must-read for Circassians who are interested in the future of their country and how the West views the Circassian issue and provides a glimpse of the role that the West might play in the eventuation of an independent Circassian state. Overseen by the veteran Circassophile Paul Goble, the 'Godfather of the independence of the Baltic countries', it is one of a very small number of web posts in which the Circassians and their issues are given substantive coverage. However, here also there is a palpable lack of sympathy for the Abkhaz cause.

It is markworthy that the ‘Circassian nationalists’ in the USA, who are fervent advocates of the independence of (historical) Circassia (the Republic of Adigea, the Karachai-Cherkess Republic, the Kabardino-Balkarian Republic, the Shapsugh Region, and other historical lands of the Circassians) from Russian rule and who are doing a great job in spreading awareness of the Circassian issue in the West in co-operation with prestigious political and scholarly institutions in the USA, are much less enthusiastic and sympathetic when it comes to the fate of Abkhazia and Abkhazian aspirations towards independence. Since the Circassians (Adiga) and Abkhaz-Abaza have always considered themselves co-ethnics (and they are incontrovertibly so), and since thousands of Circassians rushed to fight along the Abkhazians in 1992-1993, and since the Cherkess and Abaza in the Karachai-Cherkess Republic act as one on all fronts, and since the Circassian republics and Abkhazia hold very close relations at many levels (President Bagapsh of Abkhazia held official consultations with President Arsen Qanoqwe [Kanokov] of Kabardino-Balkaria soon after Russia’s official recognition of Abkhaz independence), and since the diaspora communities do not essentially differentiate between the fate of the Abkhaz-Abaza and the Adiga, it leaps to one’s mind the thought that perhaps this lack of concern for the legitimate Abkhaz cause is just an echo of the aforementioned apathy of American experts and scholars.        

What the Abkhaz need to do after making the appropriate adjustments to their new status is to think seriously about trying to win over Western sympathies as a strategic and long-term goal and work hard to shed the prevalent perception that the main strings in Abkhazia are pulled by the Russians. The euphoria and goodwill generated by Abkhazia’s new situation could easily turn to woe and disaster if by a sleight of hand Abkhazia’s independence is turned into a nominal autonomy in the vast Russian empire. It seems that the South Ossetians would not mind eventual union with their kinsmen in North Ossetia, a constituent republic of the Russian Federation. However, the Abkhaz are adamant in their stance that they would never accept being absorbed by Russia. However, it is prudent to prepare for such an eventuality and to devise counter-measures. The role of the other Circassians in the Northwest Caucasus and the diaspora is crucial in this respect. One path to follow is to work in a subtle manner for the eventual creation of an independent federation to comprehend all the Northwest Caucasians, namely the Adigeans, Cherkess, Abaza, Abkhazians, Kabardians, and Shapsugh.[3] These peoples with different nominal designations essentially make up the historical Adiga-Apswa nation which is found in the Adigean Republic, the Karachai-Cherkess Republic, the Kabardino-Balkarian Republic, the Shapsugh Region near Sochi (all these entities are currently in the Russian Federation) and Abkhazia.

The paucity of international sympathy with the Abkhazian cause is partly due to the lack of advocation pulpits. In the West, Professor Brian George Hewitt of the School of Oriental and African Studies, a prestigious scholarly institute constituent of the University of London, is the proverbial lone voice in the wilderness. He published books and scholarly articles on the Abkhaz and their language and culture and contended with the pernicious vitriol splashed at the Abkhaz by (the numerous) supporters of Georgian hegemony over the Abkhaz. The depth of Prof. Hewitt’s commitment to the Abkhazian cause manifested itself in his physical presence in Abkhazia during the crisis, voicing rational arguments in support of the Abkhaz. It is significant that Prof. Hewitt is less enthusiastic than the overwhelming majority of the Apsaw-Adiga with regards to the growing Russian role in Abkhazian affairs and has less faith in Russia as a saviour of Abkhazia. However, his lone voice was drowned in the deafening roar of euphoria following Russia’s acknowledgement of Abkhazia’s independence. His caution and discernment in this regard should be looked into once the hubbub dies down.  

Of course, there are other scholars in the West who are aware of the full dimensions of the Abkhaz issue, but they are not as keen or vocal as Prof. Hewitt. Professor William G. Clarence-Smith, also of the School of Oriental and African Studies, in a letter to the editor of the Financial Times of London entitled 'Russian cynicism revealed in Caucasus strategy' published on 14 August  2008 says: 

South Ossetians and Abkhazian Circassians have an undoubted right to self-determination, which the Georgian government has violently and wrongly denied them, but Russian cynicism in this conflict knows no bounds. If Moscow was really concerned with Ossetian and Circassian rights, it would allow its own populations in the Caucasus, including Ossetians and Circassians, the right to secede. Instead, Russia has recently fought one of the nastiest wars in modern history to prevent the Chechens of the north-eastern Caucasus from achieving independence. This follows centuries of colonial conquest and rule in the Caucasus, in the course of which the Russians deployed a shocking degree of brutality. Moscow also cites the example of Kosovo to justify its war against Georgia, and yet refuses Kosovo the right to self-determination.

Prof. Clarence-Smith’s succinct letter, a spontaneous expression of humaneness and scholarly wisdom and genius, captures in a hundred words or so the essence of Circassian independence ethos. Not a single Circassian individual, institution, or authority advocated or even mentioned Circassian independence at any time during this crisis, although they were not all under duress. This crucial point shall be expanded at a later stage.

In a newspaper article in The New York Times (9 September 2008) entitled 'Russia’s Recognition of Georgian Areas Raises Hopes of Its Own Separatists', Professor Charles King of Georgetown University, a specialist in international affairs and government, alluded to the Circassian demands for separation in the early 1990s and their subsequent suppression. Quoting the Professor's take on Circassian aspirations:

But few people have watched events in Abkhazia more closely than their ethnic kin, the Circassians. Many Circassians still live in Russia, in the republics of Kabardino-Balkariya, Karachayevo-Cherkesiya and Adygeya; the vast majority live outside Russia yet look back at the Caucasus as their homeland. "They’re ecstatic," said Professor King, author of The Ghost of Freedom: A History of the Caucasus. "Their cousins have gotten independence. They see this as something quite big, that could have real implications for Russia."

An account of a personal experience in this regard would not go amiss in the context that we are at. A few months ago I was approached by an Abaza friend in Jordan to help out in the publication of a manuscript on Abkhaz history prepared by Abkhaz scholars in Abkhazia. Keen to help out in this most worthy of endeavours, I was electronically connected with a high-ranking official in the Abkhaz Foreign Ministry. Stating my background and my absolute willingness to offer my services gratis, I was first made welcome and I took this as reciprocal willingness to do business. Enthused and animated, I offered to help out in the publication of the book in the West and to help in the creation of a media machinery to put forward the Abkhaz cause. Dead silence ensued. Beyond the personal slur, which fades into insignificance in the face of the immense challenge, one wonders how many similar offers have been given the icy treatment. It is clear from the ‘pariah’ pigeonhole in which the West shoves the Abkhazians that the latter can ill-afford to push away sympathizers and well-wishers. Perhaps paranoia plays a role in dictating whom to admit into the circle of confidence. Or maybe it is the Russians that call the shots at all levels in Abkhazia. Perhaps it was merely a case of lack of forbearance for an overbearing attitude. Be that as it may, this personal anecdote, and other accounts, leaves one with the disturbing feeling that excluding ideologies and mechanisms are at work in Abkhazia. It is always bad show allowing individual personal incidents to paint momentous events, but it is very difficult to keep one’s ego in check all the time. Already there are reports from journalists based in Abkhazia that the Russians are licking the Abkhaz political command structures into shape to take account of the new situation. This could be interpreted as an attempt to remove all non-conforming, independent and dissenting voices that might stand in the way of the slow process towards absorbing Abkhazia into Russia. 

Another misgiving (perhaps not shared by many) is the close identification and association of the Abkhaz and South Ossetian issues. The Abkhaz-South Ossetian relations are too close for comfort. The agenda of the South Ossetians is not necessarily identical with that of Abkhazia. Similar circumstances have made comrades-in-arms of the Abkhazians and South Ossetians, but one suspects that henceforward the trajectories of the two nations would diverge.          

Circassian response 

In Turkey, the substantial and influential Northwest Caucasian community stood firmly on the side of the South Ossetians and Abkhazians in the August 2008 War. The Cherkess identity in Turkey comprehends all the North Caucasians, including the Ossetians, and the Abkhaz. The Adiga gave full and unconditional support to the Abkhazians and South Ossetians. They were also vocal in their demand that the Turkish state should recognize the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. However, the Vainakh in Turkey (the Ingush and Chechens) did not identify with the plight of the South Ossetians, for the memories of the Ingush pogrom of October 1992 at the hands of the North Ossetians and the Russian army which resulted in the expulsion of the Ingush from Vladikavkaz, the capital of North Ossetia, and the Prigorodny District, historical homelands of the Ingush which the North Ossetians claimed for themselves during the Ingush forced exile in 1944. In this context, it should be mentioned that in this most recent of conflicts in the Caucasus, the predicted stream of North Caucasian volunteers rushing to help out the South Ossetians in their struggle against the Georgians did not materialize. The Chechen contingent that took part in the war on the Russian side in South Ossetia and Georgia was the Vostok Battalion of the Russian Defense Ministry’s Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) (although there was talk of a rift between Chechen President Ramazan Kadyrov and the commander of the contingent, Sulim Yamadaev). To my knowledge, no Circassian volunteers took part in the fighting in South Ossetia. In Abkhazia the situation was different. Veterans of the 1992-1993 Abkhaz-Georgian War and newer blood took steps in co-ordination with the Abkhaz authorities to defend Abkhazia and stand shoulder to shoulder with their co-ethnics in their ordeal. The Kabardians are only too aware of the fact that a significant portion of historical Little Kabarda (Qeberdey Ts’ik’w, or Jilax’steney), including the town of Mozdok (Mezdegw), has been carved out of Kabarda by the Russians and incorporated with North Ossetia. The Ingush on their part are trepid of the prospect of a unified Ossetia, which would make their struggle to reclaim their historical lands occupied by the Ossetians that much more difficult. It is safe to assume that the sympathies of the ordinary Chechens in this regard would be with the plight of their kin, the Ingush.

It seems that the head of a major diaspora Circassian organisation in Turkey (according to an undated 'natpress.net' article) met (or talked with) the Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov on 2 September 2008 to discuss the developments in the Caucasus. Lavrov thanked the Circassian community in Turkey for its supportive stance of the Russians. In return, Circassian demands were for the Russians to deign to agree 'that the natives from Northern Caucasus be added to the category of the citizens who are designated by the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 637 “About Voluntary Resettlement of Compatriots Living Abroad” issued on 22 June 2006', and 'as to the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi, it shouldn’t be forgotten or hidden the fact that the land on which the event will take place belongs to the Ubykh and Shapsugh, part of the Adiga nation. And proceeding from this, the Circassian culture should become the base for the programme of the Olympic leisure'. Other minor demands were also made, but that's it! Is this diplomacy at its best in the given conditions, trying to get some concessions for the Turkish Circassians from the Russians for supporting them against Georgia, or is that a manifestation of lack of independence ideology? It seems that the Circassians are not ready (or do not desire) to be granted independence by Moscow, or at least that's the signal that is impressed upon the Circassian masses in Turkey.

In the Northwest Caucasus the Circassian authorities, nationalists and NGOs were unitary in their supportive stance for the South Ossetians and Abkhazians. Although relations between the Circassians and Georgians have generally been cordial throughout history and the two nations have benefited from mutual influences, the dogged intransigence of the Georgians vis-à-vis the Abkhazians gave the Circassians no choice but to throw their lot with the Abkhazians in the fray. The International Circassian Association (ICA), which was established in 1991, and which represents organizations from the Caucasus and the diaspora, issued a statement on 11 August 2008 addressed to ‘Leaders of Countries’ urging the international community to recognize Abkhazia’s independence.[4] No mention was made of Circassian independence.[5] It would be fascinating to hear the opinion of Yura Schenibe (Shanibov), the charismatic leader of Circassian drive for independence in the early 1990s, now that the constraints imposed on him in the mid-1990s have been somewhat eased, on the recent events.[6] It is safe to assume that many Circassian nationalists in the Caucasus are seriously contemplating independence and are waiting for the opportune occasion to express their aspirations. We shall be listening carefully to their comments on and arguments for Circassian independence. It could be that the reluctance to openly espouse independence ideology is that first historical Circassia should be formed, and any declaration of independence prior to reclamation of all Circassian lands will leave most of Greater Circassia in Russian hands. The recent conflict has emphasized the fact that change (and upheaval) is only a heart beat away. Who had expected that Russia would recognize Abkhazia so soon after the end of hostilities? The odds were on Russia touting the issue of Abkhaz independence (shy of actual recognition) to its advantage indefinitely. The real lesson for the Circassians is that they have to be ready for all eventualities, even the sudden roll back of Russian hegemony and the formation of a power vacuum for a time. This happened in the North Caucasus before, following the communist revolution in Russia in 1917. For a few years the North Caucasians were able to manage their affairs in an independent manner, but upon recuperation Russia, in a different guise, was able to reoccupy the area. The Russians are well aware of the swirling undercurrent of Circassian subtle resurgence in the cultural and political spheres, and they are fearful of the inexorable Circassian drive for increased self-expression and autonomy, and hence the Russian response of eradicating Adigea as a first step towards completely diluting Circassian presence in the Russian sea.   

In Jordan, the Circassian and Abkhaz-Abaza communities were very vocal in their support of the Abkhazians. However, the Russian media (mainly the Arabic Service of Russia Today TV) succeeded in soliciting from select interviewees blanket support for Russian policies in the Caucasus and condemnation of Western role and influence therein. No mention was made of Circassian independence or the fate of Circassia despite the fact of the lack of any constraints. One would expect the average Circassian to call for and support Abkhaz independence. And there is no surprise in the monitored responses in this area. But wouldn’t it have been great if mention was made of the next logical step of recognizing the independence of the Circassian republics? In all the ‘Russia Today’ interviews with the Circassians in Jordan, not a single mention was made of the Circassian republics in the Caucasus and their subordinate status in the Russian Federation. Doesn’t Circassia matter? It is becoming increasing obvious that part of the Adiga-Apswa community in Jordan has been co-opted by the Russians. This goes beyond the consideration that good relations with the Russians ensures smoother interface between the diaspora and the Circassian republics in the Caucasus. Circassians should always be mindful that those who condemned Russian interference in the Caucasus (the West, Poland, Ukraine, the Baltic States, and perhaps even Georgia) will whole-heartedly support Circassian independence, if ever the Circassians decide to lift the banner of freedom and rid themselves of dependence complexes [Read a short bio of Ludwik Zierkowski-Lenoir (1803-1860) for an example of a Pole advocating and promoting Circassian independence in the 19th century]. The conundrum of lack of support of these countries for the Abkhaz and their historical support for the Circassians should be delicately resolved. Nobody claims that this would be easy. The dilemma will undoubtedly obscure lucid thinking for some time to come.

Beyond the Middle East, a Franco-Egyptian lady of Circassian origin based in Paris gave a measured response to the ‘Russia Today’ question as to her views on the August 2008 events in the Caucasus. She wisely advocated the creation of an independent Caucasian federation as an antidote to outside interference in the Caucasus. This self-same lady also presented the Caucasian case in another interview by the French channel ‘France 24’. In contrast, another Circassian lady wanted mother Russia to wrap her warm shroud around all her Caucasian children! Fawning at its ugliest.

The Circassians of Syria have had a muffled voice on Circassian national issues since the 1930s. In the second Chechen war (started 1999 and still raging) the Russians extracted ‘support’ for their brutal campaign against the freedom-loving Chechens from the Circassian Syrians (by crook, in my estimation; ‘Circassian diaspora in Syria condemn militant operations in Chechnya’, in Pravda, 3 July 2002; <http://english.pravda.ru/hotspots/2002/07/03/31724.html>). The Circassians in Syria are a very important element in the world-wide Circassian make-up. There are still indigent villages that can do worse than be transferred to the Caucasus to find a new life in the homeland and bolster the precarious gene-pool in the process. Of course, the same could be said about the hundreds of Circassian villages strewn across rural Turkey. All is needed is national vision and political will (and lesser Russian interference in Circassian affairs).

Following the coronation of a Circassian Olympic wrestling champion on 14 August in Peking (sounds much better than ‘Beijing’), I wrote on my personal webpage: 

The Circassian strongman from Kabarda Aslhenbech Vasily X’wscht (Хъущт Василий и къуэ Аслъэнбэч; Aslanbek Vasiliyevich Khushtov) wins gold in the Men’s Greco-Roman 96kg Wrestling in the 2008 summer Olympics in Beijing. It is very unfortunate that Aslhenbech is touted as a ‘Russian wrestler’. The Circassian flag should be raised and the Circassian national anthem should be blared loud and clear. Perhaps after the fiasco in South Ossetia, Russia should give serious thought to giving back Circassia to its rightful people, who are apparently vital enough to be counted amongst the high-achievers in this world. Instead of shedding crocodile tears over the South Ossetians, let the Russians give the people it actively oppresses their freedom. Three cheers for Professor William G. Clarence-Smith (of the School of Oriental and African Studies in London) for his succinct letter 'Russian cynicism revealed in Caucasus strategy' published in the Financial Times of London on 14 August 2008. I think his words of wisdom are the perfect antidote to the thoughtless elevation of Russia as a saviour of the oppressed peoples of the Caucasus. It is wholly coincidental and spurious that Russia’s and Abkhazia’s interests are coincident. If Russia swallows Abkhazia, we can all say goodbye to any idea of Abkhaz independence. 

Perhaps the only international organisation to voice express support for Abkhaz independence is the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organisation (UNPO), which was created in 1991 in The Hague to represent ethnic groups around the world that are barred from joining the United Nations for whatever reason.[7] The Circassians are represented in the UNPO by the International Circassian Association, which joined the Organisation in 1993. No statement on Circassian independence was issued by the UNPO, in the absence of demand by the concerned member.

Beyond the claptrap, the practicalities of the future relations between the Abkhazians and Circassians should at least be considered by both parties. The unconditional support received by the Abkhaz from the Circassians in the Caucasus and the diaspora should be requited by clear statements from the Abkhaz leadership (perhaps not immediately) as to how they would help the Circassians in their own aspirations. Perhaps it is now too soon to consider such a point, with the tremendous challenges facing the Abkhaz. Be that as it may, the Circassians should at least keep a close dialogue with their kin with respect to their vision for the future of the Northwest Caucasus. Since Circassian independence runs counter to Russian wishes, it would be interesting to monitor Abkhaz reactions to the notions of a free Circassia.

Circassian independence

I think that the Circassians should strive to do more to make their case more internationally known. We cannot forever remain ‘as if silent and absent’ and let our proverbial reticence detract from our chances for world recognition.[8] Our self-expression on the most accessible (and fiscally cheapest) medium, the internet, is practically insignificant. The ‘Boris Johnson affair’ (Gaby Hinsliff, ‘The riddle of Boris’s slave roots’, in The Observer, 9 March 2008; <http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2008/mar/09/boris.localgovernment>; and Andy McSmith, ‘Boris the Circassian’, in The Independent, 10 March 2008; <http://blogs.independent.co.uk/openhouse/2008/03/boris-the-circa.html>) and the indignation felt by the Circassians that British journalists were unable to locate Circassia and Circassians in the 21^st century and that 'Circassian women' are 'more available on the web' than 'Circassian men' have demonstrated that despite valiant individual efforts to spread the word, as it were, much more needs to be done at the institutional and state levels. The separation of the 'Circassian' republics and nominal diversity (where the Circassians are variously designated as Kabardians, Cherkess, Adigeans, and Shapsugh in their respective republics and areas: the Kabardino-Balkarian Republic, the Karachai-Cherkess Republic, the Republic of Adigea, and the Shapsugh Region) partly explains the obscurity of the Circassians (even though they are in the process of becoming the largest ethnic group in the North Caucasus, pushing one million in total population) and the 'inability' of journalists, amongst other people, to locate present-day Circassians and Circassia. Unfortunately, the output from the Caucasus in major languages (apart from Russian) is non-existent. The work of the Federation of European Circassians ‘EuroXase’ (<http://www.euroxase.com/>) is commendable in this respect (perhaps the addition of a Circassian edition would be considered next to send the signal that Circassian matters). Also the fervid activism of the webmaster of ‘circassianworld.com’ is a unique phenomenon that transcends the parochialism of the majority Circassians.

A check of the incidence of the word ‘Circassians’ in the news on the recent conflict yielded less than 5 counts! As Circassians, do we have a common issue with regard to our future in the Caucasus? Do a majority of us conceive of a Circassia of sorts in the Caucasus? Is independence an issue that a significant number of us contemplate? Is there a creed or an ideology that guides us in our path? Only one person mentioned the issue of Circassian secession and independence, and he was not even Circassian. Prof. Clarence-Smith’s eloquent letter was music to my ears. But where is the voice of the Circassians on their issues? Of course, they were vocal, nay, vociferous in the support of the Abkhaz struggle and independence. It could be that thousands of Circassians internally envisioned a free Circassia, and in their wisdom chose to mute the issue until better circumstances. Unfortunately, countries are not structured on wishful thinking. We need to speak out loud so as to be heard and make people take notice. The problem is that the Adigeans in the Republic of Adigea have been under tremendous strain for the past three years trying to save their republic from liquidation and insidious attempts to incorporate it in the Krasnodar Region. It is true that the Circassian nationalists in the Caucasus stood as one in the face of this latest Russian attempt to eradicate Circassian presence in the Caucasus. The diaspora, especially in Jordan, also played a positive role in tempering Russian aggression. The Circassians in the USA were brilliant in drawing political and scholarly attention to this issue. However, with the whole world focused on the Caucasus, wouldn’t it have been opportune to advocate the Circassian issue in all its manifestations? Not a single article by any Circassian was written to turn the table on the Russians and demand that the will of the Circassians in the Caucasus should be respected (I stand to be corrected on this, and other assertions that I make). It was gratifying seeing the Circassian flag (green background with twelve golden stars and three crossing arrows) raised in the mass gatherings in both Turkey and Abkhazia, but is the symbolism clear to world viewers? The Circassian lobby in Turkey, which showed itself to be vigorous and self-asserting, should be more eloquent still and should focus on Circassian issues that would also bring benefit to the host country. The matter of Turkish investment in the Circassian republics in the Caucasus and Abkhazia should be pushed into centre-stage. The scare tactics of the Russians and their cronies to drive away potential investors should be exposed. Yet a more important issue is the rights of the diaspora Circassians in the Caucasus. Besides the right of automatic citizenship in any of the Circassian republics without hindrance and obstacles and with all the rights and duties associated with this, diaspora Circassians need to press their claim to their ancestral lands. They should be allotted land plots in restitution of their loss of land and expulsion and subsequent suffering in exile.

Historical precedents for Circassian independence

Circassian independence is not an alien concept in Circassian history and ethos. The Circassians declared independence in 1836 (encouraged by the Circassophile Scotsman David Urquhart) and a national flag (green background, twelve gold stars, three crossed golden arrows)  was adopted as one of the symbols of independence (A. Jaimoukha, The Circassians: A Handbook, London and New York: Routledge, 2001, p64. The following account is from the self-same book). The looming shadow of Russia and her gradual encroachment into their country convinced many Circassians of the importance of tribal solidarity. Counsels of British 'Envoys' in Circassia, especially that of Urquhart, were instrumental in fostering unity. The NW Caucasians established a federation that included twelve tribes, nine of which were feudalistic and three egalitarian ones. Concerted campaigns were mounted in which some notable successes were scored and many fortresses were reduced to dust. This period of co-operation and optimism culminated in the declaration of independence of Circassia in 1836, which event became a landmark in Adiga history. Ismail Zeus, representative of the 'Great Free Assembly,' was sent to Turkey, Paris and London to solicit support. General mobilization was declared. The Circassian declaration of independence was published in 1836 in Portfolio. This was of particular significance as the Journal was closely associated with the British Foreign Office, and Circassia was shown as an independent country on the appended map edited by none other than Lord Palmerston, the British Foreign Secretary. In 1838, England recognized Circassia's independence. A score years later fate delivered a crippling blow to Circassia and her children. Circassian independence was finally undone by the Russians in 1864. Most European press marked this bleak event and Urquhart suffered severe personal anguish.

The Communist revolution of 1917 gave the North Caucasians the chance to reclaim their independence through the establishment of the North Caucasian Mountain Republic. In May of that year, the First North Caucasian Congress elected the Central Committee of the Union of the North Caucasus and Daghestan as a provisional Terek-Daghestan Government to prepare for an independent state. Both aboriginal North Caucasians and Terek Cossacks were united in this aim. The Central Committee met on July 28th 1917 in an extraordinary session to prepare for the Second Congress, which was scheduled to take place in the Daghestani town of Andi. The main resolution was the set up of a committee to prepare for the creation of a standing army. Local meetings were held in August 1917 to elect delegates to the Andi Congress. In Nalchik the meeting was attended by the Central Committee member Tawsulht'an Shakman (Shaqmen), a Kabardian. In Batalpashinsk (Cherkessk), Simon Basarya, an Abkhaz, supervised the meeting. In Hakurina-Habla in Adigea the meeting was attended by Circassian delegates and representatives of the Armavir Armenians from the village of Urupsk and Jews from Dzhekhanas. These two groups had been assimilated by the Circassians to some extent and identified with their cause. In September 1917, a provisional constitution was ratified by the Second Congress of the 'Union.' The Republic of North Caucasus seceded from Russia in 1917, and declared its independence on May 11th 1918. It signed an alliance with Turkey and was formally recognized by the Central Powers, Germany, Austria-Hungary and Turkey, and by Great Britain. On June 8th 1918, a contingent of instructors from the Turkish Army arrived in Daghestan to organize a North Caucasian force. All members of this group were of North Caucasian origin, the leader being Ismail Berkuk, a Circassian. This force together with the help of fifteen Turkish divisions under Izzet Yusuf Pasha, another Circassian, routed the forces of General Bicherakhov. However, before consolidating the position of the North Caucasians, the Turkish Army had to withdraw from the Caucasus under the provisions of the armistice. Another attempt by diaspora North Caucasians to free their lands was blotched.

Simultaneously with the setting up of the North Caucasian Republic, left wing Ossetian radicals, together with socialists from other North Caucasian peoples, established the Soviet Terek Republic, but it was soon overthrown by the Terek Cossacks. In September 1919, Kabarda, Ossetia, Chechnya and Daghestan declared the North Caucasian Emirate as an independent state under the conservative Sheikh Uzun-Hadzhi, a Naqshbandi Chechen who had led a revolt that succeeded in liberating some mountainous territories. He sided with the Bolsheviks against the nationalist Mensheviks. The communists recognized his government de facto and promised full autonomy. In September 1921, the Reds defeated the White Army. The communists reneged on their promises and abolished the Emirate soon after.

Both the short-lived North Caucasian Republic and Emirate were able to unite most North Caucasians under one banner, which is no mean feat by all standards. The peoples of the North Caucasus had been weary of Russian Tsarist rule and they longed for the creation of an independent republic in which their aspirations and dreams of freedom could come true. The Communist Revolution offered them the opportunity to cast off the oppressive yoke. However, these aspirations ran contrary to the schemes of the communists, and when the Red Army crushed White resistance, the North Caucasian Republic was violently destroyed. This period has become the point of reference when the emotive issues of North Caucasian unity and freedom are invoked. There is a poignant lesson in this episode of North Caucasian history. Although both Reds and Whites were engaged in a mortal fight, both parties were united in their goal of destroying Caucasian independence and freedom. Each time the North Caucasians sided with some faction, they ended up with the short end of the stick. This pattern was to be repeated after the demise of the Soviet Union, when Rotskoy and Yeltsin, the bitter enemies, were united in their stance against Chechen independence. History keeps repeating itself. It is the wise who takes heed.

In the early 1990s, the idea of a North Caucasian federation was revived as the vehicle for the people in the area to reach their political aims. The North Caucasians, especially the Abkhaz leadership, were aware of the limitations imposed by fragmentation and the advantages of concerted action. Georgia had been single-minded in demanding the abrogation of Abkhaz autonomy, and started to beat the drums of war. The Abkhazians sought safety by allying themselves with their Abaza and Circassian kin across the mountains. The Confederation of the Mountain Peoples of the North Caucasus (KGNK) was recreated in 1990 to fill the vacuum left by the ebbing Soviet power. In October 1992 it changed its name to Confederation of the Peoples of the Caucasus (KNK). It was a voluntary conglomeration of the indigenous peoples of the North Caucasus, excluding the Daghestanis. Its principal aim was the (re-)establishment of the North Caucasian (Mountain) Republic. It had always been independent of, and sometimes at loggerheads with the local authorities, which were inimical to any form of political change.

At first, the KGNK enjoyed overwhelming popular support and it scored some notable successes. In August 1992 the Parliament of KGNK declared war on Georgia and pledged support for the Abkhaz. Together with the International Circassian Association and the Congress of the Kabardian People, the KGNK mobilized the North Caucasians. On August 18th, an ultimatum was issued by the KGNK parliament that if Georgian troops did not withdraw from Abkhazia, war would be declared. Yura Schenibe (Shanibov), President of KGNK, declared war three days later. A few thousand Abaza, Adigean, Cherkess, Kabardian and Chechen volunteers joined forces with Abkhaz army units. This intervention played a decisive role in the spectacular Abkhaz victory and cemented the ethnic unity of the NW Caucasians.

The onset of the Chechen war at the end of 1994 disrupted the tacit and coincidental alliance between Russia and the North Caucasians. Now that the tables were turned against them, the Russians showed their true colours. Russia, which had been turning a blind eye to the activities of the Confederation in Abkhazia, started to view them as a major threat to its domination in the North Caucasus when attention was switched to Chechnya. Thenceforward, neutralizing the pan-North Caucasian movement became a priority in Russia’s Caucasian policy.     

It would be desirable and useful for Circassian intellectuals and elites to read Tony Wood's Chechnya: The Case for Independence, Verso, 2007. Online. Available HTTP: <http://www.chechenpress.co.uk/content/2008/03/16/Chechnya_The_Case_for_Independence.pdf> (accessed 25 September 2008). Although there have been some problems between the Chechens and Circassians in the last fifteen years or so, the trajectories of the two peoples are essentially the same. The Chechen claim to a special status due to their being the largest nationality in the North Caucasus is nowadays untenable because the Circassians have overtaken the Chechens in the numbers game. The vast Circassian diaspora, despite everything that has been said about its shortcomings, is potentially the most critical factor in a post-Russian North Caucasus. A free North Caucasus would attract a significant portion of the Circassian diaspora to relocate back to the fatherland. In the past few years, the Circassian diaspora, especially in Turkey and Jordan, has demonstrated that it is a political force to be reckoned with. It is essential that the secular elites and intellectuals of the Circassians and Chechens should hold close relations to convey to the masses that North Caucasian unity is the path to a viable future devoid of Russian colonialism. [Perhaps the Circassians should heed Paul Goble's call to 'cultivate elites abroad' ('Beijing Olympics Have Brought Only Misery to China's Muslims', Window on Eurasia, 7 May 2008) to engage the nations of the world in dialogue concerning issues pertinent to their future. Unlike the Abkhazians, the Circassians enjoy sympathy from many quarters of this globe.

Another group in the Russia Federation that has been vocal in its demands for independence are the Tatars of Tatarstan. For a concise article on the (most recent) Tatar demand for independence, refer to 'Russian Actions in Georgia Show Why Tatarstan Must Be Independent, Activists There Say', Window on Eurasia, 24 August 2008. Tatarstan was subdued and colonized by the Russians in the 16th century, fully three centuries prior to the occupation of Circassia by the Russians in the 19th century, yet the yearning for freedom has never been extinguished in the Tatar soul. Exchanging notes with Tatar ideologues is perhaps a worthwhile pursuit.

It is obvious that the Russians are worried about their soft underbelly in the North Caucasus. They are losing the numbers game in the region and their rough-shod attitude is alienating large sections of North Caucasian societies. It is highly unlikely that the 'Russian' North Caucasus will tolerate Russian imperialism much longer.

North Caucasian intellectuals and activists in the West in the 20th century

Circassian intellectuals were active in the West in the 1920s, 1930s and 1950s, when, together with other North Caucasian elites, they spread the word about the atrocities committed by the Soviet regime in the North Caucasus and advocated North Caucasian independence and federalism. They were based in cities of countries most sympathetic with the cause of the North Caucasians: Warsaw, Prague, Paris, and Munich. They used to publish journals that articulated their secular ideologies and yearnings for freedom. In 1924 the monthly magazine Kavkazski gorets [Caucasian Mountaineer] was published in Prague. In the period 1934-1939, Severni Kavkaz [The North Caucasus] was published in Warsaw and the monthly magazine Le Caucase. Kavkaz [The Caucasus] was published in Paris. L'Union Nationale des Émigrés de la Republique du Caucase du Nord (The National Union of the Émigrés of the Republic of the North Caucasus) was most active in the 1920s and 1930s. The Information Bureau of the Party of the People of Mountaineers of the Caucasus (Bureau d’Information du Parti du Peuple des Montagnards du Caucase) published the book Le Caucase du Nord [The North Caucasus] in Paris in 1931.

However, it was the 1950s that witnessed the most intense North Caucasian activism in the West (most probably with support from Western governments in the framework of the Cold War). A number of journals were published, such as The Free Caucasus. Svobodni Kavkaz (1951-1954; edited by the Chechen legend Abdurahman Avtorkhanov), United Caucasus (1953-1954), and Caucasian Review (1955-1960; Institute for the Study of the USSR), all based in Munich. Caucasian Review was absorbed by Studies on the Soviet Union. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s (RFE/RL) Chechen service, which was inaugurated in the 1970s under Abdurahman Avtorkhanov directorship and discontinued late in the decade, was re-launched in April 2002, together with Circassian and Avar services. Moscow reacted negatively to this development, perceiving outside broadcasting to the North Caucasus in languages other than Russian as a threat to state security! (RFE/RL also publishes the weekly ‘Caucasus Report’, which is also available on line.) However, with the demise of this special crop of activists, born and raised in the North Caucasus, this ebullience of North Caucasian free spirit found perdition for lack of disciples to take up the torch. Lustrous personalities and writers from the 1950s include R. Abaza, R. Adighe (pseud. R. Traho), R. Ashemez, V. Astemirov, T. Aydamyrkan (pseud. R. Traho), Haidar Bammate (born in Temur-Khan-Shura, North Caucasus, in 1890; published Le Caucase et la révolution russe: Aspect politique, Paris: L'Union Nationale des Émigrés de la Republique du Caucase du Nord, 1929), V. Djabagui, R. Karcha, P. Kosok (Kotsev, Kwetse), Aytek Namitok (Nemitiqw; published seminal books and articles and collaborated linguistically and culturally with the legendary Georges Dumezil), I. Natirboff, T. Tatlok, R. Tra(k)ho (used a number of pseudonyms). These great and highly charismatic men believed unconditionally and passionately in North Caucasian unity and federation (however, sometimes their passion got the better of them when certain themes were twisted a bit to fit the dogmas). Perhaps the fresher generations of North Caucasians should take several leaves from the unionist book to counteract the present fractiousness and antipathy. North Caucasian activism and activists in the West in the 20th century deserve further research.

The Federation of European Circassians ‘EuroXase’ is a modern manifestation of highly-civilized and secular activism in the West. However, this is purely a Circassian affair and other North Caucasians (I think) are not privy to the work of the organisation. The Circassians in the USA are also crystalizing (benign) activist means to put forward the Circassian case.

The independence imperative

The Circassians should press their claim to independence and should also convince the world that they are ready to take control of the reins of their destiny. This would be the time for Circassian intellectuals and organisations to float and advocate the concept of Circassian independence. It is time to stand up and be counted. Failure to do so in a clear manner would mean the missing of a golden opportunity, and may perhaps indicate the extent of Russian success in containing and neutralizing the Circassian issue. Monitored responses so far, however, do not augur well. We are either ‘silent and absent’, too pathologically reticent to make any ethno-centric expression, or largely co-opted by the Russians. I would be much gratified if an indignant reader informs me of an alternative explanation or to show me the error of my thinking.

It could be that at a later stage following their independence the Circassians would want to enter into confederation with their Abkhaz kin. Relations with Russia need not suffer on account of Circassian independence. If Russia sheds its colonialist instincts and puts some trust in other nations, both Circassia and Russia would benefit as co-operative neighbours. Russia’s geopolitical interests need not be adversely affected by the spread of freedom. The Circassians need to draw lessons from Georgia’s behaviour in the last few years and chart a more prudent path, more akin to neutrality. Alternatively, the West's strategic option to 'cut Russia down to size' (by leaving to the Russians only their historical lands and liberating all its colonies and giving them back to their rightful owners) would rid the North Caucasians of a bugbear that has been inimical to their peaceful existence for centuries. One understands that small peoples are easy prey and are point-blank targets for co-opting and manipulation. The Russians have been co-opting and manipulating the Circassian elites for centuries, and they are past-masters in this game. The Americans have recently entered the fray using highly sophisticated and attractive means to win the hearts and minds of the Circassians. One would expect the American endeavour to become even more vigorous in consequence of the recent events in the Caucasus and Russia’s violent recalcitrance against increased American influence in the Caucasus. This crucial counter-balancing act is spearheaded by the Jamestown Foundation, which has held landmark conferences dedicated wholly to Circassian issues.[9]  

Freedom and independence for the Circassians have never been as tenable as they are now. The West’s recognition of Kosovo’s independence has opened the door for a Russian reciprocal recognition of Abkhaz independence. The Circassians and Chechens (and other peoples in Russia) can employ the same argument used by the West and Russia to claim independence. Of course, it would be extremely naïve to expect Russia to conform to such demands and declare the peoples who wish to be rid of its heavy yoke independent nations. Obviously, there is a difficult path to tread in this regard. The Russian Prime Minister, Vladimir Putin, whose specialty is thwarting North Caucasian aspirations for freedom (I am being very restrained in my expressions), recently alluded to NGOs in the North Caucasus demanding independence as an undesirable outcome of the conflict. He specifically referred to 'the Russian North Caucasus'. Obviously, the colonial mind (and the subservient military and administrative juggernaut) is still at work to extirpate any notions of independence.   

According to a report in North Caucasus Weekly (vol. 9, issue 33, 5 September 2008), a publication of the Jamestown Foundation, John McCain, the U.S. presidential candidate for the Republican Party, has suggested that the West should consider recognizing the independence of Chechnya and the other North Caucasian republics in response to Russian recognition of Abkhaz and South Ossetian independence [this makes him the second person to mention Circassian independence]. The report goes on to say:

This is not the first time that an American politician or government official has linked Chechnya with the issue of the two Georgia’s breakaway republics, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In December 2007, Deputy Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Matthew J. Bryza said in an interview with the Azeri TV channel ANS that recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia by Russia could negatively influence the situation in the Russian North Caucasus, Chechnya, Kabardino-Balkaria [one of the Circassian republics with some 600,000 Circassian citizens, the largest concentration of Circassians in the world], Dagestan and North Ossetia...  If anyone is really interested in what people in Chechnya and other parts of the North Caucasus think about their independence from Russia, one should first of all listen seriously to people in the streets and only after that to Ramzan Kadyrov’s declarations. The interviews taken by Kavkazky Uzel demonstrate that if the United States ever recognizes Chechen independence, it could make the Chechens the best friends the U.S. has ever had. These interviews also confirm again that the issue of Chechen independence is still alive.

The Circassians must transcend vestiges of their narrow differences and embrace and engage the open world. The Circassian issue (in association with other, more pressing issues) is now being considered at the highest levels in the political world. The responsibility on the shoulders of Circassian intellectuals and politicians is immense. Are we ready to deal with independence matters? Can Circassians start talking to one another to attempt to present a united front and be up to the tremendous challenge.

Culture is a crucial unificatory catalyst in the case of the scattered Circassian communities that have been subject to disparate exotic influences for some 150 years. A solid grounding in Circassian culture and folklore is called for. Unfortunately, the Circassian republics in the Caucasus are very passive in this regard. The Circassians in the Caucasus have their own pressing problems to contend with. Circassian cultural institutions in the diaspora miserably and systematically fail to engage in meaningful cultural work. Their hosting countries don’t want to know about or have anything to do with Circassian culture. Dissemination of Circassian culture is extremely difficult in these circumstances. However, disappointment and frustration should not be allowed to win the day. Again, let’s stand up and be counted.