Preliminary Outline for Research Paper

Maimonides’ Synthesis:

Aristotelian Philosophy and Jewish Theology in The Guide of the Perplexed

Introduction

With the introduction of Islamic translations of the ancient Greek philosophers into Muslim Spain in the 10^th century[1], the Jews of the Convivencia period faced a difficult problem. Until then, Jewish scripture had been the basis for the Jewish world view, including how Jews conceived of their God and His creation. The writings of learned rabbis were limited to these holy texts as commentaries, extracting meaning from these works alone in order to complete the Jewish cosmology as a whole[2]. Further alarm resulted from the conception of the Ancient World as a unified period, as it was expected that the ancient Hebrew texts should be in philosophical accord with the Greek writings[3]. But many Aristotelian concepts blatantly contradicted or called into question biblical precepts put forth in the Torah, including the qualities of the world, the nature of God, and even Judaic Law. All in all, Aristotle offered a new way of looking at the universe that seemed irreconcilable with that of the Torah and of Jewish tradition.

The Jewish community of the Convivencia could neither fully accept the Aristotelian world view nor reject it: if they accepted without question, they could no longer accept the Torah in its entirety, and if they were to reject it, they could not continue to participate as major players in the era’s intellectual life. Aristotle and his troublesome questions simply had to be dealt with in a Jewish context. But how could these two differing points of view be reconciled? It was largely due to the genius of a single twelfth century Jewish scholar, Maimonides, and his unique combination of Hellenic thought and Jewish theology that this problem was finally solved.

Maimonides’ Synthesis

Moses Ben Maimon was born in Cordova in 1135. He was a talented physician and held a high position as such in the Islamic courts, but he was best known in the Jewish community as an extremely talented rabbi, well versed in rabbinical writings and an exemplary legal scholar[4]. Although he wrote commentaries on the Mishnah as well as a codification of Jewish law, it is his Guide of the Perplexed which synthesised the Hellenic with the Judaic.

An Introduction: The Guide of the Perplexed

The Guide of the Perplexed is addressed to “My honoured pupil Rabbi Joseph”[5], a talented student. But this serves mainly as a literary device; it was customary at the time to restrict such theological commentary to those that are learned and established intellectuals, and considered dangerous for the ‘lay-person’ to attempt such matters. As Maimonides could not address his book of such highly controversial subject matter to ‘the masses’, he writes in an enigmatic style, often even contradicting himself purposefully. This practice has left his works open to much interpretation[6].

The Guide of the Perplexed is enormous in size and scope, including lengthily discussions on the nature of prophecy, evil, providence, and the design, nature, and origin of God’s Laws. But the underlying purpose of the Guide is essentially to reconcile Greek philosophy with Judaic traditional thought[7]; the guide is written for “…someone who was firm in his [Jewish] religious beliefs and practices, but, having studied philosophy, was perplexed by the literal meaning of biblical anthropomorphic and anthropopathic terms”[8]. As Leo Strauss insists:

“[the Guide] is not a philosophic book –a book written by a philosopher for philosopher – but a Jewish book: a book written by a Jew for Jews. It’s first premise is the old Jewish premise that being a Jew and a philosopher are two incompatible things. Philosophers are men who try to give an account of the whole by starting from what is always accessible to man as man; Maimonides starts from the acceptance of the Torah.”[9]

The Guide, therefore, is grounded in fundamental Jewish concepts.

With a firm footing in the Hebrew scriptures, Maimonides begins his strange synthesis of Aristotelianism and Judaism. His synthesis takes place on several levels. First of all, he insists on a less literal reading of the Torah, especially in matters where the scripture runs contrary to natural philosophy, physics, and metaphysics. Second, he uses Aristotelian logic and argument structure as his own and, most importantly, uses Aristotelian concepts and definitions as premises in his theological discussions. And third, he takes issue with those elements of Aristotelianism that pose too much of a threat to the Jewish perspective as set forth in the scripture, resolving them through philosophical [Aristotelian] argument. These methods of synthesis are especially apparent in Maimonides’ discussions of the nature of God and of creation.

Rejecting Literal Interpretation in Favour of Aristotelianism: Corporeality

Interpretation of holy scripture plays a large part in Judaism: the rabbinical tradition of commentary and discussion upon the Torah is recorded in the Talmud, and young boys upon their Bar Mitzvahs are required to read from the texts and give a short speech outlining its application to their everyday lives. But interpretation generally stemmed from the Torah as primary document to everyday life. Maimonides’ form of interpretation, as we shall see, does not look outwards from the Torah to matters of the everyday, but rather inwards, interpreting the Torah as a figurative text in matters of theology. This interpretation is particularly evident in his discussion of God’s corporeality.

Maimonides refutes the traditional belief in God’s corporeality, explicitly because this assumption is based entirely upon a purely literal reading of the Torah[10]. He does this through a systematic examination of the Hebrew words and concepts connected with the corporeality of God, rejecting the literal interpretation in favour of a figurative one, a process which is outlined and reproduced in partiality in Appendix A. Hence, Maimonides proves that it is not given that God is corporeal, as each passage of the scripture which contributes to this argument can be demonstrably used in a figurative sense.

What, then, is God? After having rejected the traditional rabbinical answer, Maimonides provides his own, based entirely on Aristotle[11]. First of all, Maimonides outlines “the premises needed for establishing the existence of the deity…” [see Appendix B]: all of these are derived from Aristotle’s physics. He then builds his argument for God’s unity and incorporeality based on these premises, and upon other Aristotelian arguments:

“We find that many things are composed of a mover and a moved … there must exist a mover that is not moved at all; this is the first mover. And inasmuch as no motion is possible in it, it is not divisible and not a body…

[Another argument taken over from Aristotle’s speculation is as follows:] There is no doubt that there are existent things… Now there are only three possible alternatives… either no existents are subject to generation and corruption, or all of them …, or some of them are subject … whereas others are not. Now the first alternative is clearly absurd … The second alternative is likewise absurd… Hence it follows necessarily, according to this speculation that if there are, as we perceive, existents subject to generation and corruption, there must be a certain existent that is not subject to generation and corruption. Now in this existent … there is no possibility of corruption at all; rather, its existence is necessary, not possible… Of necessity, there can be no doubt that … [this existent] is necessary of existence in respect to its own essence [i.e. that of prime mover]. For without it, there would be no existent at all…[see premise #17, 25, Appendix B (JV)] After this … it follows necessarily that the existence of everything that is necessary of existence with respect to its own essence can have no cause, as has been set forth in the twentieth premise; and that in anything that is necessary of existence there cannot be a multiplicity of notions, as has been mentioned in the twenty-first premise. Hence it follows necessarily that, as has been set forth in the twenty-second premise, it is not a body or a force in a body. It is he who is the deity, may His name be sublime. Similarly it can be easily demonstrated that it is impossible that necessity of existence in respect to [the same] essence should exist in two beings… [see premise #7, 16, Appendix B (JV)]”[12].

“Thus it has become clear to you that the existence of the deity, may He be exalted – who is the necessary of existence [sic] that has no cause and in whose existence in respect to His essence there is no possibility – is proved by cogent and certain demonstrations … Similarly, demonstrations prove that He is one and not a body…”[13].

These “cogent and certain demonstrations”, however, are entirely based on a rejection of the literal Torah, and an acceptance in its stead of the authority of Aristotle’s physics[14].

An Aristotelian Argument: Divine Attributes

Further influences of Aristotle on Maimonides’ can be seen in many forms in his arguments surrounding the attributes of God; concerned that people have taken the divine scriptures at face value and have ascribed essential attributes to God based on the descriptions of his actions[15], Maimonides sets himself to his discussion. In this application of philosophy to theology, however, not only his premises but also the very structure of his argument betray his Aristotelianism. He even opens with a profession that the basis of his argument is “Aristotle[’s] establish[ment of] the fact of motion, as it had been denied, and demonstrat[ion of] the non-existence of atoms, as their existence had been asserted”[16].

The entire structure of Maimonides’ argument is laid out along Aristotelian lines. He begins with Aristotle’s distinction between essential attributes, those attributes which describe God’s essence and therefore allow one to make predicative statements about His actions, and accidental attributes, those which describe simply his actions. He then uses the mathematical logic of deduction to structure his entire discourse, the outline of which is sketched in excerpts in Appendix C: an opening statement, definition and categorisation, then a clear and systematic elimination through logic lead us to the definitions of the Divine Attributes. Philosophical concepts play a large role in his argument; the nature of the attribute, explicit genus of qualities, and essence versus action are part of Aristotle’s physical and metaphysical systems. Even the idea of the negative attribute, so central to this particular theme, proves Maimonides’ Aristotelian influences; although this concept was not devised by Aristotle himself, negative theology was a philosophical construct of Avicenna’s*. This is most likely why Maimonides considers this notion “philosophically reputable” and Aristotelian in nature[17]. Maimonides therefore appeals purely to a natural philosophy, that which is directly perceivable to everyone, to support his argument, instead of to the divine, the prophetic, or even the scriptural.

This particular influence of Aristotle may be difficult for modern readers of philosophy to detect today, but this is exactly due to the influence of medieval philosophers such as Maimonides. Since its reintroduction during the middle ages, Hellenic logic and rhetoric as used in Aristotle has provided the model for almost all philosophical works[18]. It is important, however, to view Maimonides’ synthesis in its historical context. The application of Aristotle’s logical system of analysis to theological matters[19] was still extremely novel at the time[20], and therefore Maimonides’ use of Aristotle’s structure and definitions are part of his particular genius.

A Cautious Rejection of Aristotle: Creation

With regards to the creation of world and of matter, Aristotle stands clearly in opposition to the teachings of the Torah. According to Genesis, God created the universe in time and ex nihlio, thus proving both that matter, form, and natural laws are of His creation, and that the world is not eternal. However, according to Aristotle, the universe exists eternally and “in virtue of necessity, … no nature changes at all, and ... the customary course of events cannot be modified with regard to anything”[21]. Maimonides must somehow reconcile these two opposing views in a way that allows him to preserve Aristotle’s authority, upon which the Guide is based, and simultaneously to rationalise the Genesis Creation in philosophical terms.

Maimonides has already used the scripture in a figurative sense in order to preserve Aristotle’s ideas, but he refuses to use anything but a literal interpretation of Genesis in this case. To do otherwise would be to dismiss the Law and prophecy as false[22]. Therefore, Maimonides decides to reject Aristotle, citing a demonstrably unsound argument and the necessary denial of the foundations of the Law as his causes. After accepting Creation as necessary for the Law, Maimonides disproves the eternity of the world as set forward by Aristotle; he does this, essentially, in saying that the world “has not been created in a temporal beginning, … for time belongs to the created things.” [23] God, who exists eternally prior to the creation of the world, sets time in motion when the world is created: “For this reason it says: In the beginning [Genesis 1:1]. For ‘be’ [bereshith] has the meaning of ‘in’… time is created, being consequent upon the motion of the sphere, which is created.”[24]

Having refuted the Aristotelian eternity of the world in favour of the Creation as described literally in the Torah, Maimonides must demonstrate both that Aristotle’s universal model does not rely on the sphere’s eternity, and that it is congruous with the world described in Genesis; if he does not do so, he will call into question all of the Aristotelian concepts upon which his explanations of theological phenomena in the Guide depend. He therefore cites the creation of “heaven and earth”(Gen. 1:1) as the distinguishing between supra- and sub-lunar matter, and the mention of earth, darkness, spirit, and water in Genesis 1:2 as the description of the four Aristotelian elements: earth, water, air, and darkness (=fire). He continues in this vein, taking scripture apart to reveal etymologically or structurally the order of God’s universe according to the first chapters of Genesis, and setting this creation in the context of Aristotle’s universal model*. Thus, Maimonides’ explanation is two-fold: he first refutes the eternity of the world, then proves that Aristotle’s universal is not reliant upon the world’s eternity and that the universe as Aristotle sees it proves valid in the rest of the Creation account.

Fortunately, Aristotle did not spend much time on this issue, simply stating the world’s eternity before moving on to the physical construction of the universe. The eternal nature of the world was not really necessary for his universal model, as the model could easily alternatively have been created, as Maimonides has shown[25]. But this possible double reading of Aristotle is highly dangerous for Maimonides; he cannot blatantly discard Aristotle, on whose philosophical concepts the Guide is based, without throwing the authority of the Guide’s precepts into question. What Maimonides finally does, therefore, is highly diplomatic: he states outright that the creation and eternity of the world is beyond human capacity for conception or rationalisation[26]. Because of this, humans can only offer conjectures, as logic cannot account for this phenomenon. In this light, Aristotle is not wrong, but -–quite simply— cannot have the final word. Thus, Maimonides manages to criticise Aristotle in Aristotelian form, basing his position and argument on scriptural support, without jeopardising the strength of the rest of the Guide.

Impact on Jewish Thought

Maimonides’ influence was widespread, holding major implications for Jewish theology. First of all, the concept behind his work was vital in constructing a new Jewish “worldview in which philosophy became a method of textual criticism in theology and science”[27], resulting in:

“…the systematic practice of science by Jewish scholars for the first time, the Aristotelianization of the medieval worldview; … significant inroads of empiricism in a cognitive world that preferred deduction, since the new ideas … substitute[d], as an unintended consequence of their pursuit, ‘a secular image for a religious one’; and the rearrangement of the traditional classification of the sciences and the seating of all disciplines on a basis of logic, for which mathematics (particularly geometry) was the model.” (Glick, p.106-107)

Aside from his contributions to the concept of linking philosophy and theology, Maimonides’ proofs themselves were influential in Jewish thought. Not the least of his influence was felt in his challenge to the early Jewish conception of God. When deprived of corporeality and essential attributes, the Jewish God essentially changed from man to essence or spirit. Not only did this make God more mysterious, but it also drew Him closer to the Jewish people[28]; without a body relegated to one location, God could be everywhere at once, surrounding, protecting, and influencing his creation[29]. This was a basic conceptual shift, affecting the way in which Jews conceived of and related to their God, and continues to direct the Jewish conception of God today.

It is perhaps most important in terms of conceptual change for the Jews of Europe that Maimonides challenged the literal acceptance of the Torah. Although this suggestion has often linked him with the birth of Cabala mysticism[30], his intention in The Guide was that the study of philosophy not be impeded by a literal reading of scripture[31]. In a philosophical context, he consistently argued, Jews should not be self-sufficient: they should look to outside communities’ astronomies, calendars, natural and physical philosophies for guidance[32]. This caused an uproar in the Jewish community, yet forever changed the way in which Jews related to their sacred texts. No longer did the Torah constitute the total conceptual framework: its words certainly did not need to govern the realm of natural philosophy, or even metaphysics and theology[33]. The Torah was also itself considered ‘fair game’ for philosophical questioning, contrary to the earlier teachings of the rabbis[34]. Philosophy could be applied to understand the source and aim of the Law[35], and search for a better understanding of God. No longer was the Torah beyond questioning: Jews could now look for the reasons why[36].

The medieval division of the Torah and science in terms of authority sparked a major debate in Judaism: that of reason, science, and philosophy versus faith, scripture, and tradition[37]. With the safeguard of metaphorical understanding in place, scripture could now literally stand in blatant contradiction to elements of physics. This position gave rise to several critical questions in medieval and post-medieval Judaism. When reason, a construct of natural philosophy, pointed one down a different path than that of faith, how was a Jew to synthesize these two contradicting standpoints? What should a Jew believe, the Torah or science? Is one to believe the Torah in a different sense than one believes in science? These questions continue to be of importance to Jews today. However, it was this new separation of science and faith that allowed subsequent Jewish natural philosophers, from Gersonides to Einstein, to work outside of the restraints of Judaic scripture and fully within the disciplines of science established by “idolators”, such as the Greeks and the Christians.

Conclusion

The Jewish intellectual community of medieval Spain was faced with a difficult problem when their Muslim counterparts began their studies of Aristotle. Because of the discrepancies between Hellenic and Judaic thought, scholars were perplexed as to which source to believe. Moses Ben Maimon, in his The Guide of the Perplexed, succeeded in reconciling these problems for his community thanks to several ingenious innovations. First of all, his idea that the Torah must not be interpreted literally in matters of philosophy and theology opened up many areas of difficulty in the Torah to metaphorical readings in support of Hellenic science. Secondly, he used Greek logic, rhetorical structure, and scientific concepts as the backbone of his arguments. And thirdly, he refuted Aristotelian theories which directly interfered with fundamental Judaic concepts,. In these three ways, Maimonides managed to synthesize Greek philosophy with Jewish theology. In the process, however, he left a lasting mark upon Jewish theology as a whole, having both challenged and changed the European Jews’ relationships to both their sacred text and their God.

Appendix A: Interpreting Scripture

“Image [selem] and likeness [demuth]. People have thought that in the Hebrew language image denotes the shape and configuration of a thing. This supposition led them to the pure doctrine of the corporeality of God, on account of His saying: Let us make man in our image, after our likeness [Gen.1:26]…

Now I say that in the Hebrew language the proper term designating the form … which is the shape and configuration of a thing, is to’ar. Thus Scripture says: beautiful in form [to’ar] and beautiful in appearance [Gen.39:6]; What form [to’aro] is he of? [I Sam. 28:14]… This term is also applied to an artificial form; thus: He marketh its form [yeta’arehu] with a line [Isa. 44:13] … Those terms are never applied to the deity … The term image, on the other hand, is applied to the natural form, I mean to the notion in virtue of which a thing is constituted as a substance and becomes what it is [this is the same distinction as the Aristotelian distinction between material and formal causes –JV] … It is on account of this intellectual apprehension that it is said of man: In the image of God created He him [Gen.1:27]…

As for the term likeness [demuth], … it too signifies likeness in respect of a notion. For the scriptural dictum, I am like a pelican in the wilderness [Ps. 102:7], does not signify that its author resembled the pelican with regard to its wings and feathers, but that his sadness was like that of the bird… In the same way it is said, the likeness of the throne, the likeness of a throne [Ezek. 1:26]; the likeness referred to being in respect of elevation and sublimity, not in respect of a throne’s square shape, its solidity, and the length of its legs, as wretched people think… Now man posses … intellectual apprehension. In the exercise of this, no sense, no part of the body, none of the extremities are used, and therefore this apprehension was likened unto the apprehension of the deity, which does not require an instrument… because of the divine intellect conjoined with man, … it is said of the latter that he is in the image of God and in His likeness, not that God … is a body and possesses a shape.” (Guide, I:1)

“It is thought that in the Hebrew language the meaning of the words figure [temunah] and shape [tabnith] are identical. This is not the case. For tabnith … signifies the build and aspect of a thing; I mean to say its shape… Accordingly it says: The shape of the tabernacle and the shape of all its vessels [Exod. 25:9] … For this reason the Hebrew language does not use this word with reference to attributes that apply in any way to the deity.

As for the term figure … It is used to designate the form of a thing outside the mind that is apprehended by the senses [i.e. Deut. 4:17] … It is also used to designate the imaginary form of an individual object existing in the imagination [i.e. Job 4:13] … The term is also used to designate the true notion grasped by the intellect. It is with a view to this third meaning that the word figure is used with reference to God… Thus it says: And the figure of the Lord shall he look upon [Num.12:8]. The meaning and interpretation of this verse are: he grasps the truth of God.” (Guide, I:3)

“Know that the three words to see [ra’oh], to look at [habbit], and vision [hazoh] are applied to the sight of the eye and that all three of them are also used figuratively to denote the grasp of the intellect… Every mention of seeing, when referring to God, may He be exalted, has this figurative meaning – as when the Scripture says: I saw the Lord [1 Kings 22:19]; And the Lord became seen to him [Gen. 18:1]; And God saw that it was good [Gen. 1:10]… All this refers to intellectual apprehension and in no way to the eye’s seeing, as the eye can only apprehend a body…” (Guide, I:4)

“[As Aristotle says,] man should not hasten too much to accede to this great and sublime atter at the first try… When, however, he has achieved and acquired knowledge of true and certaiin premises and has achieved knowledge of the rules of logic and inference and of the various ways of preserving himself from the errors of the mind, he then should engage in the investigation of this subject …[but] should not, from the outset, strain and impel his thoughts toward the apprehension of the deity; he rather should feel awe and refrain and hold back until he gradually elevates himself. It is in this sense that it is said, And Moses hid his face, for he was afraid to look upon God [Exod. 3:6] … The nobles of the children of Isreal [Exod. 24:11], on the other hand, were overhasty, strained their thoughts, and achieved apprehension, but only an imperfect one. Hence it is said of them: And they saw the God of Israel, and there was under His feet, and so on [Exod. 24:10]… For these words are solely intended to present a criticism of their act of seeing… because of the corruption of their apprehension, they were inclined toward things of the body…” (Guide, I:5)

Appendix B: The 25 Premises for God’s Incorporeality and Unity

“The premises needed for establishing the existence of the deity, may He be exalted, and for the demonstration that he is neither a body, nor a force in a body, and that He, may His name be sublime, is one, are twenty-five – all of which are demonstrated without there being a doubt as to any point concerning them. For Aristotle and the Peripatetics after him have come forward with a demonstration for every one of them…

1] The existence of any infinite magnitude is impossible.

2] The existence of magnitudes of which the number is infinite is impossible…

3] The existence of causes and effects of which the number is infinite is impossible… [this denies the possibility of infinite regression (JV)]

4] Change exists in four categories: … substance [generation and corruption], …quantity [growth and decrease],… quality [alteration], …place [translation and motion]…

5] Every motion is a change and transition from potentiality to actuality.

6] Of motions, some are essential and some accidental, some are violent and some are motions of a part…

7] Everything changeable is divisible. Hence everything movable is divisible and is necessarily a body. But everything that is indivisible is not movable; hence it will not be a body at all.

8] Everything that is moved owing to accident must of necessity come to rest, inasmuch as its motion is not in virtue of its essence…

10] Everything that is said to be in a body … either subsists through the body, as do the accidents, or the body subsists through it, as in the case of natural form. Both classes are … a force in the body.

11] Some of the things that subsist through body are … divisible according to accident [i.e. colours]. [Other things] are not divisible in any way, as for instance the soul and the intellect.

12] Every force that is found distributed through a body is finite because the body is finite.

13] It is impossible that one of the species of motion be continuous, except local motion, and of this only that which is circular.

14] Local motion is the primary and first by nature among all motions…

15] Time is an accident consequent upon motion and is necessarily attached to it. Neither of them exists without the other…

16] In whatsoever is not a body, multiplicity cannot be cognized by the intellect …

17] Everything that is in motion has of necessity a mover; and the mover either may be outside the moved object … or the mover may be in he body in motion…

18] Everything that passes from potentiality to actuality has something other than itself that causes it to pass, and this cause is of necessity outside that thing…

19] Everything that has a cause for its existence is only possible with regard to existence in respect to its own essence. For it exists if its causes are present…

20] Everything that is necessarily existent in respect to its own essence has no cause for its existence in any way whatever or under any condition.

22] Every body is necessarily composed of [its matter and its form] and is necessarily accompanied by accidents [quantity, shape, and position]…

25] The principles of an individual compound substance are matter and form. And there is no doubt about the necessity of there being an agent, I mean to say a mover that moves the substratum so as to predispose it to receive the form. That is the proximate mover, which predisposes the matter of a certain individual. At this point it is necessary to engage in speculation with regard to motion, the mover, and the moved. However, with regard to all this, everything that it was necessary to explain has already been explained [thanks to Aristotle]. The text of the words of Aristotle is: Matter does not move itself. This therefore is the capital premise calling for an inquiry concerning the existence of the Prime Mover…

(Adapted from The Guide of the Perplexed, Introduction to the Second Part)

Appendix C : The Divine Attributes

“An attribute predicted of any thing … must necessarily belong to one of the following five groups:

The first group is characterized by the thing having its definition predicated of it… this kind of attribute should be denied to God … for He, may He be exalted, has no causes anterior to Him that are the cause of His existence and by which, in consequence, He is defined…

The second group is characterized by the thing having part of its definition predicted of it … This kind of attribute should be denied to God … For if He has a part of an essence, His essence must be composite…

The third group consists of attributes … [which are] a certain quality with respect to the thing of which it is predicated… Now quality … is regarded [by Aristotle] as one of the accidents. Thus if an attribute belonging to this group would subsist in Him, He would be a substratum of accidents … [I]t is impossible to ascribe [any of the four qualities] to God. For He does not possess quantity … nor does He receive impressions and affections … Nor does He have dispositions so that there might be faculties and similar things pertaining to Him. Nor is He … endowed with a soul, so that He might have a habitus pertaining to him – such as clemency, modesty … health and illness…

The fourth group of attributes is as follows. It is predicated of a thing that it has a relation to something other than itself … There is no relation between God … and time and place;… For time is an accident attached to motion, [which is in turn] one of the things attached to bodies, whereas God, may He be exalted, is not a body. Accordingly there is no relation between Him and time, and in the same way there is no relation between Him and place …There is [also], in truth, no relation in any respect between Him and any of His creatures. For relation is always found between two things falling under the same – necessarily proximate – species, whereas there is no relation between the two things if they merely fall under the same genus … How then could there subsist a relation between Him … and any of the things created by Him, given the immense difference between them …?

The fifth group of the affirmative attributes is [when] a thing has its action predicated of it… this kind of attribute it remote from the essence of the thing of which it is predicated. For this reason it is permitted that this kind should be predicated of God … the acts in question need not be carried out by means of differing notions subsisting within the essence of the agent…

[God] is one in all respects; no multiplicity should be posited in Him; there is no notion that is superadded to His essence; the numerous attributes possessing diverse notions that figure in the Scriptures and that are indicative of Him … are mentioned in reference to the multiplicity of His actions and not because of a multiplicity subsisting in His essence…” (Guide, I:52)

The argument proceeds as Maimonides argues that God cannot be fully described by any affirmative attributes at all. This is because the particularising quality of affirmative attributes is inapplicable to God; as He is one, He does not have a multiplicity of attributes among which one must distinguish. It is also impossible to attribute the accidental to him, as set out above, because ”He cannot have accidents”. Furthermore, it is not for us to limit God in his essence. For this reason, when we say that “He is powerful and knowing and willing”, we must understand these attributes to “signify that He is neither powerless nor ignorant nor inattentive nor negligent”, not that he has power and knowledge and will. Therefore, it is only in the negative accidental attributes that God can be described, without denying Him the power and potential of his His unified essence.

(Adapted from The Guide of the Perplexed, I: 51, 52, 53)

Appendix D : Why and When to Reject Aristotle

“Know that our shunning the affirmation of the eternity of the world is not due to a text figuring in the Torah according to which the world has been produced in time. For the texts indicating that the world has been produced in time are not more numerous than those indicating that the deity is a body. Nor are the gates of figurative interpretation shut in our faces or impossible of access to us regarding the subject of the creation of the world in time…

Two causes are responsible for our not [justifying Aristotle through a figurative reading of Genesis]… [firstly] the eternity of the world has not been demonstrated … [and secondly] Our belief that the deity is not a body destroys for us none of the foundations of the Law and does not give the lie to the claims of any prophet… On the other hand, the belief in eternity the way Aristotle sees it … destroys the Law in its principle, necessarily gives the lie to every miracle, and reduces to inanity all the hopes and threats that the law has held out…

Know that with a belief in the creation of the world in time, all the miracles become possible and the Law becomes possible, and all questions that may be asked on this subject, vanish. Thus it might be said: Why did God five prophetic revelation to this one and not to that?… Why did He impose these commandments and these prohibitions?… What was God’s aim in giving this Law? … If this were said, the answer to all these questions would be said: He wanted it this way; or His wisdom required it this way. And just as He brought the world into existence, having the form it has, when He wanted to, without our knowing His will with regard to this .. in the same way we do not know His will or exigency of His wisdom that caused all the matters…”

(From The Guide of the Perplexed, II;35)

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Baron, Saco W. A Social and Religious History of the Jews. Vol. 8. New York, 1958.

Coppelston, Frederick. A History of Philosophy. Ch. 22, “Jewish Philosophy”. Vol. 2. New York: Image Books, 1962.

Glick, Thomas F. “Science in Medieval Spain: The Jewish Contribution in the Context of Convivencia”. Convivencia: Jews, Muslims, and Christians in Medieval Spain. Eds. Vivian B. Mann et al. New York: The Jewish Museum, 1992. 83-111.

Hyman, Arthur and James J. Walsh. Philosophy in the Middle Ages: The Christian, Islamic, and Jewish Traditions. New York: Harper & Row, 1967.

“Maimon, Moses”. Encyclopedia Judaica. 1971.

“Maimonidean Controversy”. Encyclopedia Judaica. 1971.

Maimonides, Moses. The Guide of the Perplexed. trans. Shlomo Pines. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963.

Pines, Shlomo. “The Philosophic Sources of The Guide of the Perplexed”. The Guide of the Perplexed. By Moses Maimonides, tr. Shlomo Pines. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963. lvi-cxxxiv.

Strauss, Leo. “How to Begin to Study The Guide of the Perplexed”. The Guide of the Perplexed. By Moses Maimonides, tr. Shlomo Pines. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963. xi-lvi.

Additional related sources from previous studies in the History and Philosophy of Science include:

Translated selections from Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Physics, and numerous other works

Translated selections from Ptolemy’s Almagest

Thomas Kuhn’s The Copernican Revolution and The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.

Steven Shapin’s The Nature of Scientific Revolution

Previous studies in the field of the History and Philosophy of Science, under Dr. Steven Straker and Dr. Alan Richardson, University of British Columbia.

* The works of Aristotle reached Western Europe through a roundabout route as, after the fall of the Roman Empire, classical texts disappeared from the western world for several centuries. They were preserved by early Christians in the east, primarily Mesopotamia, Syria, and Egypt, in Syrian translations (Hyman & Walsh, 204). As these areas became part of the expanding Muslim world in the 700s, academies employed scholars to translate the texts from Syrian into Arabic. It should be noted that these translators inserted their own commentaries, combined philosophers and their philosophies into a single body of Greek knowledge, and/or simply passed off their own work under the name of Aristotle or Plato (see Hyman & Walsh, 205). This resulted in many ‘classical’ texts that would have been unrecognizable to the original author! Avicenna’s (980-1037) translations/commentaries on Aristotle were highly esteemed by Eastern philosophers, and this strange blend of his works and a mélange of the Hellenes’ dominated philosophy in the Muslim world until Averroes’ (1126-1198) translation/commentaries appeared (Hyman & Walsh, 208).

* Further, Maimonides’ detailed description of the universe in section I:72 is fully Aristotelian, complete with spheres, elements, natural motions, etcetera, and a rejection of Ptolemaic teachings of epicycles and eccentrics. God is then placed in this Aristotelian universe: as the soul of heaven which is the first principle of the existence of souls in the world, as the “force which connects [the world’s] portions one with the other”, and as the thing in virtue of which “the existence of the sphere and of every part of it endures”, because of which God is referred to as “the living of the world” in Daniel 12:7.

Notes