Back
to Homepage Annuario 2003
p. 398
Giuseppe Tornielli-Brusati di Vergano.
Notes regarding his Diplomatic Mission in Romania
1879-1887
University of Bucharest
Romanian Institute of
Humanistic
Culture and Research, Venice
During the period
between 1879 and 1914, Italy was represented in Bucharest by four
plenipotentiary ministers, with considerably different temperaments, abilities,
conceptions and strategies. The personality selected to inaugurate in December
1879 the diplomatic relationship with the independent Romania at the level of
Legation was the Count Giuseppe Tornielli Brusati di Vergano, “una
delle figure più corpose della diplomazia italiana”[1].
Carried on during more than 46 years, his diplomatic career and activity is
less known and studied even nowadays[2].
The present investigation especially refers to the eight years spent by
Tornielli-Brusati in Bucharest, as plenipotentiary minister of Italy.
Born at Novara on 1836, February 12, the first extraordinary
envoy of Italy to Bucharest originated in a traditional noble family, one of
the most ancient and powerful in Novara, since a certain Guglielmo di
Tornielli, Bishop of Novara was attested in the 12th century. The family
has included an important number of local magistrates, prefects, intendents,
mayors, as well as three bishops. His grandfather, that is Giuseppe Maria, had
gone through a brilliant career in the Piedmont Kingdom, being successively prefect, General Intendent at Chambéry (1816), Director
of the Administration of the Public Debit (1820), Viceroy of Sardinia (1824),
Minister of State (1836), being named as Grande
di Corona (1831) and distinguished with the superior order of Santa Annunziata. The diplomat’s father,
that is Eugenio was mayor of
Novara, deputy and
p. 399
Gentiluomo
di camera of the King Victor Emmanuel II. Eugenio Tornielli would add the family
name of his mother, Camilla Brusati, who was the last descendent of another
famous noble house in Novara[3].
Through the agency of his mother, Tornielli was related to the family of the
dukes of Guerrieri-Gonzaga[4].
Consequently, he belonged to the Savoyard-Piedmontese high nobility, where some
other representative characters of the Italian diplomacy, such as Carlo Nicolis
di Robilant, Edoardo De Launay, Carlo Alberto Maffei di Boglio, Carlo Gerbaix
De Sonnaz, and so on came from.
Graduate in law studies at the Turin University in 1858,
Tornielli begins his diplomatic career as volunteer in the Kingdom of Sardinia’s
Minister of Foreign Affairs, on 1859, November 15[5].
On 1862, May 16 he is promoted as Second Class Secretary of Legation, and on
September 27 the same year he is attaché at the particular cabinet of the
Minister of Foreign Affairs. Between 1863 and 1867 he functions as Secretary of
Legation at St. Petersburg and Athens. After this period spent abroad, on 1867,
October 8 he is named as head of minister’s cabinet, and on 1868, January 2 has
the task of regent of the ministry’s political department by March 1876. In
this position, he has the merit to determine the constitution of the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs’ archive, which ordination he supervised personally[6].
On 1876, March 16 he is promoted as Second Class Plenipotentiary Minister. In
the periods 1976, April 2-1878, June 3 and 1878, December 19-1879, July 6 he
has the function of Minister of Foreign Affairs’ General Secretary. Thus, there
is a relatively gradual evolution, but permanently ascending. In 1882, in a
letter to the President of Ministers’ Council, Agostino Depretis, Tornielli
regarded his own evolution in the Ministry’s Direction as “13 anni consecutivi di larga, effettiva, quotidiana cooperazione nella
direzione della politica estera italiana”[7].
Affirming the important part played by him inside the decision making group
during all these years, and especially between 1876 and 1879 when he functions
as Consulta’s General Secretary,
becomes a common feature in the historiography[8].
Federico Chabod names him as “la ninfa Egeria
di Depretis per i problemi internazionali”[9],
thus defining
p. 400
his part as intimate
counsellor of the Left leader[10],
and indicates him together with Maffei di Boglio as “the real promoter” of the
Italian international policy during the difficult times of the Oriental crisis[11].
A similar and more recent opinion is to be found out in Enrico Decleva: “Anche in considerazione delle malcerte
condizioni di salute del nuovo titolare della Consulta, Luigi Amedeo Melegari
[March 1876-December 1877, n.n.], sin
lì rappresentante italiano a Berna, funzioni importanti vennero assunte
dal nuovo segretario generale, Giuseppe Tornielli Brusati, legato a Depretis,
ma già alla guida della Divisione politica del Ministero. […]”[12].
The same considerations are to be detected also at the contemporary opinions,
meaning from statesmen and diplomats. For instance, Maffei di Boglio makes
reference to the influence upon Depretis in the foreign policy matters, in a
letter on 1878, August 13 to Alberto Pansa. Tornielli is regarded as “l’anima dannata di Crispi e Depretis]”[13].
The British plenipotentiary at the conference in Constantinople, the Marquis of
Salisbury, during a visit to Rome, had the impression that it was Tornielli to
be “the real Minister of Foreign Affairs”[14].
The new regent of the Romanian diplomatic agency in Rome, Mihail Obedenaru,
after his first contacts with Consulta,
reported on 1877, May 11 that “[…] domnul
conte Tornielli este cel care pare a se ocupa mai mult cu relaþiunile între
Minister ºi Agenþii Statelor strãine. Domnul Melegari se þine mai mult în
rezervã […] / [...] the Count Tornielli is the one that seems to deal more
with the relationship between
p. 401
the Ministry and the foreign
states’ agencies. Mister Melegari is more reserved [...]”[15].
The great influence of the expert Tornielli on the Italian foreign policy in a
moment when the lack of eperience (Unerfachrenheit)
dominated on the government – including Melegari – was signaled also by the
Ambassador of Austria-Hungary, Haymerle, in a report on 1877, May 12 to the
Imperial Minister of Foreign Affairs, Andrassy[16].
In the
p. 402
summer of 1878, because of
the conflict with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Luigi Corti is forced to
retire from the function of General Secretary, despite his efforts to assure
the permanency[17]. Quite
probable, this is the period when Tornielli’s decision to
p. 403
achieve the nomination in a
representation abroad, preferably an important one, is dated. At least in a
first stage, his intention was to be nominated as Plenipotentiary Minister at
Constantinople, the only post considered as being on his own ability’s size.
Nevertheless, he would be forced to renounce because of the same Luigi Corti’s
opposition[18]. On
December 19, 1878, once with the third Depretis government’s installment,
Tornielli is once again General Secretary of the Minister of Foreign Affairs.
Since the government did not seem to be longlasting, Tornielli would decide to
‘reserve’ the post at Bucharest, although the decision to recognize Romania as
an independent state was still suspended sine
die[19].
We could ask ourselves: why Bucharest? In a letter on March
1883 to Agostino Depretis, Tornielli affirms that: “[...] During my departure
from the Ministry [1879, July 6 – n.n.] I accepted Bucharest, refused by the
others, because it was to only vacant. [...]”[20].
In truth, it was also vacant the lately created Italian Legation in Belgrade,
where Tornielli would be temporarily nominated on September, 1879, in the
expectation of the decision to recognize the Romanian independence. There were
different reasons that
p. 404
determined him to chose
Bucharest. Among others, it was because it was more attractive financially, due
also to his own efforts. The budget of representation in the ministry’s balance
sheet for the Legation in Bucharest was clearly bigger than the one allocated
to Belgrade: 50,000 Italian pounds, respectively 36,000 Italian pounds[21].
Although it was far of being a residence to offer influence to the titular
there, because of its settlement between the two rival empires, that is
Austria-Hungary and Russia, Bucharest represented an observing point more
important than Belgrade[22].
This choice is to be connected also to the idea that Tornielli had on the place
that Italy was to play in the Balkans and on the Romania’s future in this area[23]
(cf. infra). Finally, it is to be
noticed that Tornielly considered the mission to Bucharest as a shortlasting
one, as a temporary stage before his nomination in a residence to correspond to
his potential and ability[24].
On December 7, 1879, the Secretary of the Romanian Legation in Constantinople,
Obedenaru, warned I. C. Brãtianu, the President of the Council of Ministers: “Însã foarte probabilmente, Tornielli ne va
lãsa dupã câteva luni, poate chiar dupã puþine luni de tot. Deja ºtiam de la
dânsul chiar cã el doreºte mult sã ajungã la Constantinopol. Aflasem de la
Maffei, actualul Secretar General, cã [Tornielli –n.n.] ceruse postul de la Constantinopol încã din
timpul Congresului, cãci se spera attunci cã Corti ar trece la Petersburg.
Corti însã s-a reîntors la Stambul. Acum, din nou a rãmas vacant postul de
Ambasador italian de la Paris; din nou e posibil sã treacã Nigra la Paris ºi
Corti la Petersburg. În cazul acela, Tornielli s-ar repezi aci in Turcia.
Astãzi
p. 405
am
vorbit cu Corti. El chiar mi-a confirmat acestea zicându-mi cã probabilitatea
aceasta existã […] / It is still probable that Tornielli is to leave us in a few
months, maybe even after very few months. I already knew from him that he has
to go to Constantinople in intention. Maffei, the present-day General
Secretary, has let me know that [Tornielli – n.n.] had asked for the post in
Constantinople since the times of the congress, since it was then hoped that
Corti was to be removed to St. Petersburg. But Corti came back to
Constantinople. Now the post of the Italian Ambassador to Paris is again
vacant. It is again possible that Nigra to come to Paris and Corti to St.
Petersburg. In this case, Tornielli would come quickly here, in Turkey. Today I
talked to Corti. He even confirmed this to me, saying that this probability
exists [...]”[25]. One of his
letters to Alberto Pansa referring to the circumstances of his installment to
Bucharest illustrates also that he has no intention to spend in the Romanian
capital more than one year[26].
Finally, he would remain as the head of the Italian Legation in Bucharest no
less than eight years!
In connection to Tornielli-Brusati’s activity as General
Secretary of Consulta, there is to be
noticed that his position – together with Agostino Depretis’, was favorable to
the recognition of the Romanian independence as soon as possible[27].
According to the Treaty of Berlin, this recognition was conditioned by the
cession of the Southern Bessarabia from Romania to Russia and by the
modification of the Article 7 in the Romanian Constitution regarding the
circumstances of the attribution of the civic and political rights. Actually,
in the spring of 1879, during the third Depretis governments, Italy made its
second attempt to abandon the position of “solidarity” with the governments in
Berlin, London and Paris and to recognize unilaterally the Romanian
Principality’s independence. This intention was announced to the German
government by a note sent by the Italian Ambassador in Berlin, De Launay, to
the German Minister of Foreign Affairs, von Bülow, at the beginning of April
1879[28].
According to the
p. 406
warrant of the Romanian
diplomatic Agency in Rome, Obedenaru, the respective application was to be due
to the Count Tornielli’s endeavours[29].
Anyhow, as a consequence of the German government’s hostile attitude and of the
British and French refusals to leave their reserves, the idea would be finally
abandoned.
On July 6, 1879[30],
once with the fall of the third Depretis government, Tornielli would abandon
for the second time the post of General Secretary. Still, it did not occurred
without the signing on the same day of the Royal decree that nominated him as
Italian Extraordinary Envoyee and Plenipotentiary Minister in Bucharest. In the
period between 1879, September 7 and December 5 he would be temporarily
nominated
p. 407
in Belgrade. Finally, after
other five months of hesitations, Consulta
would decide to break “the line” strictly respected previously and to recognize
Romania as independent state (1879, December 5). Arrived in Bucharest in the
evening of December 18, 1879[31],
the first titular of the Italian Legation in Romania, Giuseppe
Tornielli-Brusati, Count of Vergano, would present the accreditation letters to
the Prince Charles I in a solemn audience, on December 18, 1879[32].
In the honour of the Italian Plenipotentiary Minister, the Romanian ruler
organized on December 18/30, 1879 an extraordinary lunch, with the
participation of the all first rank dignitaries of the Romanian state: the
President of the Council, the ministers of Internal Affairs and of Foreign
Affairs, the presidents of the two legislative chambers, the Primate
Metropolitan, the First-President, the presidents and the General Attorney of
the High Court, the mayor of Bucharest, the rector of the University, the Prefect of the Police, etc., meaning
more than 50 persons[33].
At the beginning of his mission in Bucharest, Tornielli came
to his 44th year of life. Since 1864, he was married with Olga
Rostpkin, the daughter of the famous Russian General Rostpokin, who had set
fire to Moscow during the entrance there of the Napoleonian troops[34].
Together with his wife, he would be accompanied in Bucharest by his foster
daughter, the Countess Virginia Lazzari-Tornielli[35].
As they were preserved, the opinions of the contemporary witnesses as regards
to his character were somehow intrigued. For instance, Salvago Raggi had known
him at Madrid in 1889. According to his depiction, Tornielli, immediately after
his transfer to Bucharest, was “un vechio
signore con una lunga barba quasi bianca […], con cortese ma lenta parola… Se
non un uomo gentile, certo era una persona intelligente, forse un po’ troppo
burocratico, ma molto capace; non uomo ‘di mondo’, ma ‘un signore’; non
elegante, ma distinto; […] con Tornielli
la vita di cancelleria era un poco monotona, forse non interessante, un pocco
accaparrante perché non amava accordare lunghe
p. 408
licenze…”[36].
Among those who did not admire him, Alessandro Guiccioli presentes him as
“proud” and thus difficult[37],
Domenico Farini as “able, but puzling”[38],
while the Austrian-Hungarian Ambassador to Rome, Ludolf, as “a determined
character”, “ambitious” and “... dangerous”[39].
The Italian Ambassador to Berlin, De Launay, describes him with negative terms
in 1884, in a moment when the name of Tornielli was on the list of the possible
ministers of Foreign Affairs: “Il ne
manque certainement pas de très bonnes qualités comme chef de mission,
mais je doute qu’il ait déjà acquis le calme nécessaire pour des
fonctions aussi importantes que celles d’un ministre des affaires
étrangères. Il est d’un caractère irascible et rancuneux qui se
modifiera avec l’âge, mais qui, pour quelques années encore m’inspirerait
quelque appréhension s’il était appelé à diriger notre politique
extérieure. […]”[40].
Nevertheless, he was generally appreciated as a “gifted” and conscientious
civil servant, with a special working capacity, “accustomed to promote, for him
and for the others, the rigid respect of the discipline”[41].
Cool[42]
and rational temperament, but possessing a faith almost boundless in the
diplomatic art, he supplied the lack of imagination by tenacity and method[43].
According to his own considerations, he was a diplomat “che sente altamente del decoro della carica che ha l’onore di occupare”[44].
His profession was what Serra called as “the courage of truth, even of that
that could hurt; he used a language which clarity was sometimes excessive”[45].
Anyway, his honesty and also his scrupulous and sometimes inflexible respect
regarding the diplomatic usages were often enough the
p. 409
origin of some dissensions
with his superiors or with the authorities that he was accredited to[46].
For instance, it was on May 1880 when the unexpected presence of an
Austrian-Hungarian extraordinary mission to the celebrations on the occasion of
the Romanian Kingdom’s proclamation and especially the priority given to this
mission during the ceremonies to the prejudice of the diplomatic corp
determined him to make a protest ’virulently’ in a ... special manner. During
the reception at the Royal Palace, he would abandon the proper place in order
to settle down at the tail end of the diplomatic corp, specifying that “it is
at the Romanian Royal Court where there is no hierarchy of the ranks”[47].
p. 410
Tornielli came to Bucharest accompanied not only by the image
of an extremely experienced diplomat, but also by the “renown” of philo-Russian[48].
This etiquette would bring him many troubles during his entire career. The
origins and the sense of it are not quite clear[49].
This characterization is not yet also clearly argumented. According to Enrico
Serra, he was to achieve such a fame after the so called “Busch incident” (on
June 1887), meaning after a conversation with the German Minister at Bucharest,
Klemens Busch, when Tornielli had brutally criticized the Italian agreements
with Germany and Austria-Hungary[50].
In truth, he had been regarded as philo-Russian a long time before this event.
For instance, it had been in 1878 when the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Luigi
Corti, had definitely named him as “Russian agent”[51].
There is also the British General Consul in Bucharest, White that also regards
him as philo-Russian in a confidential report to the Minister of Foreign
Affairs, Salisbury in December 18, 1879[52].
Still, according to his own opinion – expressed in a letter on October 1894 to
the Minister of Foreign Affairs Blanc as an argument contrary to the idea of
his transfer to St. Petersburg –, his activity as General Secretary and
p. 411
subsequently as Italian
Minister to Bucharest had been on the contrary, often unfavorable to Russia:
“In Italia non vi è forse più nessuno che ricordi la parte direttiva da me avuta nella politica la quale, durante l’ultima guerra turco-russa, preparò la situazione che condusse, nel momento critico, l’Inghilterra ad offrirci l’intesa di cui non profitammo per malaugurati incidenti di politica interna e parlamentare. Ma a Pietroburgo ciò non sarà stato di certo dimenticato; come non sarà stato messo in oblio che, durante nove anni a Bucarest, la mia azione ebbe a spiegarsi sovente in senso non favorevole alla influenza russa [emphasis mine]. La stessa mia intimità personale con il defunto Sir W. White e col successore di lui, Sir F. Lascelles, ora Ambasciatore inglese in Russia, sarà stata debitamente annotata. […]”![53]
The real meaning of such a prejudice seems to be better
understood by the former Romanian diplomatic agent to Rome, Mihail Obedenaru.
In a report dated on November 25/December 7, 1879 and addressed to the Prime
Minister, Ion C. Brãtianu, one could read about Tornielli: “Venerabile Cetãþene, permite-mi sã-þi dau
unele informaþiuni asupra noului Ministru plenipotenþiar ce Italia ne trimite.
Cum ai aflat altã datã ºi de la Domnul Rosetti, Comitele Tornielli este prea
mult propuls spre Russia. El are o lubiã, o idee fixã, dupã cum zicea de el
un competitor al lui [Corti – n.n.]; are temere de Austria; în toate vede mâna
ascunsã a Austriei. De temerea Austriei, el cautã sã fie totdeauna cu Russia de
câte ori Russia e în opposiþiune cu Austria
[emphasis mine] / Venerable citizen, please allow me to give you some
information about the new Plenipotentiary Minister that Italy sends to us. As you found out a time ago from Mr.
Rosetti, the Count Tornielli is too much directed to Russia. He has a lover, a fixed idea, as one of his
competitiors [Corti – n.n.] said; he
is afraid of Austria; he sees the hidden hand of Austria in everything. Because
of this fierce from Austria, he always looks for Russia any time Russia is
against Austria [emphasis mine]”[54].
In other words, it was the necessity to counteract the Austrian policy,
considered as hostile to the Italian interests, that determined him to preview
also the cooperation with Russia as one of the possible strategies. There is no
evidence to demonstrate that he indeed acted in the sense of its
materialization.
The Austrian-Hungariam monarchy seemed to be indeed “l’incubo” of Tornielli! However, his
diplomatic activity proves this, being “constantly hostile” to the Austrian
interests and carried on in Belgrade and then in Bucharest. According to the
observations presented on December 1879 by the Austrian-Hungarian Minister of
Foreign Affairs, Haymerle, to the Italian Ambassador to Vienna, Di Robilant,
“[…] il Conte
Tornielli durante il suo soggiorno a Belgrado avvrebbe costantemente spiegato
la sua azione in senso ostile all’Austria, ponendo sotto gli occhi del Governo
Serbo i pericoli di cui il Principato è minacciato dall’occupazione
p. 412
Austriaca nella Bosnia e nell’Erzegovina, e caldeggiando inoltre l’ideea della Lega Balkanica. Il Barone Haymerle soggiungeva che il Conte Tornielli dovendosi ora recare a Bucharest sarebbe sommamente desiderabile non spiegasse colà del pari la sua azione in modo ugualmente ostile all'Austria-Ungheria, creando così imbarazzi al Governo Imperiale”[55].
However, it happened that Tornielli had precise ideas as
regards the place taken by the Balkan states, and particularly by Romania, in
the new order constituted by the Congress of Berlin. These ideas were contrary
to the Austrian [policy in the area, respectively contrary to his own
government’s intention to develop relationship of “cordial friendship” with the
cabinet in Vienna. This is the reason why his diplomatic action in Bucharest at
least before 1883-1884 continued to take shape in the same hostile sense
against Austria-Hungary, despite the warnings expressed by his superiors[56].
The terms that he images that Italy’s Balkan strategy would
promote, somehow idealistic, indicate him as a real “herald of the nationalities’
principle”[57]. Actually,
Tornielli had served his political-diplomatic apprenticeship with one of the
apostles of the Italian Unity,
Massimo d’Azeglio, during the latter’s mission in Romagna (July 1859) in the
times of the second Independence War[58].
He had been witness and also participant to the birth of the modern Italian
nation between 1859 and 1870, so that he, just like the greatest part of the
generation that he belonged to, that is the generation of the Unity, felt the
external policy matters under the light of the principles that had inspired the
constitution process of the state, especially those of freedom and
nationalities. At the beginnings of his mission to Bucharest, Tornielli was not
yet one of those willing to abandon the ideals of Mazzini and Cattaneo
regarding a completely new Europe[59],
relying upon the nationalities’ principle. For a while, he would remain hostile
to “the middle way” of the moderates, which supposed the mixing of the
nationalities’ principle with the one of the European balance.
“Le traité de Berlin – Tornielli confessed in the
summer of 1878 to the Romanian diplomatic agent in Rome – est un pas en
arrière fait par le parti libéral de l’Europe. Nous devons l’existence
de notre État à l’application du principe de la liberté et de
l’indépendance des nationalités. Vous savez, vous Roumains, de quelle façon
notre principe a été violé [emphasis mine]. Mais
c’est le traité qui sera le plus tôt neutralisé et annihilé dans ses effets.
L’an dernier, en parlant de votre indépendance, je vous ai dit que l’on ne peut
guère faire remonter les rivières dans les montagnes. Je ne peut
que vous répéter la même chose en parlant des droits sacrés que le
Congrès de
p. 413
Berlin a cherché à supprimer. Il faut que dans la Peninsule balcanique le principe des nationalités triomphe. Et pour nous, c’est un besoin, c’est une nécessité de venir au secours de ces nationalités [emphasis mine]. Un beau rôle vous attend, vous Roumains. […] Vous avez montré de la force et de la sagesse. Soyez tranquilles, nous saurons ensemble venir à bout de tous les obstacles que le congrès a mis à notre développement, à notre évolution normale [emphasis mine]. La Russie a un terrible adversaire en Asie. Elle aura du fil à retordre. De manière que l’empire russe vous laissera plutôt tranquilles. Vous n’aurez rien à craindre de ce côté-là. Vous ne risquez pas de vous voir prendre la Dobrodja. […] Je connais le dessous de la société russe. On ne se figure pas jusqu’où va le nihilisme. […] Une société pourrie à ce point est incapable d’organiser un pays primitif. C’est une chose jugée: Les Bulgares ne seront pas assimilés par les Russes, la Dobrodja ne vous sera pas reprise, parce que les Russes verront toute leur activité absorbée par l’Asie. Vous avez donc devant vous un bel avenir. Vous serez nos principaux auxilliaires. Car nous allons travailler. La France est tenue de se concentrer chez elle, et ne pourra pas lever le drapeau des nationalités. C’est à nous qu’il incombe donc de soutenir ce grand principe. La France ne se mettra pas en avant, mais elle contribuera néanmoins à la réussite de notre cause [emphasis mine]. Le parti libéral en Europe ne tardera pas à l’emporter sur les efforts de la Sainte-Alliance remise à neuf. Le monde marche. La résultante des forces fera fatalement manquer l’entreprise de la réaction. […] Il faudra que l’on ait dorénavant une politique plus accentuée dans le sens que je viens d’indiquer [emphasis mine]”[60].
“Ciò che è necessario – Tornielli wrote in November 1879 from Belgrade to Agostino Depretis – è poter esercitare sopra questi governi un’influenza che accresca le loro simpatie per l’Italia. Non dobbiamo, noi Italiani, perdere di vista la tendenza del trattato di Berlino, come si rivelo negli ultimi atti della diplomazia Austro-Allemanna. Ma ritengo che questi paesi non sono disposti ad accettare la preminenza austriaca quando pure a Vienna ed a Berlino si fosse fitti in capo di voler rinuovare per l’Austria, nella penisola balcanica, la posizione che il Congresso di Vienna le avea fatta in Italia. Sarebbe un anacronismo che potrebbe costar caro alla antica Monarchia degli Augsburgo. Quel che è certo è che per l’Italia sarebbe tempo di smettere dalla monotona ripetizione che ho letto ancora ieri in un articolone del Diritto sulla nostra fedeltà al Trattato di Berlino nel quale, dal dire del giornale stesso, risulterebbe che fummo parte principalissima. Non saprei proprio che specie di vanto sia questo. Esso in ogni costo dimostra che non si capisce ancora da noi la tendenza che l’opera del Congresso del 1878 ha voluto imprimere alla politica dell’Europa, tendenza affatto opposta al trionfo del principio [the nationalities’ principle – n.n.] sul quale l’Italia nuova riposa”[61].
Since the first moments of his mission to Bucharest,
Tornielli would make detailed referrals about the tendencies of the
Austrian-Hungarian diplomacy in the Southeastern Europe and in Romania. In a
report on March 25, 1880, insisting upon the realities discovered in Romania,
he concluded: “[…] cã ar fi oportun ºi
convenabil
p. 414
pentru
Italia sã sprijine dezvoltarea sentimentului naþional în România, atât prin
acte care sã ateste simpatiile noastre pentru aceastã þarã, cât ºi prin acele
acþiuni diplomatice ce pot ajuta la menþinerea în echilibru a influenþelor
contrare ale Austriei ºi Rusiei / that it would be opportune and convenient
for Italy to sustain the development of the national feeling in Romania, both
through acts to attest our sympathies for this country and through those
diplomatic actions that could aid the preservation of the balance between the
contrary influences of Austria and Russia”[62].
On the opposite, according to Tornielli, the progressive installment of the
Austrian preponderance in Romania and in the entire Balkan space, favored by
the Russian inertia, would led to
“[…] a la perte compléte de l’avenir de tous les pays de l’Orient qui, par le développement graduel des germes autonomes et nationaux, semblent être appelés à former le système des états secondaires du midi de l’Europe et à rétablir ainsi l’équilibre que les grandes agglomérations ont rompu. L’intérêt qu’il y aurait pour la Roumanie et pour les autres petits états des Balkans à constituer dans un avenir peut-être peu éloigné une chaîne non interrompue depuis les Carpathes et le Pruth jusqu’à l’Adriatique, est trop naturel, trop évident pour qu’ici on ne s’en rende pas compte. [emphasis mine] […]. Je me suis formé la convinction qu’il n’y a encore rien de fait pour lier ce pays-ci à la politique orientale de l’Autriche et de l’Allemagne; mais que le cabinet de Vienne cherche surtout à endormir la Roumanie et à l’isoler des autres pays de la péninsule balkanique. L’union de ce pays serait en effet un obstacle à la réalisation de certains plans auxquells on se donne l’air de ne pas même songer, car le moment approche où leur exécution ne pourra plus être différée à la faveur de circonstances habilement préparées”[63].
p. 415
It is not quite clear whether Tornielli’s conception
previewed that this “system of secondary states” was to be necessarily
constituted in Balkan political-military league with a function both
anti-Russian and anti-Austrian. In exchange, Tornielli believed “cã prietenia
micilor puteri ar compensa în parte ceea ce este mai puþin perfect în poziþia
noastrã de mare putere / that the friendship among the small powers would
compensate partially what is less perfect in our position of great power”[64].
Realistic or not, Count Tornielli’s vision about what the Italian policy in the
Balkans had to do would not be shared by the leading milieu in Rome. On the
contrary, under the circumstances that the Italian external policy would
developed to an approach to the Central Powers especially after 1881,
Tornielli’s conceptions would come to an end by being disapproved and even
condemned[65]. Affirmed
in the period immediately subsequent to the Tunisian crisis, the Italian
government’s firm intention to follow the Austrian policy in the East became
rapidly the political line adopted in Italy’s relationship with the Southeast
European states, respectively in the relationship with Romania[66].
Despite the radical transformations occurred in the Italian external strategy,
Tornielli still continued to “navigate against the wave” in the Romanian
capital. Despite his subordinated function in Bucharest, he
p. 416
would not hesitate to
criticize and to reject the alliance project concluded with Berlin and Vienna
and also its immediate consequences[67]:
“Nella politica estera
è chiaro che non si possono mutare le linee generali direttive. Ma non
bisogna farsi l’illusione di credere che siamo cresciuti in importanza.
È il contrario che è vero. Siamo ritornati precissamente
nell’identica situazione in cui vivevamo prima del 1870, con questa differenza
che allora si diceva che l’Italia voleva ciò che la Francia e
l’Inghilterra decidevano, ed ora si dice che per conoscere la nostra opinione,
bisogna andare a Berlino ed a Vienna. Siccome mi piace dire schietto il mio
pensiero, così aggiungerò che allora ci si attribuiva almeno
certe ispirazioni nelle risoluzioni di Napoleone 3° e che ora nessuno suppore
che siamo noi ad inspirare [sic!] Bismarck. Allora avevamo
Roma da acquistare, ed ora nessuno capisce che cosa vogliamo. Quando si vuole
solamente avere il diritto di stare tranquilli, non si sente il bisogno
d’impegnarsi per rendere più libere le mani altrui. Forse ci si sospetta
meno a Vienna. Ma in compenso siamo poi sospettati dappertutto altrove”[68].
It was also the Romanian government to complain indirectly
against its anti-Austrian attitude. On October 2, 1883, in a moment when the
negotiations for the Austrian-Romanian alliances were in progress, the Italian chargé
d’affaires in Vienna, Galvagna, reported to his superior, the Ambassador Di
Robilant that:
“Sono stato oggi dal conte Kalnoky. […] Avendo saputo da me ch’ella deve recarsi da un giorno all’altro a Roma, mi ha pregato di farle conoscere quanto segue: ‘Le comte Torn s’agite beaucoup trop; il fait son possible pour empêcher le rapprochement de la Roumanie à l’Autriche; il ne cache pas à cet égard sa manière de penser, il est en confabulations continuelles avec Urussov [the Russian Minister to Bucharest – n.n.], qui est bien heureux d’avoir dans ces agissements anti-autrichiens un allié tel que Torn. Bratianu même, à son passage à Vienne, s’est plaint avec moi de l'attitude du ministre d’Italie qui ne facilite pas l’evolution qu’on est en train d’opérer dans l’opinion publique en Roumanie’ [emphasis mine]. Gli ho risposto che la cosa mi stupiva assai, giacché conoscevo a fondo Torn, e lo consideravo come incapace di agire contrariamente alle istruzioni del ministero e potevo assicurare nel modo più formale che le istruzioni costanti e ripetute di Mancini gli prescrivevano l'assoluta astensione tanto negli atti che nei consigli. ‘Je ne doute nullement que les instructions de M. Mancini soient telles, mais je vous affirme qu’il ne s’y conforme pas. Je sais que Torn est rongé par le désir d'une ambassade, et on me dit que c’est par un aimable égard à Berlin et à Vienne qu’on ne veut pas le nommer à Pétersbourg. S’il en est ainsi, je
p. 417
serais plus tranquille de le voir en Russie qu’en Roumanie. A Pétersbourg il ne pourra pas nous faire grand mal, tandis qu’il nous nuit beaucoup à Bucharest. La Roumanie n’est pas un grand Etat mais elle occupe une position qui rendrait très utile son concours en cas de complications avec la Russie, et il est de tout notre intéret qu’elle soit avec nous; et c’est ce que Torn veut empêcher [emphasis mine]. Veuillez je vous prie écrire tout cela confidentielement, au comte Robilant.’ […]”[69].
It seems that similar observations were presented at the
suggestion of King Charles I and of the Italian representative to the German
government[70]. However, a
year later, the Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dimitrie Sturdza would
express in extremely eulogistic terms as regards Tornielli, in a discussion
with the Italian Ambassador to Berlin, De Launay: “En terminant ce rapport – De Launay wrote – je ne veux pas
oublier de mentionner que le ministre des affaires étrangères de
Roumanie m’a parle dans les termes les plus flatteurs de M. le comte Tornielli,
avec lequel S. E. entreténait les meilleures relations”[71].
That demonstrates that Tornielli’s relationship with the Romanian officials
came into normality. In exchange, the resentments of the Austrian-German
diplomacy were long-lasting. According to the Austrian documents published in
the ’30 by Augusto Sandonà, it was that any time Tornielli’s name
appeared on the list of the possible ministers of Foreign Affairs, in 1882,
1885, 1887 and even in the moments when his transfers to St. Petersburg
(1883/1887) or to Constantinople (1885) were in discussion, the governments in
Vienna and Berlin opposed a determined veto[72].
p. 418
As a whole, in spite of his previous diplomatic experience,
of his profound knowledge regarding the Romania realities, of the multitude of
contacts with the local establishment, of his human and also material energy[73],
the Italian first plenipotentiary in Bucharest did exert only to a
insignificant extent a well determined function in Italy’s policy in the Danube
area, from Cairoli (1879) to Francesco Crispi (1887). His interference in the
decision making process was visible especially in the period when Benedetto
Cairoli was prime minister, meaning the first years of his mission in Romania
(December 1879-May 1881). “The mental map” that he created and sent to Cairoli,
regarding some evolutions in the Romanian policy, was decisive in the
elaboration of the Consulta’s
strategy in the area. The possibility to determine a particular strategy and
also the manner of its implementation were favored in this case by a series of
ideological affinities[74],
by the “weakness of character”[75]
of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Cairoli, and also by the obvious incapacity
of his close fellow-worker, the General Secretary of the minister, Maffei di
Boglio[76].
His recommendations were the basis on which the Italian position took shape to
a significant extent in the case of some developments in the international
policy that directly came into connection to the Romanian interests, such as:
Arab-Tabia – the delimitation of the Romanian-Bulgarian border (1879-1890)[77],
the matter of the Holy Places in the Orient, the international recognition of
the Kingdom of Romania (1881), or the first stage of the Danube Question
(1880-1881)[78]. Due to his
persuasions, it was in the spring of 1881 when Italy was the first Great Power
to recognize officially and without conditions the entrance of the small
Danubian state in “the family of the European kingdoms”[79].
On this occasion,
p. 419
together with the Ambassador
in Vienna, Di Robilant, Tornielli was a fervent supporter of the Romanian
cause, recommending insistently to his Government to ignore the existing
international stipulations in the matter. In this sense, he referred to the
dispositions of the third paragraph of the protocol at Aix-la-Chapelle (signed
on October 11, 1818 by the representatives of Austria, Great Britain, France,
Russia and Prussia), according to which the recognition of one monarch’s changing
of title was to be conditioned by the previous agreement of the powers signing
this act.
“L’iniziativa parlamentare – he wrote to the President Cairoli, during the proclamation of the Kingdom of Romania – e l’unanimità del voto al quale presero parte tutti i capi dell’opposizione, danno all’atto testé compiuto una solennità che, nelle condizioni attuali del paese sarebbe certamente mancata se dal governo avesse dovuto prendersi l’iniziativa dell’atto medesimo. Si potrà da qualche Gabinetto, tenace conservatore di tradizioni diplomatiche, oppore all’atto della volontà popolare della Romania, i protocolli del convegno di Aquisgrana? In simili pastoie della vecchia diplomazia l’Italia nulla avrebbe a vedere. Quando la legge che ha proclamato il Regno d’Italia fu comunicata al Governo inglese dal Regio Ministro a Londra, il Gabinetto britannico rispondeva immediatamente che, conformemente ai suoi principi, egli riconosceva il nuovo titolo. Questi principi sono i nostri. Le tradizioni della nostra politica sono stabilite in questo senso. Per questi motivi io mi sono permesso di pregare Vostra Eccellenza di non volere indugiare a permettrmi di annunziare al Governo rumeno che l’Italia ha riconosciuto il nuovo titolo e che nuove lettere credenziali mi sono spedite [emphasis mine]”[80].
Tornielli has also them merit to inspire the attitude in
favor of Romania adopted by the Italian government in the first moments of the
Austrian-Romanian dispute regarding the navigation on the Danube[81].
At least before December 1881, there was not any constant attitude of the
Italian government as regards the Danube matter, meaning the European
Commission of the Danube – ECD and the dispute around its composition,
respectively the stipulations in the matter of navigation on the territory of
Serbia, Bulgaria and Romania that were to be confer to. Both Cairoli and
Mancini during the latter’s first months as Minister of Foreign Affairs clearly
oscillated between the aversion to deteriorate the relationship with the
Southeastern European states and the necessities resulted from the more and
more obvious orientation towards the Central Powers. For instance, it was in
August 1880 when the Romanian Legation in Rome reported that the Consulta’s position referring to the
Danube matter had developed during no more than 15 days from the approval and
unconditioned sustain of the Austrian-Hungarian viewpoint to the embrace of the
freedom of action[82].
In his
p. 420
commentary, the Romanian chargé d’affaires, Mihail
Obedenaru considered that the motion was due either to the intervention of the
Italian minister in Bucharest, Tornielli, or to the Italian cabinet’s desire to
achieve a compensation from Vienna as an exchange for the assistance. Actually,
the Count Tornielli, faithful to the convictions that Italy is to have a
special part in the application and sustaining of the Balkan nationalities’
independence and also faithful to his extremely anti-Austrian feelings, had
such a direct intervention in the autumn of the same year to the President of
the Council of Ministers, Cairoli, that his action imposed a temporary
modification in the Italian government’s conduct. Consequently to a meeting on
November 1880 with Benedetto Cairoli at Belgirate, when he struggled against
the pro-German attitude of his colleague in Berlin, the Count De Launay,
Tornielli succeeded to achieve the promise that during the next ECD’s debates
Italy would be “favorable” to Romania. This promise would be also enunciate to
the Romanian minister in Rome, Kreþulescu[83].
According to the testimony
p. 421
of the Romanian Minister of
Foreign Affairs, Vasile Boerescu, the pledge was to be honored at least during
the session in winter 1880-1881 of the ECD session. “În chestiunea Dunãrii – Boerescu wrote to Nicolae Kreþulescu in
January 1881 – suntem mulþumiþi cum au
mers lucrurile la comisiunea de la Galaþi ºi ne-a plãcut atitudinea
comisarului italian [emphasis mine] / In the Danube matter, we are content with
the direction in which the things went to during the Commission of Galaþi and we liked the Italian commissary’s
attitude [emphasis mine]”[84].
However, the Count Tornielli’s ability to influence the
Italian external policy diminshed considerably, almost to cancelation, at the
beginning of the summer of 1881, when the portfolio of the Foreign Affairs was
received by Pasquale Stanislao Mancini (May 29, 1881). The presence of the
excellent jurist at Consulta provoked
remarkable transformations in the Italian external strategy, due to the
“possiblist” conception and
p. 422
attitude adopted in the
international relations field. Preoccupied with the taking off of Italy from
the isolation consequently to the Tunisian crisis, Mancini had to abandon the
’independent’ policy in the favor of the approach to the Central Powers. Such a
choice was to affect inavitably the attitude towards Romania. Sometimes early
after his installment, he would summarize his conception with regard to the
Italian mission in the Southeastern Europe in these terms: “[…] atitudinea amicalã reciprocã a Italiei ºi a
Austro-Ungariei, în timp ce ne va garanta o bazã sigurã de acþiune în concertul
european, ne va permite sã exercitãm, asupra aceleiaºi politici austro-ungare
în regiunile danubiene, o influenþã beneficã, nu doar din punctul de vedere al
principiilor, ci ºi din punctul de vedere al intereselor materiale ºi directe
ale acelor populaþii… / [...] while the mutual friendly attitude of Italy
and Austria-Hungary would guarantee a solid basis of action in the European
concerto, it would allow us to exert a profitable influence on the same
Austrian-Hungarian policy in the Danubian region, not only from the principle
viewpoint, but also from the viewpoint of the material and direct interests of
those peoples...”[85]!
It is useless to ask ourselves which was the point where such a strategy could
come into contact with viewpoints of the Italian Minister in Romania.
Briefly, there is to be said that the dissatisfaction
promptly manifested by Tornielli vis-à-vis
the new concepts of the Italian external policy and also the tendency to
permanently “adjust” this option, to give a personal interpretation to the
instruction, often conducted him during the immediately subsequent period to a
conflictual state with the new Minister of Foreign Affairs. On his turn, Mancini
was not ready to accept suggestions from the civil servants, who had the
execution of the orders as their essential mission. The Minister of Foreign
Affairs was many times put in the situation to remind to the Ambassador in
Bucharest that it was only the ministry to have the task and the right to
estimate the information sent by the diplomatic agents, respectively the right
to give solutions. The inherent difficulties that appeared made Tornielli at
the end of 1882 to extent his regular vacation with three months. Thus, his
absence from the post totalized approximately a half a year, between October 8,
1882 and April 1, 1883[86].
Motivated by the expectation for a transfer to St. Petersburg, his extended
staying in Italy coincided thus and involuntarily with the Consulta’s undeclared intention to temporarily remove him from
Bucharest. This was to be in connection with the fact that during the temporary
period of the First Secretary of Legation, the moderate Alberto Pansa, the
consequences of Tornielli’s anti-Austrian attitude – increased on the
background of the Romanian-Austrian-Hungarian dispute concerning the navigation
on the Danube (1881-1882) – would be somehow alleviated.
He returned to Bucharest on May 1883. This time, because of
some firm instructions from the ministry, he was constraint to renounce to his
anti-Austrian speeches, previously spoken ardently to the Romanian officials.
Because of the same instructions, during the immediately subsequent months, he
was not able to do anything but to assist helplessly and revolted to the
approaching between Romania and Vienna and Berlin. This approaching would take
the shape of a secret treaty of defensive alliance on October 30[87].
p. 423
On this occasion,
it is to be remarked the complete devotion to the general liberal values and
also to the belief in the “constitutionality” of the Romanian political life.
These tendencies made him to consider wrongly the meaning and the finalities of
the Austrian-German-Romanian negotiations in the summer and autumn of 1883, his
reports often denying the rumours regarding the conclusion of a formal alliance[88].
Erare humanum est! It is not less
true that the same Tornielli, proving not necessarily intuition but a high
level of knowledge with regard to the Romanian realities, would predict to the
Austrian-Hungarian representative to Bucharest that in a possible “war in the
East”, Romania would choose the alliance with Russia, since the Romanian
soldier feels himself closer to the Russian one because of the same virtues and
especially of the same vices![89]
It occurred in January 1887, a quarter of century previous to the Romanian
involvement in the First World War against the Central Powers.
After 1883, having the general rebound of the Italian policy vis-à-vis the Southeastern Europe
as background, the Count Tornielli’s activity in Bucharest ceased to be a noisy
one. The Italian envoyee gradually renounced to the idea to ‘inspire’ the
policy of his own government. To a significant extent, he restraint to carry
out the order given from Rome. Quoting the Italian Ambassador to Berlin, De
Launay, “Tornielli était en train de se refaire une virginité [emphasis mine]
[…] et pour peu qu’il eût
p. 424
patience,
un brillant avenir s’ouvrait devant lui”[90]!
However, there were to be other four years spent in the Romanian capital before
the well expected nomination to an important embassy to occur. His patience was
seriously put to the test during this period. After the failure of his transfer
to St. Petersburg in the spring of 1883, it occurred on November 1885 the
refusal of the Count Di Robilant against Tornielli’s request to be nominated as
Italian Ambassador to Constantinople for political reasons, as the new Minister
of Foreign Affairs considered. Still, it was the King Humbert I who firmly
promised to Tornielli to be promoted for merit in the first class of
Plenipotentiary ministers. Nevertheless, the promotion delayed and in addition,
the vacant post in Constantinople was offered on January 1887 to the Baron
Alberto Blanc[91]. Occurred
in June 1887, “the Busch incident” put Tornielli in a delicate position in his
relationship with his own ministry and thus, the matter of promotion seemed to
be delayed sine die. However, it
would happen six months later, through the agency of the new President of the
Council, Francesco Crispi.
Despite the diversity of opinions, the often polemics with
the ministry, the Count Tornielli’s activity in Romania was a fruitful one.
Through his endeavor, the juridical background for the development of the
political-diplomatic relationship between the two states was created
immediately after the establishment of relationship at the Legation level. It
occurred in the summer of 1880, through the conclusion in Bucharest of the Consular Convention and of the Convention for Extradition (August 5/17,
1880). The exchange of the ratification instruments took place on March 1/13,
1881[92].
Thus, Italy preceded all the other Great Powers in this matter. The two
conventions had the principle of the complete equality of treatment as basis
and, according to the Românul
newspaper, they had been conceived in such a manner that the reserves in the
Article 49 of the Treaty of Berlin had no value from that moment on in the
Romanian-Italian relationship. “În toate
materiile, atât comerciale, cât ºi civile ºi penale, dreptul comun al
naþiunilor libere era stabilit între ambele State în toatã întinderea ºi
întregimea lui / In all domains, both commercial and civic and criminal,
the common right of the free nations was established between the two states
wholly and completely”[93].
p. 425
Tornielli was the one that had the idea to endow the Italian
Legation in Bucharest with a proper palace and that also put it into practice
in 1883-1884, in a period when there were only the Russian Representation and
the Greek General Consulate owed buildings in their own propriety[94].
It was and older ambition from his side, which had been exposed to the Romanian
agent in Rome, Obedenaru since the summer of 1878, when Tornielli had the
function of General Secretary:
“[…] il nous faudra avoir à Bucarest une Légation digne de notre position en Europe, et digne de votre pays. L’importance du rôle que nous allons avoir, les uns comme les autres, exige que nous soyons représentés dignement, et je dirai même, avec une certaine splendeur. Sans être un État des plus riches, nous ne sommes pas dans la situation de l’Espagne. Nous aurons à Bucarest une Légation bien montée. […]”[95].
After laborious works of consolidation and restoration, the
Legation’s new residence would be officially inaugurated on March 14, 1885
through a great ball, in the presence of the King Charles I of Romania and of
more than 300 guests[96].
He was the one who also had the idea[97]
to nominate an Italian military attaché to Bucharest, since 1882. The proposal
was advanced for the same considerations regarding the Italian prestige and the
influence that it was supposed to have in Romania and implicit in the Balkans.
Tornielli was a tireless informer of Consulta about the Romanian realities that he explored in all the
details. He is the author a 532 pages synthesis entitled “Relazione del R. Ministro d’Italia in Romania per il biennnio 1882-83”[98],
a real treaty about the constitution of the Romanian independent state.
Structured in four chapter, dedicated to Romania’s international relationship,
the law activity, the country’s economic structure, the foresights on the
development, etc., the work was published on 1885 at the order of the Minister
of Foreign Affairs, Mancini, “pentru
valoarea sa
p. 426
intrinsecã
ºi pentru a fi oferitã ca model / for its intrinsic value and to be offered
as model” to the other diplomats[99].
Tornielli also noticed attentively the evolution of the Italian-Romanian
economic relationship, offering a great number of reports in the economic
field, almost all of them being published in Bolletino Consolare. Generally, he gave a special attention to the
economic matters, meaning to the development of this kind of relationship
between Italy and Romania. For example, he promoted the first contacts with Società Veneta per Imprese e Costruzioni
Pubbliche (Padua) and he facilitated this society’s subsequent presence on
the Romanian market in the field[100].
He also negotiated in 1887 the constitution of a regular service of commercial
and passenger traffic between Romania and Italy through the agency of Compagnia di Navigazione Generale Italiana[101].
As a recognition of his interest in the economic field and as a reward for the
work of documentation, he was decorated in 1886 with the silver medal with
honorable diploma by the Royal Ministry of Agriculture, Industry and Commerce[102].
As we said previously, his mission to Bucharest came to an
end on December 25, 1887. After the ‘exile’ spent in Romania, he finally
received an embassy, being sent to represent the Italian interests in Spain.
“Vidi Tornielli a Madrid.
Soddisfatto ma vedendo
sempre le cose di questo mondo
coll’occhio
del fegato”[103]!
For this material, permission is granted for electronic copying, distribution
in print form for educational purposes and personal use.
Whether you intend to utilize it in scientific purposes, indicate the
source: either this web address or the Annuario. Istituto Romeno di cultura
e ricerca umanistica 5 (2003), edited by ªerban Marin, Rudolf Dinu, Ion
Bulei and Cristian Luca, Bucharest, 2004
No permission is granted for commercial use.
© ªerban Marin, March 2004, Bucharest, Romania
Back
to Homepage Annuario 2003
[1] At least, this is
the portrait illustrated by Enrico Serra,
“I fondi archivistici sulla Romania esistenti presso il Ministero degli
Esteri”, Storia Contemporanea 11
(1980), 2: 312.
[2] For a concise analysis
regarding his diplomatic activity and emphasizing the period between 1894 and
1908, see Serra, “Giuseppe
Tornielli Brusati di Vergano”, Storia e
Politica 2 (1963): 336-363; idem,
La questione tunisina da Crispi a Rudini
ed il “colpo di timone” alla politica estera dell’Italia, Milan:
Giuffrè, 1967: 104-114, for the period when he functioned as Italian
Ambassador to London (1889-1894).
[3] Vittorio Spretti, Enciclopedia storico-nobiliare italiana, VI, Milan, 1929: 658 sqq.
[4] La formazione della diplomazia nazionale
(1861-1915). Repertorio bio-bibliografico dei funzionari del Ministero degli
Affari Esteri (a cura di Fabio Grassi),
Rome: Istituto Poligrafico e Zecca dello Stato, 1987: 721.
[5] Cf. ibidem: 719-721.
[6] Cf. Le scritture del Ministero degli Affari
Esteri del Regno d’Italia dal 1861 al 1887 (ed. by Ruggero Moscati), Rome: Tipografia riservata
del MAE, 1953: 14-15.
[7] Archivio Centrale dello Stato, Roma
[hereafter, ACS], Carte Depretis, busta 23, fasc. 81,
Tornielli to Depretis, Bucharest, July 18, 1882; Rudolf Dinu, “Note e documenti riguardanti la storia della Legazione
italiana a Bucarest, 1879-1914”, in Annuario.
Istituto Romeno di Cultura e Ricerca Umanistica 3 (2001): 284-286.
[8] Cf. Federico Chabod, Storia della politica estera italiana, II, Bari: Laterza, 1965:
594, 723-24; Le scritture del Ministero
degli Affari Esteri, cit.: 15; Rosaria Quartararo,
“L’Ambasciata di Londra: alcuni interpreti della politica estera italiana
(1861-1915)”, in La formazione della
diplomazia italiana, 1861-1915 (ed. by Laura Pilotti), Milan,
Franco Angeli, 1987: 586-623; Serra,
La questione tunisina…: 107; idem, Giuseppe Tornielli…: 339.
[9] Chabod, op. cit., II: 723-724: “Il Depretis,[…] forse anche preoccupato dell’insufficenza
del Melegari, ministro degli Esteri, e perciò deciso ad assumere nelle
sue mani la direzione effettiva della politica estera, si era risolto nell’estate, probabilmente sollecitato dalla
sua ninfa Egeria per i problemi internazionali, e vale a dire il Tornielli segretario
generale agli Esteri […] [emphasis mine]”.
[10] Cf. Stuart J. Woolf, “English Public Opinion and
Agostino Depretis”, The Journal of
Italian History, 2 (1979), 2: 218-231.
[11] Chabod, op. cit.: II, 594. “Uno stato di cose [il fatto che la politica estera restava nelle
mani della diplomazia piemonteze – n.n.], […] ch’era destinato a durare ancora assai a lungo, anche dopo la caduta
della Destra, con il Tornielli e il Maffei di Boglio – piemontesi entrambi
– veri ispiratori, dietro le spalle rispettivamente del Depretis e del Cairoli,
della politica internazionale dell’Italia dal ’76 all’81 [emphasis mine], sino a quando l’avvento del Mancini alla
Consulta non portò, per la prima volta, mentalità, preoccupazioni
e stile non piemontesi nella trattazione degli affari. […]”.
[12] Enrico Decleva, “Il compimento
dell’Unità e la politica estera”, in Storia
d’Italia, vol. II: Il nuovo stato e
la società civile, 1861-1887 (ed. by G. Sabbatucci and V. Vidotto),
Rome-Bari: Laterza, 1999:
169-170. “L’eventualità di un ingrandimento dell’Austria nei Balcani, e in
particolare in Bosnia-Erzegovina, aveva continuato nel frattempo a tenere in
allarme i governanti italiani, e in maniera più specifica Depretis che
nella sua seconda formazione ministeriale, costituita alla fine di dicembre
[1878 – emphasis mine] […] aveva assunto
direttamente gli Affari Esteri, continuando ad avvalersi della
colaborazione determinante di Tornielli [emphasis mine]. […]”. Cf. ibidem: 176.
[13] Archivio Storico Diplomatico del Ministero
degli Affari Esteri, Rome [hereafter, ASDMAE],
Carte Pansa, busta 5, Maffei to
Pansa, Rome, August 13, 1878.
[14] Cf. C. J. Lowe, F. Marzari, Italian
Foreign Policy, 1870-1940, London-Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985:
16.
[15] R. V. Bossy, Politica externã a României între anii 1873-1880 privitã de la Agenþia Diplomaticã din Roma, Bucharest, 1928: 150, no. XXXIX, Obedenaru to Kogãlniceanu, May 11, 1877.
[16] Cf. Chabod, op. cit.: II, 794, n. 441, Haymerle to Andrassy,
Rome, May 12, 1877; Bossy, op.
cit.: 182, no. LXV, Obedenaru to Kogãlniceanu, Rome, December
26, 1878: “Le Secrétariat Général a été confié au comte Tornielli, qui
a rempli les mêmes fonctions dans le précédent Cabinet Depretis. Comme
j’ai eu l’occasion de le dire déjà dans mes précédents rapports, M. Tornielli
est un homme d’état jeune, mais très-estimé, très autorisé. C’est
lui, on peut dire, qui a mené les affaires du temps que M. Melegari était
ministre […]”; Documents Diplomatiques
Français, 1871-1914 [hereafter, DDF],
series 1, II, Paris, 1930: 442, no. 387, Noailles, to the Minister of Foreign
Affairs, Waddington, Rome, February 28, 1879: “Cependant le comte Tornielli, qui paraît avoir des vues
particulières sur la direction de la politique italienne et qui
siège plus souvent au ministère des Affaires étrangères
que M. Depretis, retenu par les discussions de la Chambre et par les soins du
ministère de l’Intérieur, […]”. The manner in which Tornielli
understood to “inspire” the Italian foreign policy during the Oriental crisis
is clearly expressed by Maffei di Boglio in his presentation of the conflict
between Tornielli and Luigi Corti, in a letter to Alberto Pansa, on 1878, June
1: “Un altro motivo per cui Corti vuol assolutamente allontanare Tornielli
dalla Consulta prima della riunione del Congresso [di Berlino – n.n.], è
perché pretende che Tornielli sotto il Ministrero di Melegari e di Depretis ci
aveva posto a due dita di una guerra coll’Austria, spingendo il Regio Governo a
impedire l’annessione della Bosnia ed Erzegovina all’Austria, o almeno
protestare, per stabilire il principio che a noi dovrebbe essere accordato un
compenso [emphasis mine]. Corti invece
è fieramente opposto a questa politica, sia perché ha la convinzione che
tutta l’Europa, compresa la Germania, spinge l’Austria a ciò, sia perché
trova che una protesta da parte nostra, oltre al non aver alcun valore, ci
isolerebbe, porrebbe in rilievo la nostra debolezza e last not least ci
metterebbe in una posizione falsissima rispetto all’Austria. […]”. Cf. ASDMAE, Carte Pansa, busta 5: Maffei to
Pansa, Rome, June 1, 1878. Although somehow abrupt and subjective, the
presentation offered by the Marquis di Boglio emphasizes the essential of the
external strategy of the Depretis-Tornielli ‘tandem’ in 1877-1878. It means an ‘active’ policy of the
compensations, opposed to the passive one, “of the clean hands”, preferred by
the bynomous Cairoli-Corti. Some years later, Tornielli would assume the
responsability for the orientation given to the Italian external policy during
the Balkan crisis, considering it as the one that best represented the Italian
national interests: “Riflettiamo
che tutto ciò avvenne quando si aprì la quistione orientale. Si
poteva fare due politiche. Accettare tutto in pazienza, fare il morto, dire di
sì a qualunque cosa. Oppure procurare di mettere qualche freno al
precipitare degli avvenimenti orientali. Abbiamo preferito questa seconda
politica e se fosse da ricominciare, salvo, ben inteso, alcuni punti speciali,
io credo che chiunque seguirebbe le linee generali che furono da noi adottate.
Una maggiore arrendevolezza non avrebbe giovato. Ci avrebbero lasciati indietro
e forse il compimento dei disegni prestabiliti per compensare l’Austria,
sarebbe già avvenuto. Quale Ministero avrebbe d’altronde potuto battere
una via nella quale il paese avrebbe veduto avvenimenti di grande
gravità per la posizione relativa dell’Italia verso l’Austria, senza che
da noi si facesse pur cenno di resistenza? […]”. Cf. ASDMAE, Carte Pansa, busta 6; Dinu, loc. cit.: 280-283, Tornielli to Pansa, Bucharest, June 23, 1881.
Under the same circumstances, there are also to be remarked the critics that
Tornielli formulated on the policy of neutrality and balance promoted by the
Italian governments after the Union and that had the Italy’s isolation on the
international stage as result: “Se vogliamo essere giusti però, caro Pansa, dobbiamo riconoscere
che ciò che ci avvenne nel 1878 e ciò che accade attualmente non
è che la conseguenza della nostra politica di neutralità protratta
oltre il limite del necessario. Ella ha potuto seguire passo a passo il periodo
nel quale avremmo potuto mettere le basi di amicizie durature, di
intimità che ci avrebbero assicurato l’avvenire. Creda a me dopo il
viaggio di Berlino non siamo più stati in tempo. Abbiamo preso troppo
alla lettera la promessa cavouriana di voler essere elemento di pace e di
concordia. Non abbiamo riflettuto che per prendere la parte dell’amico di tutti
bisogna essere in grado di non avere bisogno di nessuno. Il posto che la natura
delle cose, che le circostanze stesse della Francia ci assegnavano, l’abbiamo
lasciato occupare da un altra potenza [Austria–Ungheria – n.n.] e per essa la Germania, d’allora in poi, ha
messo in non cale qualunque nostro interesse. […]”. Cf. ibidem. However, in the period there was
a part of his contemporary to consider him as responsible for such a finality.
Cf. Alessandro Guiccioli,
“Diario”, in Nuova Antologia, fasc. 1542, June
16, 1946: 433/439 – 7 ottobre 1880: “Gita
a Novara… Arrivo a Novara alle 5,30. Mi trovo all’albergo “Roma” con Sella,
Ricotti, Perazzi, Tornielli ecc… Lunga conversazione con Tornielli sulla
politica estera, che giudichiamo sotto punti di vista molto diversi. Io sono
convinto che la politica di isolamento e di sedicente libertà d’azione
sia fatale all’Italia. Egli al contrario crede alla così detta politica
di equilibrio e alla onnipotenza dell’azione diplomatica anche priva di
sanzioni materiali. Insomma egli segue la politica tradizionale del nostro Ministro
degli esteri. – 30 ottobre 1880: […] [Milano] Alla stazione incontro l’ambasciatore germanico von Keudell, che mi
parla della scarsa fiducia che l’Italia gode all’estero; egli l’attribuisce
alla politica indecisa e di vedute ristrette, che è inspirata da
Tornielli. Su questo punto devo, in cuor mio, dargli ragione”. For the
England’s fears concerning a possible motion in the Italian external policy
with regard to the Oriental question and particularly to the relationship with
Austria-Hungary once with the constitution of the Depretis government, and with
regard to the Tornielli’s position, see Maria Garbari,
“Un documento inglese sulla stipulazione della Triplice Alleanza”, in Universitã di Pavia,
Studi in onore di Federico Curato, I,
Milano: Franco Angeli, 1990: 345-349. “Il
Tornielli continuava a parlare di reali danni per l’Italia [nel caso in
quale l’Austria-Ungheria occupava la Bosnia –.n.n.], colpita nei suoi interessi adriatici, di reazioni popolari nel Regno,
di turbamento dell’ordine europeo …” [Paget to Derby, February 13 1877, FO
45 310]. “Più intransigente
appariva il Tornielli, deciso a prendere delle contromisure nel caso l’Austria
avesse messo in atto delle precauzioni militari sulla frontiera italiana e ad
evidenziare il ruolo assunto nel Regno dalla questione trentina” [Paget to
Derby, July 30, 1877, FO 45 314]; “Il
Paget notava che l’Austria pendeva sul segretario generale della Consulta [Tornielli
– n.n.] come un incubo!” [Paget to
Derby, October 8, 1877, FO 45 315].
[17] Cf. ASDMAE, Carte Pansa, busta 5: The
General Secretary of the Ministry of the Foreign Affairs, Maffei to Pansa,
Rome, June 1, 1878. “Frattanto Tornielli
fa sforzi sovraumani per rimanere. È andato dal Re, ha sedotto Cairoli,
il quale, come Ella sa, tiene ufficio alla Consulta, e da cui egli è
continuamente, a fierissimo dispetto di Corti. Infatti la lotta tra i due
è tremenda, e, davvero, mi reca meraviglia come un gentlman al par di
Tornielli si metta in tale posizione. Corti gli disse in, as many words, che o
l’uno o l’altro deve uscir dalla Consulta, e andò a rivangare le mille
amarezze di cui il cessato Ministero lo abbeverò [?] a Costantinopoli e
che tutte eran frutto delle insinuazioni di Tornielli [emphasis mine]. […] Del resto egli non teme opposizione da
Cairoli, il quale piegherebbe alle sollecitazioni di Tornielli piuttosto per
debolezza di carattere, che per qualunque altra ragione. […] Ora siccome le
idee di Tornielli sull’Italia irredenta concordano pur troppo con quelle sempre
propugnate da Cairoli e dal suo partito, Corti teme che, se non vi pone riparo,
vista massima la debolezza di carattere del Presidente del Consiglio
[Cairoli-n.n.], potrebbe succedere qualche grosso pasticcio [emphasis mine]. La morale di tutto questo è che i due
contendenti quasi non si rivolgono più la parola. È Malvano [the
Head of the Political Affairs Department – n.n.], che fa tutto, con grande ira di Tornielli il quale bestemmia contro
tale manomessione dei suoi diritti, ma non si decide ad … andarsene. […]”, ibidem: Maffei to Pansa, Rome, June 25,
1878: “Inoltre v’è la questione di
Tornielli. Io me lo sento alle costole con una tenacità che nulla
stancherà. Se dipendesse da me lo farei subito ambasciatore, senatore,
insomma tutto ciò che vorrebbe. Ma la cosa non dipende da me.
Capirà dunque, lasciando in disparte che il che ne risentirei, quanto la
mia posizione sarebbe ridicola se a novembre, tutti i posti essendo occupati,
colla caduta del Ministero dovessi cedere l’attuale mio ufficio di nuovo a
Tornielli o ad altrui. […]”.
[18] Ibidem.
[19] Bossy, op. cit.: 182, no. LXV, Obedenaru to the Minister
of Foreign Affairs, Rome, December 26, 1878, R. 779: “Il y a quelques jours, M. Maffei, Ministre d’Italie
à Athènes, Secrétaire Général des affaires étrangères dans
le Cabinet Cairoli, et qui m’avait dit en confidence, qu’il désirait la place
de Bucarest, - M. Maffei m’a fait savoir que, vers le mois d’août, M.
Tornielli avait demandé la place de Ministre plénipotentiaire à
Bucarest. M. Maffei est convaincu que si le Cabinet Depretis dure quelques mois
seulement, M. Tornielli sera envoyé chez nous à sa sortie du
ministère; si au contraire le Cabinet dure longtemps, M. Tornielli aura
acquis les titres suffisants pour ambitioner un poste encore plus élevé, comme
le serait celui de Constantinople, par exemple. Mais rien ne fait présager une
longue durée du Cabinet actuel. […]”. ASDMAE,
Carte Pansa, busta nr. 5: Maffei to Pansa, Rome, February 4, 1879: “Se la Rumenia fosse sul punto di essere
riconosciuta, mi darebbero, credo, senza troppe difficoltà la legazione
di Bucarest. Ma essa potrebbe eventualmente anche servire di comodino a
Tornielli […]”.
[20] ACS, Carte Depretis, busta 23, fasc. 81;
Museo Centrale del Risorgimento-Roma [MCR-Roma], Archivio Mancini, b. 698, fasc. 11, 2; Dinu, loc. cit.:
287-288, Tornielli to Depretis, Rome, March 23, 1883.
[21] MAE, Ministero, Ambasciate, Legazioni e
Consolati. Agenti diplomatici e consolari degli Stati esteri in Italia, 15
aprile 1882, Rome: Tipografia del Ministero degli Affari Esteri, 1882: 79.
[22] ACS, Carte Depretis, busta 23, fasc. 81:
Rome, March 23, 1883: “L’importanza di
quella residenza è determinata dalle nostre relazioni con i Grandi Stati
limitrofi della Rumania. […]”
[23] Bossy, op. cit.: 182, no. LXV: December 26, 1878: “L’été dernier, j’ai eu plusieurs conversations avec
le comte [Tornielli – n.n]. Il m’a parlé
du beau rôle que l’Italie va avoir en Europe, maintenant que par le traité de
Berlin, le parti rétrograde a eu le dessus en Europe. Puisque la France se
tient à l’écart, pense le comte, c’est à l’Italie à
prendre en main la cause du parti libéral européen et, pour l’avenir, la
Roumanie est destinée à devenir l’associée de l’Italie, en Orient. Le
comte s’est longuement étendu sur le beau rôle qu’aura notre pays et sur
l’importance de la future légation italienne à Bucarest. Il m’a pour
ainsi dire exposé une profession de foi du futur Ministre d’Italie chez nous.
[…]”.
[24] In November 1879,
when he was already in Belgrade, he required for Agostino Depretis’ assistance
in order to be nominated, even temporarily, in a residence correspondent to his
‘fame’ and to the services that he was able to accomplish.: “Le assicuro che quando mi domando se proprio sono
diventato buono a null’altro che a firmare qualche passaporto e qualche
richiesta di ospedale in questa piccola cancelleria, mi sento perdere di animo.
Non potrebbe il Ministero utilizzare meglio la mia buona volontà e
quella poca notorietà che pure si accorda al mio nome all’estero? Non
potrei, per esempio, se non si nomina subito l’Ambasciatore a Parigi, essere
mandato a reggere quel posto? Mi pare di essere capace di qualche miglior
servizio di quelli che rendo nella posizione alla quale mi ha condanato la
politica del Gabinetto Cairoli no. 2. […]”. Cf. ACS, Carte Depretis, busta 23, fasc. 81:
Tornielli to Depretis, Belgrade, November 27, 1879.
[25] Biblioteca Naþionalã [hereafter, BN], Bucharest, mss., Fond Brãtianu, file 526: 1-4, Obedenaru to Ion C. Brãtianu, Constantinople, November 25/December 7, 1879.
[26] ASDMAE, Carte Pansa, busta 6: Tornielli
to Pansa, Bucharest, December 30, 1879.
[27] In connection to
this argument, there is a consistent number of ancient and new studies, which
clarify the discussion to a significant extent. One of the most pertinent
analyses belongs to Domenico Caccamo,
“L’Italia, la questione d’Oriente e l’indipendenza romena nel carteggio del
consolato italiano a Bucarest (1870-1879)”, Storia
e Politica 18 (1979), 1: 65-124. See also Dinu,
loc. cit.: 225-236.
[28] Cf. DDF, 1, II: 466-68, n. 403,
Saint-Vallier to Wadington, Berlin, April 4, 1879. “Quant à l’Italie, a ajouté M. de Bülow, sa conduite nous est
fort indifférente et nous n’avons aucune intention d’agir pour tenter de la lui
faire modifier; elle nous avait abandonnés une première fois
[novembre 1878 – n.n]; nos observations
l’ont fait venir à résipiscence; elle se disposé à déserter de
nouveau la cause du Droit et de l’exécution du Traité; grand bien lui fasse et
qu’elle agisse comme elle le voudra; nous attachons un prix considérable
à mantenir notre communauté de vues avec la France et l’Angleterre, mais
nous n’avons pas grand souci de ce que fera le Gouvernement actuel de l’Italie,
ne pouvant plus avoir confiance dans une politique sans cesse flottante, agitée
et prête à obéir à tous les courants où l’entraînent
des ambitions peu avouables, des rêves d’influence exagérée, des
défiances et des jalousies passionnées contre l’Autriche, et, pour tout résumer
d’un mot, un désir singulièrement vif de jouer un rôle retentissant sans
l’énergie ni moyens de le remplir. Je vous dirai même confidentiellement
à ce sujet que j’ai dû relever vivement, il y a quelques jours,
une note dont M. le comte de Launay avait pour instruction de me donner lecture
et de me laisser copie; cette note, relative à la question qui nous
occupe, avait pour objet de m’annoncer l’intention du Cabinet de Rome de nous
fausser compagnie et de reconnaître l’indépendance roumaine; rien à dire
jusque-là, mais, pour justifier sa résolution, M. Depretis n’avait-il
jugé à propos de qualifier de conduite injuste notre attitude dans
l’affaire roumaine; j’ai trouvé que ce n’était pas là un terme
acceptable et je l’ai nettement déclaré à M. de Launay en refusant la
copie qu’il voulait me laisser; […]”.
[29] BOSSY, op. cit.: 189-90, no. LXXII, Obedenaru
to Câmpineanu, Rome, April 16, 1879. “Le
comte Tornielli m’a envoyé avant hier deux de ses cartes de visites, bien qu’il
n’eût pas de visite récente à me rendre. Le Secrétaire général
donnait à entendre qu’il désirait me parler. […] J’ai donc été le voir au ministère. Il
me dit en substance: ‘…Nous avons fait des démarches comme vous le savez, mais
les autres Cabinets se refusent à nous suivre; on allègue que,
pendant que la Serbie s’est prononcée d’une manière franche et nette, le
gouvernement roumain a hesité, a tergiversé’. […] Pour pouvoir, continua le comte, revenir à la charge, comme nous
le désirons, auprès des autres cabinets, il faut que nous ayons un
document, une déclaration, quelque chose sur quoi nous baser, par quoi
justifier nos nuovelles démarches”. According to the same Obedenaru,
Tornielli, on the opposite to the other decision making factors from Consulta, seems to be not receptive to
the Israelite Alliance’s interventions for the civic and political emancipation
of their religious fellowes in Romania: “J’ai
parlé au Secrétaire Général du scandale causé par les juifs à Jassy. Le
comte m’a dit que si l’Alliance israélite envoie une lettre au Cabinet italien,
la pièce ira rejoindre les nombreuses autres lettres qui dorment dans
les cartons. […]”. ibidem: 189,
no. LXXI, Obedenaru to Câmpineanu, Rome, April 6 1879.
[30] Even subsequently
to this date, both in the private correspondence to Pansa and Depretis and in
the official one to Cairoli, Tornielli would continue to be in favor of what he
considered as “un atto
di giustizia e di buona politica”, that is the immediate
recognition of the Romanian independence. Cf. ASDMAE, Carte Pansa, busta 6; Dinu, loc. cit.: 267, 269-270, Tornielli to Pansa, Novara, August 5,
1879; Tornielli to Pansa, Belgrade, October 3, 1879; ACS, Carte Depretis, busta 23, fasc. 81; Dinu, loc. cit.:
270-274: Tornielli to Depretis,
Belgrade, November 4, 1879: “L’interesse che noi abbiamo a rinvigorire la nostra influenza in questi
paesi è tale che io non comprendo come a Roma non si sia ancora pensato
a riconoscere la Rumania. […]”; Tornielli to Depretis,
Belgrade, November 27, 1879: “Alla
Consulta si persiste nel non mandarmi a Bukarest, ho creduto dunque mio dovere
di esporre in termini molto chiari tutto il danno che può risultare
agl’interessi del nostro paese dalla politica seguita verso la Rumania. […]
Anche il poco di bene che può aver
prodotto la mia presenza in questo paese [Serbia – n.n.] svanisce poiché qui si osserva come l’Italia
trascura le simpatie dei Rumeni e le pospone ad un’interesse rispetabilissimo,
ma che non è di vero ordine politico, bensì di ordine morale e
sociale. […]”.
[31] Cf. ibidem, Archivio dell’Ufficio del Personale,
serie VII, T 1: Fava to Cairoli, Bucharest, December 16, 1879, 4,30 p.m. The
diplomatic agent in Roma, Esarcu had recommended that the gratitude of Romania
for “the beauty of the friendly gesture of Italy” to be manifested through a
warmy receiving organized for the Italian Extraordinary Envoyee, cfr. Bossy, op. cit.: 93, Esarcu to Boerescu, Rome, December 15, 1879. However,
due to an inexact interpretation given to a Consulta’s
telegramm on December 11, 1879 that recommended the avoiding of the noisy
manifestations, the arrival of the Italian minister to Bucharest in the evening
of December 15, 1879 would be completely ignored by the Romanian authorities!
Cfr. ASDMAE, DP [hereafter, DP], Rapporti in arrivo,
Romania, busta 1396: R. nr. 1, Tornielli to Cairoli, Bucharest, December 19,
1879; ibidem, Copialettere in partenza,
Romania, registro nr. 1202: D. nr. 4, the General Secretary to the Minister of
Foreign Affairs, Maffei, to Tornielli, Rome, January 4, 1880.
[32] Ibidem, Divisione Politica,
Rapporti
in arrivo, Romania, busta 1396: Tornielli to Cairoli,
Bucharest, December 19, 1879. He would present the retiring letters to His
Majesty King Charles I on Thursday, January 7/19, 1888, in an official
audience, cf. Arhiva Ministerului
Afacerilor Externe [hereafter, AMAE], Bucharest, Fond 11 – Reprezentanþi strãini, Tornielli Brusati Giuseppe, T1.
[33] Cf. Monitorul Oficial al României, December
21, 1879/January 2, 1880: 8063.
[34] Cf. Serra, “Giuseppe Tornielli…”: 344; La formazione…Repertorio: 719.
[35] ASDMAE, Carte Pansa, busta 6: Tornielli
to Pansa, Novara, August 5, 1879.
[36] Cf. Glauco Licata, Notabili della terza Italia. In appendice, carte di Savago Raggi e
altri inediti, Rome: Cinque Lune, no year: 255/264.
[37] ASDMAE, Carte Pansa, busta 5: Guiccioli
to Pansa, Rome, December 19, 1879. “Ti
scrivo a Belgrado perché leggo nei giornali che il fiero Brusati è
già arrivato in Rumania. Mi felicito coi Rumeni! […]”.
[38] Domenico Farini, Diario di fine secolo, II, Rome, 1962: 1318/1523.
[39] A. Sandonà, L’Irredentismo nelle lotte politiche e nelle contese diplomatiche
italo-austriache, III, Bologna: N. Zanichelli, 1938: 116-117, Ludolf to
Kalnoky, Rome, May 30, 1883.
[40] Cf. I documenti
diplomatici italiani [hereafter, DDI], 2, XVII-XVIII: 520, no. 542, De
Launay to Di Robilant, Berlin, November 28, 1884.
[41] At least, this was
the opinion of Cairole in December 1879. Cf. ibidem, 2, XII: 391, n. 499, Cairoli to Di Robilant, Rome, December
21, 1879.
[42] Eliza Brãtianu, “Aºa i-am cunoscut”, Magazin istoric 26 (1992), 11: 54. “Contele Tornielli […] era un om rece ºi tãcut, foarte apreciat de
tatãl meu [Alexandru ªtirbey – n.n.]. Contesa,
soþia sa, era rusoaicã, vorbãreaþã, amabilã, iubea dansul ºi nu se plicitisea
la Bucharest, unde bunii dansatori erau numeroºi ºi balurile se þineau lanþ. […]
/ The Count Tornielli [...] was a cool
and silent person, very appreciated by my father [Alexandru ªtirbey – n.n.].
His wife, the Countess, was Russian, talkative, kind, she loved dancing and was
not bored in Bucharest, where the great dancers were numerous and the balls
were ceaseless. [...]”.
[43] Cf. Serra, La questione tunisina…: 107.
[44] ASDMAE, DP, Rapporti in arrivo, Romania,
busta 1396 and Rudolf Dinu, Ion Bulei, 35 anni di relazioni italo-romene, 1879-1914. Documenti diplomatici
italiani, [35 anni] Bucharest,
Univers Enciclopedic, 2001: 59-60, no. 10, Tornielli to Cairoli, Bucharest,
December 19, 1879.
[45] Serra, Giuseppe Tornielli…: 340-341.
[46] On April 1880, the
energetic manner that he used to make a protest to the Romanian authorities –
as a consequence of an aggression against one of his servants – was considered
by the Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Vasile Boerescu, as “dangerous”
and unfit for a diplomat: “Un domestique du comte Tornielli s’est
battu hier soir à la sortie du théatre avec un cocher. A propos de cet
incident le comte prend une attitude, il tient un langage qui ne s’accordent
pas trop avec le caractère d’un diplomat. Il fait presque des menaces
dans une note qu’il m’envoie. […] Veuillez
attirer officieusement l’attention du ministre sur cet incident et faire
conseiller au comte un peu plus de calme et de sang froid; car il ne se trouve
pas ici dans un pays d’orient habitue à de pareilles vices nerveuses”.
AMAE, Italia, 1880-1884, vol. 263: 13, Boerescu to the Romanian
Minister in Rome, Kretzulescu, T. cifr. nr. 5048, Bucharest, March 26/April 7,
1880. In truth, the Italian diplomat’s attitude had been to a significant
extent dictated precisely by the ’Levantine’ attitude of the Romanian Minister
of Foreign Affairs, which was to hush up the incident in intention, without any
explanation. ASDMAE, Rapporti in arrivo, Romania, busta 1396: Tornielli to Cairoli, Bucharest, April 10, 1880; Boerescu to
Tornielli, Bucharest, April 12, 1880; Tornielli to Cairoli, Bucharest, April
13, 1880.
[47] Arhiva Naþionalã Istoricã Centralã,
Bucharest [hereafter, ANIC], Casa Regalã, dosar 12/1881 [Austrian
Diplomatic Correspondence – CDA]:
91-93, Bericht n° 61 A-F, Hoyos to Haymerle, Bucharest, May 25, 1881: “Nach den seither eingezogenen Erkundigungen
war eine Anfrage ob ein Special-Gesandter genehm wäre eigentlich nur von der
serbischen Regierung anher gerichtet worden. Mein italienischer Collega hatte
allerdings vor einigen Wochen, wie er mir sagte, aus seiner eigenen Initiative,
angefragt, ob man die Entsendung von Krönungs-Botschaftern oder Gesandten erwarte
und die verneinende Antwort an seine Regierung berichtet. […] Der Abgesandte Seiner K. und K.
Apostolischen Majestät wurde während der Krönungsfeierlichkeit auf der für das
diplomatische Corps errichteten Tribüne placirt und ihm bei dieser Gelegenheit
der Vorgang vor den ständigen Vertretern eingeräumt. War Graf Tornielli schon
über diese vermeintlische Zurücksetzung sehr verstimmt so erreichte seine
Erregtheit den höchsten Grad als er sobald wir uns im Palais versammelt hatten
sah dass Feldmarschall-Lieutenant Bauer von Ihren Majestäten in einem
abgesonderten Gemache und vor dem diplomat. Corps empfangen werden sollte. Er
protestirte beim Hofmarschall und auch bei mir als dem doyen des diplomatischen
Körpers gegen diese Anordnung und da natürlich seiner Einsprache nicht Rechnung
getragen werden konnte indem der König selbst diesen modus festgesetzt hatte,
so verliess der italienische Gesandte seinen Platz und stellte sich am andern
Ende des Saales nach dem jüngsten Geschäftsträger auf, mit dem Bemerken dass an
dem königl. Rumänischen hofe keine Rangordnung mehr existire. Graf Tornielli
kam noch im Laufe desselben Tages zu mir um mir sein Bedauern zu geben dass der
Incidenzfall sich gerade wegen des Abgesandten Seiner K. und K. Apostolischen
Majestät ergeben habe und die Versicherung beizufügen dass er dem Vertreter
einer jaden anderen Macht unter denselben Verhältnissen ebenfalls das Recht des
Vortrittes abgesprochen hätte. …Die meisten meiner Collegen, selbst diejenigen
welche dem Grafen Tornielli im fond nicht unrecht geben, sind der Ansicht, dass
er in der Form gefehlt habe, da er durch das Verlassen seines Platzes und durch
die mit grosser Heftigkeit vorgebrachte Protestation sich einer Unhöflichkeit
gegen der König schuldig gemacht hat”. Cf. also ASDMAE, DP, Rapporti in arrivo, Romania, busta 1397, 35 anni…: 105, no. 55, Tornielli to
Cairoli, Bucharest, May 26, 1881.
[48] In the period, this
characterization was often completed by another one, of philo-French: “sviscerato francofilo”, according to
Domenico Farini, or “lustra scarpe della
Francia”, as Quintino Sella names him! Cf. Farini, op. cit.:
II, 1523; ASDMAE, Carte Pansa, busta
6; Dinu, loc. cit.: 280-83, Tornielli to Pansa, Bucharest, June 23, 1881.
[49] A great part of the
historiography regards him as Philo-Russian, namely a supporter of the policy
of friendship/alliance with Russia since the period of the Oriental crisis,
when he functioned as General Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Cf.
G. Salvemini, La politica estera dell’Italia, 1871-1915,
Florence, 1950: 39-42; W. Langer,
“The European Powers and the French occupation of Tunis”, American Historical Review 21 (1925-1926): 62; Carlo Giglio, “Il secondo gabinetto Depretis
e la crisi balcanica”, Rivista Storica
Italiana 67 (1955), 1: 185-186; Chabod,
op. cit., I: 532. “All’altra estremità
dell’Europa, la Russia. Era lontana, geograficamente; perciò, le due
nazioni non potevano farsi ‘né molto bene, né molto male’, annotava il Nigra,
ambasciatore a Pietroburgo. C’era stato sì, fra il ’76 e l’80, in un
periodo di asprezze italo-austriache, come un serrarsi di rapporti, tanto da
far spesso favoreggiare, nella stampa italiana e straniera, di segreti accordi
e addirittura di alleanza italo-russa, di cui sarebbe stato propugnatore il
Tornielli [emphasis mine]. [...]”
[50] Cf. Serra, La questione tunisina…: 107-108.
[51] Cf. ASDMAE, Carte Pansa, busta 5: Maffei to
Pansa, Rome, June 1, 1878, cit.
[52] ANIC, Microfilme, England, R. 124, Public Record Office, Foreign Office [PRO.FO], 104/8: 304-306, White to Salisbury, Bucharest, December 18, 1879. “Count Tornielli presented
this morning his Credentials as Envoy Extraordinary and Minister
Plenipotentiary to Prince Charles I. […] His well know anti-Germanian
proclivities and the pro Russian party including Baron Fava, the last Italian
Representative here, are making capital out of the Railway Question to increase
the existing animosity against Austria leads people here to suppose that
Russian influence has brought about the separation of Italy from the other
three Powers on the question of recognition. […]”.
[53] ASDMAE, Carte Blanc, busta 1, cartella
29: Tornielli to Blanc, London, October 2, 1894.
[54] BN, mss., Fond Brãtianu, dosar 526: 1-4, Obedenaru to Ion C. Brãtianu, Constantinople, November 25/December 7, 1879.
[55] DDI, 2, XII: 371, nr. 479, Di Robilant
to Cairoli, Vienna, December 15, 1879.
[56] Ibidem: 391, nr. 499, Cairoli to Di
Robilant, Rome, December 21, 1879.
[57] The expression
belongs to Federico Chabod, who uses it when defines a great Italian diplomat,
that is, Costantino Nigra. Cf. Chabod,
op. cit.: II, 674-675.
[58] Annuario Diplomatico del Regno d’Italia per
l’anno 1886, Rome: Ippolito Sciolla, 1886: 173.
[59] For this argument,
see G. O. Griffith, Mazzini profeta di una nuova Europa,
Bari, 1935: passim; Chabod, op. cit.: I, 525-526.
[60] BN, mss., Fond Brãtianu, file 526: 1-4, Constantinople, November 25/December 7, 1879, cit.
[61] ACS, Carte Depretis, busta 23, fasc. 81:
Tornielli to Depretis, Belgrad, November 4, 1879.
[62] DDI, 2, XII: 636, nr. 783, Tornielli to
Cairoli, Bucharest, March 25, 1880.
[63] ASDMAE, DP, Rapporti in arrivo, Romania,
busta 1396: ciphered report [attached to political R. no. 65], Tornielli to
Cairoli, Bucharest, July 30, 1880. Also, according to the ciphered appendix of
the same political R. no. 65, ibidem:
“Je prie V. E. de vouloir bien se faire soumettre mon
dernier rapport ciffré. Je l’ai écrit après avoir eu une longue audience
du prince régnant qui dignait s’exprimer de façon à ne point me laisser
de doute au sujet de ce que j’avance à l'égard des agissements
autrichiens en Roumanie. […] En
parlant de l'influence que les intérêts réunis des États Balcaniques
pourraient avoir à un moment donné, S. A. Royale m'a dit que, toute
modestie à part, la Roumanie étant le seul des trois États qui puissent
se vanter de posséder une vraie armée, s'est à elle que devrait
appartenir la direction des intérêts de la ligue [emphasis mine]. Ceci m’a
surtout démontré que l’on ne s’est pas encore engagé ici avec l’Autriche et
l’Allemagne aussi loin que bien de monde le pense. Faisons nous de notre
côté quelque chose pour détourner le danger de l’occupation autrichienne dans
d’autres provinces ottomanes. En est-il encore temps
[emphasis mine]”. It is also to be mentioned that he would make a
proposal to the Ministry, in order to assure a clearer coherence of the Italian
policy in the Southeastern Europe, meaning his simultaneous activity as
Plenipotentiary Minister both to Belgrade and Bucharest: “Nel mio rapporto sopra i due posti, Bukarest-Belgrado, credo che
persisterò nella mia idea che convenga, in certe circostanze, tener
riunite le due legazioni sotto un solo titolare, che però abbia obbligo
effettivo di avere due residenze. Mi pare che la presenza a Belgrado di un
Ministro, fruit sec de la carrière, per tutto l’anno serva a nulla e che valga assai meglio che il
Ministro soggiorni tre mesi dell’anno a Belgrado ed a Bukarest il rimanente. Un
buon Segretario che lo surroghi, alternandosi nei due posti, un Segretario di
seconda classe o un’Addetto che lo segua e il personale di cancelleria stabile
nelle due residenze basterebbero al buon andamento che avrebbe allora una certa
unità d’indirizzo ed anche maggiore significazione politica. […]”. ASDMAE, Carte Pansa, busta 6; Dinu, loc. cit.: 276, Tornielli to Pansa, Bucharest, December 30, 1879.
[64] ASDMAE, Carte Pansa, busta 6: Tornielli to Pansa, Belgrad, October 3, 1879. This idea seemed to be one of his diplomatic strategy’s coordinate. He would go back on it later, exposing it in 1886, in the context of the Rumelian crisis, in a particular letter to the General Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Capelli, condemning at the same time the policy of indifference promoted by Consulta in the relationship with the Balkan states: “È curiosa l’idea del riserbo adottato da noi verso i piccoli Stati balcanici. L’Italia, che non è ancora un’aquila ma un aquilotto, dovrebbe, secondo Tornielli, circondarsi, a sua difesa, di paseri. […]”. Cf. DDI, 2, XX: 147, no. 144, Capelli to Di Robilant, Rome, September 30, 1886. Some years later, in 1891, after a meeting with the Romanian King, Charles I, at Pallanza, he would go even farther, suggesting the conclusion of an alliance with Romania to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Di Rudini: “Mi permetto […] d’indicarle che, nelle conversazioni che ho avuto col Re […], mi sono formato l’idea che per noi vi sarebbe forse l’occasione di conseguire dalla Rumania un impegno per l’eventuale sua azione, comune alla nostra in certe eventualità. Tale impegno accrescerebbe il peso della nostra cooperazione in Oriente, perché ormai la Rumania, dal punto di vista militare, non è quantità trascurabile. Nutro opinione che il Re Carlo s’indurrebbe a fare qualche cosa con noi piuttosto che con l’Austria o l’Inghilterra. La nostra posizione in questo gruppo sarebbe molto più forte se con noi conducessimo i rumeni”; ibidem, 2, XXIV: 369, no. 449, Tornielli to Di Rudini, Novara, September 22, 1891. Obviously, it demonstrates that he had no idea about the Italian-Romanian alliance treaty concluded on May 9, 1888.
[65] Cf. DDI, 2, XIV: 67-68, no. 71, Di Robilant
to the General Secretary of the Ministry of the Foreign
Affairs,
Blanc, Vienna, June 30, 1881; ibidem:
109, no. 119, Mancini to Tornielli, Rome, July 28, 1881. Actually, his
anti-Austrian attitude was considered as one of the main obstacles against an
Italian-Austrian approach by the Italian Ambassador to Vienna, Di Robilant:
“[…] a cosa serve ch’io mi adoperi qui a
riavvicinare i due paesi, mentre… a Bucarest chi rappresenta il governo
italiano [Tornielli] si direbbe non si fa altro studio se non di
metterci male coll’Austria”, cf. Chabod,
op. cit.: II, 769, note 286, Di
Robilant to Nigra, Vienna, July 2, 1881.
[66] Cf. DDI, 2, XVII-XVIII: 171, no. 170,
Mancini to Di Robilant, Rome, April 15, 1884.
[67] ASDMAE, Carte Pansa, busta 1, Diario, II: “Domenica, 31 dicembre: Lettera contessa Tornielli. Sera White. Finito
il 1882, di cui non me lagno. D’accordo con Tornielli per disapprovare la
Triplice Alleanza: 1° Perché giunta troppo tardi. Se a suo tempo poteva
prevenire il disastro di Tunisi, essa non serve ora che nominalmente a
proteggerci dal pericolo che non esiste di una supposta aggressione francese; 2°
perché ci espone così inutilmente ai danni di un guasto colla Francia
colla quale l’Italia non può mantenersi in ostilità
permanente [emphasis mine]; 3° perché il
giorno in cui fossimo invitati a marciare in nome del casus foederis, non si marcierà [sic!]; e ciò con danno della nostra
reputazione.”
[68] ACS, Carte Depretis, busta 23, fasc. 81:
Tornielli to Depretis, Bucharest, May 23, 1883.
[69] DDI, 2, XV-XVI: 679-80, nr. 703,
Galvagna to Di Robilant, Vienna, October 2, 1883 (appendix to the letter the
Count Robilant to Mancini, Turin, October 6, 1883).
[70] “Des préjugés existaient contre lui. Dans les
premiers temps de son séjour à Bucharest, il les avait en quelque sorte
justifiés, à tel point qu’un jour le Ministre de Roumanie vint chez moi,
au nom de son Souverain, pour me signaler les allures de notre représentant qui
favorisait la politique russe, et se montrait anti-autrichien. Je gardais ces
détails par devers moi, car il me répugne de faire tort même à
ceux qui n’usent pas envers moi de bons procédés, et à plus fort raison
pour ceux qui comme Tornielli m’ont témoigné du bon vouloir. Je répondais
à Mr. Liteano que mieux valait fermer les yeux, que mon collègue
quand il se serait mieux orienté, prendrait une autre attitude. En effet depuis
lors le Gouvernement Roumain non seulement n’a pas élevé des plaintes, mais
rendait de justes éloges. […]”. Cf. ACS,
Carte Crispi, busta 72, fasc. 107: De Launay to Barilari, Berlin, June 15,
1887.
[71] DDI, 2, XVII-XVIII: 244, no. 251, De
Launay to Mancini, Berlin, June 13, 1884.
[72] Cf. Sandonà, op. cit., III: 116-118. ACS,
Carte Depretis, busta 23, fasc. 81: Tornielli to Di
Robilant, Rome, March 22, 1883; Di Robilant to Tornielli, Vienna, March 23,
1883. DDI, 2, XIX: 4, no. 2, De
Launay to Di Robilant, Berlin, June 29, 1885. “A propos de Tornielli dont le nom était mis en avant pour recueillir la
succession Mancini, ici les journaux la Post et le Kreuzzeitung lui
donnent déjà une boule noire. Le Morning Post de Londres, un des organes prétendus de lord Salisbury, émit l’espoir qu’il
n’en sera rien de cette candidature. Je m’abstiens d’écrire là-dessus
à Rome. On n’a pas demandé mon avis, et d’ailleurs je ne voudrais pas
nuire à Tornielli dont je reconnais volontiers certaines bonnes
qualités. Je pense que c’est un fonctionnaire qu’il faut tenir en réserve pour
l’avenir après qu’il aura occupé quelques postes plus en évidence que
celui de Bucarest”; ibidem, 2,
XX: 618, no. 647, T. f.n., De Launay to Di Robilant, Berlin, April 5, 1887.
[73] Cf. Dinu, loc. cit.: 243-244 and note 67.
[74] Cf. supra, note 17.
[75] For some
considerations about “la debolezza di
carattere” of the President of the Council, Benedetto Cairoli, see the
correspondence of his fellow-worker, Maffei di Boglio. Cf. ASDMAE, Carte Pansa,
busta no. 5: Maffei to Pansa, Rome, June 1 1878, cit.
[76] For some extremely
negative considerations about the Marquis Alberto Maffei di Boglio, see the
“Memoirs” of the diplomat Salvago Raggi, who was in his subordination at Madrid
in 1890. Cf. Licata, Notabili della terza Italia. In appendice,
carte di Savago Raggi e altri inediti, Rome: Cinque Lune, f.a.: 264 sqq.: “Maffei era un ‘vieux beau’; intelligenza, zero. […] Esitava nel paralre, e un breve mugolio
rivelava lo sforzo per trovare la parola desiderata anche nei discorsi
più banali… Il concetto che Maffei aveva della importanza della sua
posizione era grande e non meno grande era la coscienza della sua
incapacità, perciò ogni suo atto richiedeva tutta la sua
attenzione… […]”!
[77] For this matter,
see cf. Antonello Biagini,
“L’Italia e la delimitazione del confine in Dobrugia”, in Risorgimento. Italia e Romania, 1859-1879. Esperienze a confronto (Atti
del Convegno Internazionale 'Italia e Romania dal 1859 al 1878. Unità
nazionale e politca europea', Milano, 2-3 luglio 1979) (ed. by Giulia Lami), Bucharest: Anima, 1992: 85-114.
[78] Cf. ªerban Rãdulescu-Zoner, “La souveraineté de la
Roumanie et le problème du Danube après le Congrès du
Berlin”, Revue des études sud-est
européennes 9 (1971), 1: 152 sqq; G. N. Cãzan,
“La question du Danube et les relations roumano-austro-hongroises dans les
années 1878-1883”, Revue roumaine
d’histoire 18 (1979), 1: 43-61.
[79] ASDMAE, DP, Rapporti in arrivo, România,
busta 1397, 35 anni: 99-100,
Tornielli to Cairoli, Bucharest, April 4, 1881.
[80] ASDMAE, DP, Rapporti in arrivo, România,
busta 1397: Tornielli to Cairoli, Bucharest, March 26, 1881.
[81] ANIC, Fond Kreþulescu, file 122: 22-23,
R. 221, Obedenaru to Boerescu, Rome, August 19/31, 1880; ibidem, file
125: 6-7, [Kreþulescu] to Boerescu, Rome, [November 24/December 6], 1880.
[82] ANIC, Fond Kreþulescu, file 122: 22-23,
R. 221, minutes, Obedenaru to Boerescu, Rome, August 19/31 1880. “Dans le numéro du 15 Août, le
Diritto publiait un entrefilet, provenant
de Mr. Malvano, où on lisait: ‘L’Italie ayant autorisé son délégué qui
siège dans le Comité d’études, non seulement à accepter le projet
de réglement, mais même les amendements proposés par le Commissaire
austro-hongrois, se trouve déjà tenue liée (vincolata) d’accepter
l’intervention et la présidencede l’Autriche au sein de la Comission exécutive.
L’Italie n’a jamais pensé à attenuer l’efficacité de son approbation
(consenso) qu’elle a du reste elle même prêtée (promise) par
anticipation’. […] Dans le numéro
d’hier soir du Diritto, le souffleur
officiel dit: ‘1° Il n’est pas encore démontré que les questions préliminaires
et les questions de forme – dont il a apparu tout un nuage autour des affaires
danubiennes – soient écartées et résolues en temps utile de façon à ce
que la Commission puisse affronter les questions de premier ordre dans sa
prochaine session d’automne. 2° Il ne nous semble pas convenable de manifester
l’opinion du Gouvernement (à supposer que cette opinion nous soit
connue) relativement à l’affaire qui probablement sera l’objet
ultérieurement d’une échange d’idées. Dans cette affaire il y a une chose
à laquelle nous devons tenir surtout, c’est que, pour Italie, la liberté
du vote ne soit pas diminuée par des manifestations intempestives’. Ainsi,
Monsieur le Ministre, le 15 Août on fait dire à l’organe officieux
que l’Italie a déjà promis … de soutenir les prétentions de l’Autriche.
Le 31 Août, on fait dire que l’Italie garde sa liberté d’action, qu’elle
ne doit pas engager son vote par des manifestations anticipées et
intempestives. Dans les quinze jours il a dû se passer quelque chose.
Ou bien Mr. le Comte Tornielli, qui craint l’Autriche pardessus tout, aura
réussi à faire dévier le Cabinet de Rome du chemin qu’il avait pris; ou
bien le Cabinet italien, après mûre réflexion, s’est convaincu
qu’il était intempestif d’appuyer les désirs de l’Autriche avec empressement,
lorsque peut-être les intérêts italiens exigeraient par la suite
une autre attitude [emphasis mine]. Ou
bien encore, l’Italie, avant de donner son vote à l’Autriche,
voudra-t-elle obtenir de cette dernière un avantage quelconque en
échange”.
[83] Ibidem, file
125: 6-7, R. (minutes), [Kreþulescu] to Boerescu, Roma, [November 24/December
6] 1880. “Je viens vous rendre compte des conversations que je
viens d’avoir avec M. le Comte Tornielli et avec M. Cairoli, Ministre des
affaires étrangères. M. Tornielli est venu me voir. Il m’a dit
s’être rencontré à Belgirate (Haute-Italie) avec M. Cairoli,
où se trouvait aussi le Comte de Launay, Ambassadeur d’Italie à
Berlin. ‘Nous étions là le pour et le contre [ss. orig], dit le Comte Tornielli; car M. de Launay avait été influencé par les
idées du Cabinet de Berlin en cette affaire. Nous avons longuement parlé en
présence de M. Cairoli. J’ai vu que M. de Launay a été presque convaincu que la
Roumanie a le droit de son côté. J’ai surtout insisté sur ce point: le traité
de Berlin reconnaît une commission européenne générale, celle qui date du
traité de Paris, et une commission riveraine à réunir en temps opportun…
Si les Puissances veulent d’une commission mixte, cela ne peut être
arrêté que par un congrès et un traité à venir. Sur ce
point, M. Cairoli comme M. de Launay ont dû se déclarer de mon avis. Et
je pense que la Roumanie doit tenir fermement à ce que la question préalable
soit posée de cette façon, dans le cas où l’Autriche venait à
insister et à saisir la Commission Europèenne de cette affaire.
On ne peut rien désirer de mieux que de voir cette affaire assoupie. On devrait la
laisser dormir pour que nous gagnons du temps’. Pour arriver, dis-je, jusqu’en
1883 ou jusqu’à l’époque où l’on devra s’occuper de prolonger la
durée des pouvoirs de la Commission Européenne. ‘Précisement, reprit le Comte.
Ainsi, continua-t-il, l’affaire peut tomber jusqu’à nouvel ordre; mais
si l’Autriche la reprend, ce n’est pas à nous à combattre
l’avant-projet. Nous pouvons vous aider, nous devons le faire; j’ai beaucoup
insisté dans ce sens auprès de notre gouvernement, mais ce n’est pas
à nous à poser la question prèalable; c’est à vous’. Je ne manquai pas de dire au Comte
combien nous apprécions l’attitude ferme qu’il a prise dans cette affaire, et
combien nous lui savons gré pour la manière dont il soutient notre cause
auprès de son gouvernement, lequel avait pris dans le commencement une
voie qui n’était pas la bonne. […] J’ai
ensuite été voir M. Cairoli. Il fut le premier à me parler de cette
affaire. Je lui dis sans aucun détour que nous ne pouvions nullement accéder
aux propositions de l’Autriche. […] On
a mis en avant les intérêts considerables de la Grande Puissance voisine;
nous nous aussi nous y avons des intérêts, et toutes les Puissances
européennes, et l’Italie elle-même plus que bien d’autres. Et c’est au
nom de vos propres intérêts que nous vous demandons à nous
prêter tout votre appui. M. Cairoli m’exprima aussi l’avis que selon
toute probabilité on ne traitera pas cette affaire dans la prochaine session;
que l’avant-projet sera laissé dans l’oubli; mais que si toutefois on remet
l’affaire sur le tapis, l’Italie ne manquera pas de nous être favorable [emphasis mine]. It was undoubtedly
unofficial the Tornielli’s option that essentially relied upon the inflexible
resistence against the Austrian-Hungarian pretentions: “[…] e indispensabil – he would declare to
N. Kreþulescu – sã vã arãtaþi ferm deciºi
a susþine drepturile D-trã., ºi aºa vã vor ajuta ºi unele Puteri. Alminterea,
dacã de exemplu Puterile vãd cã vã arãtaþi dispuºi a face concesiuni ºi
transacþiuni, dacã lãsaþi a se crede cã veþi ceda, nimeni nu va avea curajul sã
va susþie ºi sã-ºi atragã la colére de Bismarck. […] / [...] there is
indispensable to prove yourselves firmly resolute to sustain Your rights, and
thus there would be some Powers to sustain you. Otherwise, if for instance the
Powers notice that you are ready to make concessions and transactions, if you
would let them to believe that you would retreat, then there would be no one to
have the courage to sustain you and the provoke la colère de Bismarck. [...]”. Cfr. ibidem, file 334: 71, personal letter, minutes, Kreþulescu
to Boerescu, Rome, November 24 /December 6, 1880.
[84] Ibidem, file
333: 1-2, 5-6, personal letter, Vasile Boerescu to Nicolae Kreþulescu,
Bucureºti, January 7/19, 1881.
[85] DDI, 2, XIV: 109, nr. 119, D. 98,
Mancini to Tornielli, Rome, July 28, 1881.
[86] ASDMAE, Archivio dell’Ufficio del Personale,
serie VII, Tornielli-Brusati, T1.
[87] Cf. Dinu, “Romanian-Italian Relationship
inside of the Triple Alliance. The 1888 Agreement”, Annuario. Istituto Romeno di Cultura e Ricerca Umanistica di Venezia
2 (2000): 181-188.
[88] Cf. 35 anni: 165-66, nr. 107, Tornielli to
Mancini, Bucharest, October 5, 1883: “Dans l’entretien que je me suis procuré avec M. Bratiano
et dont j’ai rendu compte hier à V. E., je me suis abstenu, comme de
raison, de l’interroger on sujet des prétendus accords pris par le Roi Charles
et signés ensuite par son premier Ministre avec les Cabinets de Berlin, Vienne.
Je ne sais pas si ma réserve a été remarquie [sic!]
par Bratiano qui ce matin est venu me
voir et presque aussitôt m’a dit: ‘J’ai été souvent obsédé par les diplomates
russes au sujet des traités et des alliances qu’on nous attribue, je leurs ai
constamment répondu que les Représentants de la Russie étaient moins encore que
tout autre autorité à me prêter de pareilles imprudences car ils
devraient bien se rappeler que je n’ai consenti à signer une convention
que le coûteau à la gorge lorsque les armées russes avaient
déjà entamé notre frontière. Je ne comprends vraiment pas que
l’on puisse m’attribuer l’idée d’engager ainsi à la légère mon pays.
On ne comprend évidemment pas que pour un petit état les chances de la guerre
esposent l’existence; une grande puissance subit l’umiliation d’un échec sans
disparaître, mais un petit pays peut être rassé de la carte géographique.
Notre enjeu à nous serait beaucoup plus grand que celui de tous nos
alliés possibles; où ils n’y a pas de parrité il ne peut y avoir des
engagements a longue échéance’. Bratiano avait amené lui-même le discours
de manière à avoir l’occasion de me faire cette déclaration, dont
je pense devoir prendre note dans ma correspondance officielle; elle n'ajoute
pas grande chose a ce que j’ai eu l’honneur de faire connaître à V. E.,
mais elle confirme mes impressions sur les derniers incidents de la politique
de la Roumanie”; ibidem: 166-167, no. 108, Tornielli to Mancini, Bucharest, November
21, 1883.
[89] BAR, Corespondenþã diplomaticã austriacã,
Mapa XLIII/Acte 1-444, 1887: Bericht 6C, Heidler to Kalnoky, Bucharest, January
30, 1887: “Meine bescheidene
Zwischenfrage, was speziell Rumänien Russland verdanke, schien den blinden
Eifer meines italienischen Collegen nur zu steigern, denn er fuhr fort: ´wenn
je [?] Rumänien in einem
zukünftigen Orientkrieg eine Polle zu spielen hätte, so würde sich die Kraft
diesser elementaren Geneigtheit für Russland im rumänischen Soldaten und im
Volke zeigen. Der rumänische Soldat fühle sich dem russischen durch gleiche
Tugenden und noch mehr durch gleiche Fehler verwandt. Diessem Gefühl würde es
entsprechen mit den Russen und nicht gegen dieselben zu kämpfen´. […]”.
[90] ACS, Carte Crispi, busta 72, fasc. 107:
Berlin, June 15, 1887, cit.
[91] Dinu, “Note e documenti…”, cit.: 292,
Tornielli to Depretis, Bucharest, January 9, 1887.
[92] Cf. Trattati e Convenzioni tra il Regno d'Italia
ed i Governi esteri, VIII, Rome, 1883: 78-116.
[93] ASDMAE, DP, Rapporti in arrivo, România,
busta 1396: R. 74, Tornielli to Cairoli, Bucharest, August 26, 1880. “Presa periodicã din aceastã þarã a primit cu
semne de deschisã simpatie pentru Italia încheierea convenþiilor noastre cu
România. Mai multe ziare au vorbit în termenii celei mai sincere satisfacþii.
Va vedea Excelenþa Voastrã dacã convine ca asemenea manifestãri ale presei
române sã aibã un ecou în cea italianã. […] / The periodicals in this
country received the conclusion of our conventions with Romania with signs of
sincere sympathy towards Italy. Many newspapers spoke in the terms of the most
honest satisfaction. Your Excellence will see if it is conveneint that such a
manifestations of the Romanian press have echo in the Italian one. [...]”; Românul (Bucharest) on August 7/19,
1880.
[94] Cfr. Dinu, “Documents regarding the history
of the Italian Legation in Bucharest, 1879-1914”, Annuario. Istituto Romeno di Cultura e Ricerca Umanistica, 4
(2002): 366-367.
[95] BN,, mss., Fond Brãtianu, file 526: 1-4, Constantinople, November 25/December
7, 1879, cit.
[96] Dinu, Note e documenti…, cit.: 291, Tornielli to Pansa, Bucharest, March
17, 1885.
[97] 35 anni: 73, nr. 22, Tornielli to
Cairoli, Bucharest, March 12, 1880: “[…] oserei
sottomettere al prudente apprezzamento di Vostra Eccellenza l’importanza che
potrebbe avere la designazione di un distinto nostro ufficiale per compiere,
almeno durante qualche mese, le stesse funzioni tanto in Serbia che in Rumania”.
ibidem: ciphered appendix: “La présence de l’uniforme
Italienne ferait ici le meilleur effet, car il y a encore beaucoup des
officiers roumains qui ont fait les études à Turin et les attachés
militaires servent quand ils sont bien choisis non seulement pour reconnaître la
force d’un Etat mais aussi pour entretenir un contact sympathique entre les
armées. Pour la Serbie le choix devrait être fait d’une manière
très prudente pour ne pas éveiller l’idée que nous y envoyons un
conseiller vu un instructeur. Un seul officier suffirait pour le moment pour
Belgrade et pour ici; mais il devrait être d’un caractère docile
pour se laisser diriger par le chef de la Légation”.
[98] Giuseppe Tornielli-Brusati, Relazione del Regio Ministro d’Italia in Rumania, 1882-1883, Rome,
Ippolito Sciolla, 1885.
[99] ASDMAE, DP, Registri Copialettere in
partenza, R. 1203, Rumania: 35, Mancini to Tornielli, Rome, June 24, 1885.
[100] BAR, mss., Fond G. C. Cantacuzino, S 59(1)/MLXXII: Tornielli to G. C.
Cantacuzino, Novara, November 27, 1887.
[101] ASDMAE, DP, Rapporti in arrivo, Romania,
busta 1398: R 847, Tornielli to Depretis, Bucharest, July 18, 1887.
[102] Annuario diplomatico del Regno d’Italia per
l’anno 1886, Rome: Ippolito Sciolla, 1886: 173.
[103] ASDMAE, Carte Pansa, busta 3: Collobiano
to Pansa, Lisbon, June 26, 1888.