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p. 421
Hans–Christian
Maner,
University
of Mainz
The symbols depicting the “Repelling of the Great
Turk” and the “Defence against the Turks”, that had already become central
topics in East Central and Southeast Europe in the sixteenth century, as
political and military acts, as well as a communication process meant an object
of domination, of striving for hegemony, leadership of opinion[1].
It was not only a topic that was imparted to all groups of the population,
but it was also put to functional use. In addition to the function of a purely
informative kind about the occurrences at the actual theatre of war, and also a
propaganda function, that had to serve for the justification and motivation,
there was a discursive function discussing, on the one hand, the possibilities
of defence and their improvement, while on the other hand mobilising religious
feelings, and thus intended to bring about a reassurance of the population[2].
This latter function, in particular, was destined to endure for long time: The
“defence against the Turks” became the common experience, the common
reminiscence of the peoples of East Central and Southeast Europe.
No image has engraved itself so deeply in the
historical awareness of the people of the region as the struggle against the
Turks and their “foreign domination” lasting for centuries. Anyone exposed to a
danger for so long, includes it in his thinking and feeling, all the more so if
it befalls one in the sign of an alien god. What people had suffered and
endured, how they had fought and killed, lost and won, they formed in repeated
narration, handing it down as a saga to the following generation, embedded in
the elementary and confidence in Biblical tradition. Behind the image produced
in particular by representatives of the Christian churches of the “Struggle
against the Infidels”[3],
that did not, of course,
p. 422
rule
out an objective interest in the foreigner, as the book market in the age of the
Renaissance and overseas expansion clearly show, there was certainly also
hidden a feeling of uncertainty in the encounter with the other[4].
Contemporary accounts already used the topos of the
defence of Christian Europe. Thus, among others, the Italian humanist Aeneas
Silvius Piccolomini, the later Pope Pius II, emphasised in a letter to Pope
Nicholas V (1447-1455) that the regent of Hungary, János Hunyadi [Iancu de
Hunedoara/ John of Hunedoara] (c. 1387-1456) led his campaigns against the
Ottomans under the motto of the liberation of Europe. However, it was Hunyadi’s
son and king of Hungary Matthias Corvinus (1453-1499) who arose as the real Defensor
Christianitatis. In diplomatic correspondence, he was regarded as
“Christendom’s protective shield and rampart” against the Turks[5].
However, this characterisation was not only applied to him, others claimed the
title, too. Thus in 1467 the Poles avouched they would form a protective wall (antemurale)
not only against the Turks, but also against the Russians[6].
Finally, the Italian humanist and politician Filippo Buonaccorsi, known as
Callimachus Experientis (1437-1496), endeavoured to bring together the various
strands to form a common Bohemian–Polish–Hungarian antemurale concept.
From the nineteenth century on, down to our own days,
historiography has taken the wars against the Turks as instruments, and
inserted them into the latticework of tasks and objectives which it ascribed to
the young national states that had come into being, or were on the point of coming
into being, in the framework of the dominant modern national ideology with its
powerful effect. In its secular guise, the antemurale Christianitatis
topos took on a fundamentally new meaning content for the Poles, Hungarians,
Croats, Serbs or Romanians, that was nevertheless orientated towards building
and consolidating a national and national state identity aimed, not least, at
domination.
The presentation of the repelling of the Turks was
accompanied by the heroising of individual persons, as not only the example of
Stephen the Great shows, but also, in particular, that of the Albanian Gjergj
Kastriot, known as Skanderbeg, but also the Serbian Prince Lazar. I shall now
turn to their historiographical positioning in the 19th and 20th
centuries in condensed form. Since the advent of modern national awareness, as
well as the coming into being of national states, great commemorative
ceremonies were held for Stephen the Great which did not, it is true, take on
the dimension of those for other princes,
p. 423
nevertheless,
the Moldavian prince was regarded as a central figure of national integration.
In this connection, the topos of repelling the Turks encompassed all fields of
his rule. In 1871, seven years before young Romania gained its independence as
a state, on the occasion of a ceremony in Putna at the prince’s grave, the
repelling of the Turks was taken as the occasion to look forward with nervous
anticipation to the “Hour of justice” and to demand the right to independence.
At the first great commemorative ceremony for the 400th
anniversary of his death, the motif of the “pater patriae” emerged, who
had fought for the liberty of the Romanians, an independent Romania and against
the foreigners[7]. In a
leading position, in 1904, Nicolae Iorga sketched out with powerful eloquence
the contours of the picture of Stephen the Great. His statements have shaped
Romanian historical science down to the present day[8].
But historiography during the Communist period also
took up the symbol of Stephen the Great. Thus Petre Constantinescu–Iaºi used
powerful words in 1954 on the occasion of the 450th anniversary of
his death. Stephen the Great became the leader of the “Romanian people” that
“had defended the country with weapons in their hands against the most ruthless
enemy, the Ottoman invader”. The Moldavian prince was thus at the same time
fighting against a “backward, rapacious and destructive power that was
threatening the civilisation as well as the progress of the Romanian lands”. At
the same time, the Turks were portrayed as cruel executioners who slaughtered
the inhabitants wildly, burning down everything and suppressing the peoples[9].
The central event of the Romanians in exile in Paris
in 1954, organised by the Royal University Foundation Carol I, offered, so to
speak, the contrast programme. Apart from the religious element, the struggle
of the athleta Christi against the infidels, the feeling of “national
honour” and the ideal of emancipation were seen as the main motors for the actions
against the Turks. The focal point of attention in this connection was intended
to be not a minor, local prince, but a politically experienced leader, who knew
how to proceed offensively and for this strove to win over the European courts
to act together[10].
From the nineteen-seventies on, the importance of the
repulsion of the Turks by Stephen the Great was seen in a considerably wider
framework than the restricted one of the principality of Moldavia. In the
master narrative by the historian father and son, Constantin C. Giurescu and
Dinu C. Giurescu, for Stephen the Great, the struggle against the Turks was
“the greatest idea of his life”, whereby it was a matter for him of extracting
p. 424
Moldavia
from its position of subjection. In particular in the description of the
conflict, the prince’s heroic prowess is emphasised, how he made his way
himself to the thick of the battle which had ultimately contributed to the
Turks’ withdrawal. What is striking in the depiction of this scene is the use
of a comparison. Stephen, they relate, had namely acted “just like Michael the
Brave will do in Cãlugãreni”, to quote the Giurescu’s who thus anticipate
events[11].
To the fore is clearly the cult of the person of the prince – whose
significance is even compared with that of Pericles for the Greeks[12]
– and less the condemnation of the enemy, as had taken place in the sweeping
judgements during the 450th anniversary. Thus in the master narratives of the
nineteen-seventies, in the so-called liberal phase of historiography, the
country, the harvest, the villages were not burnt by the advancing Turkish
army, but at Stephen’s command by his own people. But one thing does remain
even in this master narrative: the Turks appear as an amorphous, uniform,
undifferentiated mass that was only intended to symbolise the other, the alien[13].
The heroic prowess as well as the greatness of the victory at Vaslui in 1475 is
further emphasised by the fact that the course of the battle is exactly retold,
complete with a sketch[14].
The picture of the guard, who distinguishes himself at
the gates of Europe in the struggle against the “infidel”, is not only to be
found in Romanian historical science down to the present[15].
This topos with a quite topical reference, which is intended to symbolise belonging
to the one, Christian Europe, is also common to the other peoples in Southeast
Europe, as the examples further below will show.
The Moldavian historian Alexandru D. Xenopol
emphasised the status that the history of the Romanians held for Europe. In this
connection, he stressed, in particular, the princes’ struggle against the
Turks. “The Romanians have above all defended Western civilisation against the
Turkish conquest; that is where their importance in European history lies”[16].
And Xenopol continues by observing that Western Europe should not forget that
it owed its standard of living and cathedrals in part to the battles taking
place over the centuries in the Carpatho–Danubian area[17].
p.
425
One continuous tenor from the so-called “liberal
phase” of historiography places the main stress for the reign of Stephen the
Great on the “struggle for independence”, i. e. “the liberation of Moldavia
from foreign dominion”[18].
In accordance with current requirements, this was thus intended to be
accompanied by endeavours, including “measures for the restoration of internal
unity and the feeling of belonging together, and progressive international
recognition”. Precisely the victory of 1475 was underlined as a striking event,
because, as a result, Moldavia no longer remained merely “a simple subject of
Polish-Hungarian disputes, but became an active and decisive factor in European
politics” – hence the account. Vaslui thus had an importance going beyond the
framework of the “History of the Fatherland”; it ranked “among the important
events of universal history”[19].
In the programmatic main work of the Albanian national
movement, Sami Frashëri devotes a chapter of his own to Skanderbeg, revered as
the national hero, who – “a miracle of perfection” – had made the Albanians
great and created a renown for them, “who will make this nation the subject of
glory and greatness for ever”[20].
Skanderbeg (1405-1468), who – according to Frashëri – was the founder of the
Albanian state and head of a legitimate government, successfully resisted the
Turks. Europe expected him, who was also referred to as “athleta Christi”,
the elimination of the danger from the Turks. Only after his death did the
Turks finally conquer Albania. Despite this glorification, the leader of the
age of Rilindja period did not judge the Turkish period following
Skanderbeg negatively.
Quite differently, on the other hand, Albanian
historiography after the Communist seizure of power which depicted Turkish rule
in the darkest colours. Albanian history in the Turkish period is presented as
a constant struggle by the broad masses of the population against their
suppressers[21]. Against
this, Skanderbeg’s time stands out as “une époque des plus décisives de notre
histoire nationale”. The great hero had been the first to unify the country
politically and militarily and, with his victories has laid the foundations for
the declaration of independence in 1912[22].
p.
426
How very much the Skanderbeg cult was propagated by
the historiography of Hoxha’s Albania is shown in an outstanding manner by the
great ceremony on the occasion of the quincentenary of his death in 1968. The
Skanderbeg celebrations can be regarded as a veritable performance show by
Albanian historical science with the version of national history prescribed by
Enver Hoxha. Skanderbeg had led the Albanian people, so the interpretation, for
25 years “in the legendary struggle against the Ottoman power” and at the same
time represented a “protective shield of European culture and civilisation, as
well as a brilliant example of the people’s struggle for freedom and
independence”. Hoxha himself, as well as his ideologists and historians saw in
the courage of the hero Gjergj Kastriot Skanderbeg, the struggle against the
Turks for freedom and independence, the core of the Albanians’ national
history: “The legendary struggle of the Albanian people under Skanderbeg’s
leadership in the fifteenth century has spread the Albanian people’s reputation
as a people that prefers to die fighting than to live on its knees in slavery,
as a small but heroic people that does not bow before any enemy, that is a
master of war in the field of strategy, a master in measuring itself in armed
struggle against any enemy, even if the latter is far superior, and capable of
achieving victory over the latter.” The heroic prowess of Skanderbeg, a
“colossal mountain oak”, is even further intensified by the statement that the
Albanians, as “Europe’s smallest people”, had offered resistance alone, like a
defensive dam, to the “destructive flood of Ottoman aggression” that was
threatening European civilisation.
Skanderbeg’s war is said to have represented a
“glorious chapter” in the own national history, as well as European history.
Skanderbeg thus embodies the basic axioms of the Albanian view of history:
age-old continuity, autochthony, European dimension. For the Hoxha regime it
was, of course, central to elucidate the topicality of the Skanderbeg period,
not least in order thus to historically justify the building of a totalitarian
dictatorship. Apart from the ideological components, which have been replaced
by nationalist ones, the patterns of interpretation of the picture of
Skanderbeg persist in the present. What is explosive is the emphasis on
Skanderbeg’s struggle against the Turks as the symbol for the creation of the
unitary state which, differently to under Hoxha, no longer just referred to the
territory of the Republic of Albania, but to the whole of the Albanian area of
settlement in the Balkans[23].
The martyr-like also to be encountered in the most recent
portrayals of Skanderbeg is to be found, too, in representative form in another
well-known picture, the cult surrounding the Serbian Prince Lazar and the
Kosovo myth closely linked with it. Differently from the case of Stephen the
Great and Skanderbeg, a long rule and several victorious battles against the
Ottoman armies are not the essential feature of the picture
p. 427
of
Lazar. Prince Lazar, the vice-regent of the Serbian Empire, did not survive his
great battle in 1389, nevertheless, or to put it better, precisely therefore
his figure was and is revered and transfigured to an extent that does not apply
either for Stephen the Great or for Skanderbeg. Directly after the battle,
Lazar was canonised by the Serbian Church in the tradition of the Nemanjids.
The Church also played a considerable role in the further course of the
elaboration of the cult. The hagiographic texts about the battle and Lazar were
intended to keep the “memory” of the golden age of Serbian history, the
medieval empire, alive[24].
Far more than Stephen and Skanderbeg, Lazar is glorified as a martyr and
imitator of Christ, and his defeat is even transformed into a transcendental
victory. Despite all that, the mystification of the prince also served very
worldly, national objectives: the rebirth of the nation and the restitution of
its former empire, i. e. a return to the “origins”[25].
Despite the different initial situation, the Serbs’
defence against the Turks, starting out from the Battle of Kosovo polje, served
common Southeast European topoi: the self-sacrifice as a “bulwark” for the
preservation of Christian Europe, as well as the stressing of the uniqueness.
In addition, in the Lazar cult and Kosovo myth, the
special significance of delimitation becomes clear, but it also plays a not to
be underestimated role in the Romanian and Albanian cases. The Turk as the
“other”, the “alien” is contrasted with the “own”, the “own national unity”.
Not least the constantly recurring key terms unity, independence, freedom and
independence, the use of which in a medieval context hardly conceals the
intention of projecting them into the direct present, show particularly clearly
how very much ruler personalities, as powerful historical symbols, unite memory
and remember, expectation and expect, conception and presentation in
themselves.
The topic of “Repelling the Great Turk” may be
described as a specific lieu de mémoire of all the peoples of Southeast
Europe, but it is a topos that cannot serve as a part of a supranational culture
of reminiscence. Its boundaries are the respective nation’s borders. The
observations in this paper have made it clear that this type of reminiscence
was closely connected with the formation of national states and the advent of
ethno-nationalism[26].
It was thus intended, it is true, to unite and strengthen one’s own nation, but
this had to take place within a twofold delimitation: on the one hand against
p. 428
the
other emerging nations – the latter playing no role in one’s own “Repelling of
the Great Turk”, although they used the topos in exactly the same manner – and
then against the amorphous mass of the “Infidels”. The latter proves in
addition how very much this reminiscence is accompanied by myths and
stereotypes. In the various accounts, it is, for example, not stressed that
various subject peoples, who were to later form nations, had also fought in
each case on the side of the Ottoman power. The topos of “Repelling the
Great Turk” or the notion of a historic battle territory between Christian Europe
and the Ottoman Empire, as it is presented in Southeast European
historiographies[27], does not
appear exactly advantageous for the processes of “de-nationalisation” and
“Europeanisation” in view of the expansion of the EU, into the field of vision
of which Turkey has long since come.
In the overemphasis of defence or repelling, the
confrontational attitude (Christians – Infidels), elements of the acceptable modus
vivendi, the existing co-existence go under and the concept goes wrong. How
very much reminiscence in Southeast Europe was aligned towards the formation
and preservation of the national states and still pays tribute to the hegemonic
paradigm of the national, is also to be seen in the fact that models freer of
violence, such as, for example, federation concepts, the picture of a bridge,
or the notion of Southeast Europe as the area of a common Byzantine culture,
which can also be encountered among almost all peoples in Southeast Europe,
have not yet become a far-reaching lieu de mémoire[28].
In particular the concept of the area of a common Byzantine heritage, even
through the Ottoman period, offers itself as a topos for a supranational
reminiscence culture in a special manner in Southeast Europe, above all, as it
is particularly present in parts of historiography, but also in the awareness
of the Orthodox churches[29].
The “Repelling of the Great Turk” can thus be
described as a central national lieu de mémoire in Southeast Europe and
parts of East Central Europe. Analysis of it and making people aware of it is
of fundamental importance and a necessary preliminary step on the way towards
creating supranational, European mnemotopes.
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or the Annuario. Istituto Romeno di cultura e ricerca umanistica 6-7 (2004-2005),
edited by Ioan-Aurel Pop, Cristian Luca, Florina Ciure, Corina Gabriela
Bãdeliþã, Venice-Bucharest 2005.
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October 2005, Bucharest, Romania
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[1] Dieter Mertens, Europäischer Friede und Türkenkrieg
im Spätmittelalter [European Peace and War against the Turks in the Late
Middle Ages], in Zwischenstaatliche Friedenswahrung in Mittelalter und
Früher Neuzeit [International Preservation of Peace in the Middle Ages and
Early Modern Period], edited by Heinz Duchhardt, Köln–Viena 1991, p. 46.
[2] Hans–Joachim Kissling, Türkenfurcht und
Türkenhoffnung im 15./16. Jahrhundert. Zur Geschichte eines “Komplexes”
[Fear of the Turks and Hope against the Turks in the 15th and 16th
centuries. On the history of a “complex”], in “Südost-Forschungen”, no. 23,
1964, pp. 1-18; Gerhard Seewann, Türkenhilfe, Türkenfurcht, Türkengefahr,
Türkensteuer [Help against the Turks, Fear of the Turks, Danger of the
Turks, Turkish Levy], in Lexikon zur Geschichte Südosteuropas [Lexicon
on the History of Southeast Europe], edited by Edgar Hösch et alii,
Viena 2004, pp. 700-701.
[3] Cf. on this Einleitung [Introduction], in Das
Osmanische Reich und Europa 1683 bis 1789: Konflikt, Entspannung und Austausch.
[The Ottoman Empire and Europe 1683 to 1786: Conflict, Détente and Exchange],
edited by Gernot Heiss and Grete Klingenstein, Munich 1983, p. 9.
[4] Jean Delumeau, Angst im Abendland. Die Geschichte
kollektiver Ängste im Europa des 14. bis 18. Jahrhunderts [Fear in the
West. The History of Collective Fears in Europe from the 14th to 18th
Century], Reinbek bei Hamburg 1985, pp. 397-411.
[5] Sándor Õze, Norbert Spannenberger, Zur
Reinterpretation der mittelalterlichen Staatsgründung in der ungarischen
Geschichtsschreibung des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts [On the Reinterpretation
of the Foundation of the Medieval State in Hungarian Historiography of the 19th
and 20th centuries], in “Jahrbücher für Geschichte und Kultur
Südosteuropas”, no. 2, 2000, pp. 61-77, here p. 63.
[6]
Heidi Hein, Antemurale christianitatis – Grenzsituation als
Selbstverständnis [Antemurale Christianitatis – Frontier Situation
as a Conception of Oneself], in “NGO. Unabhängige Kulturzeitschrift JI”
(http://www.ji-magazine.lviv.ua/seminary/2003/sem25-03-ger.htm).
[7] Address by the Professor of Universal History at the
University of Iaºi, Petre Rãºcanu, in Nicolae Iorga, Pomenirea lui ªtefan
cel Mare [The commemoration of Stephen the Great], Bucharest 1905, pp.
73-76.
[8] N. Iorga, Istoria lui ªtefan cel Mare pentru
poporul român [History of Stephen the Great for the Romanian People],
Bucharest 1966 (a reprint true to the original of the first edition of 1904).
[9] Petre Constantinescu–Iaºi, 450 de ani de la
moartea lui ªtefan cel Mare [450 years since the death of Stephen the
Great], in Studii cu privire la ªtefan cel Mare [Studies on Stephen the
Great], Bucharest 1956, pp. 4-5.
[10] Emil Turdeanu: ªtefan cel Mare, 12 Aprilie 1457-2
Iulie 1504 [Stephen the Great, 12 April 1457-2 July 1504], Paris 1954, pp.
12-32.
[11] Constantin C. Giurescu, Dinu C. Giurescu, Istoria
românilor din cele mai vechi timpuri ºi pînã astãzi [History of the
Romanians from the Earliest Times to the Present], vol. 1, Bucharest 1975, p.
311.
[12] Ibidem, vol. 2, De la mijlocul secolului al
XIV-lea pînã la începutul secolului al XVII-lea From the beginning of the
14th century to the beginning of the 17th century],
Bucharest 1976, p. 154.
[13] Cf. also Istoria României. Compendiu [History
of Romania. Compendium], edited by Miron Constantinescu, Constantin Daicoviciu et
alii, Bucharest 1971, p. 135.
[14] Cf. also the account in Istoria României, vol.
II, Bucharest 1962, pp. 513-515.
[15] Manole Neagoe, ªtefan cel Mare [Stephen the
Great], Bucharest 1970, p. 76.
[16] Alexandru D. Xenopol, Rolul românilor în Orient
[The role of the Romanians in the Orient], in “Românul literar”, III, 1905, p.
72; quoted from Vasile Cristian, Preocupãri de istorie universalã
[Preoccupation with Universal History], p. 109.
[17] On this cf. also Alexandru Constantin, A. D.
Xenopol peste hotare [A. D. Xenopol abroad], in A. D. Xenopol, Studii
privitoare la viaþa ºi opera sa [Studies about his life and work], p. 439.
[18] ªerban Papacostea, Stephan der Grosse, Fürst der
Moldau 1457-1504 [Stephen the Great, Prince of Moldavia], Bucharest 1975,
p. 13; Idem, ªtefan cel Mare, domn al Moldovei (1457-1504), Bucharest
1990, p. 23.
[19] Ion Cupºa, ªtefan cel Mare [Stephen the
Great], Bucharest 1974, p. 75.
[20] Quoted from Peter Bartl, Zum Geschichtsmythos der
Albaner [On the historical myth of the Albanians], in Mythen, Symbole
und Rituale. Die Geschichtsmächtigkeit der Zeichen in Südosteuropa im 19. und
20. Jahrhundert [Myths, Symbols and Rituals. The historical power of signs
in Southeast Europe in the 19th and 20th centuries],
edited by Dittmar Dahlmann and Wilfried Potthoff, Frankfurt am Main 2000, p.
131.
[21] Ibidem, p. 138.
[22] Aleks Buda, Georges Kastriote-Skanderbeg et son
époque, in Deuxième Conférence des Etudes albanologiques, Tirana
12-18 janvier 1968, vol. I, Tirana 1969, p. 49; on this in detail Oliver
Jens Schmitt, Genosse Alesk und seine Partei oder: Zur Politik und
Geschichtswissenschaft im kommunistischen Albanien (1945-1991) [Comrade
Alesk and his party or: on politics and historical science in Communist
Albania], in Geschichtswissenschaft und Nationsbildung in Ostmittel- und
Südosteuropa [Historical science and nation-building in East Central and
Southeast Europe], edited by Markus Krzoska and Hans–Christian Maner (being
printed).
[23] On this cf. also Ulf Brunnbauer, Die Nation erschreiben.
Historiographie und Nationsbildung in der Republik Makedonien seit 1944 [Writing
up the Nation. Historiography and the Formation of a Nation in the Republic of
Macedonia since 1944], in Geschichtswissenschaft und Nationsbildung in
Ostmittel- und Südosteuropa (being printed).
[24] Frank Kämpfer: Nationalheilige in der Geschichte
Serbiens [National Saints in the History of Serbia], in “Forschungen zur
Osteuropäischen Geschichte”, no. 20, 1973, pp. 7-22; Rade Mihaljèiè, Lazar
Hrebeljanoviæ. Istorija, kult i predanje [Lazar Hrebeljanoviæ, History,
Cult and Tradition], Belgrade 1984, passim.
[25] Holm Sundhaussen, Kriegserinnerung als
Gesamtkunstwerk und Tatmotiv: Sechshundertzehn Jahre Kosovo-Krieg (1389-1999)
[Remembrance of war as a Gesamtkunstwerk and motive for a crime: Six
hundred and ten years Kosovo War (1389-1999)], in Der Krieg in religiösen
und nationalen Deutungen der Neuzeit [The war in religious and national
interpretations of modern times], edited by Dietrich Beyrau, Tübingen 2001, p.
27.
[26] Holm Sundhaussen, Nationsbildung und Nationalismus
im Donau–Balkan–Raum [Nation Building an Nationalism in the Danube–Balkan
Area], in “Forschungen zur osteuropäischen Geschichte”, no. 48, 1993, pp.
233-258.
[27]
On this and also the following cf. Maria Todorova, Imagining the Balkans,
New York–Oxford 1997, p. 12.
[28] Horst Haselsteiner, Föderationspläne in
Südosteuropa [Federation Plans in Southeast Europe], in Nationalrevolutionäre
Bewegungen in Südosteuropa im 19. Jahrhundert [National Revolutionary
Movements in Southeast Europe in the Nineteenth Century], edited by Christo
Choliolèev, Karlheinz Mack and Arnold Suppan, Viena–Munich 1992, pp. 123-133;
M. Todorova, op. cit., pp. 31-34.
[29] Alexandru Duþu, Europäisches Bewußtsein und
orthodoxe Tradition [European Awareness and Orthodox Tradition], Das
Europa-Verständnis im orthodoxen Südosteuropa [The Comprehension of Europe
in Orthodox Southeast Europe], edited by Harald Heppner and Grigorios
Larentzakis, Graz 1996, pp. 129-142; the classical work reappraising this topos
in 1935 (N. Iorga, Byzance après Byzance, continuation de l’“Histoire
de la vie Byzantine”, Bucharest 1935) was republished in English in 2000
(N. Iorga, Byzantium after Byzantium, Iaºi 2000). At the same time, the
concept is still a topic for international research, cf. e. g. the volume of
papers given at the conference: Byzance après Byzance: 5e
Symposium Byzantinon 19-20-21 novembre 1987, Centre de Recherches sur
l’Europe Centrale et Sud Orientale (CRESCO), Institut d’Histoire du Moyen Age
de l’Université des Sciences Humaines de Strasbourg, Amsterdam 1991
(Byzantinische Forschung, 17).