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p. 205

The Use of the “Gate of Christendom”.

Hungary’s Mathias Corvinus and Moldavia’s Stephen the Great Politics in the late 1400’s

 

 

Alexandru  Simon,

“Babeș-Bolyai” University of Cluj-Napoca

 

When the fall of Constantinople was still a living memory, deprived from its later images, projects and crusader ideas had a different value. To defend the remaining Christian space and to recover what had been lost were key medieval phrases in any politically correct speech. Sometimes they meant more, specially in the boarder areas, close to the Ottoman Empires. Being a gate, as well as a bulwark, was a view intended to express a way of life and to get European attention and funding.

Basic Medieval Figures. In 1473, Moldavia’s decision to turn against its lord and protector, the Ottoman Empire, may not have been a real surprise, for both the Ottomans and the Christian powers, but it still was a change that came rather sudden[1]. Or so it seems. Over the last decades, since the battle at Kossovo-polje (1448), Moldavia had not taken actively part in any anti-ottoman campaigns[2]. Even then, the soldiers from Moldavia were only a small group inside the army led by John Hunyad[3]. Meanwhile, the orthodox rejection of the Union of Florence[4] was widening the gap between Moldavia and the crusader projects[5]. In 1456[6], the state, disputed by Hungary and Poland, which

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basically regarded it as one of their provinces[7], submitted itself to Ottoman protection. Henceforth, the empire gained the political overhand, closing in on Hungary’s eastern and Poland’s southern borders[8].

On the other hand, Hungary[9], for shier military necessities, propaganda reasons and crusader dreams, had established herself as the outpost of Western Christendom[10], claiming the leadership in any action against the threat, still contained south of the Danube. It was an attitude that caused several problems for the neighbouring Christian states since the late 1300’s[11]. At the same time, the crusader policy was one of the main heritages that Mathias Corvin[12], son of the late John Hunyad had to work with during his reign (1458-1490). More focused on his Bohemian claim and the conflict with the German Empire, Mathias never underestimated or forgot the political capital[13] represented by the fight against the Ottomans, the menace at his borders. Buffer states or large military unites under his symbolical command would have come in handy for him.

But neither Wallachia, nor Moldavia, the only two orthodox states, to Hungary’s and Poland, having outlived the Ottoman expansion before and after the fall of Constantinople (1453), could be reckoned with[14]. The bad blood between Hungary

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and Moldavia[15] dated back to the XIVth century. Plus, Moldavia had become the vassal of Poland, Hungary’s great catholic rival in the East and, in the long run, a model of collaboration with the Ottoman Empire[16]. More recently, in 1467[17], Stephen, Moldavia’s ruler, had supported the Transylvanian uprising against Mathias. In retaliation, at the end of the same, Mathias and his troupes entered Stephen’s lands[18], where the rebellion in the southern part of Moldavia worked to their favour. The campaign was a failure. Still, it did not such much fuel the feud between the two characters. It led to a more moderate, even friendly approach[19].

Shortly after, at the beginning of the eighth decade of the century[20], great plans to put an end to sultan Mehmed’s II power started to resurrect the crusader idea. The plans even involved Persia. Nevertheless the Holy Siege[21], the chief-architect of these projects, had no partner in the orthodox world. Alongside Wallachia, Moldavia, caught up under the Ottoman force and also in their own rivalry[22], Moscow[23] was the last survivor of the Byzantine Commonwealth[24], the most important one. All roman attempts

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to get Moscow’s aid and support failed in the year 1472[25]. Moscow had its own interests and kept on regarding the Union of Florence as treason of the orthodox values.

The Political Path. We do not know who made the first step, pope Sixtus IV or Stephen the Great. It’s possible that Stephen offered his services only after having being contacted by one the numerous Catholic envoys in the region[26]. Before this gesture, he was better known for a rather anti-catholic position and a quite pro-ottoman attitude, mainly in the year 1462[27]. Mistrust was perfectly normal on both sides. Even though the first signs for a break-up with Istanbul, date from 1473, Stephen seems to hesitate or just wait, until 1474[28], when, after repeatedly invading Wallachia, loyal to the sultan, there was no way back for him[29]. Hesitations were wide spread also amongst the Catholic princes[30]. King Mathias’s trust and Rome’s approval appears to have be gained only late in the year.

The victory at Vaslui (January 1475), the greatest Christian success over the last decades[31], made Stephen famous. Moldavia’s duke[32], as he entitled himself, announced his triumph all over Europe. Stephen was praised[33] and immediately Mathias claimed the success for himself[34], Stephen having acted just as one of the king’s captains, as a count following his monarch’s orders. A new conflict between the two was ready to irrupt, now that they were on the same side[35]. Stephen needed political recognition from

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Rome and urgent financial support[36]. Both were dependent on Mathias’s attitude, to whom, in mid summer 1475, Stephen, already Poland’s vassal, had, officially, sworn alliegence[37]. Plus, since fall, the pope was promoting a crusade placed under Mathias’s leadership[38].

In 1476, after threats and black-mails[39], the problem could be solved only under the form of a compromise. Sixtus IV invented a pilgrimage made by Stephen and his noblemen, dukes counts, and barons, to Rome in 1471[40] and therefore called[41] him prince/duke (when things had to be clear) Stephen, a true athlete of the Christian belief. Still, he was no king. He wasn’t Mathias’s equal. As for the money, the Holy Siege urged Mathias to give Stephen sums from the amount he had received for his promised actions[42]. It wasn’t until 1478, that Sixtus IV decided to personally send money to Moldavia[43]. In 1476, Stephen barely managed to face the campaign led by Mehmed II[44].

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There were no successes up to match the expectations. Hungary’s and Moldavia’s actions combined or, more frequently, divided were limited to the fights on the Danube and interventions in Wallachia[45]. Promises and demands mounted up[46]. In the autumn of 1479[47], Stephen was tempted to abandon the combat. At the same time, Mathias’s captains were crushing one of the largest ottoman armies who had ever crossed the Danube[48]. Soon after, in 1480, Stephen resumed to his fighting[49].

“The Fear of Otranto”[50] brought up new energies for the fight against the Ottomans (1480-1481). Stephen was the only one to strongly act out, on land, the proclaimed crusade[51]. At the time, Mathias was black mailing the Pope that if he didn’t get his ecclesiastical ways, he would become an orthodox[52]. In 1483, Mathias bailed out from the war and signed a five years truth with Bayazed II, Mehmed’s successor[53]. The

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truth was supposed to protect Moldavia, a nameless part of the his kingdom in Mathias’s view. Neither European States, nor, least of all, the Ottomans accepted it[54]. Moldavia should have been mentioned as a separate political part. In 1484, her key harbours Chilia and Cetatea Albă surrendered to Bayazed[55]. Stephen seemed paralysed all this time[56]. Mathias blamed everyone. Eventually, he found Stephen responsible having provoked the Turks[57].

Over the next two years, Moldavia came close to collapse[58]. In the South[59] things didn’t go any better for Hungary. Stephen[60] pledged allegiance to Casymir IV of Poland (1485). Mathias and Stephen weren’t able to manage without. In 1486[61], at the same time, their ambassadors came to Istanbul in order to negotiate peace. In 1489, at Stephen’s demand[62], Innocent VIII freed him from his polish vow. The alliance between Mathias and Stephen was restored. Any hopes that could have been made vanished

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quickly when Mathias died (1490). Stephen refused to take up Maximilian of Habsburg’s offer and occupy Transylvania[63], nor did he support Mathias’s son and heir, John[64]. He backed up Vladislav II Jagiello, who was to become king and a constant ally to Moldavia[65].

The Christian Colours of Ambition. Mathias had an imperial goal, hoping that by gaining the Bohemian crown he would be able to compete successfully for the German throne[66]. Things seem to be quite clear in his case. Still they are not, for bias sources and the appearance of a struggle for survival held by his enterprise require, at least, prudence[67]. As for Stephen, a Byzantine ambition may resurge from the Moldavian chronicles and manuscripts of his time[68]. He and his forefathers, since Moldavia’s final Byzantine recognition, are named tsars[69], a title given also to the sultan and all the neighbouring orthodox rulers, with the significant exception of Wallachia[70], now exiles (Serbia)[71], or merely a part of a catholic state (Kyiv[72]). It’s hard to state whether he dreamed of becoming the heir of the Byzantine emperors[73], a natural und unrealistic thought, altogether, given the circumstances, or, more likely, for internal and external purposes, he tried to gain the status of tsar, amongst the orthodox states, both

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living and dead[74], who’s rulers had used this title before. Stephen tried to gain the respect of the former Commonwealth, and may have succeeded to a certain degree[75], in the lands of Hungary[76] and also in those of Poland-Lithuania[77].

A thin line runs through the memory of this time. Eventually, it should not be forgotten that in Venice’s opinion[78], Moldavia was under the ecclesiastical authority of Constantinople, where it should stay. Likewise, Stephen never called himself tsar, inside, in his local documents, or outside Moldavia’s border, in his relations[79] with Moscow, Wallachia and Mount Athos[80], not to mention Poland and Hungary who often did not even recognize him as a ruler from God’s grace[81]. Besides the Wallachian case, only the plan to free Caffa (1477) might indicate an ambition to expand his reign in the Black Sea area[82]. For a time of uncertainties and plans it is to little of information.

Relevant information and signs may come from Rome. Sixtus IV named Stephen princeps, a polite and disputed middle class between dukes and kings[83]. Even a sword may have been conceded to Stephen[84]. More over, following up the launch of the crusade after Otranto, the cross double makes his appearance on Moldavia’s cote of arms[85]. A clear idea of what it meant gives us one of Mathias’s black mail letters to the Sixtus IV. If the pope did not back up on his claims, Mathias would change the cross

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double with the triple cross[86]. The cross double signified a roman mission, given to a king, while the triple cross stood for the orthodox belief. In 1480-1481, Stephen may have received the sign[87] that could allow him to consider his catholic neighbours his equals. It goes without saying that this would have worked only if the crusade had been successful.

The triple cross did not leave Moldavia. In 1493, a gift made by Stephen to the bishop of Rădăuți[88] had a triple cross on it. It was a time of great cultural and architectural efforts, several churches were built after the prince signed peace with the Ottomans[89]. On the other hand, the cross double seems to have first appeared on Stephen cote of arms placed on the walls of the monastery Putna[90]. In 1473, soon before the real fighting against the Turks began, all the orthodox high figures disappeared form Stephen’s council, never to return[91]. In particular, Moldavia’s metropolite[92] had made his career on fighting Rome and the Union of Florence. He was buried (1477/1478), close to Stephen’s tomb. Not a word about conflicts or Stephen’s well known harshness has come to us.

Given this facts, the reasonable conclusion would be that Stephen controlled both the catholic way and the orthodox path for Moldavia, trying to make sure that orthodox hard-liners did not endanger his anti-ottoman stands, nor that religious troubles should weaken his position in a rather unstable Moldavia[93]. In a way, it was a unique perception of religious union, of Christian community. At the turn of the century, Stephen was reacting strongly against any attempt to make out of Orthodoxs Catholics (1499)[94], while advising Moscow, already a centre of orthodox purity, to renounce its combats against it’s catholic neighbours, and join all the Christian princes in the fight against the Ottoman Empire (1500)[95]. He was trying to build a bridge from East to West.

Mathias attempted the same, from West to East this time. His reign was of unprecedented tolerance towards the Orthodoxs, an attitude enabled, but also endangered, by the efforts made, by his father, in particular, to install the Florentine union in Hungary. Mathias even wrote to the pope saying that because of catholic

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pressure many Orthodoxs join the Turks (1476)[96], asking him to put the catholic extremists on hold. In these cases of Orthodoxs taking pro-ottoman stands, Mathias agreed also to hard measures (1478)[97]. Soon after, he was helping the Serbian Church in exile[98].

Mathias and Stephen’s religious politics met in the 1480’s. The result was the only medieval orthodox archbishopric in Transylvania, led by Daniel, accepted as such by a catholic king and a orthodox ruler[99]. It did not last. Daniel’s Christian place can be seen through the title of one of his successors, only a bishop now, in the time of Reformation[100]: bishop of the Transylvanian Wallachs [Romanians] who confess to the Roman [Catholic] or the Greek [Orthodox] religion[101].

Building the Gate and its Walls. Hungary first claimed its status of Christian boarder area, both gate and bulwark, in the XIIIth century[102], and thereby asked for a special status, offensive and defensive, from Rome. Its role was perfected by king Louis I de Anjou in the second half of the next century[103]. Sigismund of Luxembourg[104] and John Hunyad[105] gave the final and decisive touches to Hungary’s position. A classic imperial task[106], the crusade become the mission of the Hungarian Kingdom in the Danube areas. By using the concept of Christian unity under the leadership of Rome[107],

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a concept which had to be accepted by Byzantium[108], Hungary was drawing near the orthodox rulers, who now had a chance to surpass the religious barriers but, at the same time, had no way back.

They either went with the catholic powers or they joined the Turks[109], but kept on promising that they will help the western crusaders. The idea of an orthodox crusade had failed following the disappearance of the Balkans States. It was a concept for radicals[110], fragile because it had to combine the Byzantine Holy War[111], trapped between very vast ideological senses and very precise political limits, with the support offered to their position by the Ottoman Empire, with the help that Greek hard liners, most frequently, had given to the sultans against catholic efforts[112].

Wallachia grew familiar with these problems. Praised and accused since the 1370’[113] for its attitude, Wallachia turned from a Christian outpost to a battlefield, having to face not only the Turks in the South, but also the demands of Hungary and the interests of Moldavia in the North[114]. Its delicate and quickly changing position is revealed by Vlad II, member of the Dragon order founded by Sigismund of Luxembourg[115], guide for the Turks in their Transylvanian campaign of 1438[116], the first

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Wallachian ruler to act explicitly and vigorously for Christendom[117], executed, in 1447, by John Hunyad who considered him unstable, at best a double agent[118].

Even though the first papal demand for her aid dates back to 1408[119], the first accusations of refusing to sustain the crusader effort to 1412[120], the first ottoman attack to 1420[121], protected by Wallachia and having the advantage not to represent a direct threat or an immediate interest for the Turks[122], Moldavia was new in this Christian business, still a very tormented youth. The civil war in the forth and sixth decade of the century had developed itself, rather early on, into a combat between the supporters of religious union and those loyal to traditional orthodoxy[123]. Just before the breakout of this conflict, in 1432[124], Moldavia had won her first major battle against the Turks. In 1457, Stephen, brought up, in exile, also in a pro-unionist environment[125], came to

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power when the traditionalists, pro-ottomans, had established themselves as the dominating force in Moldavia[126].

Hungary was not willing to give away her crusader mission. A succession of disasters and victories by coalitions led by her kings or generals had identified the kingdom with the idea of crusade, of crusader mission[127]. Wallachia and Moldavia seemed reluctant to even join such an enterprise it in the years surrounding the fall of Constantinople[128]. Political, military and orthodox reasons pilled up to inhibit temptations. They started resembling Christendom’s trench.

Rules of Engagement. Almost twennty years later, after several waves of crusader spirit and projects had passed him by[129], Stephen placed himself at the for-front of the war against the Ottomans and called his country questa Porta della Christianità[130]. He was inside the Christian community, at its very limit, a bulwark for Poland and Hungary[131], in his own words. Stephen was at war for what was left of the Christian word, making no direct reference to what was left in front of the gate he controlled.

What may have looked as guardian status could rapidly turn into a attacking position, a change that was still valid near the end of Stephen’s rule, when Istanbul feared that the Christians could flood the empire through Moldavia[132]. There was much more to the status of Christendom’s Gate. Shortly after his victory of 1475, Stephen was considered by Cazymir IV’s secretary as the best choice for leading, at the top of a council of the Christian princes, the war against the Ottoman Empire[133]. It was only a thought but expressed the steak. Rome did not seem to oppose this idea.

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No word of Mathias was mentioned when Stephen was introduced to Europe as the greatest Christian warrior of his time[134]. Behind this great scene, Stephen was asked to respect his contract with Mathias[135]. In fact, he had to follow the chain of command. Rome could not risk pushing none of them away specially Mathias[136]. In response, Stephen, not content with what he was getting, seems to have started playing on the, still, silent hostility between Rome and Venice[137]. Hoping to get actual support, which he did not, Stephen pictured the merchant city as his only Western protector, Rome being just a stop, made if the Republic agrees to it[138]. Venice was delighted. When the pope finally gave a official promise to send money to Stephen, she took full credit for it. One year later, in 1479, Venice signed a peace treaty with the Ottomans, to whom she then eased the way to Otranto[139]. Once again Siamo Venitiani e poi Christiani[140] was working. These turns in Stephen politics might have come much to the delight of Mathias. He used every communication channel to get across Europe news of his victories, generally small fights in the boarder areas, or successes of his captain Stephen[141]. Mathias’s adversaries in Italy, the German Empire and Poland emphasised his lying and deceiving ways[142]. The Holy Siege seemed not to react in any way to these allegations. Sixtus IV and Innocent VIII, when not in conflict with him because of his Catholic ecclesiastical policy, kept praising and giving funds to Mathias[143], money he spent for his own needs and purposes. It was no premiere for Mathias. This policy had been working since his first years of reign[144]. In order to divert attention from his limited actions, despite the financial aids, it is supposed that he went as far as to arrest and accuse Vlad the Impaler,

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ruler of Wallachia, of treason in 1462[145], starting a whole propaganda campaign about his cruelties. It remains a possibility that, altogether, suits Mathias’s enterprises and fits Vlad’s deeds.

Rome had no other option then to continue backing up Mathias. Once, she had given him the crusader mission, Rome could not take it back without endangering the whole concept. Mathias knew that. Also, up to today, we know the story mainly from the correspondence between the Holy Siege and Mathias. And as it shows from Stephen’s cote of arms, there was much more to it.

On Both Sides of the bulwark. Moldavia made it well out of ottoman wars. Stephen gained the respect of his neighbours. He crushed the polish armies, with Hungarian and Ottoman troupes backing him up (1497)[146]. The armies, led by king John Albert, had entered Moldavia pretending that they went on to regain the harbours lost by Stephen, while the king had in mind to replace Stephen with one of his brothers. At peace with Istanbul, Stephen appeared more powerful than ever. He remained a constant threat to the Empire, while the only hostilities were combats in boarder areas[147]. But when there were talks about a campaign against the Turks[148], his name came up for the first line of the future Christian army. Stephen never stopped promoting the Ottoman war. Whenever the crusade seemed to be drawing near, his messengers went to Buda, Venice and Rome, as in 1501[149].

In the West, Stephen’s rating may have been as high as ever. Maximilian of Habsburg, after Stephen had diplomatically abandoned him in 1490, invited his son and heir, Bogdan, for it was in Christendom’s best interests[150], to join him during his coronation in Rome, scheduled for 1503. Bogdan received, at his own request, the support of pope Jules II[151] in the attempt to marry the daughter of king Sigismund I of Poland, who accused him of being only a schismatic (1509)[152]. A few years before, when Stephen was still alive, strong rumours went around Italy that he, together with Hungary’s king Vladislav II were planning a attack on the Ottoman Empire[153].

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Vladislav, having Stephen’s promise for help, even declared war[154], but nothing significant happened. Local Christian competition and the Christian mission melted into one during his fight with Poland in the last decade of the XVth century[155]. From Moscow[156] to Buda[157], the two aspects were intimately linked. Stephen’s demands on Poland were in Christendom’s best interests[158].

Without actually engaging himself in any large-scale operations, Stephen got the almost maximum profit. He was a hero, ready to come out of retirement. Practically, he did what Mathias had done before. Stephen was a constant threat, not a active one, although always ready to stand in the first line. He lived of his image as the greatest fighter as Mathias had lived of the memory of his predecessors. The Turks felt threatened at the thought of being charged by Stephen’s troupes[159], like when they had felt the menace of Mathias’s[160] army closing in, propaganda aside[161]. Mathias had a German problem[162], Stephen a polish one. Both argued that their Christian neighbour stood in the way of the ottoman fight[163]. Stephen was closer to the truth anyway. The ottoman front, victory there, was the only way out of his regional difficulties. Even so, curiously enough, both Hungary, in 1526[164], and Moldavia, in 1538[165], seemed to have

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been dealt the great ottoman blow at an equal amount of time from Mathias and Stephen’s deaths, in 1490 and 1504.

Stephen’s efforts to promote himself were slightly smaller than before, others were placing him on Christendom’s defence bulwark. His warrior years paid of. Not new successes worked in his favour, but the memory of previous victories. Yet, the context differed. Projects were still there, however something had started to change in the European attitude towards the crusade[166].

Despite time’s flow, nobody else might have been able to take Stephen’s crusader place. With Mathias[167], the recollection of Hungary’s successes, his father’s heritage, was fainting away. After 1490, Hungary’s armies fought more than before against the Ottomans[168]. Probably things would have been different if Mathias had lived on, therefore reducing Stephen’s freedom of action.

Words and Titles. Stephen nevver used the word crusade[169], tough he acted in its spirit, avoiding Eastern or Western reproaches. To Catholics, Orthodoxs alike, he spoke over the Christian fight. The words used by him, and by the Ottomans, in regard to his lands, were gate, bulwark, shield, lock[170], applied to whole Occident as also to his neighbours. Of all these, gate brought Stephen’s fighting into Europe. It meant communion in danger, for Moldavia wasn’t any different than the rest of the “Free World”.

Stephen had a responsibility and others were responsible for him. Close to 1500, when the Turks feared that Christendom’s gates would open in Moldavia and that their empire was going to have to face a mass invasion[171], Stephen once again pictured Moldavia as the only gateway trough which the Ottomans could enter Eastern Europe[172]. He was playing on the idea already accepted by Hungary and Poland-

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Lithuania, that Stephen’s country was the key for regional stability and security[173]. Still, his political interest was enforced by Bayazed II’s reasoning. In the same year 1499, the sultan asked the Tatars to occupy Moldavia, for, if they did so, then he would be free to expand into every part of the world[174]. Moldavia was the opening for the Ottoman Empire.

This had been Hungary condition for a century. It did not fade away. Hungary remained the Ottoman high way into Europe. Only now in the East, Moldavia had opened a new gate both for the Christians and the Pagans[175]. Christendom’s contact area with the Ottoman Empire was evolving.

And there was always the question of personal value. Stephen had won himself the title of true fighter of the Christian belief[176], a Christian knight, title and formula bestowed by Rome upon only two other leaders in the century: John Hunyad[177], George Skanderbeg[178], both Catholics, both before Stephen. Yet there was the Union of Florence and the Moldavian Gate of Christendom. At the same time, athlete was a crusader title that Mathias lacked[179]. But, none of those bearing it were kings. What could have be called the Hungarian Gate and the Romanian Bastion of Christendom[180]

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in light of the lines of vassalage[181] and of the general European advance projects of the Ottoman Empire[182], was turning into a double gate, double menace system, as Moldavia pushed herself and was pushed into the front light. Still the hierarchical rules did not fade away, despite the fact that the Christian power and interest balance got a growingly stronger Eastern counterpart. It was a development that allowed, in 1519[183], the rulers of Wallachia and Moldavia to be recognized by Rome as equal parts in the projected crusade and that eased the way for a distinct concept of an Orthodox war on the Turks[184]. The understanding of Christendom and its gates widened. Stephen of Moldavia had driven and used a medieval concept to its eastern limit, a concept guided, as private property, by Hungary’s Mathias from Rome to the Danube.

 

 

Other articles published in our periodicals by Alexandru Simon:

 

La place chrétienne de la foi des Roumains de Transylvanie en 1574

 

Quello ch’è apresso el Turcho. About a Son of Stephen the Great

 

 

 

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© Șerban Marin, June 2005, Bucharest, Romania

 

Last updated: July 2006

 

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[1] For the year 1473 see Ștefan Sorin Gorovei, 1473: Ștefan, Moldova și lumea catolică [1473: Stephen, Moldavia and the Catholic World], in “Anuarul Institutului de Istorie și Arheologie «A. D. Xenopol»”, XXIX, 1992, pp. 75-84; Eugen Denize, Ștefan cel Mare și luptele cu turcii. O nouă abordare [Stephen the Great and the Ottoman Combats. A New Approach], in “Studii și materiale de istorie medie”, XIX, 2001, pp. 115-128.

[2] Ștefan Andreescu, Une information negligée sur la participation de la Valachie à la bataille de Kosovo, in “Revue des études Sud-Est européennes”, VI, 1, 1968, pp. 85-92.

[3] Francisc Pall, Byzance à la veille de sa chute et Janco de Hunedoara (Hunyadi), in “Byzantinoslavica. Revue internationale des études byzantines”, XIX, 1, 1969, pp. 119-126; Șt. Andreescu, op. cit., pp. 85-92.

[4] Oskar Halecki, From Florence to Brest (1439-1596), Roma, 1958, pp. 32 sqq; Joseph Gill, The Council of Florence, Cambridge, 1959, passim; Borys A. Guzdiak, Crisis and Reform. The Kyvian Metropolitanate, the Patriarchate of Constantinople and the Genesis of the Union of Brest, Cambridge (Massachusetts), 1998, pp. 27 sqq.

[5] Fr. Pall, Intervenția lui Iancu de Hunedoara în Țara Românească și Moldova în anii 1447-1448 [John Hunyad’s Intervention in Wallachia and Moldavia in the years 1447-1448], in “Studii. Revistă de istorie”, XVI, 5, 1963, pp. 1049-1072; Flavius Solomon, Das moldauische Fürstentum und das Problem der christlichen Einheit (Ende 14./15. Jahrhundert), in Church and Society in Central and Eastern Europe (edited by Maria Crăciun and Ovidiu Ghitta), Cluj-Napoca, 1998, pp. 135-155; Dan Ioan Mureșan, Isihasmul și prima etapă a rezistenței la deciziile conciliului florentin în Moldova (1442-1447) [The Hesychasme and the First Phase of the Moldavian Opposition against the Decrees of the Florence Council (1442-1447)], in “Studia Universitatis Babeș-Bolyai. Historia”, XLIV, 1-2, 1999, pp. 3-57.

[6] Șerban Papacostea, La Moldavie état tributaire de l’Empire Ottoman au XVe siècle, le cadre international des rapports établis en 1455-1456, in “Revue Roumaine d’Histoire”, XIII, 3, 1974, pp. 445-460.

[7] See Idem, Domni români și regi angevini: înfruntarea finală (1370-1382) [Romanian Rulers and Anjou Kings: The Final Confrontation], in “Anuarul Institutului de Istorie și Arheologie «A. D. Xenopol»”, XXIII/2, 1986, pp. 571-581; Alexandru Simon, În jurul Carpaților. Formele și realitățile genezei statale românești [Around the Carpathians. The Forms and Realities of the Romanian State Genesis], Cluj-Napoca, 2002, pp. 465-482.

[8] See Donald E. Pitcher, A Historical Geography of the Ottoman Empire from the Earliest Times to the End of the Sixteenth Century, Leiden, 1972, passim.

[9] Pál Engel, The Realm of St. Stephen. A history of Medieval Hungary, London, 2001, passim.

[10] O. Halecki, Un empreur de Byzance à Rome. Vingt ans de travail pour l’union des églises et pour la défense de l’Empire d’Orient, Warsawa, 1930, pp. 48 sqq; Ș. Papacostea, Bizanțul și cruciata la Dunărea de Jos la sfârșitul secolului al XIV-lea [Byzantium and the Crusade on the Lower Danube at the End of the XIVth Century], in “Analele Academiei Române. Memoriile Secțiunii Istorice”, IVth series, XV, 1990, pp. 139-154.

[11] Peter F. Sugar, South-Eastern Europe under Ottoman Rule 1354-1804, Seattle–London, 1979, pp. 26 sqq.

[12] Wilhelm Fraknói, Mathias Corvinus. König von Ungarn (1458-1490), Freiburg im Breisgau, 1891, passim; Peter E. Kovács, Mathias Corvinus, Budapest, 1990.

[13] Lajos Elekes, A magyar-román viszony a Hundyadiak korában [The Romanian-Hungarian Relations during the Hunyad Age], in Mátyás Király Emlékkönyv születésémek ötszáséves fordulójára [Studies on King Mathias’s Reign], vol. II, Budapest, 1940, pp. 173-228; Vasile Pârvan, Relațiile lui Ștefan cel Mare cu Ungaria [Stephen the Great Relations with Hungary] in Idem, Studii de istorie medie și modernă [Studies in Medieval and Modern History] (edited by Lucian Nastasă), Bucharest, 1990, pp. 129-206.

[14] See note 5 and Constantin A. Stoide, Contribuții la istoria Țării Românești între anii 1447-1450 [Contributions to Wallachia’s History in the Years 1447-1450], in “Anuarul Institutului de Istorie și Arhelogie «A. D. Xenopol»”, X, 1973, pp. 163-181; Pavel Chihaia, Artă medievală, vol. III, Țara Românească între Bizanț și Occident [Medieval Art. Wallachia between Byzantium and the Occident], Bucharest, 1998, pp. 104 sqq.

[15] Paul W. Knoll, The Rise of the Polish Monarchy. Piast Poland in East Central Europe, 1320-1370, Chicago–London, 1972, pp. 244 sqq.

[16] See Francis Dvornik, The Slavs in European History and Civilization, Rutgers, 1962.

[17] Konrad G. Gündisch, Participarea sașilor la răzvrătirea din anul 1467 a transilvănenilor împotriva lui Matia Corvinul [The Participation of the Saxons to the Transylvanian Rebellion against Mathias Corvinus in the Year 1467], in “Studia Universitatis Babeș-Bolyai. Historia”, XVII, 1, 1972, pp. 21-30.

[18] Ș. Papacostea, Un episode de la rivalité polono-hongroise au XVe siècle: l’expedition de Matia Corvin en Moldovie (1467) à la lumière d’une nouvelle source, in “Revue Roumaine d’Histoire”, VIII, 6, 1969, pp. 967-979; when Stephen had claimed successfully the throne in 1457, he had the support of the southern countries and of the Wallachians; “The Moldavian-German Chronicle”, in Cronicile slavo-române din secolele XV-XVI publicate de Ioan Bogdan [The Slavic-Romanian Chronicles from the XV-XVI Centuries] (edited by P. P. Panaitescu), Bucharest, 1959, p. 28.

[19] Ioan–Aurel Pop, Relații între Transilvania și Moldova în timpul lui Ștefan cel Mare [The Relations between Transylvania and Moldavia during Stephen the Great’s time], in “Acta Musei Napocensis”, XXXI/2, 1994, pp. 11-21.

[20] O. Halecki, Sixte IV et la chrétienté orientale, in Mélanges Eugène Tisserant, vol. II, Orient Chrétien, Città del Vaticano, 1964, pp. 241-264; Stephen is considered to have acted accordingly to the Union of Florence.

[21] Nicolae Iorga, Veneția în Marea Neagră. III. Originea legăturilor cu Ștefan cel Mare și mediul politic al dezvoltării lor [Venice in the Black Sea. III. The Origins of the Relations with Stephen the Great and the Political Environment for their Development], in “Analele Academiei Române. Memoriile Secțiunii Istorice”, IInd series, XXXVII, 1914-1915, pp. 3-4.

[22] See P. P. Panaitescu, Ștefan cel Mare și orașul București [Stephen the Great and Bucharest], in “Studii. Revistă de istorie”, XII, 1959, pp. 9-23.

[23] Dimitri Obolensky, Russia’s Byzantine Heritage, in “Oxford Slavonic Papers”, I, 1950, pp. 37-63; Nicholas Andreyev, Filofey and his Epistle to Ivan Vasil’yevich, in “Slavonic and East-European Review”, XXXVIII, 1959-1960, pp. 1-31.

[24] D. Obolensky, The Byzantine Commonwealth. Eastern Europe 500-1453, London, 1971, passim.

[25] See the works in note 23; Albert M. Amann, Ostslawische Kirchengeschichte, Wien, 1950, pp. 185 sqq.

[26] O. Halecki, Sixte IV et la chrétienté orientale, pp. 243-246; Șt. S. Gorovei, op. cit., pp. 77-82.

[27] C. A. Stoide, Luptele lui Vlad Țepeș cu turcii 1461-1462 [Vlad the Impaler’s Combats with the Turks], in “Anuarul Institutului de Istorie și Arheologie «A. D. Xenopol»”, XV, 1978, pp. 31-32; Matei Cazacu, Du nouveau sur le rôle international de la Moldavie dans la seconde moitié du XVe siècle, in “Revue des Etudes Roumaines”, XVI, 1981, p. 43; Stephen goes, in collaboration with the Turks, against Vlad’s interests, who was fighting them (at least he is accused of doing so), and expels Franciscan monks from Moldavia.

[28] E. Denize, op. cit., pp. 117-122.

[29] P. P. Panaitescu, op. cit.

[30] Ioan Ursu, Ștefan cel Mare. Domn al Moldovei de la 12 aprilie 1457 până la 2 iulie 1504 [Stephen the Great. Moldavia’s Ruler from the 12th April 1457 to the 2nd July 1504], Bucharest, 1925, pp. 81-83; Nicolae Grigoraș, Moldova lui Ștefan cel Mare [Stephen the Great’s Moldavia], Iași, 1982, pp. 107-116.

[31] Constantin Rezachevici, Ecouri occidentale târzii ale bătăliilor lui Ștefan cel Mare de lângă Vaslui și Valea Mare-Războieni [Late Western Echoes of the Stephen the Great’s Battles], in “Revista de Istorie”, XXVIII, 1, 1975, pp. 67-71.

[32] Fontes Rerum Transylvanicarum (collegit et edidit Andreas Veress). Acta et epistolae relationum Transylvaniae Hungariaeque cum Moldavie et Valachia, vol. IV (I), 1468-1540, Budapest, 1914, no.9, p. 9.

[33] C. Rezachevici, Rolul românilor în apărarea Europei de expansiunea otomană. Secolele XIV-XVI. Evoluția unui concept în contextul vremii [The Role of the Romanians in Europe’s Defence against the Ottoman Expansion. XIV-XVIth Centuries. The Evolution of a Concept in his Time], Bucharest, 2001, pp. 215-216; see also I.–A. Pop, Țările Române ca “Poartă a Creștinătății” la Dunărea de Jos (secolele XV-XVI). Ideea și fapta, în Kulturraum Mittlere und Untere Donau: Traditionen und Perspektiven des Zusammenlebens, Reșița, 1995, pp. 157-163.

[34] V. Pârvan, op. cit., pp. 179 sqq; W. Fraknói, op. cit.

[35] A. D. Xenopol, Istoria Românilor din Dacia Traiană [History of the Romanians], vol. II, De la întemeierea Țărilor Române până la moartea lui Petru Rareș, 1546 (edited by Nicolae Stoicescu), Bucharest, 1987, pp. 298-300.

[36] Augustinus Theiner, Vetera monumenta historica Hungarica sacram illustrantia, vol. II, Ab Innocentio PP. VI. usque ad Clementem PP. VII, 1352-1526, Roma, 1859, no. 634, pp. 449-451; Eudoxiu de Hurmuzaki, Documente privitoare la istoria românilor [Documents concerning the History of the Romanians] (further Documente), vol. VIII, 1376-1650, Bucharest, 1894, no. 18, p. 14; Fontes, vol. IV (I), no. 16, pp. 17-18.

[37] E. de Hurmuzaki, Documente, vol. II/2, 1451-1510 (edited by Nicolae Densușianu), Bucharest, 1891, no. 298, pp. 329-330.

[38] Ibidem, vol. VIII, no. 21, p. 18; N. Grigoraș, op. cit., p. 147.

[39] See the documents in note 36 and A. D. Xenopol, op. cit., pp. 295-296 and p. 298, note 56.

[40] Vetera Monumenta, vol. II, no. 634, pp. 449-451.

[41] Ibidem, no. 636, pp. 453-454.

[42] Fontes, vol. IV, no. 16, pp. 17-18.

[43] Constantin Esarcu, Ștefan cel Mare. Documente descoperite în Archivele Veneției [Stephen the Great. Documents discovered in the Archives of Venice], Bucharest, 1874, no. 8, pp. 52-53; a story could prove relevant. Genovese from Caffa who, had escaped from the Turkish captivity (July 1475), fled to Moldavia, where, instead of being released, they were kept as prisoners, managing to escape to Poland only during the Ottoman campaign of June 1476.It’s a story based on a rapport addressed to the pope from Poland, on a Genovese source (both from 1476), even on a set of instructions given by Stephen to his ambassadors in Poland (1481), but depicted in a totally different manner by the main polish chronicle of the age, by Dlugosz, and a German chronicle from Stephen’s Moldavia (Șt. Andreescu, Cu privire la ultima fază a raporturilor dintre Moldova și Genova [On the Last Phase of the Relations Between Moldavia and Genova], in “Anuarul Institutului de Istorie și Arheologie «A. D. Xenopol»”, XIX, 1982, p. 204; Ioan Bogdan, Documentele lui Ștefan cel Mare [The Documents of Stephen the Great], vol. II, Hrisoave și cărți domnești, 1493-1503. Tractate, acte omagiale, solii, privilegii comerciale, salv-conducte, scrisori, 1457-1503, Bucharest, 1913, no. 193, pp.365-366; “The Moldavian-German Chronicle”, in Cronicile, pp. 32-33). A year later, in 1477, Stephen’s plan to recapture Caffa and Crimeea was announced in Venice (N. Iorga Veneția, p. 70), relations with Genova seeming to have remained normal (Ș. Papacostea, Caffa et la Moldavie face à l’expansion ottomane (1453-1484), in I Genovesi nel Mar Nero durante i secoli XIII e XIV (edited by Ștefan Pascu), Bucharest, 1977, pp. 150-152). If the events from 1475-1476 (when tensions were mounting between Moldavia and Poland, the last one, having, since 1462, the over hand on the Genovese colonies in the Black Sea) had not been closely related to a Moldavian need for ransom or to pay back (Șt. Andreescu, Cu privire la ultima fază, pp. 208-209; in 1482, however Genovese Refuges considered settling down in Moldavia), and they were (since the 1460’s tensions almost turned into a open war, and, in February 1475, Stephen’s peace offer was turned down, because he had asked Caffa to become Mehmed’s enemy; Ș. Papacostea, Moldova lui Ștefan cel Mare și genovezii din Marea Neagră [Stephen the Great’s Moldavia and the Genovese from the Black Sea], in “Anuarul Institutului de Istorie și Arheologie «A. D. Xenopol»”, XXIX, 1992, pp. 72-73), Stephen could not have claimed, without endangering his already vulnerable position, to aim at conquering Caffa. Still such a story, a diplomatic mistake, revealed by the way Dlugosz, a great fan of Stephen, the Moldavian-German Chronicle try to portray it, did not do Stephen any good in Italy and might have contributed to the event of 1484 (note 56). Relating these prisoners to the absence of any Christian solidarity, in Moldavia (Andrei Pippidi, Tratamentul prizonierilor creștini [The Treatment Received by Christian Prisoners] in Idem, Contribuții la studiul legilor războiului în Evul Mediu [Contributions to the Study of War Laws in the Middle Ages], Bucharest, 1974, pp. 331-332) is far fetched once we take into account Genova’s role and Moldavia’s involvement in the Crusade after Otranto (note 51) or look at the treatment received by the Wallachians Orthodoxs during Stephen’s campaigns (P. P. Panaitescu op. cit.).

[44] Franz Babinger, Mehmed II le Conquerant et son temps (1432-1481). La grande peur du monde, tournant de l’histoire, Paris, 1954, pp. 423-428.

[45] N. Grigoraș, op. cit., pp. 190-202; K. G. Gündisch, Siebenbürgen in der Türkenabwehr 1396-1526, in “Revue Roumaine d’Histoire”, XIII, 3, 1974, pp. 435-444; see also Ș. Papacostea, La guerre ajournée: les rélations polono-moldave en 1478. Refléxions en marge d’un text de Filippo Buonaccorsi-Callimachus, in “Revue Roumaine d’Histoire”, XI, 1, 1972, pp. 3-21; since mid 1476, Poland, linked closely to the Ottoman Empire, because of their common interests in the region, tried to determine Rome and Venice to retire their help given to the Ottoman war, because the was, primly, to Mathias’s advantage, but also Stephen’s (see N. Iorga Veneția, p. 54) The Genovese incident may have been useful (see note 43).

[46] Ibidem; see Ș. Papacostea, Relațiile internaționale ale Moldovei în vremea lui Ștefan cel Mare [Moldavia’s International Relations in the time of Stephen the Great], in “Revista de Istorie”, XXXV, 5-6, 1982, pp. 607-638.

[47] In this matter see Șt. S. Gorovei, Autour de la Paix moldo-turque de 1489, in “Revue Roumaine d’Histoire”, XIII, 3, 1974, pp. 535-544; Alexandru V. Boldur, Ștefan cel Mare, voievod al Moldovei (1457-1504). Studiu de istorie socială și politică [Stephen the Great, Voivode of Moldavia (1457-1504). Studies of Social and Political History], Madrid, 1970, p. 236.

[48] K. G. Gündisch, Siebenbürgen in der Türkenabwehr, p. 438; Fontes, vol. IV, no. 30, pp. 32-33.

[49] N. Grigoraș, op. cit., p. 195.

[50] F. Babinger op. cit.; Aurel Decei, Istoria Imperiului Otoman până la 1656 [The History of the Ottoman Empire up to 1656] (edited by Virgil Ciocîltan), Bucharest, 1978, pp. 129-130; C. Rezachevici, Rolul, pp. 227-228.

[51] E. Denize, op. cit., p. 126; Șt. Andreescu, Cu privire la ultima fază, pp. 210-217.

[52] W. Fraknói, op. cit., pp. 282-283; Epistolae Matthiae Corvini Regis Hungariae ad pontifices, imperators, reges, principes, aliosque viros illustres, vol. IV, Košice, 1743, no. 27, pp. 56-57.

[53] I. Ursu, op. cit., pp. 174-177; Ș. Papacostea, Relațiile, p. 623.

[54] Mathias could not get anyone convinced that he had included, under that form, Moldavia in his treaty with the Ottomans (E. de Hurmuzaki, Documente, vol. II/1, 1451-1575 (edited by N. Densușianu), Bucharest, 1891, no. 11, p. 15; Fontes, vol. IV, no. 36, pp. 39-40). Even the sultan was talking about Regno Moldaviae, not about Hungary’s province. There is still a strong possibility that it was not, only, question of mentioning Moldavia as a state, but of the two harbours, regarded as cities in Moldavia’s custody and not in Moldavia’s property, due to their autonomy and their Genovese status (see E. Denize, op. cit., p. 126).

[55] Nicoară Beldiceanu, La conquête de cités marchandés de Kilia et de Cetatea Albă par Bayezid II, in “Südost-Forschungen”, XXIII, 1964, pp. 66-69; treason appears to have be involved in the surrender of the cities.

[56] Only in the spring of 1485 did Stephen attempt to recapture the harbours (Ibidem, p. 86); N. Iorga, Studii istorice asupra Chiliei și Cetății Albe, Bucharest, 1899, p. 167); in this matter, see also Maria Magdalena Székely, Șt. S. Gorovei, “Semne și minuni” pentru Ștefan cel Mare. Note de mentalitate medievală, [“Signs and miracles” for Stephen the Great. Notes on Medieval Mentality], in “Studii și materiale de istorie medie, XVI, 1998, pp. 49 sqq.

[57] N. Iorga, Acte și fragmente cu privire la istoria românilor [Documents and Fragments concerning the History of the Romanians], vol. III/1, Bucharest, 1897, pp. 63-65, 104; Mathias even threw his chancellor in jail.

[58] Not a single document was issued by Stephen, faced with several military claims to his throne; N. Grigoraș, op. cit., pp. 212-219; Sergiu Iosipescu, Contribuții la istoria Moldovei lui Ștefan cel Mare [Contributions to the History of Stephen the Great’s Moldavia], in “Anuarul Institutului de Istorie «A. D. Xenopol»”, XXIX, 1992, p. 64.

[59] Karl Nehring, Herrschaftstradition und Herrschaftslegitimität. Zur ungarischen Aussenpolitik in der Zweiten Hälfte des 15. Jahrhunderts, in “Revue Roumaine d’Histoire”, XIII, 3, 1974, pp. 463-472; K. G. Gündisch, Siebenbürgen in der Türkenabwehr, p. 439; in 1485, Mathias entered Vienna, but his longly awaited success was short lived.

[60] Victor Eskenazy, Omagiul lui Ștefan cel Mare de la Colomeea (1485). Note pe marginea unui ceremonial medieval [Stephen the Great’s Hommage in Colomeea (1485). Notes on a Medieval Ceremony], in “Anuarul Institutului de Istorie «A. D. Xenopol»”, XX, 1983, pp. 257-267; a part of this ceremony could and was interpreted, in its time, as a unjustified humiliation.

[61] Tahsin Gemil, Un izvor referitor la moartea lui Dimitrie Jakšiè, solul lui Matia Corvin la Bayezid II [A source concerning the death of Dimitri Jakšiè, Mathias Corvinus envoy to Bayezid II], in “Anuarul Institutului de Istorie “A. D. Xenopol»”, XXII/2, 1985, pp. 597-604.

[62] I. Ursu, op. cit., p. 204; Ș. Papacostea, De la Colomeea la Codrii Cosminului (poziția internațională a Moldovei la sfârșitul secolului al XV-lea) [From Colomeea to the Cosmin Woods (Moldavia’s International Position at the End of the XVth Century], in “Romanoslavica”, XVII, 1970, pp. 541-542.

[63] Fontes, vol. IV, no. 38, pp. 42-43, still, at first Stephen may have come close to accepting the offer; Ștefana Simionescu, Legăturile dintre Ștefan cel Mare și Maximilian I de Habsburg în lumina unui nou izvor [The Relations between Stephen the Great and Maximilian of Habsburg in light of a new source], in “Revista de Istorie”, XVIII, 1, 1974, pp. 257-262.

[64] Ioan Drăgan, Nobilimea româneasca din Transilvania 1440-1514 [The Romanian Nobility from Transylvania 1440-1514], Bucharest, 2000, p. 98, p. 253, p. 336, for the Romanian questions of this character’s fate.

[65] Ș. Papacostea, De la Colomeea la Codrii Cosminului, pp. 543 sqq; V. Pârvan, op. cit.

[66] W. Fraknói, op. cit.; K. Nehring, op. cit.; see Idem, Mathias Corvinus, Kaiser Friedrich III und das Reich. Zum Hunyadisch-Habsburgischen Gegensatz im Donauraum, Münich, 1989, passim.

[67] See specially Ibidem, p. 23, notes 33-34 seqq.

[68] Dumitru Năstase, Ștefan cel Mare împărat [Stephen the Great Emperor], in “Studii și materialele de istorie medie”, XVI, 1998, pp. 65-74.

[69] Ibidem; “The Anonymous Chronicle of Moldavia”, in Cronicile, p. 14; see Eugen Stănescu, Tendances politiques et états d’esprit au temps d’Etienne le Grand, à la lumière des monuments écrits, in “Revue Roumaine d’Histoire”, IV, 1965, p. 233-260; given the circumstances of the Age, in particular the Roman link, it has to be said to for the papacy, the tsars of Serbia or Bulgaria were only kings, rank, considered insufficient by Serbian and Bulgarian Rulers, with which they had been accepted by the Holy Siege as rulers in the XIIIth and XIVth Century (see F. Dvornik, op. cit.).

[70] Stephens enemies Radu, in 1464, and Basarab, in 1475, both loyal subjects of the sultan, said that they had a empire to rule (Documenta Romaniae Historica, B. Țara Românească, vol. I, 1250-1500 (edited by P. P Panaitescu and Damaschin Mioc), Bucharest, 1966, no. 148, p. 218, no. 175, p. 249, no, 298, p. 394, no. 399, p. 480).

[71] “The Anonymous Chronicle of Moldavia”, in Cronicile, p. 22; see also I.–A. Pop, Relații între Transilvania și Moldova, pp. 18-20.

[72] Cronicile, p. 16; Hermann Jablonowski, Westrussland zwischen Wilna und Moskau. Die politische Stellung und die politischen Tendenzen der russischen Bevölkerung des Grossfürstentums Litauen im 15. Jahrhundert, Leiden, 1955.

[73] D. Năstase, op. cit.; Șt. S. Gorovei, 1473, p. 84; the title does not figure on Stephen’s tombstone.

[74] Franz Dölger, Die “Familie” der Könige im Mittelalter, in Idem Byzanz und die europäische Staatenwelt, Ettal, 1953, pp. 34-69; Petre Guran, La légitimation du pouvoir princier dans les hagiographies slavo-byzantines (XIe-XIVe siècles), in “Archæus. Études d’histoire de religions”, IV, 1-2, 2000, pp. 294-305.

[75] See A. Pippidi, Tradiția politică bizantină în țările române în secolele XVI-XVIII [The Byzantine Political Tradition in the Romanian Countries in XVI-XVIII Centuries], 2nd edition, Bucharest, 2002, pp. 145 sqq.

[76] Moldavia’s metropolite was able to oint the metropolite of Belgrade (“The Cronicle of Macarie”, in Croncile, p. 91).

[77] Valeria Costăchel, Relațiile dintre Moldova și Rusia în timpul lui Ștefan cel Mare [The Relations between Moldavia and Russia in the Time of Stephen the Great], in Studii cu privire la Ștefan cel Mare [Studies on Stephen the Great], Bucharest, 1956, pp. 169-202.

[78] E. de Hurmuzaki, Documente, vol. VIII, no. 18, p. 14.

[79] For both states see Documente Ștefan, vol. II, passim.

[80] N. Beldiceanu, En marge d’une recherche concernant les rélations roumano-athonites, in “Byzantion. Revue internationale des etudes byzantines”, L, 2, 1980, pp. 617-623.

[81] See the works and documents in notes 7 and 38.

[82] Documente Ștefan, vol. II, no. 159, p. 346; see also S. Iosipescu, Ștefan cel Mare–coordonate de strategie pontică [Stephen the Great. Coordinates of Pontic Strategy], in “Revista de Istorie”, XXXV, 5-6, 1982, pp. 639-652.

[83] Veniamin Ciobanu, Coroana: simbol al puterii monarhice și al statului (secolele XII-XVII). Considerații generale [The Crown symbol of the Power of the Monarch and of the State (XII-XVIIth Centuries). General Lines], in “Anuarul Institutului de Istorie “A. D. Xenopol»”, XXXIII, 1996, pp. 1-23; see also Percy Ernst Schramm, Kaiser, Könige und Päpste, IV volumes, Stuttgart, 1968-1971.

[84] Nestor Vornicescu, Ștefan cel Mare și Sfânt erou al creștinătății și al civilizației [Saint Stephen the Great, Hero of Christendom and Civilization], in “Magazin Istoric”, new series, XXVIII, 7, 1994, p. 4.

[85] Dan Cernovodeanu, Arta heraldică în România [The Heraldic Art in Romania], Bucharest, 1977, pp. 117-119; Ileana Căzan, Imaginar și simbol în heraldica medievală, Bucharest, 1996, p. 116.

[86] Epistolae, pars IV, no. 27, pp.56-57; see A. Pippidi, Tradiția politică, pp. 61-63 for the crosses of the Romanian rulers.

[87] This cross appeared on Stephen’s cote of arms at the time the crusade was launched after Otranto (note 51). There seems to be also a possibility (for it see the bibliography used by the works in note 84) that the cross appeared around 1477, soon after the Roman recognition of 1476 (see note 40).

[88] Dimitrie Dan, Cronica episcopiei de Rădăuți cu apendice de documente slavone originale și mai multe ilustrațiuni [The Chronicle of the Bishopric of Rădăuți], Viena, 1912, p. 209 and picture no. 5.

[89] See note 47.

[90] See note 84.

[91] Documente Ștefan, vol. I-II, passim; I. Ursu, op. cit., pp. 290-291; see also Al. V. Boldur, op. cit., p. 153

[92] See note 5; N. Iorga, Istoria bisericii românești și a vieții religioase a românilor [The History of the Church of the Romanians and of their Religious Life], vol. I, Bucharest, 1908, pp. 81-84.

[93] Leon Șimanschi, Politica internă a lui Ștefan cel Mare [Stephen the Great’s Internal Policy], in “Revista de Istorie”, XXIV, 5-6, 1982, pp. 585-606.

[94] Documente Ștefan, vol. II, no. 180, p. 451.

[95] A. Pippidi, Tradiția politică, p. 145.

[96] E. de Hurmuzaki, Documente, vol. II/2, no. 219, pp. 244-245; it is a one of a kind attitude of a Hungarian king.

[97] Ibidem, no. 248, pp. 277-278.

[98] Yvan Radonitch, Histoire des Serbes de l’Hongrie, Paris–Barcelone–Dublin, 1919, pp. 102 sqq.

[99] See Mircea Păcurariu, Istoria Bisericii Ortodoxe Române [History of the Romanian Orthodox Church], 2nd edition, vol. I, Bucharest, 1991, pp. 314 sqq.

[100] Cesare Alzati, Terra romena tra Oriente et Occidente. Etnie et chiese nell’ tardo ‘500, Milano, 1982, pp. 105 sqq.

[101] E. de Hurmuzaki, Documente, vol. XV/1, Acte și scrisori din arhivele orașelor ardelene Bistrița, Brașov, Sibiu [Documents from the Archives of cities Bistrița, Brașov, Sibiu] (edited by N. Iorga), Bucharest, 1911, no. 1221, pp. 659-660; the formula repeats itself three times inside the document: Episcopus Valachorum transilvanensium romanam videlicet seu graecam religionem profitentium [...] ita tamen ut ipse religionem romanam sive grecam illis quibus interest, libere profiteri ac erudire [..] presbyteris walachis ac alterius cuiusvis status et condicionis hominibus grecam, ut premissum est, seu romanam religionem profitentibus; see for comparaison the case of the Italo-Greeks (Vittorio Peri, Chiesa Romana e “Rito” Greco. G. A. Santoro e la Congregazione dei Greci (1566-1596), Brescia, 1975, p. 37, p. 40, p. 43, p. 75, pp. 190-205; Florence’s “place” after Trento).

[102] Ș. Papacostea, Between the Crusade and the Mongol Empire. The Romanians in the 13th Century, Cluj-Napoca, 1998, passim; Șerban Turcuș, Sfântul Scaun si românii în secolul al XIII-lea [The Holy Siege and the Romanians in the XIIIth Century], Bucharest, 2001, passim.

[103] Norman Housley, King Louis the Great of Hungary and the Crusades, 1342-1382, in “Slavonic and East European Review”, LXII, 1982, pp. 192-208.

[104] Ilie Minea, Principatele Române și politica orientală a împăratului Sigismund [The Romanian Principalities and Emperor Sigismund’s Oriental Policy], Bucharest, 1914, passim; Elemer Mályusz, Kaiser Sigismund in Ungarn. 1387-1437, Budapest, 1990, passim.

[105] Lájos Elekes, Hunyadi, Budapest, 1952, passim; Camil Mureșan, Iancu de Hunedoara, Bucharest, 1968, passim.

[106] See Bernard Guénnée, L’Occident au XIVe et XVe siècles. Les Etats, Paris, 1993, passim.

[107] See Joseph Gill, Byzantium and the Papacy, 1198-1400, New Brunswick–New Jersey, 1979.

[108] See O. Halecki, Un empreur, passim; the problem remains a very delicate one, for it melts into one politics and religion, in a region, better known for changing alliances than for absolute purity and right, regardless of Church.

[109] Vitalien Laurent, Les premiers patriarches de Constantinople sous la domination turque (1454-1476), in “Revue des études byzantines”, XXVI, 1968, pp. 229 sqq; Steven Runciman, The Great Church in Captivity: A Study of the Patriarchate of Constantinople from the Eve of the Turkish Conquest to the Greek War of Independence, London, 1968, passim; D. Năstase, Le Mont Athos et l’Orient chretien et musulman au Moyen Âge, in “Revue Roumaine d’Histoire”, XXXII, 3-4, 1993, pp. 317 sqq.

[110] See the case of the 14th Century efforts in Michel Lascaris, Actes serbes de Vatopédi, in “Byzantinoslavica. Revue internationale des études byzantines”, VI, 1935, pp. 5 sqq.; P. F. Sugar, op. cit., pp. 20-21; O. Halecki, Un empereur, pp. 183 sqq.

[111] V. Laurent, L’idéé de guerre sainte et la tradition byzantine, in “Bulletin de la Section Historique de l’Académie Roumaine”, XXIII, 1946, p. 71-98.

[112] Idem, Les premiers patriarches, pp. 230-232; D. Năstase, Le Mont Athos et l’Orient chretien, pp. 318-319.

[113] E. de Hurmuzaki, Documente, vol. I/2, 1346-1459 (edited by Nicolae Densușianu), Bucharest, 1890, no. 123, p. 159; Documenta Romaniae Historica. D. Relatiile între Țările Române [Relations between the Romanian Countries], vol. I, 1222-1456 (edited by Șt. Pascu, Constantin Cihodaru, K. G. Gündisch, D. Mioc, Viorica Pervain), Bucharest, 1977, no. 61, p. 106, no. 62, pp. 107-108.

[114] Dan Pleșia, Șt. Andreescu, Un episode inconnue des campagnes du voievode Dan II, prince de Valachie, in “Revue Roumaine d’Histoire, XIII, 3, 1974, pp. 545-557; Nicolae Grigoraș, Relațiile Moldovei cu Imperiul Otoman până la domnia lui Ștefan cel Mare [Moldavia’s Relations with the Ottoman Empire until Stephen the Great’s Reign], in “Revista de Istorie”, XXVIII, 1, 1975, pp. 33 sqq; Mircea Popa, Aspecte ale politicii internaționale a Țării Românești și Moldovei în timpul lui Mircea cel Bătrân și Alexandru cel Bun [Aspects of the International Policy of Wallachia and Moldavia in time of Mircea the Old and Alexander the Good], in “Revista de Istorie”, XXXI, 2, 1978, pp. 253-271; C. A. Stoide, Basarab al II-lea (1442-1444), in “Anuarul Institutului de Istorie și Arheologie «A. D. Xenopol»”, XVII, 1980, pp. 279-302; to what concerns Moldavia, it appears that, already in 1433, Stephen II appealed the Turks for support against Iliaș, who had defeated them the previous year.

[115] I. Minea, Vlad Dracul și vremea sa [Vlad Dracul and His Time], Iași, 1928, pp. 7 sqq.

[116] V. Ciocîltan, Între Sultan și Împărat: Vlad Dracul în 1438 [Between the Emperor and the Sultan. Vlad Dracul in 1438], in “Revista de Istorie”, XXIX, 11, 1976, pp. 1767-1790; P. Chihaia, op. cit., passim; Wallachia was absent from the Council of Florence. Perhaps, Vlad II exploited Sigisimund of Luxemburg’s resentments towards this council in order to place his refusal of the union. From then one, it is supposed he fought for a purely orthodox idea, a formula that requires a detailed study in the framework 1436-1450.

[117] C. Rezachevici, Rolul, pp. 191-192.

[118] Fr. Pall, Intervenția, pp. 1049 sqq.

[119] Ș. Papacostea, La Valachie et la crise de structure de l’Empire ottoman (1402-1413), in “Revue Roumaine d’Histoire”, XXV, 1-2, 1986, pp. 30-31.

[120] Florin Constantiniu, Ș. Papacostea, Tratatul de la Lublau (15 martie 1412) și situația internațională a Moldovei la începutul secolului al XV-lea [The Treaty of Lublau (15 mars 1412) and the Moldavia’s International Situation at the Beginning of the XVth Century], in “Studii. Revistă de istorie”, XVII, 5, 1964, pp. 1129-1140.

[121] N. Grigoraș, Relațiile, p. 30

[122] See T. Gemil, Românii și otomanii în secolele XIV-XVI [The Romanians and the Ottomans in XIV-XV Centuries], Bucharest, 1991, pp. 58-59, pp. 112 sqq.

[123] See note 5.

[124] Radu Constantinescu, Documente ragusane în colecția de microfilme a Arhivelor Statului [Documents from Dubrovnik in the Microfilms Collection of the National State Archive], in “Revista Arhivelor”, LVIII, 1, 1981, p. 36.

[125] C. Rezachevici, Rolul, p. 196; L. Șimanschi, Dumitru Agachi, Înscăunarea lui Ștefan cel Mare; preliminarii și consecințe [Stephen’s the Great Enthronement; Preliminaries and Consequences] in Românii în civilizația occidentală [The Romanians in the Western Civilization] Iași, 1997, pp. 211 sqq; Adrian Andrei Rusu, Ioan de Hunedoara și românii din vremea sa. Studii [John Hunyad and the Romanians of His Time. Studies], Cluj-Napoca, 1999, pp. 77 sqq; Stephen’s father, Bogdan, who came to power (1449) after the troubles caused by the Moldavian civil war and its Florentine back-ground, was a loyal supporter of John Hunyad’s policy, a promoter of religious union. After his father’s assassination (1451), Stephen found refuge in Transylvania, where he first claimed the throne (1455), then supposedly left for Wallachia, when Vlad the Impaler, son of Vlad Dracul became ruler (1456). With his aid, Stephen went on to regain Moldavia (1457). In the long run, two aspects from his youth may be of considerable significance: Theoctist, the anti-unionist metropolite, entered Moldavia only after the death of Stephen’s father, (1453-1454). The only Moldavian chronicles, closer to the 1400’s, mentioning the event, date it in the time of Alexander II, one of Bogdan’s successors, however places him before Stephen’s father (“The Chronicle of Putna I”; “The Chronicle of Putna II”; “The Romanian Translation of the Chronicle of Putna”, in Cronicile, p. 49, p. 61, p. 70). Relevant enough is the fact that the same chronicles are the first ones to introduce the Stephen’s ointment by Theoctist as ruler of Moldavia, an episode absent from the “The Anonymous Chronicle of Moldavia” (in Ibidem, p. 15; the death of Theoctist is, in return, mentioned), yet the writing closest to the Stephen’s official chronicle. The tomb stone placed by Stephen the Great on the Stephen II’s grave, a leader of the Anti-Florentine party, fits into a large process of care for his ancestors memory, started in 1480 and finished in 1497 with this grave (Repertoriul monumentelor și obiectelor de artă din timpul lui Ștefan cel Mare [The Repertoire of Monuments and Artefacts from Stephen the Great’s Time] (edited by Mihail Berza), Bucharest, 1958, p. 249, p. 250, p. 252, p. 253, pp. 255-256, pp. 262-263, p. 273, p. 275). Also, of great interest for Stephen’s rule, for its memory, might be that absence of Stephen II’s beheading from the “The Anonymous Chronicle of Moldavia” (in Cronicile, p. 15), in opposition with the blinding inflicted by Stephen II on his brother and rival Iliaș, a supporter of the Union of Florence (this episode is mentioned by the other chronicles who add Theoctist’s coming to Moldavia).

[126] Theoctist’s power, at its peak, in 1462, in N. Iorga, Istoria Bisericii, pp. 83-84; see also Șt. S. Gorovei, 1473, p. 84, in regard to Stephen’s attitude in the Florentine question and in.the Franciscan Incident of 1462/1463.

[127] N. Housley, The Avignon Papacy and the Crusades, 1305-1378, Oxford–New York, 1986; Idem, The Later Crusades. From Lyons to Alcazar, 1274-1580, Oxford–New York, 1992.

[128] N. Grigoraș, Relațiile, pp. 29-31; N. Stoicescu, Vlad Țepeș [Vlad the Impaler], Bucharest, 1976, pp. 26-33; Stephen and Vlad, both kept (prepared) in Transylvania, were John Hunyad’s solutions for the crises.

[129] For the projects of this age (1457-1470), see A. Decei, op. cit.; F. Babinger, op. cit.

[130] Fontes, vol. IV, no. 16, pp. 17-18.

[131] E. de Hurmuzaki, Documente, vol. VIII, no. 26, pp. 23-25.

[132] Călători străini despre Țările Române [Foreign Travellers on the Romanian Countries], volume I (edited by Maria Holban), Bucharest, 1968, p. 149.

[133] C. Rezachevici, Rolul, p. 214.

[134] Vetera Monumenta, vol. II, no. 634, pp. 449-451, no. 636, pp. 453-454.

[135] A. D. Xenopol, op. cit., pp. 298-299.

[136] W. Fraknói, op. cit., passim; the documents in Epistolae, passim and Magyarország egyházi és politikai összeköttetései a római szentszékkel [The Ecclesiastical Relations between Hungary and the Holy Siege], vol. II, Budapest, 1902.

[137] N. Iorga, Veneția, pp. 73-75; George Lăzărescu, N. Stoicescu, Țările Române și Italia până la 1600 [The Romanian Countries and Italy until the Year 1600], Bucharest, 1972, pp. 92-93; for Venice’s double-triple game (Rome–Istanbul–Suceava) see also E. Denize, Veneția, Țările Române și ofensiva otomană după căderea Constantinopolului (1453-1479) [Venice, The Romanian Countries and the Ottoman Offensive following the Fall of Byzantium], in “Revista Istorică”, new series, V, 11-12, 1994, pp. 1157-1194.

[138] Ibidem; C. Esarcu, op. cit., no. 8, pp. 52-53.

[139] A. Decei, op. cit.

[140] See Ovidiu Cristea, Siamo Veneziani e poi Christiani. Some Remarks Concerning the Venetian Attitude towards the Crusade, in “Annuario dell’Istituto Romeno di Cultura e Ricerca Umanistica di Venezia”, III, 3, 2001, pp. 105-116.

[141] For example Fontes, vol. IV, no. 11, pp. 12-13, no. 13, pp. 14-15, no. 15, pp. 16-17 (all from 1475) and no. 25, pp. 28-29 (from 1476), and then no. 32, pp. 34-35, no. 33, p. 36, no. 34, p. 37 (all from 1480-1481).

[142] N. Grigoraș, Moldova lui Ștefan, pp. 180-182; V. Pârvan, op. cit.

[143] V. Pârvan, op. cit.

[144] Vetera Monumenta, vol. II, no. 530, p. 351, no. 534, pp. 356-357, in 1460, pope Pius II gave instruction that if Mathias did not move soon, the money should be put under lock; N. Iorga, Notes et extraits pour servir à l’histoire des croisades au XVe siècle, vol. IV, 1453-1476, Bucharest, 1915, pp. 180-186; N. Stoicescu, op. cit., pp. 87-88.

[145] Ș. Papacostea, Cu privire la geneza și răspândirea povestirilor scrise despre faptele lui Vlad Țepeș [About the Genesis and Spread of the Written Stories on Vlad the Impaler’s Deeds], in “Romanoslavica”, XIII, 1966, pp. 159-167.

[146] Gheorghe Duzinchevici, Războiul moldo-polon din 1497. Critica izvoarelor [The Moldavian-Polish War of 1479. The Exam of the Sources], in “Studii și materiale de istorie medie”, VIII, 1975, pp. 9-61.

[147] E. Denize, Ștefan cel Mare și luptele cu turcii, pp. 125-128; see Idem, Ștefan cel Mare și războiul otomano-venețian din 1499-1503 [Stephen the Great and the Ottoman-Venetian War of 1499-1503], in “Revista de Istorie”, XLI, 10, 1988, pp. 997-991; in 1499, Stephen crushed a Turkish army, who after a misfortunate expedition into Poland, tried to pass through Moldavia. Nevertheless one year before, he had supported the Ottoman campaign in Poland; see N. Grigoraș, Moldova lui Ștefan, p. 254.

[148] Ibidem, pp. 252-272; E. Denize, Ștefan cel Mare și războiul, pp. 997-991; C. Rezachevici, Rolul, passim.

[149] I. Ursu, op. cit., pp. 262-263; N. Grigoraș, Moldova lui Ștefan, p. 264.

[150] Șt. Simionescu, op. cit., p. 98.

[151] C. Alzati, op. cit., p. 248, note 5.

[152] E. de Hurmuzaki, Documente, vol. II/2, no. 459, pp. 577-578.

[153] I. Ursu, Ștefan cel Mare și turcii [Stephen the Great and the Turks], Bucharest, 1914, pp. 172-173.

[154] Ibidem, p. 262.

[155] See Al. V. Boldur, op. cit., pp. 292-295.

[156] Idem, Politica lui Ștefan cel Mare într-o lumină nouă [Stephen the Great’s Politics in a New Light], in “Studii și cercetări istorice”, XVIII, 1943, p. 58; in 1499, now Lithuania talked to Moscow about Moldavia as their Gate.

[157] Ș. Papacostea, De la Colomeea la Codrii Cosminului, p. 538; N. Grigoraș, Moldova lui Ștefan, pp. 252, 261-262

[158] As an example, the crusade proclaimed in 1500 to which Stephen wants to attended but is impeached by the problems caused by Poland, problems still of concern in 1501, when he informs the new king, that the Turks are ready to attak Hungary (E. de Hurmuzaki, Documente, vol. II/2, no. 402, pp. 456-457, no. 419, pp. 476-481, no. 422, pp. 487-491; Ibidem, vol. VIII, no. 31, pp. 30-32; N. Grigoraș, Moldova lui Ștefan, pp. 262-263).

[159] C. Rezachevici, Rolul, p. 222.

[160] Fontes, vol. IV, no. 24, pp. 26-27, no. 25, pp. 28-29 (from 1476).

[161] For Mathias, compare W. Fraknói, op. cit., passim with V. Pârvan, op. cit.; see also I. Ursu Bătălia de la Câmpul Pâinii (1479), in “Revista pentru istorie, arheologie și filologie”, XIV, 1913, pp. 138-150.

[162] K. Nehring, Herrschaftstradition und Herrschaftslegitimität, passim.

[163] See note 158 and for Mathias, in the year 1476, see Fontes, vol. IV, no. 22, pp. 25-26; despite these allegation and its actual, more “peaceful”, ottoman policy, Poland still claimed a great role in Christendom’s defence: see Paul W. Knoll, Poland as “Antemurale Christianitas” in the latter Middle Ages, in “Catholic Historical Review”, LX, 1974, pp. 381-401.

[164] P. Engel, op. cit., pp. 232 sqq.

[165] T. Gemil, Les rélations de la Moldavie avec la Porte ottomane pendant le premier règne de Petru Rareș 1527-1538, in “Revue Roumaine d’Histoire”, XVII, 2, 1978, pp. 291-312; still, almost as in Hungary, but over a longer time frame in Moldavia, the Ottoman Empire did not gain a strong overhand East of the Carpathians until 1559, or even 1574, and therefore making it a part of the “Ottoman Commonwealth” (see Șt. Andreescu, Limitele cronologice ale dominației otomane în Țările Române [The Chronological Limits of the Ottoman Domination over the Romanian Countries], in “Revista de Istorie”, XXVII, 3, 1974, pp. 409-410; Șt. S. Gorovei, Moldova în «Casa Păcii». Pe marginea izvoarelor privind primul secol de relații moldo-otomane [Moldavia in the “House of Peace”. A Research Based on the Sources Regarding the first Century of Moldavian-Ottoman Relations], in “Anuarul Institutului de Istorie și Arheologie «A. D. Xenopol»”, XVII, 1980, pp. 662-666; Idem, Câteva însemnări pentru istoria relațiilor româno-otomane în veacurile XV-XVI [On the History of the Romanian-Ottoman Relations in the 15th-16th Centuries], in Românii în istoria universală (coordinated by Ion Agrigoroaiei, Gheorghe Buzatu, Vasile Cristian), vol. I, Iași, 1986, p. 40).

[166] C. Rezachevici, Rolul, pp. 229 sqq.

[167] W. Fraknói, op. cit., passim; P. Engel, op. cit.

[168] K. G. Gündisch, Siebenbürgen in der Türkenabwehr, p. 439.

[169] C. Rezachevici, Rolul, p. 213.

[170] See note 36 and Documente Ștefan, vol. II, no. 191, p. 476 (1503: Stephen addressing the polish ambassadors); E. de Hurmuzaki, Documente, vol. VIII, no. 27, p. 25 (1477: Stephen’s ambassador in Venice); for the Turkish speech on Moldavia’s geopolitical, symbolical status, Donato Da Lezze, Historia Turchesca (edited by I. Ursu), Bucharest, 1910, p. 38, p. 82, p. 91; Cronici turcești privind Țările Române. Extrase [Turkish Chronicles regarding the Romanian Countries], vol. I, Secolul XV-mijlocul secolului XVII (edited by Mihail Guboglu and Mustafa Ali Mehmet), Bucharest, 1966, pp. 457-458; for Rome’s use (for Rome the Union of Florence was still valid and functional in 1496, E. de Hurmuzaki, Documente, vol. II/2, no. 330, p. 370) of the term gate for Moldavia see Ș. Turcuș, op. cit., p. 134, note 2; Moldavia was the Gate, the bulwark that stood in the Ottoman way to the Golden Apple, the imperial symbol who flew to Rome from Byzantium, after its fall, according to Ottoman ideology.

[171] Călători străini, vol. I, p. 146.

[172] A. D. Xenopol, op. cit., p. 333.

[173] Ș. Papacostea, De la Colomeea la Codrii Cosminului, p. 538.

[174] E. de Hurmuzaki, Documente, vol. II/2, no. 393, p. 493.

[175] It is the term generally used to define the Turks, underling the purely Christian aspects of Stephen’s fight and of the problems involved by it, a term used both to promote Christian Unity and Christian problems; see for instance P. P. Panaitescu, Contribuții la istoria culturii românești [Contributions to the History of the Romanian Culture] (edited by Silvia Panaitescu and Dan Zamfirescu), Bucharest, 1971, p. 109; A. Pippidi, Tradiția politică, p. 145.

[176] Vetera Monumenta, vol. II, no. 634, pp. 449-451.

[177] Ioan Lupaș, Der Siebenbürgische Woiwode Johannes Huniades “Fortissimus athleta Christi”, in Idem, Zur Geschichte der Rumänien. Aufsätze und Vorträge, Sibiu, 1943, pp.134-153; John of Hunyad may have been named unico Christi fortissimo athleta, by pope Calist III only after his death (1456).

[178] J. Gill, Pope Callistus III and Skanderbeg the Albanian, in “Orientalia Christiana Periodica”, XXXIII, 1967, pp. 534-562 [reprinted in Idem, Church Union: Rome and Byzantium (1204-1453), London, 1979]; S. N. Naci, À propos de quelques truchements concernent les rapports de la papauté avec Skanderbeg durant la lutte albano-turque (1443-1468), in “Studia Albanica”, V, 1968, pp. 73-86; Fr. Pall, Skanderbeg et Ianco de Hunedoara, in “Revue des études Sud-Est européennes”, VI, 1, 1968, pp. 5-21; his becoming a Catholic was perhaps a consequence of this title, received after the death of Hunyad.

[179] Mathias was the verum Christi pugilem (Monumenta Vaticana Hungariae, vol. I/6: W. Fraknói, Mathiae Corvini Hungariae Regis epistolae ad Romanos Pontifices datae et ab eis acceptae, Budapest, 1891, no. 82, p. 109; K. Nehring, Mathias Corvinus, Kaiser Friedrich III und das Reich, p. 75), a title still open to interpretations, as we don not know where it was suggested by Mathias’men, or it came out of Rome’s own initiative, and as this title seems to have come to life only a few months before that of Stephen’s, which appears superior to the formula attached to Mathias.

[180] The opposite idea in Lájos Elekes, Il bastione ungherese e le porte rumene dell’Europa, Budapest, 1940; see also V. Ciobanu, Implicații ideologice ale impactului otoman asupra Europei (secolele XIV-XVII). Câteva considerații [Ideological Consequences of the Ottoman Impact on Europe. General Lines], in “Anuarul Institutului de Istorie și Arheologie «A. D. Xenopol»”, XXXI, 1994, p. 190; and more recently: Nora Berend, Défense de la Chrétienté et naissance d’une identité: Hongrie, Pologne et la Péninsule ibérique au Moyen Âge, in “Annales : histoire, sciences sociales”, LVIII, 5, 2003, pp. 1009-1027.

[181] A perspective on the relations of Wallachia and Moldavia with Hungary and Poland in Grigore C. Conduratu, Relațiunile Țării Românești și Moldovei cu Ungaria. Până la anul 1526 [Wallachia and Moldavia’s Relations with Hungary], Bucharest, 1896, passim; V. Ciobanu, Țările Române și Polonia. Secolele XIV-XVI [The Romanian Countries and Poland. XIV-XVI Centruries], Bucharest, 1985, passim; it is hard to say how this system would have worked, had Mathias lived on after the alliance concluded between him and Stephen in 1489. Vassalage was still there. Positively, Stephen would not have gotten the attention his received in his last years of reign.

[182] T. Gemil, Românii și otomanii, pp. 58-59; P. P. Panaitescu, De ce n-au cucerit Turcii Țările Române [Why did the Turks not Conquer the Romanian Countries], in Idem, Interpretări românești. Studii de istorie economică și socială (edited by Șt. S. Gorovei and Maria Magdalena Székely) [Romanian Interpretations], Bucharest, 1994, pp. 111-118.

[183] E. de Hurmuzaki, Documente, vol. II/3, 1475-1531 (edited by N. Densușianu), Bucharest, 1893, no. 224, pp. 307-309; Florentina Căzan, Politica echilibrului european în prima jumătate a secolului XVI [The Policy of European Balance in the First Half of the XVIth Century], in “Studii și articole de istorie”, XXI, 1973, p. 9; A. Pippidi, Tradiția politică, p. 218, note 50; in 1519, Rome, again with no success, offered Vasili III of Moscow recognition as tsar, in exchange for his participation in the planned crusade and for his acceptance of the Church Union.

[184] “The Moldavian-Russian Chronicle”, in Cronicile, pp. 158-159; second/third decade of the XVIth Century, sketches the way for a purely orthodox anti-ottoman fight. The Latin origin of the Romanians started fitting into the eastern rule book, for they, as the old true Christians, had rejected the false claims of the Holy Siege. Peter Rareș’s combat got the support of the orthodox hard-liners; see Petru Rareș (chief editor and coordinated by L. Șimanschi), Bucharest, 1978, passim; see also D. I. Mureșan, Autour de l’élément politique du culte de Sainte Parascève la Jeune en Moldavie, in L’empereur hagiographe: culte des saints et monarchie Byzantine et post-byzantine; Actes des Colloques internationaux “L’empereur hagiographe” (13-14 mars 2000) et “Reliques et miracles” (1-2 novembre 2000) tenus au New Europe College (edited and coordinated by Petre Guran with the collaboration of Bernard Flusin), Bucharest, 2001, pp. 249-280.