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Lessons for Today from the Vietnam War Peace Movement
By PAUL SIEGEL
Although there are important differences between the guerrilla war now
being
waged in occupied Iraq and the long-lasting high casualty war in
Vietnam,
there are many lessons to be learned from the antiwar movement during
the
Vietnam war that can be used by the antiwar movement today.
Many in today's antiwar movement regard its task as rescuing the
American
presidency from the Texas oil men who wish to gain control of Iraq's
vast
oil reserves and to tighten U.S. dominance of the Middle East in the
interests of Big Oil. These oil men they see as having enlisted the
services
and accepted the ideology of a neo-conservative cabal that unabashedly
speaks of an American empire that will bring order to the world,
embarking
on a foreign policy that can only bring disaster.
The Vietnam war revealed, however, that American imperialism is not an
aberration but a steady drive. Although five successive presidential
administrations, Democratic and Republican, spoke publicly, as the Bush
administration does, of defending democracy and freedom, the internal
government documents that came to light through Daniel Ellsberg's and
Anthony Russo's publication of the Pentagon Papers spoke a different
language—the language of securing control of raw materials and
strengthening
regional dominance.
The Truman administration gave military aid to the French government
seeking
to retain its Indo-Chinese colonial empire against the national
liberation
struggle led by Ho Chi Minh because it feared that a flourishing
Communist
Vietnam would attract the other countries of Southeast Asia to go the
same
route. And Southeast Asia, said a secret memorandum of the National
Security
Council, "is the principal world source of natural rubber and tin, and
a
producer of petroleum and other strategically important commodities."
Moreover, continued the memorandum, should this happen it "would
seriously
jeopardize fundamental U.S. security interests in the Far East,"
rendering
the position of the U.S. military bases in the region "precarious" and
even
making it "extremely difficult to prevent Japan's eventual
accommodation to
communism."
Therefore , a State Department memorandum concluded, if the French were
forced to withdraw, "the U.S. would have to consider most seriously
whether
to take over in this area." These were the considerations that governed
the
subsequent Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon administrations.
During these long years the U.S. antiwar movement grew from a small
number
of demonstrators heckled by counter-demonstrators to a mighty force.
This
force, as Howard Zinn says in his chapter on the war in “A People's
History
of the United States” (Harper Collins, 1995), which should be required
reading for all antiwar activists today, "played a critical part in
bringing
the war to an end."
It not only did that. The "Vietnam syndrome" has long made American
imperialism hesitate about engaging in military ventures, especially
those
that might entail high casualties. The memory of the popular opposition
to
the Vietnam war in the U.S. and abroad also played a part in the
organization of the huge worldwide antiwar demonstrations before the
invasion of Iraq.
The memory of this opposition has brought about a speeding up in many
respects of the process that occurred during the Vietnam war. What took
years is now taking months.
Some in the United States were, however, discouraged by the fact that
these
demonstrations, which were far bigger in the United States than they
had
been until the late stages of the war in Vietnam, did not stop the
invasion.
The Bush administration seemed too arrogant in its disregard of public
opinion, the American media too compliant to expose the lies about Iraq
constituting an imminent threat and being tied to the al Qaeda, the
general
public too accepting of what it was being told for the demonstrations
to
make an impact.
These activists would have been less disheartened if they remembered
that
Nixon, who, when he became president, stated, as Bush has done, that
protests would not affect his decision-making, acknowledged in his
memoir
that he had given up plans to intensify the war because of the anti-war
movement.
The Pentagon Papers expose the administration's concerns that, as one
secret
government analysis stated, "there may be a limit beyond which many
Americans and much of the world will not permit the United States to
go"
and, as another analysis put it, "the growing disaffection ... runs
great
risk of provoking a domestic crisis of unprecedented proportions." The
culmination was the U.S. signing a peace agreement that brought the war
to a
close.
“Peace” candidates derailed movement
One way in which a present lack of confidence in the antiwar movement's
ability to force the government to withdraw from Iraq manifests itself,
as
it did during the Vietnam war, is activity on behalf of presidential
candidates of the Democratic Party who are critical of administration
war
policies. A glance at the so-called peace candidates during the Vietnam
war
will be helpful in this connection.
The 759-page exhaustive and solidly documented history of the antiwar
movement, “Out Now!” (Monad Press, 1978), by Fred Halstead, a major
leader
of the movement and Socialist Workers Party candidate for president in
1968,
recalls the events.
In response to enormous antiwar sentiment, Senator Eugene McCarthy
challenged Johnson in the Democratic Party primaries of 1968. He called
for
a suspension of U.S. bombing and the initiation of negotiations with
the
National Liberation Front.
In his formal announcement of his candidacy he deplored the "discontent
and
frustration" and the "disposition to take extralegal if not illegal
actions
to manifest protest" that he saw developing. His candidacy, he hoped,
would
"restore to many people a belief in the processes of American politics"
and
"counter the growing sense of alienation" that was leading to "threats
of
support for third parties or fourth parties or other irregular
political
movements."
The choice at the Democratic Party convention, however, was not between
Johnson and McCarthy. Johnson, finding that Vietnam was a bone in his
throat
he could neither cough up nor swallow and faced with demonstrators
chanting,
"Hey, hey, LBJ, how many kids did you kill today?" everywhere he went,
announced that he would not run.
McCarthy's candidacy did indeed lead very many back to the normal
"processes
of American politics," as McCarthy frankly hoped it would. They
diverted
their energy from building mass demonstrations to electioneering, but
the
Democratic Party machine chose Vice-President Humphrey rather than
McCarthy
as the party's candidate.
Humphrey had a reputation as a liberal reformer, but he could not
escape the
stigma of being the vice president of Johnson, who had in the 1964
election
campaign presented himself as a man without the trigger-happy
propensities
of his opponent, Barry Goldwater, and then after his election had
escalated
the war. Nixon, who promised that he would get the United States out of
Vietnam, won in the race against Humphrey.
The 1972 election campaign resembled the 1968 campaign in a number of
ways.
Again, many antiwar activists directed their energy to gaining the
Democratic nomination for a dovish candidate, Senator George McGovern.
Having gained the nomination, McGovern discouraged demonstrations and
retracted his previous call for immediate withdrawal from Vietnam but
promised to gain peace within three months of his election.
Nixon after his 1968 election had in response to the demonstrations
reduced
the number of American troops in Vietnam but had sought to win the war
by
beefing up the South Vietnamese government forces with much more
materiel
and bombing more heavily than ever. When, because of the weakness of
the
unpopular South Vietnamese government and the determination of the
Vietnamese peasants, this strategy did not work, he escalated the
bombing
even more and invaded Cambodia and Laos to curtail supplies to the
National
Liberation Front, arousing great outrage.
Yet Nixon won the 1972 election overwhelmingly. In the weeks before the
election he suspended bombing and engaged in negotiations with the
National
Liberation Front whose substance was kept secret, and Secretary of
State
Kissinger announced, "We believe that peace is at hand," only a few
details
needing to be taken care of.
McGovern expressed satisfaction with this development and refrained
from
calling for the immediate withdrawal of troops.
After Nixon carried the 1972 election, negotiations dragged on for
weeks and
then were finally broken off, with the U.S. resuming bombing on a scale
greater than ever before. This revived the antiwar movement, which held
a
gigantic "counter-inaugural" demonstration at Nixon's inauguration.
Shortly
after, the Nixon administration signed a peace agreement that was
virtually
the same as that which it had rejected before.
The "peace" candidates, we can conclude from this condensed summary of
Halstead's richly detailed account, only succeeded in periodically
depriving
the antiwar movement of steam. They did not bring peace.
“Bring the Troops Home Now”
Despite such episodic sputtering, the movement, which included diverse
groups, engaged in controversy that ironed out certain principles that
guided its main sections and enabled the movement to drive forward to
victory. The first of these was that the single purpose of the movement
was
to bring the war to an end by mobilizing masses against it.
It was not, therefore, to concern itself with multiple issues, as many
who
wished to transform it into a political party or an organization
attached to
a political party sought. Political organizations working in it could
publicize their positions within the movement and outside it, but the
antiwar coalition itself, united in seeking to mobilize the greatest
number,
would advance only central antiwar demands.
It would not engage in exhibitionistic forays that would isolate it
from the
masses, as the anarchistically inclined wished to. However, it would
not
exclude either radicals, as red-baiting moderates desired, or
major-party
moderates, as ultra-lefts desired.
Finally, the antiwar coalition would make its tactical decisions by
democratic discussion and voting in meetings open to all. It would not
be a
front for an organization that gives marching orders to the foot
soldiers it
summons.
These principles of organization, which proved successful in building
the
movement, would be well worth striving for today. So too problems and
opportunities Halstead described as faced by the movement remain with
us
today, and we can profit from his recital of how it dealt with them,
not
always entirely successfully.
To take up just one of these, the movement recognized the importance of
reaching out to GI's. It established "GI coffeehouses" near army bases
across the country where soldiers could spend time when off duty, meet
activists, and become informed about the war and about their
constitutional
rights to express their opinions. It also established antiwar GI
newspapers,
which were at first published by civilians but later published by GI's
themselves.
The point was to spread antiwar sentiment and activism in the military,
despite all the difficulties attendant on the effort. "The GI's
themselves
would have to decide how far they could go in organizing petitions,
letters
home, demonstrations, and so-on. Whatever they could do in that regard
would
have a great effect back home."
The soldiers in Iraq were told that they would be greeted as liberators
with
kisses and flowers and found themselves received with hostility. They
expected to go home not too long after gaining victory and found their
stays
extended while they operate under exceedingly difficult conditions
performing police tasks for which they have not been trained. They are
weary, demoralized, and disillusioned.
The anti-war movement must make contact with them and their families at
home, helping them in their tribulations and inviting them to join in
the
call for the return of the troops to the U.S. The slogan, "Support the
troops," has been raised to justify the occupation expenditures, as it
was
raised during the Vietnam War, but the way to support them is to remove
them
from harm's way.
Many who say that the invasion of Iraq was wrong also say that now that
we
are in it we have to carry through and restore Iraq to stability. But
the
occupation itself is the cause of instability.
It is hated by most Iraqis, whose attitude is typified by the man who,
freed
by American forces from a Saddam Hussein prison, exhibited his hands
swollen
by beatings to a New York Times reporter and told him that of course he
was
glad to be free but now he, like other Iraqis, wants the Americans to
go.
The slogan of the antiwar movement must still be "Out Now!"
The article above first appeared in the December 2003 issue of Socialist Action newspaper.
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