In Defense of the Supererogatory & Suberogatory
 

    In a three-fold model of morality*, acts are either obligatory, right (permissible), or wrong.  However, there are acts that seem permissible in the three-fold model that do not fit intuitionally: the supererogatory and the suberogatory.  This paper will present the advantages of a moral theory that accommodates these categories.
     Supererogatory acts are those that, according to a three-fold model of morality, are permissible, but not obligatory.  Furthermore, these acts are seen as above and beyond the call of duty.  Acts of this type needn’t be heroic: opening a door for someone whose arms are full of groceries could be considered a supererogatory act.
     Suberogatory acts, then, are acts that are permissible; not wrong.  These acts typically cause a level of moral criticism or uneasiness, but are not so morally amiss that they are forbidden.
     Consider the following case:  “in boarding a train the person who is first gets first choice of seats.  But suppose that the train is almost full, and a couple wish to sit together, and there is only one place where there are two seats together.  If the person ahead of them takes one of those seats, when he could have taken another less convenient seat, and knowing that the two behind him wanted to sit together, then he has done something blameworthy.   Yet, if he gives up this seat, and takes a less desirable one, he has done something praiseworthy.  The problem is justifying the blame when the agent is acting within his rights.  The people who want to sit together have no claim against the person ahead of them in line.  Thus, he has no obligation to pass up a more convenient seat.^**” (Driver, Suberogatory, 287)
     Driver thus introduces the topic of “morally charged situations:” situations in which the agent’s only options are to either supererogate or suberogate.  It is precisely for these situations that a moral theory is advantaged for accommodating the supererogatory and suberogatory. 
     When an agent is acting within her own rights, such as in the above case, one is intuitionally hesitant to say that by taking the more convenient seat, she is acting wrongly.  Consider the following additions to the case: Grumpy, the person before the couple on the train, has had a long day.  He has worked hard, and is tired.  His only current thought is to board the train, and finally be able to rest.  The place where the couple can sit is much more convenient, perhaps even with a view.  Thus Grumpy takes the seat, thankful that he can finally rest. 
The couple, on the other hand, while wishing to sit together, have the option of moving once an additional place once someone has left (whether Grumpy or another passenger).  Of course, the case can be further amended that the couple have also had a bad day, etc., however, the status of the couple may not have any effect on Grumpy’s actions.
       Similarly, if Merna the mailwoman, while delivering her route, sees a child trapped in a burning building, she is obligated to call for help.  Should she choose to risk her own life to save the child, she supererogates.  One wishes to say she is praiseworthy for doing so.  And yet, according to the three-fold model of morality, while what she has done is permissible, it is no more than that. 
     One can imagine the following criticism: Supererogatory, nor suberogatory, acts exist.  Supererogatory acts are merely permissible, or possibly obligatory.  Suberogatory acts, on the other hand, are either merely permissible, or simply wrong. 
     The response to this is two fold: (1) if supererogatory acts are right or obligatory, does Merna have an obligation to risk her own life?  Certainly not.   Having an obligation to risk one’s life (as opposed to calling for professionals to help), is counterintuitive.   Is it merely permissible, and thereby not praiseworthy?  One would hope not.  Risking one’s life for another, especially in the case where Merna does not have any connection to the trapped child, should be a praiseworthy act.  (2) if suberogatory acts are either permissible or wrong, is Grumpy, by virtue of permissible acts carrying neither praiseworthiness nor blameworthiness, not blameworthy for taking a seat that is obviously wanted (and arguably maximizes utility) by others?  One wishes to say that he is, even if only slightly.  Furthermore, if suberogatory acts are merely wrong, Grumpy performs a wrong act by taking the seat, which is within his rights: he is the first to board the train, and thus has his choice of seats.
      A moral theory which accommodates the supererogatory and suberogatory, therefore, eases intuition significantly.  It better explains everyday life, much like the five-fold model.  Such examples as presented above occur every day, and are not at all uncommon.  To say that Merna either has an obligation to risk her life, or that is she not praiseworthy for doing so, seems counterintuitive, and indeed it is.  To say that Grumpy is either not blameworthy for breaking up a couple, or that he has committed a forbidden act is also counterintuitive.  A moral theory that encompasses the categories of supererogatory and suberogatory therefore accounts for these actions, better applying morality to real life.