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[NATURAL DISASTER]
Mississippi River 1988
Mississippi River 1993 Flood
St.Louis Flood LanSat 1993
The Great Flood of 1993 was said, in terms of economic and human impacts, to  be the most costly and devastating flood to hit the United States in modern  history.  Nine states, more than 15 percent of the U.S. territory, were  impacted at catastrophic levels.  These states were Iowa, North Dakota,  South Dakota, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Illinois, Missouri, Nebraska and Kansas.   Losses ranged between $15-$20 billion, rivaling those of Hurricane Andrew.   More than 50,000 homes were damaged or destroyed, with over 54,000 persons  evacuated from flooded areas (see endnote #1).
Technically, it could be posited that the disaster's roots began during the  wet fall of 1992, which resulted in above normal soil moisture and water  storage conditions in the upper Mississippi and Missouri basins.  These  conditions were followed in the spring and summer months of 1993 by  meterological patterns more typical of late winter patterns, which follow  more northerly tracks, that result in persistent and intense storm systems.   Beginning in March 1993, the broad extent of the storms dumped the Upper  Midwest with extreme amounts of rainfall, with some areas receiving more than  4 feet of rain during those months.  The massive build-up of water could be viewed in satellite imagery as the equivalent of a sixth Great Lake in the  middle of the nation's heartland.  Flooding would continue in some areas as  until as late as September 1993.
During the flooding, a total of 95 forecast locations in the Upper Midwest  would exceed all previous floods on record, sometimes by as much as six feet.   Over 500 forecast points on the major rivers and tributary systems were to  exceed flood stage.   Hydrologists stated that there were five key factors  that contributed toward the excessive spring snowmelt which flooded the  upper Mississippi River basin: **high soil moisture, **deep hard ground  frost, **heavy snowcover, **widespread heavy rains during a melt period,  and **warm temperatures that led to rapid melting. (See endnote #2)
The flood affected many people's lives in some very basic ways.  First, in a  land overwhelmed by waters,  there was the ironic lack of pure drinking  water, as in the case of the city of Des Moines, Iowa where over 250,000  residents existed without drinkable tap water for a month.  Water had to be  shipped in from Chicago and given out through 50+ distribution points  (see endnote #3).
Several rail lines were closed, including the Santa Fe Chicago-California  line, the Burlington Northern, the Union Pacific Chicago & North Western  railroad, and the Soo Line, causing major delays in freight shipments and  operating losses in excess of $300 million. Manufacturing plant closures  occurred in several areas when these needed freight shipments did not show  up on time.  In Iowa, it was found that over 300 of the state's 4,000 bridges  could have possible structural damage.  And in large areas inundated by the  flood, there was  more than 600 billion tons of topsoil erosion by the river  flow, leading to a total loss of the 1993 harvest (see endnote #4).
Whole towns were almost erased, either never to be rebuilt, or to be moved  to higher ground levels (see endnote #5).  One of these was the town of  Valmeyer, Illinois, a community of 900 people who were suddenly uprooted on  the morning of August 2, 1993 when flood waters breached a levee just north  of there.  Completion of the relocation would take at least three years and  would cost more than $16 million (see endnote #6).  6,000 people had to be  evacuated in August 1993, in South St. Louis, when flooding threated a  propane tank farm.  51 tanks, each containing 25,000 gallons of propane were floated off their supports and posed a danger of exploding  (see endnote #7).  On July 9, 1993, at the Deerfield Village Mobile Home Park  in St. Charles, Missouri (a 40 acre park), 265 families were threatened when  the Mississippi River jumped an agricultural  levee.  About 60 of these  families had to move their trailers to parking lots on higher land at the  local schools (see endnote #8).  When the waters finally receeded, families  all over the flood zone were discouraged by water and silt damage, thick mud residue, and the mosquitos and other insects that seemed to thrive in  those conditions (see endnote #9).
In a normal flood plain which is unaltered by levees, floodwaters will spread  out slowly, depositing silt and experiencing little erosion, while the  undeveloped soils will absorb water like huge sponges to the point of  saturation.  But when a river is restricted by levees, floodwaters will swell  upstream, with waters moving more swiftly,  simultaneously  cutting out deep  channels and not allowing silt to build up to replenish erosion areas.  Under unusual situations, as in the Great Flood of 1993, the extreme volumes  of water might breach these levees.
The Army Corps of Engineers, responsible for 229 levee systems, were proud  that only two of their systems were breached, even though 39 others were  seriously damaged.  Unfortunately, most of the problem levees that failed  were privately built by farmer's cooperatives or municipalities.  Of these  1,100 private levies, 70 percent failed.  Repairs on these private levees would prove to take much longer than the Army Corps' to complete (see endnote #10).  The difference in the failure rate was stated by NOAA as being due to  the fact that most Federal levees were designed to withstand a 100-500 year  flood, while the non-Federal levees, which mostly were used to protect  agricultural lands, were only designed for a flood with return periods of 50  years or less.
The number of Army Corp owned levees which were affected by the flood  were as follows
(see endnote #11):
48  Illinois
17  Iowa
13 Kansas
   1 Minnesota
112 Missouri
  7 Nebraska
  0 North Dakota
  1 South Dakota
  1  Wisconsin
-------------------------
200   Total Levies
Total Estimated Cost of repairs was $217,357.
The Natural Disaster Survey Report gave 106 recommendations based on an  intensive study of the conditions found in all 9 affected states.  The report  noted several  deficiencies that originated mainly out of inadequate  technology  within the current forecast and warning system. These deficiencies  were proposed to be corrected through the on-going modernization and restructuring of the National Weather Service, and through a new program  called the Water Resources Forecasting System (WARFS), which helps emergency  managers to more effectively predict floods and manage the nation's  increasingly valuable fresh water supplies (see endnote #12).  Other areas of  deficiency which were identified by the survey team (in the overall prediction  and response system) "included inadequate computer processing and  telecommunications capabilities, as well as problems associated with timely  and complete dissemination of appropriate products (see endnote #13).
The Department of Commerce and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric  Administration (NOAA) also stated in the report that they were committed to:  "develop and to implement an advanced hydrolic prediction system for the  entire Nation," and that improved decision making information for the Great  Flood of 1993 alone "could have easily translated into savings of hundreds of  millions of dollars through improved mitigation actions. Moreover, the  associated human suffering could have been dramatically reduced with more  timely, accurate and improved decision-making information" (see endnote #14).  
This activity constituted a major component of the NOAA 1995=>2005  Strategic Plan, whose objectives were as follows (see endnote #15):
1.
Reduce fatalities and injuries due to hazards from weather and floods;
2.
Improve the flow of more accurate environmental data and predictions  to the public;
3.
Enhance the ability of planners to use hydrologic forecasts in the  range of days to months;
4.
Provide better information for management of fresh water resources;
5.
Prevent avoidable damage to private, public, and industrial property   over land, in coastal areas, and along rivers;
6.
Improve efficiency, reliability, and savings in industry,  transportation, agriculture, and hydro-energy systems.
Most of the deficiencies noted by the NOAA survey team resulted from  "inadequate technological capabilities within the current forecast and  warning system."  The report stated that these identified deficiencies could  be corrected through the implementation of modernization and associated  restructuring (MAR) of the National Weather Service.  In  fact, a major recommendation of the team was that MAR must be maintained on schedule, "or  accellerated wherever possible."  One good example of successful MAR is the  installed base of the Weather Surveillance Radar 88 Doppler (WSR-88D) systems  installed previous to the flood event.  On July 18, 1993 and on August 11-12,  1993, the WSR-88D systems were able to document the radar rainfall estimates  in Chicago and Kansas City, which led to the saving of lives during each of those flash flood conditions (see endnote #16).
Maximum use of the WSR-88D currently awaits upon the completion of the Next Generation Weather Radar (NEXRAD) network over the upper Mississippi River  basin, in addition to implementing the Advanced Weather Interactive Processing  System's (AWIPS) capability under MAR.  Of equal importance to "these  technological enhancements are the advances in human resources" also planned  under MAR, including training on modernized NWS technology and "advanced  hydrometerological functions" as part of the Regional Forecasting Center  operations" (see endnote #17).
The report stated that the key to developing improved river and flood  forecasts in the future will depend on "establishing and maintaining an  Advanced Hydrologic Prediction System (AHPS)."  The current NWS River  Forecast System (NWSRFS) consists of modules of software which  function by  1) collecting data; 2) processing data; 3) modelling data; and by 4) providing output products. The four major components of a NWSRFS are:  1) data analysis  procedures; 2) modules used to compute and display runoff and river  discharges; 3) utility programs and databases which manage large volumes of  data; and 4) an operational forecast program command language which allows  the forecaster to define modeling options, to make adjustments to model state  variables and data values, and to recompute forecasts (see endnote #18).    One recommendation based on this was that the NWS Office of Hydrology should  systematically re-evaluate the operational readiness of the NWSRFS and any  other software used for hydrologic forecasting (see endnote #19).
NWS-MAR modernization would contribute to improve hydrologic prediction  through:

1) on-site interactive computer processing that supports: "a modern,  interactive river forecast system"; and interactive precipitation analysis  using data from radar, satellite, aircraft, and automated surface gages;
2)  rapid, wide-band communications; and
3)  more effective use of human resources. Payoff in improved forecasts  and warnings are projected to be enormous (see endnote 20).
Another major block of the AHPS capability will be provided by a Water  Resources Forecast System (WARFS), which gives river forecasts with greater  lead-times, forecast ranges, and probabilities of occurrences.  WARFS  accomodates these requirements by using:
1) advanced hydrologic and hydraulic models;
2) integrated data management and analysis techniques;
3) coupled rainfall and temperature forecasts;
4) advanced remote sensing and analysis of snow water equivalent; and
5) a consortium of cooperative efforts with NOAA's partners.
The most important enhancements will be in the application of "more advanced  hydrologic and hydraulic models using improved hydrometeorological data and  the capability to incorporate both short term meterological predictions and  longer term, climatological information (see endnote #21)."
Further observations by the survey team were that the River Forecasting  Centers and the National Meterological Center did not routinely archive their  quantitative precipitation forecast products in digital format.  It was noted  that these data were essential for post-event analysis, research and  development, model calibration, simulation requirements, climatological  studies, and forecast verification. Therefore all data and products should be  archived and made available digitally to end-users (see endnote #22).
The survey team also noted several instances where coordination and  communication problems occurred associated with data exchange between  Federal agencies (see endnote #23).  Part of this was due to computer hardware  limitations, which made it difficult to distribute NWS products to endusers.  They pointed out that the overall effectiveness of the NWS's river forecasting  services critically depended on other Federal, state, and local agencies for  information used in forecasting and dissemination of forecasting and warnings,  as well as to ensure that the public take actions necessary to prevent loss  of life, etc.  NWS was encouraged to maintain and strengthen cooperative  arrangements with its current partners (see endnote #24).  It was also noted  that in some communities there seemed to be a lack of communication and  coordination among different agencies.  It was recommended that national,  regional, and local NWS offices team up with Federal, state and local agencies  to "coordinate more frequent communication to ensure that needed information  is distrubuted among all agencies (see endnote #25).
In terms of computer aided telecommunications, the survey team found that the  current telecommunications environment for interagency data exchange relied  on "limited, voice-grade, two-way links which did not provide adequate service  during the Great Flood of 1993.  In addition,  there was no backup should  there be a disasterous failure of the NOAA Central Computer Facility.  It was  found that the NWS needed to evaluate its backup procedures "to ensure  there is sufficient communications capacity to support operations during  major flooding" (see endnote #26).
In sum, similar to the case of Hurricane Andrew, the overall lessons learned  from the Great Flood of 1993 had much to do with issues of communication and  technology. It is this writer's opinion that NOAA and other emergency  management teams would benefit by:
1)
developing better communication between federal, state and local  governmental offices;
2)
creating better implementation of existing modelling and communications  technologies as well as  exploring and creating new, more efficient solutions  to technically related problems;
3)
installing better telecommunications networks capable of handling high  traffic baud rates;
4)
emphasizing that emergency management staffs needed to be better  trained and prepared for unusual environmental situations;
5)
updating current computer systems, giving them larger database  capacity, in order to better handle archival as well as multi-tasking  assignments;
6)
making sure that satellite as well as other aerial based reconnaissance  vehicles be used more to collect data on soil saturation, weather patterns  and water level conditions; and
7)
by standardizing as much as possible all emergency related forms and  procedures, and developing clear, heirarchy charts of responsible personnel  available for consultation.
  These suggested steps should contribute toward cutting down confusion, and  allow for easier data exchange between governmental departments and the  public.
Endnotes for Case Study #4:

  1.  Natural Disaster Survey Report: The Great Flood of 1993 (U.S. Dept. of  Commerce and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Admin. [NOAA], February  1994) p. xvii
2.  NOAA 94-31 National Weather Service Public Information Statement: Great  Flood of '93 Impact Unprecedented, Report Finds (National Oceanic and  Atmospheric Administration, 5/11/94) p.1
3.  Edward Walsh, "Floods Begin to Ease In the Des Moines Area: Drinking  Water Cutoff of a Month Projected"  (The Washington Post, 7/13/93)  Sect. A1 Headline.
4.  Michael S. Arnold, "Gore, Touring Devastated Areas, Pledges Strong  Federal Response" (The Washington Post, 7/13/93) p. 7 Sect.A col 4
5.  Timothy Egan, "2 Months of Downpours and Surging Rivers Redraw Map of  Midwest" The New York Times National 8/22/93 sect. 24L
6.  Edward Walsh, "Bottomland Town Looks Up for Life: Flooded Illinois  Community Must Move to Preserve Itself " (The Washington Post, 9/16/93)  Sect.A p.1 col.3
7.  Keith Meyers, "Mississippi Surges Past Straining Levees" (The New York  Times, 8/8/93) Sect. 26L.
8.  Jane Gross, "In the Path of the Flood, Hard Times Just Got Harder" (The  New York Times, 8/8/93) Sect. 26L
9.  Edward Walsh, "Racing to Rebuild as the Lost Summer Ends" (The Washington  Post, 9/20/93) Sect. A p.7. col 1
10. Timothy Egan, "2 Months of Downpours and Surging Rivers Redraw Map of  Midwest"
11. Captain Ken Young,  "Levee Rehabilitation Status Report Current as of  11 April 94. (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 4/11/94)  p. iii
12. Natural Disaster Survey Report: The Great Flood of 1993 (U.S. Dept. of  Commerce and the National Oceanic And Atmospheric Administration [NOAA],  February 1994)  p.9-3
13. Natural Disaster Survey Report: The Great Flood of 1993  p. xix
14. National Disaster Survey Report: The Great Flood of 1993 p. xix
15. National Disaster Survey Report: The Great Flood of 1993 p. viii
16. National Disaster Survey Report : The Great Flood of 1993 p. xviii
17. National Disaster Survey Report : The Great Flood of 1993 p. xviii
18. National Disaster Survey Report : The Great Flood of 1993 pp.4-7
19. National Disaster Survey Report : The Great Flood of 1993 pp. 2-3
20. National Disaster Survey Report : The Great Flood of 1993 pp. 2-7
21. National Disaster Survey Report : The Great Flood of 1993 pp. 2-11
22. National Disaster Survey Report : The Great Flood of 1993 pp. 9-2
23. National Disaster Survey Report : The Great Flood of 1993 pp. 9-13
24. National Disaster Survey Report : The Great Flood of 1993 pp. 9-13
25. National Disaster Survey Report : The Great Flood of 1993 pp. 9-22
26. National Disaster Survey Report : The Great Flood of 1993 pp. 9-14, 9-15
(Updated 9/02/03 D.J. Russell)