Weather related disaster events in the 1990's are treated in a rather convoluted manner by the U.S. government. According to a representative at the Office of Hydrology of the National Weather Service, the responsibilities toward weather related events are delegated as follows: The Office of Meteorology has jurisdiction from the forecast right up to the point when the precipitation hits the ground. After that, the Office of Hydrology has responsibility. If the precipitation seeps underground, the USGS Water Resource Division takes over. If pollution occurs, the Environmental Protection Agency is responsible for the clean up. If disaster related materials need to be moved from "here to there", the Bureau of Reclamation does the job in the west and the Army Corps of Engineers does it from the Mississisppi eastward. When flooding dumps into the Gulf, the National Ocean Service takes over. After the cleanup of the disaster has occurred, and all the fuss has died down, the responsibility for the data belongs to the National Climate Center (see endnote #5).

On September 29th and 30th, 1981, the "Emergency Management Information and Technology Hearings before the Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight of the Committee on Science and Technology: 97th Congress" were held. From our point of view in the 1990's, notable was the fact that Vice President Albert Gore, then Congressman Gore, presided as chairman of that subcommittee.

Historically, the Emergency Broadcast System was created in 1951 by Congress to stand ready to alert the country to foreign threats [ie: nuclear attack], but until recently never was activated on a nation-wide level. Instead it was used to warn of more than 17,000 state and local disasters, such as hurricanes and riots. Unfortunately, an inherent weakness in this system's infrastructure was that it had been based on the broadcasting market of the 1950's. It therefore excluded cable television systems which in the 1990's reached over 60 percent of current American homes, and often used unmanned local stations. It also did not reach Americans with hearing problems or persons who did not speak English. When a crisis arose, emergency management teams [from either the Federal Emergency Management Administration, the National Weather Service, the state governor's or local mayor's office, or local police or fire departments], had to telephone the broadcast stations responsible for putting the warnings on the air. These stations would then activate a two-tone signal and read a bulletin over the air. The tone would cue a group of stations down the line to repeat the signal and the message, which would prompt a subsequent group of stations, etc., until the daisy chain of necessary stations was complete. Unfortunately, broadcast industry lore was full of tales of broken daisy chains, for success and timeliness of the operation was immediately dependant upon chance, [ie: officials had to be able to get through on phone lines that might have been jammed during the crisis, and all along the chain, the station staff needed to be available and know how to operate the system] (see endnote #16).

For example, firefighters and police officers were now able to receive these signals as data messages displayed on pagers or portable computers, and the signals were created to automatically turn on televisions and radios, set off smoke detectors, and make lamps flash to alert the deaf. It had also been suggested that the Emergency Broadcasting System overhaul, would represent a new $100 million market for makers of consumer-electronics devices to alert citizenry of impending disasters, making non "disaster-ready" devices obsolete. This new system therefore would communicate official instructions, and would increase the communication options by having computerized transmissions which would automatically send audio, text and bilingual bullitens to television and radio stations, cable operators, and satellite-TV companies. The FCC also in time, hoped to have in place receiving equipment in public address systems found in hospitals, schools and nursing homes (see endnote #19).

The unprecedented string of natural and manmade catastrophes during 1992 and 1993 has caused many businesses and government to realize the importance and need for disaster recovery planning as part of the organizational infrastructure. It has been found that there needs to be an active exploration of alternative communication and supply routes in case primary sources or operations are shut down. It is important that every organization should develop its own disaster recovery plan and that each plan should mesh with the corporate plan.

If done properly, the most important steps in disaster planning can then be summarized as follows: (see endnote #20)

A. Test the disaster recovery plan - at least once a year.

B. Update the Disaster Recovery Plan - after every operations change.

In the last decade microcomputer-based decision aids have been developed for various organizations like the American Red Cross, the United States Coast Guard, and the New York State Office of Disaster Preparedness. These organizations recognize that in this advanced technological society, disasters result from vulnerabilities not only from geophysical events, but also from the anticipated and unanticipated consequences of complex human systems. To respond effectively to both natural and man-made disasters requires the assessment of information prior to, during and after catastrophic events, as well as involving the initiation of activities that hopefully will lessen the impact of those disasters on society. The quality of the decisions individuals will make in crisis setting is directly affected by the quality of the information received, the individual's cognitive abilities, and what kind of options may exhist (see endnote #22).