FORCE TO KOREA (1950-1955)
On 24 October, MacArthur ordered his commanders to advance as rapidly as possible towards the Yalu River separating North Korea from China. The next day saw the UNC meet the CPV in battle for the first time. In the next week, the CPV smashed a South Korean regiment that had reached the Yalu River and mauled a regiment of the US 1st Cavalry Division during attacks delivered in sub-zero weather. The Chinese continued to attack until 6 November when they quickly broke contact, having delivered their message that any further UNC advance northward would be met with force. Some 30,000 Chinese in the CPV 39th Army were involved in what they called their “First Phase Offensive.”
Undeterred by the punitive CPV attack, the UNC launched its “Home for Christmas” offensive on 25 November. After some progress, the UNC was violently counterattacked the next day by the CPV, an event that marked Communist China’s undeniable entry into the war. Both the US 2nd and 25th Infantry Divisions were attacked and hurled back by the Chinese “volunteers” in a four-day battle. The US Eighth Army (including PEFTOK) began to retreat in the west pursued by the CPV XIII Army Group (130,000-200,000 men in 18 divisions). The US X Corps in the east withdrew under heavy pressure from the CPV IX Army Group (120,000 men in 12 divisions).
By year-end, the UNC was forced out of North Korea. Seoul was lost to the CPV on 3 January 1951 but the UNC withdrawal stopped at the line of the 37th Parallel. The UNC’s military strength at the start of the New Year stood at close to 500,000 men of whom 270,000 were South Korean. Ranged against them were some 250,000 Chinese and over 100,000 North Koreans. More than 1,000,000 Chinese troopers were stationed in reserve near the Yalu River.
The Chinese fighting man
The bitter first defeats at the hands of the CPV had shown the UNC just how good the Chinese soldier was at his trade. Without tanks, little heavy artillery and no air support, the CPV had taken on a mechanized enemy with tremendous firepower and had defeated it, but at heavy cost.
Many of the men in the CPV were veterans of the wars against the Japanese and the Nationalist Chinese. They had won both wars and a number of the CPV divisions that fought in Korea had a tradition of victory on the battlefield. Their commanders were experts in guerilla warfare but had, however, no experience fighting a modern army such as the UNC.
Chinese divisions generally consisted of 10,000 men with three divisions generally comprising an army. The men of the CPV were mostly tough, disciplined and brave. It was not uncommon for them to march 18 miles a night on snow covered mountains and hills and be fit to fight afterwards. UNC air supremacy meant that the CPV did its marching at night, as did the German Army in the Normandy campaign during World War 2.
PEFTOK fought many hard battles against the CPV. After the Battle of Yultong, one trooper from the 10th said that the Chinese “fight like devils.” My father described them as tough soldiers who really knew how to fight. “Matigas. Magaling lumaban,” (“They’re tough. They know how to fight”) are words my father used to describe the Chinese soldier. Our soldiers called the Chinese enemy “Insik” (the Filipino word for Chinese) or “Reds”.
During an offensive, the Chinese preferred night attacks and were masters at night fighting. All their major offensives in Korea were launched at night, including their Great Spring Offensive in April 1951 that brought about the Battle of Yultong. Night attacks not only allowed the CPV to exploit its skills in this type of fighting, but also limited the effectiveness of UNC artillery and air power.
In an attack, the CPV consistently sought to turn the enemy’s flanks and surround him. The trapped enemy units were then chopped up and destroyed. The CPV tended to avoid frontal attacks although western media accounts at the time fostered the myth of the Chinese “human wave” attacks that sacrificed hundreds of men in vain frontal assaults. The CPV had excellent pre-attack reconnaissance and also took pains to learn as much as possible about the UNC units facing them. The British related incidents during which the Chinese (using loudspeakers) welcomed by name their units newly arrived at the front line.
A heavy mortar or artillery barrage followed by infiltration and infantry assault was the normal pattern of a standard CPV night attack. The first wave generally consisted of grenadiers who hurled hundreds of “stick” grenades at front line enemy positions. Infantry armed with submachine guns and rifles then rushed the enemy in waves, aiming to pierce his flanks or the links between units. In the attack the Chinese preferred using “concussion grenades” that stunned the defenders and were less dangerous to their attacking troops because of fewer shrapnel. High explosive fragmentation stick grenades were used mainly in defense because of their greater killing power.
The CPV, however, was poorly armed and went to battle with a variety of weapons. A favorite weapon was the 72-round Type 50 submachine gun, a Chinese-made copy of the reliable Russian-made PPSh submachine gun proven in World War 2. Their rifles and machine guns were mostly Russian, Japanese and American. The American weapons were captured from the Nationalist Chinese. This multiplicity of weapons complicated re-supply.
As for uniforms, the CPV fought in a quilted uniform heavily padded against the cold. This uniform was colored brown on one side and white on the other. They had practically no special winter clothing such as parkas or heavy jackets and thus suffered more from Korea’s harsh winters than their UNC opponents. The Chinese soldier did not wear helmets in battle but wore thick cotton caps with large earflaps. (continued on next page)
Copyright 2000 by Art Villasanta. This web site is being continuously updated.
