FORCE TO KOREA (1950-1955)
Leveling the battlefield
The massive UNC superiority in firepower, especially in artillery, literally “leveled” the battlefield in favor of the UNC. Overwhelming firepower also offset the general UNC disadvantage in combat experience. Most ROK soldiers, American GIs and UNC troops were “green” conscripts or reservists hastily committed to the war. As can be expected of green troops, they found the going hard at first and suffered accordingly. The Chinese considered the Americans especially vulnerable in night combat. Throughout the war, the UNC sought to inflict maximum casualties on the CPV during its withdrawals, and evaded CPV offensives by fighting delaying actions. The UNC relied on its firepower and air power to destroy CPV manpower while minimizing its own casualties.
During The Big Bug Out, American artillery fired more than 50,000 rounds a day to fend off the advancing CPV. To this incredible expenditure of metal was added thousands of tons of bombs and missiles dropped by UNC attack and bomber aircraft, mainly American, on CPV positions at the front and rear. American bombers killed Mao Anying, son of Mao Zedong, on 25 November 1950 in Pyongyang when they obliterated his artillery unit then on its way to the front. Captured Chinese soldiers said UNC air power was the weapon most feared by the CPV.
Americans and South Koreans
Americans officers headed the multinational UNC and, in the main, were responsible for the broad conduct of the war. The United States contributed the dominant share of UNC military power and suffered the most casualties among foreign combatants. Of the 1.6 million Americans who served in the war, close to 34,000 were killed in action while over 100,000 were wounded in action. More than 20,000 other Americans were killed by friendly fire or died from other causes. President Harry Truman, however, officially described the Korean War as a “police action” to skirt a provision in the United States’ Constitution that vested the right to declare war—and thus the right to commit US troops to combat overseas—only in the U.S. Congress. The United States did not declare war on North Korea.
The brunt of the fighting, however, was borne by the infantry divisions of the Republic of Korea (ROK). The ROK provided more than half the UNC’s military manpower and paid the heaviest price. More than 200,000 South Korean soldiers gave their lives to defend their country. South Korean military casualties are estimated to range from 600,000 to 800,000 men and may have approached 1,000,000 men. Poorly led, poorly armed and poorly trained at the start of the war, the men of the ROK infantry divisions (mainly young conscripts) bore the weight of the NKPA invasion and the CPV intervention.
Only 90,000 lightly armed and party trained South Korean soldiers without tanks, pitiful artillery support and no air power stood up to the surprise NKPA invasion on the early morning of 25 June 1950. South Korean accounts note with sorrow that entire regiments were destroyed in the uneven fight against the more than 135,000 NKPA that attacked South Korea without warning. The NKPA used over 120 Russian-made T-34/85 tanks, an excellent World War 2 medium tank, to crush South Korea’s thin defenses. South Korean accounts report cases of incredible heroism by individual South Korean soldiers who, clutching explosives, hurled themselves against the T-34s. These men selflessly ignited the explosives, destroying themselves and the tanks in the process.
Despite inadequate equipment and indifferent leadership, the South Korean army fought in all the war’s major battles. ROK divisions were the hardest hit in all the CPV’s five offensives—the CPV saw them as the weak link in the UNC lines and “easy meat.” Their inability to resist the early Chinese offensives from 1950 to 1951, however, gave the CPV an advantage in morale during the first year of the conflict. According to one South Korean source, the CPV’s early victories led the South Koreans to consider the Chinese as “mysterious supermen” incapable of being defeated. The superiority in morale gained by the CPV over the ROK was overcome when the ROK stood up to the second phase of the CPV’s Great Spring Offensive in May 1951.
ROK divisions earned the respect of the CPV for their bravery and tenacity. One Chinese account said the CPV suffered greatly from the South Korean’s refusal to retire once an attack had been checked. Instead of retreating downhill as was the American’s custom, ROK infantry regrouped where they were stopped and resumed the attack. This tactic caused higher ROK casualties, but also inflicted higher casualties on the Chinese as well.
The ROK Army or “Yuk Gun” reached a peak strength of some 600,000 men during the war. Without the bravery and sacrifice of the South Korean soldier, the war would probably have turned for the worse.
The cost of conflict
The CPV suffered heavy losses because of its reliance on infantry power. Chinese casualties from 1950 to 1953 were estimated at more than 900,000 men by the UNC. Some western sources say the figure is more than a million. The People’s Liberation Army, however, placed total CPV casualties at close to 400,000 men, of whom 110,000 were killed in action. Another 30,000 men died of wounds and sickness. NKPA losses, according to the UNC, exceeded 500,000 men.
Estimated UNC (including ROK) combat deaths range from 200,000 to 450,000 men. Over 80 per cent of this total were South Korean. More than 500,000 UNC and ROK soldiers were either wounded or listed as missing in action. Civilian losses were enormous: upwards of 500,000 South Korean civilians were killed during the war. The number of North Korean civilians who died as a result of the war is harder to estimate, but published figures place this at from 1,000,000 to 3,000,000 persons.
Copyright 2000 by Art Villasanta. This web site is being continuously updated.
