the east front

shock at Kamenewo

Prologue

The relative easy and low cost conquest of Orel by the 4th Panzerdivision, along with the trapping of several Soviet armies, was sufficient to encourage the German High Command to attack the enemy position in the Tula and Moscow direction. Fuel and ammunition absence, apart the inevitable tanks' decrease due to the wear, did not discourage the Germans. The weather was excellent, the ground compact and enemy disrupted.

Moreover, the OKW expected that Guderian's activity in southern sector would had diverted (as it did) the enemy forces' attention from the main action of von Bock Army Group Center attacking from the west. On October 4th air recon confirmed the correcteness of the prevision by spotting many Russian tanks arriving at Mtsenk by train wagons.

Alerted on 1st October by Guderian's progresses, which became clear before von Bock had striken the following day, Staling sent General D.D. Lelyushenko, with a motorized regiment, to Mtsenk. A little rocket battery (Katiusha) and, most important, the 4th Tank Brigade with KV-1s and T-34s arrived form Leningrad by railway, was added to this force. These were the vehicles spotted by German air planes, which ingenerated the suspicion that KVs were between the enemy forces.

Lelyushenko, to front the Germans on the river Lisiza, had at his disposal light tanks, AT guns and entrenched infantry between the railway and the Kamenewo village, to maintain control over the bridge. The XXIV Panzerkorps continued its advance on October 5th, with the 3rd Panzerdivision towards Bolchow and the 4th towards Mtsensk: the 50 Kilometers hole between the two was covered by ground and air recon vehicles. On the night fall the 4th Panzerdivision (General W. von LanGerman) had advanced and was positioned to cross the Lisiza the following day.

Kamenewo area chart

The battle

At 0900 hours some shots were fired on known enemy positions, followed by the irruption of General H. Eberbach's 35th Panzerbrigade. His five tank companies and his motorcycles battalion, supported by field artillery, a nebelwerfer detachment and an 88mm battery in anti-tank role, were moved over the bridge. Temporary obstacled by some mines, they were able to pass intact and headed for the ridge.

Suddenly and exchange of shots between the Panzer III and IV and the T26 and AT weapons took the destruction of the latters. The coureageous Russian infantry which tried to destroy the German tanks with hand bombs was annihilated by the motorcyclists. An handbook-like interweapon attack had open the road to the coming wave of panzers, followed by a six 105mm howitzers battery and a 100mm gun, plus two 88mm guns (all with AT mission), which occupied the ridge.

General Katukov's 4th Armored Brigade's tanks expected for this. After moving during the night between the 5th and 6th to reach the woods on front of Woin, they awaited that the Germans were near enough before opening an heavy and precise fire with their 76mm guns.

Having conveniently measured the distances they were able to hit their targets, piercing the German plates at a maximum distance of 800m, while getting no damage from the response fire by 50mm shots, which bounced off on their thick and sloped platings.

The unequal engagement was of brief time. The German tanks withdrawed in hidden positions and then returned on the slope, trusting on their fast field artillery to dispatch the enemy tanks. But the 88s did not their job. After hitting a target each, they were destroyed by HE projectiles from the tanks, leaving the AT defence to the 105mm howitzers and the 100mm gun which were positioned on the river line.

Russian countera-attack's direction

The Mtsensk battle developed a comparison between the German guns and the Soviet tanks of General Katukov's 4th Tank Brigade during the October 5th's night. The import fact is that these tanks were employed in concentrated formation. Katukov launched the attack of his KV-1s and T-34s when the 4th Panzerdivision was trying to cross the Lisiza near Kamenewo. The two 88mm guns were positioned on the ridge for repulsing such an attack.

The T-34s and KV-1s advanced in two waves, the first covered by the second placed on the high ground. A group moved along the road while another, of 25 elements, emerged from the wood to caught the Germans on their flanks.

Strong point of the brisge defence is the 100mm gun: camouflaged and appearently not seen by the Russian commanders this gun, firing 32 pounds prjectiles at an 835 m/s speed did a slaught. Immediatly the T-34s tried to reach the gun's position, destroying some 105mm guns before being repulsed by the German infantry fire and tentatives of flame them with gasoline.

Yet without artillery support, the Russians were supported by their comrades' 76mm fire on the ridge. Coming to a distance of less than 20 metres from the German guns they lost this advantage: the uncaute movement cost them an heavy price: 5 tanks were hit, of which 3 by Lt. Krause from an hidden position.

Shocked the Germans completed their retreat while the Russians reorganized with artillery and infantry for the following day's attacks. That night the first snow falled and the start of the end of Guderian's advance on Tula began.

Conseguences

The effects of this first fight against many Russian tanks were noticeable. To begin, the front halt, imposed by the strong Russian defence, did feel its effects over other points when the German communication lines begin to collapse under the alternance of bad weather and freeze, unfreeze and mud. The block did the German losing their favourable chance, letting the Russians much time to prepare fresh forces to protect the most obvious objective, Moscow.

The Germans proved once again to be superior to the Russians for training and tactics, but the German technics was inferior for all that regarding the firepower, protection and mobility: in a tank combat their tanks were surpassed.

In a few months the Panzer IIIs and IVs got thicker plates and heavier guns, with the 50mm L60s and 75mm L43 with a muzzle spped of abour 730 m/s. New projects were layed down: the Tiger, with 100mm front armor and armed with a 88mm L56 gun and the Panther, with its 75mm L70 and sloped 80mm frontal plating. None of these improvings was ready to save the Germans from the Winter.

The combination of snow-mud-KV-T34 delayed down the German progresses definetely: from the battle of the Lisiza and fall of Mtsensk 18 days passed; temperatures decreased to -30º centigrades, reducing the vehicles efficiency to less than 20 percent. The narrow tracks sunk in the mud and were blocked when freezing came after: for the first time many tanks had to be abandoned when the Germans begun to withdraw.