The Early Deploying Support Group
Current planning for logistics in war assumes the use of divisions and corps. This preference for divisional and corps organizations results in the deployment of large force structures. Contemporary deployment schemes includes many assets that are irrelevant to the conduct of strategic operations demanding speed of action and discrete military capability. Also, capabilities residing inside the division might be needed much earlier or much later in operations. Division size deployments result in the deployment of division artillery brigades, division support brigades, engineer brigades, aviation brigades, and so on. This design with its roots in World War II presumes the existence of a 22,000-man corps level support organization weighing roughly 98,000 tons (on which divisions are inherently dependent) with a large rear support area that is immobile and that must be secured.
Why does this anachronistic structure persist? It persists because the Army logistical system, as the system during Vietnam and World War II, is heavily dependent on constant, detailed information from fighting units in the field. [distrust, micro-management] Much of the critical sustainment capability is retained at the division and corps levels. Consequently, American fighting formations have often had to send troops back to rear area support formations in search of supplies
In the past, some of the difficulty associated with supplying formations in the field stemmed from how frequently combat units were required to reposition. But a great deal of difficulty also reflected the desire to centralize control over all available resources. This desire is based on the idea that to decentralize control would create too much wasteful slack in the supply system. Of course, anyone who saw service in Southwest Asia during 1991 remembers well the thousands of vans and containers lying around the docks and airfields whose contents were unknown and never used. While combat Soldiers along the Euphrates River in March 1991 badly needed new boots to replace the ones falling off their feet, officers and Soldiers in higher headquarters and rear areas were sporting new ones.
This structure makes lucrative targets for
The early deploying support group (EDSG) attempts to move in a new direction. The leading principle is that logistics and operations must go hand in hand (see figure 6–11). Thus, EDSG works in two ways. First, EDSG capitalizes on the considerable sustainment capabilities already permanently organized with combat groups. Second, EDSG supplants the ponderous corps support command of 22,000 Soldiers by creating modular support formations designed to deploy rapidly and sustain a 35,000 to 45,000-man expeditionary force for 30 to 45 days or until additional support forces arrive; success in the battle of hours and days requires many things, but of these the most important is projecting force over great distances, first into the theater of conflict or crisis and then across the theater itself.
Deployments tend to fall into one of four categories:
The operations share 80 percent commonality; only the units and locations really change. Ideally, the joint community, as well as the services, should plan for each type and then restrict changes to the deployments to practically zero during the first 120 hours of deployment. For U.S. Army forces in particular, this necessitates change in the way forces organize to deploy on strategic air and sealift. In addition, Army rotary aviation assets have not been fully exploited as they were in the Haitian intervention to move critical supplies around within theater or from ship-to-shore. In the proposed force structure, there are four EDSGs in the active component. Of these units, one would remain on permanent stand-by for supporting OOTW and other non-combat missions. Three EDSGs would be part of the proposed rotational readiness structure. Two additional EDSGs should be part of the Army Reserves to be called up when active EDSGs are fully tasked out to other missions.
Understanding the Logistics Challenges
Our existing logistical systems and processes were developed to support a force that no longer exists in missions that are no longer strategically relevant. Our current logistics capabilities are designed on the structures that sustained the force during World War II and the Cold War, with its various conflicts.
Consequently, failures in the existing logistics process are quite common. To understand the limitations of the existing system, it is critical to understand the three primary causes of challenge in logistics.
Consequently, these challenges are combining to form a sort of logistical death spiral. Improvements in technology are causing new units and personnel to be added to combat formations that are already too large and powerful. But the existing logistics base cannot sustain a larger and more advanced force so additions of civilian and higher echelon support are added to compensate. But this results in an even larger force so we turn to technologies like precision weapons and self-diagnostic equipment to compensate but all of this is being operated and maintained by personnel with little experience and training. These additions create further logistics challenges and the downward spiral continues on.
In the timeframe following WWII, we have added helicopters, computers, thermal and night vision systems, missiles of all types, and now unmanned aerial and ground vehicles to the overall capabilities of the force. All of these advances necessitated a further addition to the force structure to provide for the advance itself as well as the sustainment of the technology. And if history is our guide, the situation for logistics units is only going to get worse – much worse. The war on terror is not going away anytime soon and this means providing comprehensive services to units of all types and sizes scattered throughout the world. The time has come to transform our combat and logistics structures and capabilities to prepare for the coming storm.
The EDSG is based upon forming smaller deployable units that can meet most needs of the force when sent abroad. The nature of conflict is such that we can never provide 100% of the support a force requires in war. Instead of attempting to meet every need and seeing where failure occurs, we must select the resources we deem critical and focus our efforts on ensuring success in those areas. If this means losing a few tanks or aircraft to maintenance needs for the duration of a conflict, this is a small price to pay for achieving total success in those areas we deem critical. A month without mail service is a small price for having adequate ammunition and food. A lack of sufficient dental and mental health support is a small price for complete trauma medical success. A good hot meal may be great for morale, but we need to seriously consider whether this need is more important than sufficient fuel and repair parts. As operations become extended, hire contractors to meet these needs but focus on what really matters in the critical early stages of conflict.
Palletization, Logpacks, and Containerization
Modern combat logistics is evolving through a variety of concepts including palletization and containerization. Where previous supporting elements operated from large tents and shelters requiring extensive manpower and transportation resources, today’s forces can utilize mobile buildings developed on standardized pallets that are compatible with automated load handling systems (LHS). LHS-equipped vehicles can load or unload these mobile buildings at the touch of a button with minimal labor and time. Maintenance units are already fielding Forward Repair System (FRS) shelters while work is ongoing to develop Deployable Medical Systems (DEPMEDS) to leverage LHS technologies. This automated pallet concept originated in the transportation and supply areas of logistics as a more efficient means to transport bulk quantities of artillery ammunition, fuel, and water. An unfortunate limitation of current pallet designs is that their size and weight are too great for effective employment in many tactical situations. The planned Future Tactical Truck System fails to address this shortcoming, as it remains based upon a pallet design with a payload of 13 tons. An appropriate tactical pallet concept will revolutionize our logistics capabilities and achieve the objective of integrating our logistics and operational activities.
As the backbone of deployed logistics capabilities is the medium tactical truck fleet, a tactical pallet with the dimensional cargo area of these vehicles seems logical. Ideally, a higher payload capacity of 7.5 tons should be engineered into the pallet design to enable more efficient movement of ammunition and fuel. More importantly, a pallet of this size can be used in a variety of transportation modes instead of being limited to wheeled tactical trucks, as is the case with existing and planned pallet systems. Designed properly, this tactical pallet could still be transported by existing LHS-equipped trucks, but also by helicopter slingload, mass airdrop by C-17 or C-130 aircraft, and by tracked and amphibious vehicles to be designed.
The tactical pallet concept should be combined with a system that replaces existing Soldier sustainment systems with a logistical pack, or logpack. A logpack combines the food, water, personal hygiene, and small arms ammunition needed by an individual Soldier for 48 hours into a pack similar to a small rucksack. A field variant of the logpack can be carried in a box about the size of an MRE case without ammunition included. Items within the logpack should be packaged as the individual Soldier will use them. A logpack system eliminates the need for water purification and food preparation systems in the tactical environment. Logpacks offer additional advantages as well, including improved NBC survivability, reductions in Soldier illness casualties, and improved subsistence support in terrains where water may not be available such as mountains and deserts. The tactical pallet design should be capable of carrying up to two hundred logpacks enabling a single pallet to provide most sustainment needs for an entire company of troops.
Additional improvements in the EDSG are available through ISO sea/air/land containerization. In the civilian world, and to some degree within the military, containers are used to transport large quantities of bulk items using automated systems for transport to limit the manpower requirements of operations. As with pallets, large containers can be converted into buildings for a variety of uses. This practice enables us to define a standardized Theater Support Module by combining a pneumatic frame tent (raised and supported by air, roughly 60’ wide by 100’ in length) along with as many as five ISO-standard 40’ containers to form a basic TSM. Depending on the containers used, a TSM can provide higher echelon supporting units with up to 11,000 sq. ft. of protected, controlled space for medical facilities, maintenance systems, warehousing, C4I activities, and billeting. The complete TSM, regardless of mission, can be transported by a total of eight standard commercial trailer loads for overland mobility while the use of commercially available Self-Loading Trailers (SLT) minimizes the workload of off-loading and assembling the modules. This approach also enables complete TSM systems to be assembled and operated within the cargo areas of ships, like the Joint Venture or standard container transport ships, or even within the cargo area of a Skycat 1000 airship. This approach also suggests that the EDSG should place a greater emphasis on using tractor-trailer vehicle systems, to include HETS as well as COTS vehicles and trailers, in lieu of many HEMTT and PLS vehicle systems.
Together, these technologies enable the EDSG to operate in a highly distributed environment. Where today’s combat forces must be spread over great distances, the EDSG can support and sustain operations with an equal degree of mobility and flexibility. The EDSG serves as an interface between joint, international, commercial, and strategic logistics systems and the deployed combat force. Compatibility with commercial container systems allows the EDSG to plug into existing logistics resources anywhere in the world while logpacks and tactical pallets enable the EDSG to convert those resources and distribute them effectively across a variety of tactical environments.
Strategic Sustainment Stream
Using existing and planned technologies, it is possible to project approximately 10,000 tons of combat materials from CONUS on a daily basis to anywhere in the world using a relatively limited quantity of resources. This capability will require the successful development of the previously mentioned Skycat 1000 airship, of which 60 will be required for sustainment purposes in place of the aging C-5 series of aircraft. Accompanying this airship fleet should be a total of 150 Boeing 747 aircraft converted to the KC-25/33A military cargo nose-loading version with Boeing On Board Loader devices to load/offload themselves without needing materiel handling equipment. The KC-25/33A can supplement Air Force aerial refueling assets in addition to providing a strategic lift capability. Support for the 747-family of aircraft is available worldwide while the Skycat airship provides the ability to deliver goods to any location in the world, including on water and in locations without aviation support systems. The ability of the EDSG to operate in a distributed fashion allows the group to locate wherever is militarily optimal for the logistics situation. Some elements of the EDSG may operate from ships in the region while other elements operate from distant airfields or nearby land.
Further strategic sustainment is available through pre-positioned materials as well as naval systems. Existing ISO container ships can deliver massive quantities of materials and the EDSG can bring these materials into the mix either by off-loading the materials in an appropriate port or through operations on the ships themselves. A container ship may carry the necessary materials for logpacks while an onboard EDSG team assembles the packs and prepares them for aerial delivery by helicopter slingload. A similar approach could be taken for supplying fuel or ammunition. Through its inherent modularity, the EDSG can adapt to the strategic demands of the given scenario.
Tactical Sustainment Stream
Once the EDSG has converted the delivered materials into appropriate tactical forms, delivery to deployed units is possible through a variety of means. The use of tactical pallets enables the options of mass airdrop, helicopter slingload, amphibious transport, and overland delivery. As the objective combat groups will require an average of 40 tactical pallets per day of materials, the sustainment needs of the typical combat group can be fulfilled by five C-17 sorties, 20 C-130 sorties, or a combination of 30 UH-60 and 10 CH-47 sorties. In the case of high-threat operations, such as forced entry missions, fixed-wing aircraft can operate from distant airfields to deliver the needed goods by parachute. For lower threat situations, helicopters can bring the materials in from Navy and commercial ships. For more economical sea-based support, amphibious trucks can be used to take the materials to shore and deliver the goods overland. For traditional overland delivery, existing M1120 HEMTT and developing MTV-LHS can provide transport while tracked support vehicles would also be possible.
A fleet of 50 C-17 aircraft along with 200 C-130 aircraft is sufficient for sustaining up to eight deployed combat groups at peak material consumption rates (80 pallets per group per day). This would include providing fuel and heavy ammunition through palletized aerial delivery. It would also make no difference if these groups were involved in a single large conflict or spread across eight distinct missions scattered around the globe. This capacity should be augmented by an expansion of the LHD-carrier fleet to 18 ships as well as procuring an additional fleet of 100 Joint Venture/modified commercial ISO container ships with bow ramps to off-load onto beaches directly LST-style. These naval vessels can be used for sustaining lower-threat operations as well as providing capacity for additional EDSG functions.
Additional Considerations
This approach to combat logistics will provide substantial reductions in the overall size of the force that must be deployed for a given mission. By emphasizing palletization and containerization, the deployed force will require fewer material handling systems than alternative designs. Logpacks also eliminate the need for water purification and food preparation systems in the early-deployed force. Moreover, the use of pallets allows the force to transition between various stages of missions. When the force needs more fuel for mobility purposes, the generic pallet-compatible vehicle can convert to transporting fuel. If greater ammunition is needed, the same vehicle can transition to transporting ammunition. In post-conflict phases, the same vehicle may use an engineering or power generation pallet to assist in rebuilding and clean-up operations.
By emphasizing compatibility with standard intermodal transport systems, the combat force can tap into existing civilian resources, but the reverse is also true. Containerized medical and sustainment systems can be transported and operated by civilian organizations in support of humanitarian missions. Similarly, the proposed Theater Support Module could also be transported and operated by civilian groups for OOTW missions such as providing shelter and full spectrum medical services for disaster relief. Moreover, the field variant of the logpack is ideal for humanitarian missions in that it provides for personal hygiene without the need for accessible potable water. These factors will dramatically reduce the burden of OOTW missions on the military while also increasing the quality of the services provided.
It should be noted that these concepts are intended to coincide with significant enhancements in our strategic deployment capabilities. Specifically, The Department of Defense needs to develop a strategic deployment capability around a force of:
These are in addition to the previously mentioned aircraft needed to sustain future operations. To achieve this level of strategic capability will mean adding 80 C-17s to the currently planned fleet as well as 200 KC-33A and 80 Skycat 1000 airships in total. This will enable the rapid deployment and sustainment of all proposed combat groups.
Finally, this level of functionality does not come at great cost. Most of the items involved in this concept are already commercially available at nominal costs and can be purchased in lieu of existing procurement programs. For example, the Army ground systems can be obtained through existing medium and heavy truck procurement programs and in place of the planned FTTS program. Naval systems can be financed through the retirement of existing excess ships that are extremely expensive to operate. Aerial systems can be financed through ending the Air Force conventional take-off and landing version of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program, recapitalizing the A-10 fleet (bigger engines, new wings that fold, second seat for enlisted observer) and F-16 fleet at planned JSF levels, and using the savings to finance the needed transport aircraft. Converting the JSF program to a STOVL-only aircraft design would also enable the Navy to use the planned ships as aircraft carriers for supporting smaller missions where a complete carrier battle group is not necessary. This would also be a preferable approach to providing naval air support in high threat situations where the loss of the carrier is possible as a converted container ship carrier may have about 100-200 personnel on-board compared to over 5000 personnel on a nuclear carrier.
Scenario One: Humanitarian Aid Mission, remote regions
Natural disaster in the form of a major earthquake has struck a remote, Third World nation and the call has gone out for humanitarian aid. While many nations are volunteering to provide aid, the transportation network of the afflicted nation has been severely damaged by the earthquake, preventing the international community from entering the region. An EDSG has been tasked with providing and transporting the aid until appropriate transportation routes can be established for international resources to take over.
Using a relief version of the planned field log packs, we can calculate that a single field pack will provide sufficient emergency aid for four people per day. For the U.S. commitment to this relief of assisting an estimated 200,000 victims needing aid, we will need to deliver 50,000 field packs per day (84 TEU or 250 tactical pallets). For medical services, a MEDEVAC (Heavy) Company along with its associated Medical Support Company will be deployed. Both of the EDSG General Medical Companies will also take part in this tasking. Two transportation companies will be taking part in the relief effort, one Heavy company using organic HETS tractors along with reserve Self-Loading Trailers (52 systems), and a Light company using MTV-LHS with their accompanying trailers (52 systems). A General Support Battalion will also deploy to provide MP and Engineering support.
For this scenario, aid will be packaged in the United States into tactical pallets and configured for parachute delivery into the afflicted region until the transportation network can be reestablished. Disbursement of U.S. aid in the deployed area is handled by the Transportation (Light) Company while the Transportation (Heavy) Company will be transporting the aid from the international community. The enhanced capabilities of the HETS, combined with the SLT trailers, allows this unit to use even the most marginal of transportation routes to efficiently deliver up to 100 TEU of standard intermodal shipping containers of relief supplies per day (200 TEU over short distance routes). Engineering resources will be restoring the transportation infrastructure during this time.
Medical resources will deploy with the Transportation resources by C-17 aircraft. The entire force should be deployable by fewer than 60 C-17 sorties with 15 aircraft remaining in the area to support parachute delivery of relief supplies. An additional 30 C-130 aircraft will be deployed to provide additional parachute delivery as well as MEDEVAC support for the Medical Companies of the EDSG. The Medical Companies will establish a site at an available 3,000 foot runway airfield within the afflicted area that is capable of supporting C-130 aircraft for JATO-equipped STOL operations if necessary. These units provide a total of 24 ground ambulance systems, 4 emergency surgical teams with operating rooms, a limited intensive care capability, and evacuation capability to distant resources for critical care.
Providing for a maintenance rotation, the strategic stream for relief aid from CONUS is transported by a team of 20 KC-25/33A cargo aircraft. Each aircraft can carry up to 20 tactical pallets of relief aid at projected weights and dimensions. The pallets will then be transferred to tactical aircraft in theater and parachute delivered into the afflicted areas. Light transportation systems can then move the supplies to the needed areas. This system can remain fully functional for up to 45 days, providing sufficient time for civilian and international resources to take over the mission using sealift and ground transportation assets. This mission will require less than half of the total assets of a single EDSG.
Scenario Two: Tactical Assault with Sea Support
An anti-Western regime in the Middle East is threatening the region with the use of cruise and theater ballistic missiles. Available assets in the region include a Carrier Battle Group, a marine expeditionary unit with LHD carrier, and airbases within the region to support Air Expeditionary Forces. The Army contribution to the joint mission is to consist of an Airborne-Air Assault Group augmented by Aviation Combat Group, and a Light Reconnaissance Strike Group. A single EDSG is expected to provide support for all ground combat units.
Supply operations will be disbursed to regional airbases to support parachute delivery of materials into the theater during initial phases of operation. Modified container ships will be embarked to provide support of larger, follow-on forces as well as enhanced medical support. The total ground force will require an average of 180 tactical pallets of fuel, ammunition, log packs, and other materials per day (600 tons on average per day). A peak of 240 pallets per day will be required to support major combat operations. Forty KC-25/33A aircraft will provide the strategic stream of resources from CONUS to regional airfields. Twenty C-17 aircraft and 50 C-130 aircraft will be tasked with executing the tactical leg of sustainment operations and augmenting MEDEVAC support. Pallets are direct delivered to the support units of the deployed forces.
A second LHD along with 3 aviation container ships will be brought to the region to transport and support the Aviation Combat Group. Additional maintenance, general support, and medical units of the EDSG will be deployed to an in-country airport to be seized in the early phases of operations. Medical operations will be strictly field operations with higher echelon surgical and hospitalization provided by the supporting LHD vessels and MEDEVAC support to distant garrison facilities. Maintenance support is provided on an attrition basis with EDSG maintenance units establishing a cannibalization point at the local airfield while additional vehicles and parts can be flown from CONUS or included in the existing resupply network. This support package can sustain major operations for up to 45 days using approximately 2/3 of the resources of a single EDSG.
Scenario Three: Major Regional War
The following scenario is based largely on the events of Operation Iraqi Freedom. This is not a critique of that operation – the scenario is being used solely to demonstrate how the EDSG concept can be used to support major regional warfare against virtually any enemy nation. This same concept could be used just as well against North Korea, Iran, Syria, or any other enemy of the United States. For this scenario, a lead-time of two months is assumed to account for diplomacy, political maneuvering, and prepositioning of combat forces. A total of three fronts are to be opened in this scenario. A single major attack (Front A) will commence from a neighboring state featuring two Combat Maneuver Groups, a marine expeditionary unit, and an Airborne-Air Assault Group augmented with Aviation Combat Group. A second front (Front B) will consist of an AAAG regimental battlegroup augmented with a battalion battlegroup from a CMG. A third front (Front C) will consist of a Light Reconnaissance Strike Group augmented with the remaining regimental battlegroup from the AAAG. The objective is to establish three bases of power within the enemy nation from which to influence their public and take down the enemy government. One CMG, the MEU, one Air Force AEF, and one CVBG are assumed to be prepositioned discretely in the supporting neighbor in advance of operations as part of "peacetime exercises."
In this scenario, Fronts B and C will be supported primarily by garrison operations in Germany and CONUS. The AAAG regimental units will parachute insert into the desired locations to establish airheads capable of supporting C-17 aircraft and Skycat 100 airships for insertion of heavier combat forces. The LRSG is deployable by 162 C-17 sorties while the CMG battalion battlegroup is fully deployed by 6 Skycat 1000 loads. The logistics burden of these two fronts combined should peak at about 320 pallets per day with an average daily need of 240 pallets per day. Sixty KC-25/33A provide the strategic stream to regional airfields while 20 C-17s and 100 C-130s provide tactical resupply and MEDEVAC support. Front B will receive Heavy MEDEVAC and Medical support companies while Front C receives Light MEDEVAC and support. General Medical Companies will support Front A with additional support from marine and LHD assets. Maintenance resources will split in a similar fashion with the bulk of support going to Front A while Fronts B and C use an attrition program of cannibalization with replacement systems delivered from CONUS. No EDSG transportation will be required in B and C allowing all assets to support Front A. Fronts B and C will each receive a General Support Battalion while the remaining two battalions will support Front A.
Support for Front A will originate in the neighboring nation with support primarily coming from overland transportation. A constant stream of up to 2000 tons per day of materials is available through Skycat 1000 airships with an additional 70,000 tons of materials prepositioned during the two-month lead-up to the war. As this front is driven into the enemy nation, the AAAG and MEU can establish bases of power within the nation to allow for direct delivery of materials, to include humanitarian aid, to forward areas and to serve as a midpoint for helicopter support operations in taking down the enemy government and providing MEDEVAC support. EDSG assets will occupy these bases of power along with the AAAG and MEU to provide complete local support to the CMGs that are thus free to take out the enemy at will. The three bases of power will draw enemy forces into kill zones accessible by the aircraft of the AEF and CVBG while the CMG and LRSG assets undertake further offensive action.
This operation will require the complete resources of a single EDSG. Of the proposed strategic airlift resources, fewer than half are necessary to undertake this operation in both strategic and tactical terms. This scenario also does not make use of the massive capacity of shipping resources available to U.S. forces. In short, this type of engagement would require less lead-time, fewer forces, and fewer resources than existing methods. It is also more likely to achieve positive outcomes with fewer combatant and noncombatant casualties. The use of power bases within the enemy nation also reduces problems associated with anarchy and inability to execute humanitarian operations by allowing for direct insertion of aid and influence into the heart of the nation.
NOTES
1. Martin Van Crefeld, Command in War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), 247.
2. It was a source of considerable disappointment to the author that when the war ended in March 1991 officers at the Regimental, Division, and Corps Headquarters were wearing new desert boots while privates in the scout and tank platoons of the squadron had none. It smacked of Vietnam in the worst way.
3. A large-scale, clandestine chemical attack on a base such as Camp Doha in Kuwait would be deadly and create a logistical nightmare that disrupts support for thousands of troops in the field. Greg Jaffe and Carla Anne Robbins, "How Vulnerable Are Troops If Iraq Taps Poison Agents?" The Wall Street Journal, October 2, 2002, 7.
4. Historically, armies have tended to integrate more and more arms and capabilities at progressively lower levels. See Jonathan M. House, Toward Combined Arms Warfare: A Survey of 20th Century Tactics, Doctrine and Organization (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Combat Studies Institute, 1984), 188.
PIC 2
5. Lt. Gen. Daniel G. Brown (USA) has heard it before, but he smiles when he hears it again: "Amateurs talk strategy; experts talk logistics." See Harry Levins, "Army Veteran Knows From Experience the Importance of Logistics," St. Louis Post-Dispatch, August 24, 2002, 23.
6.INTRODUCTION
Proposed EDSG Organization – This is a version of what an EDSG would look like given the personnel parameters outlined in the Colonel Macgregor article. There are some changes that we are suggesting by this is the basis of our thought processes on the EDSG concept. Also note that this is the complete EDSG package and not necessarily what would be deployed for a given scenario. You may notice that this showcases our concerns on using a large formation that is to be broken down into modules – a large number of small companies will make up the EDSG to give it the necessary modularity. We also don’t use an early entry module as this will be dependent on the given scenario so we assume that to be done on an ad hoc basis. We also leave 800 personnel available for general purpose tasking to take on whatever misc. missions pop-up or to augment other areas. We’re not saying that these are necessarily the way things should be done, these are the ideas behind the concepts in the article.
C4I Battalion
HQ Company – Provides C2 integration and computer systems support
Alpha Company – Intelligence support
Bravo Company – Land Operations Coordination
Charlie Company – Air Operations Coordination
Delta Company – Sea Operations Coordination
Echo Company – Deployed Signal Unit
Foxtrot Company – Deployed Signal Unit
Medical Battalion
Alpha Company – Medevac (Heavy)
HQ & Trauma/Triage section
Two Evac platoons (8 AMEV per platoon)
One Evac platoon (8 wheeled ambulances)
Bravo Company – Medical Support (Heavy)
Two Nurse/Corpsman platoons
One Lab Support platoon (includes nuclear medicine and NBC medical support)
One Preventive Medicine platoon
Charlie Company – Medevac (Light)
HQ & Trauma/Triage section
Two Evac platoons (4 UH-60 per platoon)
One Evac platoon (8 wheeled ambulances)
Delta Company – Medical Support (Light)
Two Nurse/Corpsman platoons
One Lab Support platoon (includes nuclear medicine and NBC medical support)
One Preventive Medicine platoon
Echo & Foxtrot Companies – General Medical Treatment
One HQ & Triage platoon
Two General treatment platoons
One Dental/Mental Health platoon
Maintenance Battalion
Alpha & Bravo Companies – Automotive and Armament Maintenance
One HQ & Depot support platoon
Two MST Platoons (Four MST w/ two MTVF and two FRS per team in ea. Platoon)
One Recovery, Evacuation, Swap platoon (8 HETS, 3 HEMTT wreckers)
Charlie & Delta Companies – Aviation and Missile Maintenance
One HQ & Depot support platoon
Two MST Platoons (Four MST w/ two MTVF and two FRS per team in ea. Platoon)
One Recovery, Evacuation, Swap platoon (8 HETS, 3 HEMTT wreckers)
Echo & Foxtrot Companies – Equipment Maintenance
One HQ & Depot support platoon
Two MST Platoons (Four MST w/ one MTVF and three CMT-H per team in ea. Platoon)
One Recovery, Evacuation, Swap platoon (8 tractor/SLT trailer, 3 MTV w/crane)
Supply Battalion
Alpha Company – Logpack Assembly/Tier III supply operations
Food, water, small arms ammunition, construction materials, theater support systems
Bravo & Charlie Companies – Organizational/Tier II supply operations
Fuel, heavy ammunition, vehicle and system repair parts
Delta Company – Section/Tier I supply operations
General individual supplies, uniforms, office supplies, TA-50, batteries
Transportation Battalion
Alpha & Bravo Companies – Transportation (Heavy)
52 HETS with trailers
Charlie & Delta Companies – Transportation (Medium)
52 Commercial Tractors with SLT Trailers
Echo, Foxtrot, and Golf Companies – Transportation (Light)
52 MTV-LHS with compatible trailers
Hotel Company – Transportation (Amphibious)
52 Amphibious HEMTT-LHS
General Support Battalions (Four ea.)
Alpha Company – Military Police
Bravo Company – Chemical
Charlie Company – Engineer
Delta Company – Explosive Ordnance Disposal
General Support Detachments (800 man "warm body" brigade)
Mortuary Affairs
EPW Detainment
Refugee Support
Warehouse Augmentation
Medical Support Augmentation
Crowd Control
Medical Quarantine
Supply and Transportation in the Combat Group Structure
The supply and transportation elements of the U.S. Army are faced with perhaps their greatest challenge since World War II. As happened in the 1940s, the Army is once again being called upon to fight on a global scale. While the enemy in the war on terror is quite different from the Germans and Japanese of the previous era, many of the challenges remain the same particularly in the areas of supply and transportation. While the forces involved are much smaller in size, they lack the luxury of time afforded to the combatants of prior generations. As the logistics failures of Operation Iraqi Freedom have clearly demonstrated, we must overhaul our existing supply and transportation networks to maintain functionality in the new era of global warfare.
Philosophy of Support
Mobile warfare on a global scale eliminates our ability to effectively maintain warehouses and ground transportation networks in forward areas. We no longer have the luxury of clearly defined battlespaces and theaters within to operate. We must possess the ability to know what our field units need and get those materials to the field as rapidly and efficiently as possible. In the proposed group structure, supply and transportation are best provided with an emphasis on three primary areas:
Systems and Definitions
Tiers of Supply
The existing classes of supply should be merged to form three tiers that would be managed by three expense accounts held by the unit. The accounts should consist of Sectional accounts, Organizational accounts, and Subsistence accounts. Accounts should be managed by a Visa debit/credit card system with the unit being reimbursed for expenses as documentation is provided. This technology enables us to discretely monitor the materials being purchased and possessed by the unit without the need for excessive reporting and inventories. It also empowers the unit to utilize local purchasing capabilities where needed (See Appendix I).
ULLS-OOO
The existing Unit Level Logistics System should be replaced by a database program designed on the OpenOffice.org software suite. This software suite should be adopted Army-wide as it is free and very powerful and flexible. It also uses a compact file format that is more adaptable to satellite communications. Accompanying each ULLS-OOO system should be a satellite modem capable of networking with notebook and PDA computers. System should also be barcode enabled and compatible with handheld PDAs and scanners. A point-of-sale capability should also be included for managing lateral transfers of materials, issuing of materials to sub-units, as well as for bartering between units (See Appendix I).
Tactical Pallets
Tactical pallets are designed to provide the optimum amount of load in terms of payload and volume that can be transported by all Army transportation systems. It can be loaded by tactical vehicles using Load Handling Systems while also being compatible with air transport, helicopter transport, and parachute delivery systems. A variety of pallets must be available to fill the majority of tactical resupply needs (See Appendix II).
Tracked Support Vehicle (TSV)
A TSV must be defined that can effectively serve as a tactical prime mover for deployed combat units. This vehicle must be equipped with a Load Handling System and be compatible with proposed tactical pallets. The TSV is able to support maneuver warfare in armored formations while also offering superior mobility in support of light infantry elements. Includes a Vehicle Tracking System (VTS) (See Appendix III).
Logpacks
The primary subsistence materials needed by deployed troops should be packaged within a logpack in garrison facilities prior to delivery to the field. This includes food, water, small arms ammunition, and basic hygiene items. Like the MRE, logpacks are intended as a short-term sustainment system to be used until follow-on elements are brought in for traditional subsistence support (See Appendix IV).
Theater Support Module (TSM)
A system of tents and shelters used to assemble deployable support facilities. The basic TSM consists of an airframe tent 60’ wide by 100’ long with interfaces to support as many as five 40’ shelters, ten 20’ shelters, or combinations thereof. Shelters used in supply TSM will be tailored to specific types of supplies. For example, a 40’ shelter may be used with a specific stockage of repair parts tailored for a CMG operating in desert regions. Another may be for sectional supplies needed in a jungle environment. Other shelters may simply be for bulk quantities of specific items like MREs.
Logistics Issues
With this construct, units will be scheduled for normal deliveries of subsistence and organizational materials. Using the logpack system, the typical company will receive one pallet of logpacks every other day. Consequently, each battalion will receive two pallets of logpacks every day in addition to their other requested materials. Some additional supplies can be included in the pallets of logpacks, particularly sectional supplies that are cyclical in nature such as batteries. Additional pallets will provide fuel, heavy ammunition, and all other requested materials. Deliveries will typically be arranged by battalion with the distribution teams for the battalion handling receipt and disposition of the materials.
Battalion and Lower Support
Combat units will retain a modest supply section to manage their sectional and organizational materials. These teams will reside in the headquarters sections of each company within the group concept. Units will retain the absolute minimum quantity of excess supplies on-hand to maximize mobility. Most supply and transportation support will come from the Group Support Battalion.
Supply and Transportation Company, Group Support Battalion
To accommodate variability in unit size and operations, existing S&T companies will be reconstructed to a more modular and mobile design. As the intended combat groups are to be capable of being subdivided to the battalion battlegroup level, the S&T unit is structured to support specific battalions. The S&T Company will include a small headquarters section to manage and support the operations of the company as well as a support platoon for providing S&T services to the supporting elements of the combat group, including strike, recon, and aviation elements. A platoon will also be included in the company for each maneuver element of the group so that a combat group with four maneuver elements will have four maneuver platoons within the S&T Company. A group with three maneuver elements would therefore only have three maneuver platoons in the S&T Company. Maneuver platoons will consist of one material squad, two distribution squads, and one support squad. Support platoons will include two material squads, one distribution squad, and one support squad. In light groups such as the AAAG, only one distribution squad will be used in maneuver platoons.
Material Squad (8 personnel)
The material squad is intended to hold a small reserve of materials for use by the supported unit. These reserves will vary by mission and tasking. The squad will possess two HEMTT-LHS for transportation of this reserve capacity, typically additional fuel and heavy ammunition, and two HMMWV cargo vehicles for managing additional materials.
Distribution Squad (8 personnel)
The distribution squad is issued four TSV with trailer per squad with the purpose of obtaining materials for their assigned unit and delivering those materials to their intended destination. This will typically involve the distribution squad retrieving pallets from a drop zone or helicopter landing zone and delivering the supplies to the forward units assigned.
Support Squad (8 personnel)
The support squad is designed to deal with special contingencies and to reinforce the distribution squad during peaks in demand. The squad will operate two MTV with MHE as well as two TSV.
Company Headquarters Section (9 personnel)
The headquarters section includes personnel for coordinating support of the unit with other elements of the Group Support Battalion. Section includes a two-person maintenance support team, a two-person supply support team, a two-person personnel support team, unit First Sergeant, Company commander, and unit Training/NBC NCO. Section includes three HMMWV (two four seat) along with two trailers.
Supply Battalion, Early Deploying Support Group
The Supply Battalion of the EDSG is tasked with converting bulk quantities of military goods into appropriate tactical loads for insertion into the theater of operations. More often than not, this work will be performed in distant garrison facilities but the unit will also retain the ability to perform these same tasks in a forward posture.
Sectional Materials Company, EDSG
The Sectional Materials Company (SMC) is responsible to providing and resupplying the materials that are used at the individual, squad, and section levels. This includes small arms, issued TA-50, uniforms, protective gear, sectional computers, and office supplies among other things.
HQ Processing Platoon (33 personnel)
The headquarters section includes personnel for coordinating support of the unit. Section includes a two-person maintenance support team, a two-person supply support team, a two-person personnel support team, unit First Sergeant, Company commander, and unit Training/NBC NCO. Section includes three HMMWV (two four seat) along with two trailers. Four processing teams are also members of this platoon, including one contracting officer, one senior logistics specialist, and four processing clerks. Each team is transported in two HMMWV, a four-seat model with trailer for hauling personnel and equipment as well as a shelter carrier containing the computers and satellite modem necessary for order processing.
Sectional Warehousing Platoon (20 personnel)
The Sectional Warehousing Platoon operates from a Theater Support Module as well as from a variety of ISO containers. The platoon will include 10 TSV for organic mobility in addition to enabling the unit to move and load tactical pallets in the warehouse and supply yards.
Sectional Line-Haul Platoon (32 personnel)
The Section Line-Haul Platoon is responsible for retrieving bulk goods from strategic transport nodes and delivering the goods to the SMC. For deployment purposes, the platoon will possess 16 commercial semi-tractors with Self-Loading Trailers for transporting the unit TSMs. Once deployed, the SLHP will transition to traveling routes between shipping and aviation ports for movement of sectional goods. Where possible, this platoon will augment warehouse personnel.
Organizational Materials Company, EDSG
The Organizational Materials Company (OMC) is responsible to providing and resupplying the materials that are used at the organizational level. This includes vehicles repair parts, fuel, large caliber ammunition, tools, and unit radios among other items.
HQ Processing Platoon (33 personnel)
The headquarters section includes personnel for coordinating support of the unit. Section includes a two-person maintenance support team, a two-person supply support team, a two-person personnel support team, unit First Sergeant, Company commander, and unit Training/NBC NCO. Section includes three HMMWV (two four seat) along with two trailers. Four processing teams are also members of this platoon, including one contracting officer, one senior logistics specialist, and four processing clerks. Each team is transported in two HMMWV, a four-seat model with trailer for hauling personnel and equipment as well as a shelter carrier containing the computers and satellite modem necessary for order processing.
Organizational Warehousing Platoon (20 personnel)
The Organizational Warehousing Platoon operates from a Theater Support Module as well as from a variety of ISO containers. The platoon will include 10 TSV for organic mobility in addition to enabling the unit to move and load tactical pallets in the warehouse and supply yards.
Combustibles Warehousing Platoon (40 personnel)
The Combustibles Warehousing Platoon manages the supply operations of large ammunition and fuel. Due to the volatility of these materials, the warehouse will often be located separate from the remainder of the unit. Unit systems include eight TSV, eight commercial tractors with tanker trailers, and eight forklifts for ammunition handling.
Organizational Line-Haul Platoon (32 personnel)
The Organizational Line-Haul Platoon is responsible for retrieving bulk goods from strategic transport nodes and delivering the goods to the OMC. For deployment purposes, the platoon will possess 16 commercial semi-tractors with Self-Loading Trailers for transporting the unit TSMs. Once deployed, the OLHP will transition to traveling routes between shipping and aviation ports for movement of sectional goods. Where possible, this platoon will augment warehouse personnel.
Subsistence Goods Company, EDSG
The Subsistence Goods Company (SGC) is responsible to providing and resupplying the materials that are used at the individual, squad, and section levels. This includes small arms, issued TA-50, uniforms, protective gear, sectional computers, and office supplies among other things.
HQ Processing Platoon (33 personnel)
The headquarters section includes personnel for coordinating support of the unit. Section includes a two-person maintenance support team, a two-person supply support team, a two-person personnel support team, unit First Sergeant, Company commander, and unit Training/NBC NCO. Section includes three HMMWV (two four seat) along with two trailers. Four processing teams are also members of this platoon, including one contracting officer, one senior logistics specialist, and four processing clerks. Each team is transported in two HMMWV, a four-seat model with trailer for hauling personnel and equipment as well as a shelter carrier containing the computers and satellite modem necessary for order processing.
Subsistence Warehousing Platoon (20 personnel)
The Subsistence Warehousing Platoon operates from a Theater Support Module as well as from a variety of ISO containers. The platoon will include 10 TSV for organic mobility in addition to enabling the unit to move and load tactical pallets in the warehouse and supply yards.
Subsistence Line-Haul Platoon (32 personnel)
The Subsistence Line-Haul Platoon is responsible for retrieving bulk goods from strategic transport nodes and delivering the goods to the SGC. For deployment purposes, the platoon will possess 16 commercial semi-tractors with Self-Loading Trailers for transporting the unit TSMs. Once deployed, the SLHP will transition to traveling routes between shipping and aviation ports for movement of sectional goods.
Transportation Battalion, Early Deploying Support Group
The Transportation Battalion of the EDSG is designed to provide transportation support to a variety of combat groups in the forward area. This may involve transportation of personnel but will typically involve movement of materials within and around the theater of operations. The Transportation Battalion will consist of eight companies that are built on a common organizational construct but which possess differing vehicles for various types of missions. The companies will include two Heavy Transportation companies, one Medium Transportation company, two Light Transportation companies, and one Amphibious Transportation company. Each company will be structured as follows:
HQ Dispatch Platoon (21 personnel)
The headquarters section includes personnel for coordinating support of the unit. Section includes a two-person maintenance support team, a two-person supply support team, a two-person personnel support team, unit First Sergeant, Company commander, and unit Training/NBC NCO. Section includes three HMMWV (two four seat) along with two trailers. Included within the platoon is a Dispatch section for organizing the operations of each platoon within the company. This section will include two HMMWV with shelter systems and satellite modem for ULLS-OOO operations. Platoon will also possess four prime mover vehicles as reserves for unit operations.
Maneuver Platoon (3 ea. Of 44 personnel)
Each Maneuver Platoon consists of 16 prime movers accompanied by four armored HMMWV along with two additional armored HMMWV with satellite modem for operational management. Armored HMMWV should be optimized for mobile security operations or replaced with more suitable alternatives.
Companies will be distinguished by the associated prime mover assigned to the unit. Heavy units will be issued modified HETS incorporating a longer trailer and a hybrid powertrain for improved efficiency. Medium units will use traditional civilian-style semi-tractor trailers and will be assigned Self-Loading Trailers. Light units will be issued MTV-LHS vehicles along with their associated trailers. Amphibious units will be outfitted with modified HEMTT-LHS vehicles that use a hybrid powertrain and are specially modified for amphibious operations. Interim units can use civilian tractor-trailers until amphibious HEMTT is fielded.
Joint Support, Higher Echelons
Additional transportation systems should be pooled within JSHE formations. This will include the bulk of HETS and existing PLS systems. These should be available for those situations where needed, however most expected contingencies are not well suited to large quantities of these transportation systems. Additional resources will also be available from civilian contractors. Similarly, additional support in supply operations should be available from joint and civilian entities.
Existing higher level Army depot and garrison operations will be critical to executing future supply operations. While these operations should be rolled into a joint logistics organization, a substantial investment must be made in maximizing automation in these facilities. Successful civilian distribution operations, such as Land’s End in Dodgeville WI, should be used as blueprints in designing and developing future power projection infrastructures in existing garrisons and depots.
Aviation and naval resources will also play a critical role in all future supply and transportation operations. These resources should be viewed in three fleets – tactical sustainment operations, strategic sustainment operations, and deployment operations.
Tactical Sustainment Operations
Tactical joint support involves those resources that will be operating directly within the theater of operations. These systems should include the requisite survivability features necessary for such operations. Naval vessels in this area will include LHD carriers as well as smaller ships designed to support helicopter and amphibious operations. These include ships like the High Speed Vessel (Joint Venture) as well as container ships modified to support these types of operations with bow ramps to offload straight onto beaches. In total, the LHD fleet should be expanded to 18 vessels while an additional 100 vessels of the HSV or container ship configuration should be fielded.
Aviation support in the tactical area should come from a fleet of 50 C-17 aircraft along with a fleet of 200 C-130 aircraft. More often than not, these aircraft will be conducting parachute delivery operations of supplies, equipment, and personnel. Guided Parachute Delivery Systems should also be fielded to improve the effectiveness of these operations.
Strategic Sustainment Operations
Strategic Sustainment resources are primarily responsible for moving materials from CONUS to locations abroad for insertion by tactical resources. All existing naval container and materials vessels will remain in the field of strategic sustainment operations. No additional vessels are deemed necessary for this role.
Aviation resources for these operations must be heavily expanded. As the existing C-5 family of aircraft is severely aged, a new type of aircraft, the Skycat 1000, should be developed and fielded to replace it. The Skycat 1000 is a lighter-than-air ship that is currently designed and intended to carry a load of roughly 1000tons over 4000 nautical miles (500tons to 8500nms). This airship can travel 2765 miles per day at optimum cruising speed enabling the Skycat 1000 to reach most militarily-desired destinations within four days or less. The planned cargo hold of the Skycat 1000 is 10,600 square feet in size and stands 26 feet in height. For sustainment missions, as many as 130 TEU of containerized materials can be stored within the cargo area of the Skycat 1000 depending on weights (7.5 ton average). Sixty of these aircraft should be procured for sustainment operations. Additionally, we should procure 150 KC-33A (military 747-400 cargo/refueler) to augment the Skycat sustainment fleet. Each KC-25/33A can carry 14 TEU at similar weights. This fleet would enable us to consistently project an average of 10000tons of materials to areas throughout the world on a daily basis.
Deployment Operations
Deployment resources are primarily intended to provide deployment of forces but can also be used to augment sustainment resources. Deployment systems are also intended to support the day-to-day operations of the U.S. military forces abroad. In the Navy, the various types of roll-on/roll-off cargo vessels form the deployment segment of the fleet.
In the Air Force, the deployment fleet will be more diverse, including segments for tactical and strategic deployment. Tactical deployment resources should include 150 C-17 aircraft as well as 300 C-130 aircraft. An additional 50 KC-25/33A should be available to support strategic deployment. Rounding out our deployment force should be an additional 20 Skycat 1000 airships. In theory, this aircraft could carry as many as 170 HMMWV, 12 M1A1, or 64 M113 Gavins in a single sortie. The Skycat also features air-cushion landing gear to enable the ship to direct-deliver forces without airfield support. It could even theoretically initiate an amphibious assault landing. With this fleet, any of the proposed combat groups can be deployed to any location on the globe in under one week with sufficient resources to engage in combat immediately. Depending on the groups used and the desired location, as many as three combat groups can be assumed to be deployable in one week from aerial assets alone without augmentation from sustainment systems. Various combinations of units can also be rapidly deployed consistent with the modular nature of the proposed combat groups.
Major Equipment and Personnel Summary
Supply and Transportation Co., Group Support Battalion, Combat Maneuver Group
HQ Section 1 officer 3 HMMWV
8 enlisted 2 3/4T trailer
Support Platoon (1) 1 officer 4 HEMTT-LHS
31 enlisted 4 HMMWV
4 TSV w/ trailer
2 TSV
2 MTV w/ MHE
8 ULLS-OOO
8 VTS
Maneuver Platoon (3)1 officer 2 HEMTT-LHS
31 enlisted 2 HMMWV
8 TSV w/ trailer
2 TSV
2 MTV w/ MHE
4 ULLS-OOO
12 VTS
Totals 5 officer 10 HEMTT-LHS
132 enlisted 13 HMMWV
137 personnel 28 TSV w/ trailer
8 TSV
8 MTV w/ MHE
2 3/4T trailer
20 ULLS-OOO
44 VTS
Major Equipment and Personnel Summary
Supply Battalion, Early Deploying Support Group
Sectional Materials 5 officer 11 HMMWV
80 enlisted 2 3/4T trailer
16 commercial semi-tractors
16 self-loading trailers
10 TSV
1 TSM
6 ULLS-OOO
16 VTS
Organizational Materials (2) 5 officer 11 HMMWV
120 enlisted 2 3/4T trailer
8 6K forklifts
24 commercial semi-tractors
16 self-loading trailers
8 fuel trailers
18 TSV
2 TSM
6 ULLS-OOO
40 VTS
Subsistence Goods 5 officer 11 HMMWV
80 enlisted 2 3/4T trailer
16 commercial semi-tractors
16 self-loading trailers
10 TSV
1 TSM
6 ULLS-OOO
16 VTS
Totals 20 officer 44 HMMWV
400 enlisted 8 3/4T trailer
16 6K forklifts
80 commercial semi-tractors
64 self-loading trailers
16 fuel trailers
56 TSV
6 TSM
24 ULLS-OOO
72 VTS
Major Equipment and Personnel Summary
Transportation Battalion, Early Deploying Support Group
Transportation(Heavy)(2) 5 officer 5 HMMWV
148 enlisted 2 3/4T trailer
52 HETS-HP
18 armored HMMWV
8 ULLS-OOO
Transportation(Medium)(1) 5 officer 5 HMMWV
148 enlisted 2 3/4T trailer
52 commercial semi-tractor
52 self-loading trailer
18 armored HMMWV
8 ULLS-OOO
Transportation(Light)(2) 5 officer 5 HMMWV
148 enlisted 2 3/4T trailer
52 MTV-LHS w/ trailer
18 armored HMMWV
8 ULLS-OOO
Transportation(Amphib)(1) 5 officer 5 HMMWV
148 enlisted 2 3/4T trailer
52 HEMTT-Amphib
18 armored HMMWV
8 ULLS-OOO
Totals 30 officer 30 HMMWV
888 enlisted 12 3/4T trailer
104 HETS-HP
52 commercial semi-tractor
52 self-loading trailer
104 MTV-LHS w/ trailer
52 HEMTT-Amphib
108 armored HMMWV
48 ULLS-OOO
Appendix I
Tiers of Supply
If you take a step back and look at the big picture of supply, it becomes possible to identify three distinct categories within which all military materials fall. From this view, three distinct tiers can be recognized.
Tier I – Sectional Accounts
Tier I consists of the materials and systems that support actions at the individual, squad, and section level. These materials and systems tend to be highly critical to the successful function and survival of personnel. Examples of Tier I materials include:
|
Small Arms and Munitions |
Issued TA-50 |
Individual Protective Gear |
|
Uniforms and Clothing |
Squad radios and computers |
Handheld GPS and related gear |
A quick look at the listed assets allows for a number of key observations that Logisticians need to understand. These items are critical to the survival and function of the deployed force, but they also could theoretically be replaced by suitable substitutes from the civilian world or from other forces. For example, individual troops will often replace their military issued weapons and TA-50 with options better suited to their taskings in a conflict zone (using enemy rifles and ammunition to conserve your own is common practice).
Tier II - Organizational Accounts
The definition of organizational level changes from unit to unit. In some cases, organizational level will mean company level, sometimes it may refer to battalion or even brigade level depending on the unit TO&E. Regardless of the organization, we are generally looking at the same items here - the materials and systems that are controlled by the organization for it's specific role. Examples of Tier II assets include:
|
Heavy Weapons and Munitions |
Fuel |
Detection and Decontamination Gear |
|
Support Tools and Kits |
Tanks and Fighting Vehicles |
Repair Parts |
Some quick observations of the Tier II list bring a few points to note. The existence and functioning of these systems are a very desired thing but in general, their lack of presence will not directly result in casualties. These items rank as being important as opposed to critical. Another key note here is that no suitable substitute will usually be available for these items. A final key note is that these are the heaviest items in the logistics system - another way of looking at this tier of support would be as "tonnage items."
Tier III – Subsistence Accounts
Tier III items are typically consumable bulk items that will be used by individuals and organizations in operations abroad. Where items from Tiers I & II are largely issued items and the materials to keep them operational, Tier III items are the consumables that are necessary to support every unit, regardless of activity. The other key elements of Tier III are the support systems that enable different organizations to function as a collective force within a deployed environment. Examples of Tier III assets include:
|
Small Arms Ammunition |
Food |
Water |
|
Construction Materials |
Field Hygiene Systems |
Field kitchens, hospitals, etc. |
The most important note here is that the items of Tier III will often be replaced by suitable alternatives from sources outside the normal military logistics system. In many operations, these items will be available locally and can be utilized without any serious problems. On the other hand, these are the most critical of all logistics items. A force without food and water is not a force - it is a collection of casualties.
These accounts should be managed using expense accounts connected to Visa debit/credit cards. The technology should be fielded at which point conversion teams will visit each unit. Every item the unit possesses will be turned in and accounted for within the new strategic ERP system. A quantity of money will be deposited into the units accounts based upon the type of unit. The unit will then "purchase" whatever materials and equipment it desires for its missions. Some materials and equipment will be mandatory while others, like hand tools, batteries, office supplies, etc, can be purchased locally and the unit reimbursed on a monthly basis when copies of receipts are uploaded to the computer network.
ULLS-OOO
Managing this system, as well as other logistics operations at the unit level, should be a system called ULLS-OOO. The OOO stands for OpenOffice.org. This application suite is a powerful alternative to Microsoft Office with many features ideally suited to military applications. In addition to the standard word processing, spreadsheet, and presentation capabilities, OOO also includes drawing and diagram software, database software, and compatibility with a variety of file and technology types including Adobe PDF, Macromedia Flash, PDA, XML, and ActiveX. Virtually all organizational computer software used in the Army can be effectively replaced by OOO, which is free of charge. This software can also manage such difficult document types as maps, books, and forms. The database tools should be used to develop a replacement to the existing ULLS family of computer programs. These systems can then be integrated with the systems fielded under LOGMOD for a seamless and powerful logistics management system.
Appendix II
Tactical Pallets
Cargo Pallets
Flatbed Pallet - A flatbed pallet is just that, a flat bed with no sides or rear. This is the prefered pallet for air delivery operations due to its ease of loading and unloading by personnel and material handling equipment.
Halfside Pallet - A halfside pallet is similar to the cargo areas of existing military trucks. It would include a tailgate in the rear and could include troop seats on the sides or down the centerline of the pallet. The halfside pallet is the standard pallet for PLS vehicles assigned to hauling of unit's permanent materials (tentage, camoflauge, specialty gear, etc.).
Support Pallets
Recovery Pallet - This pallet converts the standard PLS vehicle into a recovery vehicle. Includes a heavy recovery winch suitable for all systems lighter than Abrams and a hoist for lifting vehicles for towing operations.
Fuel Pallet - Converts the PLS vehicle into a fuel tanker. Pallet includes an independent power source for off-vehicle operations. Holds 1250 gallons of fuel and includes storage boxes sufficient for carrying ammunition (including Abrams rounds) or common repair parts like spare track sections. Air droppable for FAARP operations.
Ammunition Pallet - A pallet for servicing artillery systems. Ballistic resistant and compartmented to keep rounds and charges separate. Includes conveyors to move rounds and charges either to a self-propelled howitzer or to a towed howitzer. Includes an independent power source for dismounted operations and can be airdropped for rapidly constructing a FAARP.
Water Pallet - Includes a large water tank for storage and a ROWPU unit for cleaning the water.
Troop Pallets
Dropside Pallet - The dropside pallet features a fixed roof and 6' height sides that can be dropped to form a larger floor (total floor of 12' by 20' with sides lowered). Tentage or netting can be applied with the pallet forming a floor and a hard roof for improved weather resistance. This pallet is a semi-permanent billeting pallet for long-term and OOTW missions. Pallet should include power, communication, and water connections. Pallet can be raised for use in flood regions.
Bunker Pallet - The bunker pallet is built with ballistic resistant panels on all aspects. It also includes structural bracing to support additional sandbagging or burial. Sides can be expanded to form a 12' by 16' room complete with independent power and NBC overpressure systems. Pallet can be used collapsed or expanded and is the standard pallet for command and control operations. Can also remain on the PLS vehicle for mobile operations.
Urban Pallet - A pallet designed for supporting troops in urban warfare. Uses ballistic resistant construction and sits on a scissors lift that can lift the box up to 10' above the bed of the PLS vehicle. Includes firing ports on all sides and two ring mounts on the top. Rear doors are held on slides and allow access to an extra wide, multisection ladder than can be used to climb higher or lower than box height or can be covered to serve as a ramp.
Shower/Decon Pallet - A pallet that can serve as a shower point in normal operations or as a decontamination system when required. Includes water piping and drainage systems with filtration options depending on the circumstances.
Toilet Pallet - A "porta-john" pallet for controlling disposal of human waste in field environments. Includes a holding tank and 8 stalls that can be used on or off the PLS vehicle to meet situational requirements. Includes a companion pump pallet for emptying the toilet pallet when needed or the toilet pallet can also be drained via gravity if required.
Engineering Pallets
Dump Pallet - A pallet that converts the standard PLS vehicle to a dump truck complete with bed vibrator and top-hinged tailgate for road building and material movement operations.
Floating Bridge Pallet - A pallet for building a floating bridge. Includes two sections attached with a hinge. When deployed, the pallet forms a 12' by 16' floating bridge section. Can also be deployed from amphibious PLS vehicles.
Bridge Pallet - The bridge would sit on a turntable on the pallet with two fold-out sections and attachable legs. It could be deployed from the vehicle or the TSV could simply dismount the pallet for a semi-permanent install. A single pallet could form an 8' by 20' bridge with additional pallets added for longer or wider arrangements.
Road Pallet - A road mat section could be developed like those floor mats you see made from strips of cut-up old tires. These mats are durable but also flexible, allowing for a considerable length of the mat to be rolled up. Make the roll slightly narrower than 12' and it could be placed on a bar on the back of a TSV. When you're ready to lay the mat, turn the bar 90 degrees and unroll the mat into place.
Appendix III
Tracked Support Vehicle
Arguably, the most difficult aspect of logistics in the modern era is the issue of transportation. Historically, the U.S. has relied on a variety of wheeled trucks to provide transportation but this has become difficult in recent conflicts. As warfare has become increasingly asymmetrical, transport vehicles have become more and more vulnerable to attacks from hidden forces. Exacerbating the matter is the fact that warfare has also become increasingly mobile placing greater pressure on our transportation assets.
As all of this has been going on, our forces needs for support have grown exponentially. Forces today require massive quantities of fuel and munitions to remain operational. This has resulted in larger and larger support vehicles that are more vulnerable and less mobile than ever before. Adopting the proposed palletization system will help to resolve some of these issues, but it is critical that we field a true tactical vehicle for executing the pallet concept. To address this need, we should field the Tracked Support Vehicle (TSV).
Tracked vehicles are inherently more mobile than wheeled vehicles because their weight is distributed over a much larger area than wheeled vehicles. The elimination of tires also eliminates the ability of opposing forces to shoot those tires out or for the tires to blow out on shrapnel, broken pavement, or sharp rocks. But tracked vehicles also possess a number of different attributes that make them ideal for use as support vehicles.
A warning if you do not employ tracked, armored logistics vehicles can be seen in the daily ambush of our road-bound trucks in Iraq and the French disaster in Indo-China. In "From Stalingrad to Khe Sanh: Factors in the Successful Use of Tactical Airlift" Dr. Vaughan and Major Inoho write:
www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/cc/vaughan.html
Due to the difficulty involved in reaching the crests, the French installed themselves in the lower, more accessible areas, convenient to re-supply vehicles, and abandoned the heights. They believed that the vast basin would protect them from surprise attack. They appeared not to realize that due to the proximity of the surrounding mountains, a few well-placed Viet Minh guns could severely disrupt airlift operations (Roy, 1965: 36-7). Giap attacked on 13 March 1954."
"Disregarding warnings that great risks were associated with it, Navarre put his plan into action on 20 November 1953. Operation Castor, as it was called, began with an airborne assault on Dien Bien Phu. The Sixth Parachute Battalion landed 200 meters north of the village, and airborne troops of the Second Battalion, First Regiment, dropped 600 meters to the south. These forces cleared Dien Bien Phu of enemy forces and secured the dirt airstrip. The following day two more parachute battalions were airdropped along with an artillery battalion, command headquarters, and heavy equipment. On 22 November, the sixth parachute battalion landed (Davidson, 1988: 189-96). The French forces occupied a fortified entrenched camp having three sub-sectors, which supported one another with forty-nine strong points (Giap, 1964: 78). Navarre believed that the poor roads in this hilly region would deny the Viet Minh the ability to bring up artillery. He believed that the Dien Bien Phu garrison would enable French forces to bring their superior firepower to successfully bear against the Viet Minh (Gurtov, 1967: 93).
Tracked vehicles ride lower to the ground than wheeled vehicles because they don't require the extensive drivetrain systems that wheeled vehicles need. This results in a vehicle with a lower center of gravity (less likely to tip over or lose the load) that is also much easier to load (no ladders to climb to get in). This also means a vehicle that is lower in height so it is easier to transport and the vehicle can be armored without excessively increasing the weight (because we don't have the excessive weight of the drivetrain). Tracked vehicles can also pivot steer, making them far more manueverable in tight quarters. Tracked vehicles can also make use of hybrid powertrains without excessively complicating the vehicle because only two drive gears have to be powered as opposed to 4, 6, 8, or even 10 wheels. Hybrid powertrains dramatically increase range and overall efficiency. They also allow for the vehicle to be used as a power generation system without need for an extra system.
The ideal TSV would look similar to the existing M1108 Universal Carrier from United Defense (see photo above). This design is based on the M113 Gavin chassis and could be modified into a TSV. The design already includes an armored cab and can also include an NBC over-pressure system (which the TSV should have). Band tracks are already available for this chassis allowing for reduced noise, road wear, and maintenance. There is also a hybrid powertrain system available that produces 500hp, as much as the engine in the current PLS (a much larger, heavier vehicle that hauls 33 tons of cargo). It also comes with a mount for an M240 machine gun and can be equipped with thermal sights and GPS tracking systems (like those available on the current PLS). Ironically, even with substantial armor, this vehicle only weighs two tons more than the current MTV and it weighs roughly the same as older 5 ton cargo vehicles. There is no problem transporting this vehicle with all available airlift assets; it can roll-on/roll-off of C-130 and with little work it should even be air-droppable if it isn't already.
If we outfit this vehicle with the proposed 7.5 ton PLS, we have the basic TSV. The dimensions of the pallet should come out to roughly 12' long by 8' wide which matches the current FMTV but can carry substantially more weight, which is desparately needed to meet our growing fuel and ammunition needs. Add a tracked, PLS-compatible trailer and we have the complete TSV package. Together, it can transport 15 tons of cargo on or off road and it transports in roughly the same amount of airlift space as the current MTV/trailer combination.
What we get is a vehicle robust enough to survive in a mechanized environment because it is armored, can operate electrically without a heat signature, is smaller than other support vehicles, and rides on tracks. But its also light enough to support light and Airborne forces and can even be air-dropped. It has the power and mobility to chase the M1 Abrams and M2 Bradleys and fighting M113 Gavins with fuel and ammunition but its small enough and efficient enough to operate with the light forces without being a burden. Its equipped for night and NBC ops but will be equally at home in OOTW. And with the tactical pallet system, it can occupy virtually all support roles and yet it can load and unload itself.
Appendix IV
Logpacks
The basic premise behind a log pack system is that the Soldier’s rucksack should be replaced with a log pack that is supplied to the Soldier with ammunition, rations, and water. On a scheduled basis (most likely every two days to limit weight) this log pack would be swapped out with a new log pack to keep the Soldier supplied with the basic necessities of combat. To fully exploit the benefits of this system, we need to make a few minor adjustments.
Most log pack systems are proposed as a way to support the infantry folks but this ignores some of the greatest benefits that are available with log packs. Why not use the log pack concept for support of all forward deployed assets, regardless of combat duty? This would allow us to eliminate some of the weakest links in the current support chain while introducing a great deal of flexibility to our logistics.
A basic log pack would consist of the following:
* Six improved MREs
* Two gallons of water in a bag similar to what the mess halls currently use for milk
* Six pairs of 100% cotton or wool disposable field socks (2 pairs each of small, medium, and large)
* Two packs of medicated body powder (something like a trial size pack of Gold Bond)
* Two packs of heavy-duty disposable wipes (5 wipes each of a human version of Pledge Grab-It Wet Floor Wipes)
* Two packs of all-purpose field soap
* Applicable sundry items (pens, pads of paper, news updates, snacks, etc.)
A field pack would consist of packaging these items into cases similar to the existing cases of MREs. A combat pack would add ammunition to the load and package it into a small rucksack with a tag on the top listing what type of ammunition is inside. These packs would support either two Soldiers for one day or one Soldier for two days.
Logistically, this offers a number of advantages. It will dramatically limit the vulnerability of high priority targets like ROWPU and mess halls in forward areas and particularly in the BSA. It also works well with providing aerial support for all logistics as water and small arms ammunition is divided into more manageable units. The personnel no longer needed for support in the front can be used to form the units that load and manage the log packs in the rear.
Perhaps most importantly is that log packs limit the vulnerability of the food and water portion of the supply chain to contamination. Water buffaloes are prime targets allowing enemy forces to rapidly and efficiently poison large numbers of personnel. Another critical issue is field mess halls - how many times do we have to witness large numbers of Soldiers, congregating in the same field location at the same three times a day, every day, before we fix this obvious weakness? What is absurd is that oftentimes, the Soldiers standing in the chow lines will even be discussing what obvious targets they are while standing there. We know it is a problem; let’s fix the problem.
Improving the MRE
Improvements can be made to the MRE with the establishment of a log pack system. Like the log pack concept in general, these improvements can enhance logistics as well as morale and field hygiene.
The first improvement comes from the 1st Tactical Studies Group and involves converting the spoon supplied in all MREs into a spork that includes a toothbrush on the handle end as well as an attaching point for disposable razor blades. This is a straightforward, common sense improvement. If the powers that be don’t like the spork idea (it is reported that the idea was rejected because of this), then fine, leave it a spoon but at least provide the toothbrush and razor modifications.
Another improvement that can be made with log pack MREs is the incorporation of a greater variety of foods in the MRE. We won’t have to have foods with extended shelf lives with this program as we know what will be consumed and when. This means that we can incorporate a lot of different foods that are already commercially available. This will result in significantly lower costs than with current MREs.
These two changes will dramatically improve life in the field for many Soldiers. We can also use the MRE as a tool to improve Soldier performance as well. Field living in the military is physically little different than many professional sports. The physical toll that field living takes on the body can be enormous and unlike most sports, it lasts 24-7 for the duration of the conflict. Professional athletes optimize their performance largely through managed diets. The same advantages can be implemented here. Different foods offer different benefits depending on climate and region. With this program, we can tailor the diets of Soldiers to the physical realities in which they are living.
Improving Field Hygiene
Currently, U.S. ground forces suffer from one extremely serious field hygiene problem. The problem is that in general, there is no field hygiene. Good field hygiene does not require having hot showers and given the latest innovations, for short periods of time it doesn’t require water at all. But it does take a little common sense and supplies. This is where a few of the items in the proposed log pack come into play.
Disposable 100% Cotton or Wool Socks – 6 pairs per log pack, 2 small, 2 medium, and 2 large
Most of the clothing that a Soldier wears in the field can be worn for extended periods before it becomes unwearable. Socks do not fall into this category. Socks must be changed every day and should always be replaced with a clean pair.
By including six pairs of 100% cotton socks in the log pack, we get a multi-use addition to the pack. The Soldier will only be wearing two of the pairs (the ones that fit), the others can be torn up and used as camo strips, all-purpose cotton rags, padding for metal gear on the LBE or ruck, or anything else that a good size piece of cotton cloth can be used for. Cotton won’t hold up well as a sock, but that is why we are treating it as a single use disposable item.
This ensures that every Soldier has a fresh, dry pair of socks every day when deployed. It also provides the Soldier with material to help in maintenance of weapons and other equipment. The socks can be recycled or if the situation requires they can be disposed of, as cotton is biodegradable. By vacuum packing these socks, this addition can be made with very little space and weight.
All-Purpose Field Soap – 2 packs per log pack
A number of companies offer soap products that can be used as toothpaste, body soap, or shampoo. While they are a far cry from the comforts of home, they suit the requirements of field hygiene quite well.
Heavy-Duty Disposable Wipes – 2 packs per log pack, 5 wipes per pack
While the field soap is a great and versatile product, there are areas of the body that should be cleaned with other means. Five wipes works out to one for each foot, one for the rear, and one for the groin, with another for the hands when finished.
Medicated Body Powder – 2 packs per log pack
Most foot and rash problems are simply a matter of a local area of skin getting overheated from friction. Medicated powders can drastically reduce these types of problems, especially in the feet and groin areas.
These additions to the log pack will dramatically improve the field hygiene of deployed forces but it also accomplishes other tangible benefits as well. Few things kill morale quicker than heat rash and trench foot. And you can never have enough cotton rags in the field when it comes to maintenance.
Push Logistics
Perhaps the greatest benefit of log packs is the ability to perform push logistics. With this technique, supplies are provided to the Soldier in the field, as they are required, without any action from the Soldier. Certain field items, such as batteries, have a known life span after which they must be replaced. With log packs, we can incorporate these items into the logistics system on a scheduled basis so that the Soldier in the field gets the material he needs as he needs it. Let’s look at this a little closer with our battery example.
All units possess certain battery-operated devices like NVGs and radios. With push logistics, when the unit first gets deployed, they would be issued fresh batteries for all of their devices. Then on a scheduled basis they would automatically receive new batteries for all of their devices. While this doesn’t eliminate the need for having some spares on hand, it does greatly reduce how many need to be kept.
The incorporation of field hygiene elements within the log pack is another form of push logistics. With these types of supplies, we know in advance how much and of what items the units will require. We can send the supplies to the unit without all the red tape that currently cripples our supply system.
A variety of other field items would work well with a push logistics capability. Sundry packs that currently require ordering can be included within the log pack. Newsletters can be fielded to keep the Soldier in the field reminded of what it is he is fighting for. Useful items like 550 cord, pens, and paper can occasionally be included in the packs. We could even include things like decks of cards, small games, or books. We simply would rotate what types of items are included in the packs from day to day to control weight. One day may be batteries, the next may be prizes, the next sundry items, the next field items, and so on and so forth. And because the packs themselves will normally be returned to the rear to be refilled, undesired or unneeded items can be sent back with spent packs.
We can also use the packs to include pills for immunizations or notices of policy or procedure changes. Updates on current enemy tactics or methods could be distributed as well. The log pack system also provides for a built-in method for troops to get mail sent home to loved ones; they can send it back with the pack while bundles of mail for the unit can be included in new log packs.
This is an ideal way to meet the vast majority of the logistical requirements of deployed units. It allows us to incorporate a number of different supply issues into a single, flexible solution. Push logistics with log packs will result in improved morale, improved field hygiene, better combat performance, and healthier Soldiers overall.
Medical Support in the Combat Group Structure
With a transition to a new paradigm of military force structure comes the need to review and update the means by which this force is supported in the spectrum of missions performed today. As future forces are expected to operate within dispersed nonlinear environments, it is critical to adjust our support units to maintain their ability to provide their existing levels of support within this context. Support that is currently provided by the highest echelons will remain largely unchanged, as these are typically follow-on units that will be operating under similar circumstances in future operations. The challenge comes in forward supporting echelons that must be able to support combat forces in all phases and types of operations, whether OOTW or forced-entry combat in a non-linear mobile environment. The following is an overview of the units and systems that are deemed necessary to maintain current medical capabilities within future force structures.
Philosophy of Support
Where emphasis is currently placed on providing the maximum level of care possible as forward as possible, current plans will make this methodology untenable. Units within a highly mobile environment will not have the luxury of establishing fixed sites for patient holding and treatment areas. Moreover, existing systems used to provide these services lack the mobility necessary for rapid deployment and employment. In the proposed group structure, forward care is best provided with an emphasis on three primary areas:
Systems and Definitions
Medical Evacuation Vehicle (MEV)
Ground ambulatory systems will be referred to in this document as MEV. For groups comprised of tracked armored vehicles, the MEV will be a modernized M113 Gavin featuring hybrid power train, band tracks for improved ride, and the medical systems included in the current AMEV. For lighter units, the MEV will be a hybrid powered M997 ambulance with remaining systems as currently configured.
Patient Evacuation, Triage, and Treatment Set (PETTS)
PETTS is a set of mobile monitoring systems to assist medical personnel in diagnosis and treatment of casualties. All major casualties will be assigned a PETTS that will remain with the patient throughout the medical treatment cycle. Two PETTS should be carried in every MEV from support battalion up. Set should include a portable ultrasound unit, handheld pulse oximeter, and a portable monitor/defibrillator with blood pressure monitor (See Appendix I).
Theater Support Module (TSM)
A system of tents and shelters used to assemble deployable support facilities. The basic TSM consists of an airframe tent 60’ wide by 100’ long with interfaces to support as many as five 40’ shelters, ten 20’ shelters, or combinations thereof. See Appendix I for proposed shelter configurations.
Additional Skill Identifier – Combat Trauma Specialist (M1)
The existing training regimen for MOS 18D should be divided into two parts with the portions emphasizing resuscitive and stabilitive care being placed within a new ASI program. Training should include basic surgical skills for treating combat trauma. Completion of ASI will be a prerequisite for Special Forces Medical candidates while the training will also be open to all qualified combat medics. Objective force should include one M1-qualified medic per MEV team.
Logistics Issues
Proposed force changes include a merging of the existing classes of supply into a system of three tiers. A distribution network will be established within all areas of operations to provide for resupply of all classes of materials in the early phases of operations. Static warehousing is not compatible with mobile operations; therefore supply operations will depend on this distribution network. A quantity of medical supplies will be kept on-hand during operations while resupply for all units, including medical units, will come through the distribution network by truck, helicopter, and air drop dependent upon the tactical situation.
Battalion and Lower Care
Existing medical operations will remain unchanged at the battalion level and lower. Quantities of personnel and equipment are assumed to be effective and will remain as currently assigned. The primary role of medical personnel at this level is the collection and removal of casualties from the combat area to a collection point.
Medical Company, Group Support Battalion
To accommodate variability in unit size and operations, existing medical companies will be reconstructed to a more modular and mobile design. As the intended combat groups are to be capable of being subdivided to the battalion battlegroup level, the medical unit is structured to support specific battalions. The medical company will include a small headquarters section to manage and support the operations of the company as well as a support platoon for providing medical services to the supporting elements of the combat group, including strike, recon, and aviation elements. A platoon will also be included in the company for each maneuver element of the group so that a combat group with four maneuver elements will have four maneuver platoons within the medical company. A group with three maneuver elements would therefore only have three maneuver platoons in the medical company. Maneuver platoons will consist of one treatment squad, two ambulance squads, and one support squad. Support platoons will include two treatment squads, one ambulance squad, and one support squad.
Treatment Squad (12 personnel)
The treatment squad includes the platoon leadership of one M.D. as well as one P.A. Unit has the capacity to transport up to 40 patients in a mobile environment. Squad equipment includes one HMMWV for general transportation needs, two MEV with complete ambulance crews including one medic per team with ASI M1, and two MTV-LHS with trailers. Trailers carry DEPMEDS-T units while vehicles carry cargo beds with troops seats for mobile patient holding.
Ambulance Squad (11 personnel)
The ambulance squad consists of three MEV with ambulance teams as well as a HMMWV cargo vehicle for supplies and coordination.
Medical Support Squad (14 personnel)
The medical support squad provides supply, maintenance, and lab support to the various medical teams. Equipment includes a mobile warehouse of DEPMEDS-E and DEPMEDS-R on an MTV-LHS as well as four cargo HMMWV. Additional teams include one supply team, one maintenance team, one preventive medicine team, and one lab support team.
Company Headquarters Section (9 personnel)
The headquarters section includes personnel for coordinating support of the unit with other elements of the Group Support Battalion. Section includes a two-person maintenance support team, a two-person supply support team, a two-person personnel support team, unit First Sergeant, Company commander, and unit Training/NBC NCO. Section includes three HMMWV (two four seat) along with two trailers.
Medical Battalion, Early Deploying Support Group
The Early Deploying Support Group (EDSG) will include a forward major medical capability for the initial phases of operations. While the medical company of the GSB is capable of interfacing with higher echelon support elements, the EDSG is capable of providing complete care up to short-term hospitalization as well as interfacing the combat force with all support echelons to include joint and civilian forces. The EDSG also features enhanced laboratory and ambulance capabilities to augment the resources of the assembled combat force. The EDSG is also inherently capable of providing integration of medical services for larger sets of deployed groups.
MEDEVAC Company, EDSG
Each EDSG will feature two MEDEVAC companies, one Heavy and one Light. The primary purpose of the MEDEVAC Company is to expand on the capabilities of the medical resources of the GSB with a greater quantity and quality of available resources. Each MEDEVAC Company will have one platoon of trauma surgical teams and three platoons of medical evacuation resources. Evacuation resources will be used for both augmentations of GSB medical assets as well as to transfer patients to higher echelon support resources. Each MEDEVAC Company will possess a DEPMEDS-OR for surgical services, but use of this system is dependent on the unit configuration and tasking. A secondary capability of the MEDEVAC Company is to merge with a Medical Support Company to form a small field hospital.
HQ Trauma Platoon (33 personnel)
The headquarters section includes personnel for coordinating support of the unit. Section includes a two-person maintenance support team, a two-person supply support team, a two-person personnel support team, unit First Sergeant, Company commander, and unit Training/NBC NCO. Section includes three HMMWV (two four seat) along with two trailers. Four surgical teams are also members of this platoon, including one surgeon, two supporting nurses, one anesthesiologist, one operating room specialist, and one respiratory specialist for each team. Each surgical team is transported in two HMMWV while the team will usually be operating within a DEPMEDS-OR unit.
Tactical Evacuation Platoon (40 personnel)
The Tactical Evacuation platoon consists of ambulance teams equipped to operate in high threat or complex tactical environments. Light MEDEVAC platoons will consist of four UH-60Q air ambulances and their relevant supporting systems. Heavy MEDEVAC platoons will feature eight MEV. Each MEDEVAC ambulance in the EDSG will be equipped with a quantity of PETTS equal to the quantity of casualties transportable by the system. Supporting elements will include two maintenance teams per platoon for maintaining medical, automotive, and aviation systems, as well as two supply teams. Maintenance teams are equipped with CMT-H specialized for the systems of the platoon. Supply teams possess one MTV-LHS with trailer and one HMMWV.
General Evacuation Platoon (24 personnel)
The General Evacuation platoon is for lower threat and simplistic scenarios where ambulatory services are required. Platoon features eight HMMWV MEV with support coming from attached supporting units.
Medical Support Company, EDSG
The Medical Support Company provides the personnel and resources necessary to convert the MEDEVAC Company from a mobile field trauma unit into a garrison, quasi-hospital configuration. Where the MEDEVAC Company possesses the mobile operating room, the Medical Support Company provides the TSM tent structure as well as one DEPMEDS-P for surgical preparation and radiology services, one DEPMEDS-IC for post-operative critical care, and one DEPMEDS-L for level III+ laboratory support. An additional shelter will also be available to house unit personnel when other arrangements are not feasible or for including food services within the module (see Appendix I).
Nursing Support Platoons (32 personnel)
The Nursing Support platoons are available to provide pre- and post- operative care of casualties as well as to maintain patient holding areas. These platoons are also responsible for assisting MEDEVAC Company in their respective taskings. Platoon equipment includes two MTV with MHE crane for assembling TSM and handling bulk supplies in addition to providing general transportation for unit personnel. Unit equipment is pre-packaged with TSM modules including beds, screens, and miscellaneous medical materials in two 40’ containers of the TSM package. Platoon also issued two HMMWV (4-seat) for additional personnel transportation.
Laboratory Support Platoon (32 personnel)
The Laboratory Support Platoon provides a full service laboratory capability to the EDSG. Unit personnel will include specialists in dealing with NBC materials as well as the latest testing equipment to identify pathogens of all types (one squad). Platoon will also possess the materials and personnel necessary for operating a blood bank as well as for providing general laboratory services (two squads). One squad will also specialize in radiology services including computed tomography, magnetic resonance imaging, and radiography. Platoon will possess four HMMWV for personnel mobility but all operational capability and equipment will reside in the unit’s DEPMEDS facilities.
Preventive Medicine Platoon (20 personnel)
The Preventive Medicine Platoon will include the equivalent of three existing Preventive Medicine detachments in terms of personnel and equipment. The platoon will be equipped with existing mobile laboratory systems and eight HMMWV for mobility.
Medical Treatment Company, EDSG
The purpose of the Medical Treatment Company is to provide a more comprehensive and capable medical unit in the forward area. The MTC is capable of operating in a mobile of static configuration. Each MTC will possess its own TSM for treatment purposes, but the shelters employed in the TSM will be smaller modules designed to operate in mobile configurations as well.
HQ Triage Platoon (45 personnel)
The HQ Triage Platoon includes the same organizational HQ section as the MEDEVAC companies. In place of surgical teams, this platoon will feature specialized teams in the areas of Cardiology, Pulmonology, Neurology, Obstetrics, ENT, and Orthopedics. Each team will feature one M.D., one P.A., two nurses, and one ambulance team of two medics. Team equipment includes one MTV-LHS with DEPMEDS-T on trailer, one wheeled MEV, and one HMMWV.
General Treatment Platoons (24 personnel)
The General Treatment Platoon consists of patient holding capability, medic/nursing staff, physical therapy, and pharmacy sections. Each platoon will have one MTV-LHS with DEPMEDS-T on trailer, one HMMWV with shelter for pharmacy operations, one MTV for unit mobility, and two wheeled MEV. Two additional HMMWV will be included with the unit for operational functions.
Dental and Mental Health Platoon (30 personnel)
The Dental and Mental Health Platoon rounds out the EDSG medical capability with complete emergency dental services as well as the equivalent of a mental health detachment. Equipment for dental services is packaged in a modified DEPMEDS-T towed as part of an MTV-LHS vehicle. Dental capabilities are limited to general repairs and emergency oral surgeries. The mental health section will operate with a similar arrangement using their respective equipment in a DEPMEDS-T. Unit vehicles include six HMMWV in addition to mentioned MTV.
Joint Support, Higher Echelons
It is assumed that all remaining medical support will come from joint, garrison, and civilian resources. For example, some Navy ships possess extensive medical capabilities including complete hospital services. Most potential theaters also possess civilian medical resources substantially greater than the resources that can be employed in a mobile military unit. Efforts are also underway to develop a joint force for control of higher echelon logistics functions and it is assumed that existing field hospitals will be included within this force structure. Where these options are not available, casualties requiring care beyond what is capable in the EDSG as well as those casualties meeting defined criteria will be evacuated to existing U.S. Army garrison medical facilities for further treatment.
It should also be noted that an additional pool of up to 800 personnel is available in the General Support Battalion to assist EDSG medical units in those situations where additional personnel are required with minimal training. Four additional TSM are also available to each EDSG for mass casualty events.
Theater Evacuation Capability
The primary method of evacuation from theater will come from a fleet of 48 modified C-130 aircraft. These aircraft will incorporate existing modifications that enable the transport to operate from the sea as well as from land. Aerial refueling systems should also be included in the modifications. These aircraft will be devoted to the medical evacuation role and will be equipped accordingly to include PETTS availability and respirators. Existing cargo aircraft can also be used for medical evacuation but this quantity will be devoted to this mission.
Major Equipment and Personnel Summary
Medical Co., Group Support Battalion, Combat Maneuver Group
HQ Section 1 officer 3 HMMWV
8 enlisted 2 3/4T trailer
Support Platoon (1) 4 officer 5 MTV-LHS w/ trailer
45 enlisted 7 MEV
7 HMMWV
4 DEPMEDS-T
1 DEPMEDS-E
1 DEPMEDS-R
14 PETTS
Maneuver Platoon (3) 2 officer 3 MTV-LHS w/ trailer
46 enlisted 8 MEV
7 HMMWV
2 DEPMEDS-T
1 DEPMEDS-E
1 DEPMEDS-R
16 PETTS
Totals 11 officer 14 MTV-LHS w/ trailer
191 enlisted 31 MEV
202 personnel 31 HMMWV
2 3/4T trailer
10 DEPMEDS-T
4 DEPMEDS-E
4 DEPMEDS-R
62 PETTS
Major Equipment and Personnel Summary
Medical Battalion, Early Deploying Support Group
MEDEVAC (Light) 13 officer 15 HMMWV
124 enlisted 4 MTV-LHS w/ trailer
4 CMT-HMMWV
8 MEV
8 UH-60Q
80 PETTS
1 DEPMEDS-OR
MEDEVAC (Heavy) 5 officer 15 HMMWV
132 enlisted 4 MTV-LHS w/ trailer
4 CMT-HMMWV
24 MEV
96 PETTS
1 DEPMEDS-OR
Medical Support (2) 7 officer 16 HMMWV
109 enlisted 4 MTV w/ MHE
1 DEPMEDS-P
1 DEPMEDS-IC
1 DEPMEDS-L
Medical Treatment (2) 21 officer 21 HMMWV
102 enlisted 10 MTV-LHS w/ trailer
2 MTV w/ MHE
10 MEV
10 DEPMEDS-T
20 PETTS
Totals 74 officer 104 HMMWV
678 enlisted 28 MTV-LHS w/ trailer
12 MTV w/ MHE
52 MEV
8 UH-60Q
8 CMT-HMMWV
20 DEPMEDS-T
2 DEPMEDS-OR
2 DEPMEDS-P
2 DEPMEDS-IC
2 DEPMEDS-L
216 PETTS
Appendix I
PETTS and TSM Systems
The following are examples of systems that would make up the PETTS. These are not recommendations of equipment, only examples of existing systems with the desired capabilities.
Ideally, some form of charting system should also be included in the PETTS, potentially a digital chart compatible with the actual systems selected for the PETTS.
DEPMEDS-T
A shelter designed from a 20’ ISO container that can be expanded to form a 20’ by 24’ treatment area. Shelter is compatible with existing and planned LHS systems and can be expanded while on or off the vehicle. Shelter includes an automated blood analysis system as well as a C-Arm radiography system. All treatment equipment can be stored and accessed within the shelter while the shelter is collapsed.
DEPMEDS-E
A 20’ ISO container storage system designed for stockage of medical expendables. Can be expanded for easier access but must remain fully accessible while in a collapsed state on the transportation vehicle. System is LHS compatible.
DEPMEDS-R
A 20’ container designed for medical repair and less commonly used supplies. Designed similar to previous DEPMEDS shelters.
DEPMEDS-L
A Level III+ laboratory facility packaged within a 40’ ISO expandable container. This lab is tailored to chemical and biological identification and isolation as well as complex lab procedures. DEPMEDS-L should be used as part of a TSM and transported by semi tractor with self-loading trailer.
DEPMEDS-OR
A dedicated surgical facility in a 40’ ISO expandable container. System includes a 12’ by 24’ sterilization and preparation room along with a 28’ by 24’ operating facility for up to four surgical teams. System includes a C-arm radiography system as well as complete oxygen, suction, ventilation, and four PETTS. If possible, bypass systems should be included as well.
DEPMEDS-IC
An expandable 40’ container providing short-term intensive care facilities and equipment. Supports up to 10 patients in intensive care facilities including ventilation and automated IV systems.
DEPMEDS-P
A 40’ expandable container equipped for surgical preparation and radiology support missions. Small room contains a mobile computed tomography (CT) system as well as an extremity MRI system. Main room holds up to six surgical patients in prep in addition to two C-arm radiography systems and two blood analysis systems.
Maintenance in the Combat Group Structure
Arguably the greatest logistics challenge in the modern era is the performance of maintenance in a mobile environment. Proper maintenance and repair of military equipment is difficult enough in a garrison setting; it can be virtually impossible in the field. Unlike other areas of logistics, maintenance is a field of constant need. Unless units are off-line, there is always a need for maintenance regardless of time, location, or activity. Consequently, much effort should be directed towards making our maintenance operations as efficient and effective as can be made.
In virtually every maintenance field in the civilian world, a simple formula can be found that crosses all boundaries of location, industry, and equipment types. Maintenance units must be led by personnel that have a minimum of a functional understanding of the actions performed by the unit. No one would ever consider placing a Signal Corps officer in charge of an infantry unit but we don’t hesitate to put one in charge of a maintenance section. You will never find an artillery officer leading a medical unit but you will find them leading maintenance operations. This may be a factor in existing problems in field maintenance operations.
Another element of the successful civilian maintenance formula is the use of a blend of highly experienced, somewhat experienced, and relatively inexperienced technicians. In a typical civilian maintenance operation, one will find roughly 25% of the technical workforce to be inexperienced (less than four years), about 50% will possess significant experience in the field (four to eight years), while around 25% will be highly experienced (eight or more years). Highly experienced civilian technicians will have a minimum of eight years of full-time, hands-on experience in their field of maintenance and will have completed substantial training in topics currently regarded by the Army as being depot-level support. Existing Army maintenance units are overwhelmingly comprised of inexperienced technicians with a modest quantity (usually well under 25%) of personnel possessing significant experience. The existence of any highly experienced technicians in an Army maintenance unit is universally accidental as Army personnel policies are specifically tailored to prevent the existence of these needed personnel in units. Any Army technician that has not been promoted to management level (NCO) by the requisite eight years is forced out of service.
It should also be noted that number of years in a given maintenance MOS does not translate into years of experience. Achievement of NCO rank actually begins a process of technical degradation in the Soldier as side duties take precedent over hands-on technical work and training. The longer an individual remains in a given maintenance MOS as an NCO, the more detached the Soldier becomes from actual maintenance operations. The NCO will not necessarily receive critical training on new unit equipment, tools, maintenance procedures, and operational practices and the training they do receive on these topics will often be in a format very different from the hands-on technician. Consequently, in military maintenance, only years of lower enlisted technical experience count as years of experience.
Philosophy of Support
In the Combat Group structure, and in any other expeditionary force setting, maintenance sections must be restructured emphasizing three key areas:
It should be noted that this concept is not intended for long-term maintenance support operations. These units will have additional supporting resources available for extended and garrison operations. This maintenance concept is designed for short-duration, high-intensity operations such as expeditionary warfare.
Systems and Definitions
Combat Technicians
A new MOS should be developed for the position of Combat Technician. A Combat Technician will be formally trained in inspection, service, and troubleshooting procedures. Repairs will be limited to those repairs that can be performed in two hours. Training will encompass all ground military systems to include vehicles, radios, small arms, power generation equipment, night vision equipment, and similar organizational systems. Additional training will include organizational supply operations, transportation operations, and organizational communications operations. (See Appendix I).
Direct Support and ASI
With rotational readiness greatly reducing the organizational maintenance load in deployed units, greater emphasis can be focused on improving direct support and depot operations for more effective maintenance support. Direct support MOS should be merged into five DS categories of Automotive, Armament, Aviation, Munitions, and General Equipment. Certification programs should be implemented that correlate with equivalent civilian technical certification programs. Those technicians that complete all relevant certifications within their respective field (the equivalent of Master Technicians in the civilian world) will be defined as Depot Technicians. Combat Technicians will also be eligible for promotion to Depot Technician through certification as well. All DS and Combat Technicians should be allowed to remain in service for up to 12 years during certification process and up to 20 years upon attainment of depot status, regardless of rank, so long as they remain physically able to perform military duties (See Appendix II).
ULLS-OOO
The existing Unit Level Logistics System should be replaced by a database program designed on the OpenOffice.org software suite. This software suite should be adopted Army-wide as it is free and very powerful and flexible. It also uses a compact file format that is more adaptable to satellite communications. Accompanying each ULLS-OOO system should be a satellite modem capable of networking with notebook and PDA computers. The maintenance section of this new ULLS should be designed consistent with civilian industry standards for documentation and auditing of warranty repair work. (See Appendix III).
Tracked Support Vehicle – Contact Maintenance (TSV-CM)
A TSV must be defined that can effectively serve as a tactical prime mover for deployed combat units. This vehicle must be equipped with a Load Handling System and be compatible with proposed tactical pallets. The TSV is able to support maneuver warfare in armored formations while also offering superior mobility in support of light infantry elements. Includes a Vehicle Tracking System with communication capabilities (VTS). In the Contact Maintenance variant of the TSV, a pallet should be installed that provides for secure tool storage on the sides, air power and electrical power towards the front, and large parts storage in the center (See Appendix IV).
Mobile Tactical Vehicle – Fitter (MTVF)
The MTVF is designed specifically for major field repair work in direct support operations. The MTVF includes an open cargo area with crane capable of lifting and storing powerpacks and other major maintenance components. The MTVF should be equipped with tools specific to these types of repairs in addition to cutting and welding systems (See Appendix V).
Forward Repair System (FRS)
Similar to existing FRS, the proposed FRS should be limited to capabilities that are transportable by HEMTT for purposes of enhanced mobility while retaining the ability to repair medium and heavy armored vehicles. This may be capable with existing FRS but it may require developing a new model of similar design.
Theater Support Module (TSM)
A system of tents and shelters used to assemble deployable support facilities. The basic TSM consists of an airframe tent 60’ wide by 100’ long with interfaces to support as many as five 40’ shelters, ten 20’ shelters, or combinations thereof. A typical TSM arrangement for maintenance support would consist of the major tentage, a 40’ container for office and computer support, a 40’ container for parts and supplies, a 40’ container for a mobile machine shop, and four container-mounted FRS units.
Logistics Issues
With this construct, maintenance is performed primarily in a mobile environment. In those cases where repairs cannot be performed in less than two hours, disabled systems will be evacuated to an appropriate repair location/facility or stripped for useable components.
Battalion and Lower Support
All Army battalions should possess a relatively limited maintenance capability. Rotational readiness allows for a decrease in tactical levels of organizational maintenance capacity. Every battalion should possess a maintenance section that includes one appropriate recovery vehicle (M88, MTVR, or HEMTT depending on unit type), one MHE vehicle (MTVF or MTV with MHE), and two TSV-CM with cargo trailers. Each vehicle will be equipped with VTS and ULLS-OOO. This section should be manned entirely by Combat Technicians including one senior NCO and an additional seven technicians.
Maintenance Company, Group Support Battalion
To accommodate variability in unit size and operations, existing Maintenance companies will be reconstructed to a more modular and mobile design. As the intended combat groups are to be capable of being subdivided to the battalion battlegroup level, the Maintenance unit is structured to support specific battalions. The Maintenance Company will include a small headquarters section to manage and support the operations of the company as well as a support platoon for providing maintenance services to the supporting elements of the combat group, including strike, recon, and aviation elements. A platoon will also be included in the company for each maneuver element of the group so that a combat group with four maneuver elements will have four maneuver platoons within the S&T Company. A group with three maneuver elements would therefore only have three maneuver platoons in the Maintenance Company. Maneuver platoons will consist of one repair squad, two maintenance squads, and one support squad. Support platoons will include two repair squads, one maintenance squad, and one support squad. In light groups such as the AAAG, only one maintenance squad will be used in maneuver platoons.
Repair Squad (8 personnel)
The repair squad is intended to provide major repair capabilities to the supported battalion. These reserves will vary by mission and tasking. The squad will possess two HEMTT-LHS for transportation of two Forward Repair Systems (FRS). Two MTVF should also be assigned to the squad in support of major DS repair operations.
Maintenance Squad (8 personnel)
The maintenance squad consists of two maintenance support teams to support mobile maintenance operations. One team will focus on automotive and armament maintenance operations while the other team supports C&E and other equipment maintenance operations. Each team will feature two Combat Technicians as well as a specialist in each of the assigned types of operations (DS Automotive and DS Armament, or DS C&E and DS Equipment). Each team is equipped with one TSV-CM and one HMMWV with trailer.
Support Squad (8 personnel)
The support squad provides recovery and supplies support for the Forward and Maintenance squads. The squad will operate two MTV with MHE as well as two recovery vehicles appropriate to the equipment type of the supported unit (M88 for CMG, MTVR for LRSG, HEMTT for AAAG).
Company Headquarters Section (9 personnel)
The headquarters section includes personnel for coordinating support of the unit with other elements of the Group Support Battalion. Section includes a two-person maintenance support team, a two-person supply support team, a two-person personnel support team, unit First Sergeant, Company commander, and unit Training/NBC NCO. Section includes three HMMWV (two four seat) along with two trailers.
Maintenance Battalion, Early Deploying Support Group
The Maintenance Battalion of the EDSG is tasked with providing maintenance support to deployed combat units. This support must be capable of performing effective operations in a mobile environment as well as a static environment.
Automotive/Armament Maintenance Company, EDSG
The Automotive/Armament Maintenance Company (AAMC) is responsible for providing maintenance support of vehicle and weapon systems. The unit will possess a limited depot-level support capability but will emphasize direct support capabilities in a mobile environment.
HQ Depot Platoon (33 personnel)
The headquarters section includes personnel for coordinating support of the unit. Section includes a two-person maintenance support team, a two-person supply support team, a two-person personnel support team, unit First Sergeant, Company commander, and unit Training/NBC NCO. Section includes three HMMWV (two four seat) along with two trailers. Four support teams are also members of this platoon, including one motor officer, one depot technician, one DS automotive technician, one DS armament technician, and two combat technicians. Each team is transported in two HMMWV, a four-seat model with trailer for hauling personnel and equipment as well as a cargo carrier containing the computers and satellite modem necessary for maintenance operations. In static operations, teams will operate from TSM using containerized FRS included in modules.
Maintenance Support Platoon (3 ea of 32 personnel)
The Maintenance Support Platoon operates primarily from mobile maintenance systems. The platoon consists of eight maintenance support teams. Each team includes one HEMTT-FRS and one TSV-CM manned by two combat technicians and a DS technician from each DS maintenance field. Where possible, an additional TSM may be provided for each platoon in a static mode of operations.
Recovery/Evacuation/Swap Platoon (40 personnel)
The Recovery/Evacuation/Swap Platoon is responsible for providing transportation of company systems during deployment and for transporting disabled systems in the forward area. Equipment includes one HETS with SLT trailer, seven HETS with standard trailers, four M88 recovery vehicles, four MTVR, and four MTVF. Personnel will evacuate systems that cannot be fixed in the forward area or will strip the vehicle of useable components for reuse. Personnel include eight recovery specialists, eight DS automotive technicians, eight DS armament technicians, and 16 combat technicians.
Aviation/Munitions Maintenance Company, EDSG
The Aviation/Munitions Maintenance Company (AMMC) is responsible for providing maintenance support of aviation and smart munitions systems. The unit will possess a limited depot-level support capability but will emphasize direct support capabilities in a mobile environment.
HQ Depot Platoon (33 personnel)
The headquarters section includes personnel for coordinating support of the unit. Section includes a two-person maintenance support team, a two-person supply support team, a two-person personnel support team, unit First Sergeant, Company commander, and unit Training/NBC NCO. Section includes three HMMWV (two four seat) along with two trailers. Four support teams are also members of this platoon, including one motor officer, one depot technician, one DS aviation technician, one DS munitions technician, and two combat technicians. Each team is transported in two HMMWV, a four-seat model with trailer for hauling personnel and equipment as well as a cargo carrier containing the computers and satellite modem necessary for maintenance operations. In static operations, teams will operate from TSM using containerized FRS included in modules.
Maintenance Support Platoon (3 ea of 32 personnel)
The Maintenance Support Platoon operates primarily from mobile maintenance systems. The platoon consists of eight maintenance support teams. Each team includes one HEMTT-FRS and one TSV-CM manned by two combat technicians and a DS technician from each DS maintenance field. Where possible, an additional TSM may be provided for each platoon in a static mode of operations.
Recovery/Evacuation/Swap Platoon (40 personnel)
The Recovery/Evacuation/Swap Platoon is responsible for providing transportation of company systems during deployment and for transporting disabled systems in the forward area. Equipment includes one HETS with SLT trailer, seven HETS with standard trailers, four HEMTT recovery vehicles, four MTVR, and four MTVF. Personnel will evacuate systems that cannot be fixed in the forward area or will strip the systems of useable components for reuse. Personnel include eight recovery specialists, eight DS aviation technicians, eight DS munitions technicians, and 16 combat technicians.
General Equipment Maintenance Company, EDSG
The General Equipment Maintenance Company (GEMC) is responsible for providing maintenance support of all remaining military equipment and systems. The unit will possess a limited depot-level support capability but will emphasize direct support capabilities in a mobile environment.
HQ Depot Platoon (33 personnel)
The headquarters section includes personnel for coordinating support of the unit. Section includes a two-person maintenance support team, a two-person supply support team, a two-person personnel support team, unit First Sergeant, Company commander, and unit Training/NBC NCO. Section includes three HMMWV (two four seat) along with two trailers. Four support teams are also members of this platoon, including one motor officer, one depot technician, one DS electronics technician, one DS NBC technician, and two combat technicians. Each team is transported in two HMMWV, a four-seat model with trailer for hauling personnel and equipment as well as a cargo carrier containing the computers and satellite modem necessary for maintenance operations. In static operations, teams will operate from TSM using containerized FRS included in modules.
Maintenance Support Platoon (3 ea of 32 personnel)
The Maintenance Support Platoon operates primarily from mobile maintenance systems. The platoon consists of eight maintenance support teams. Each team includes one CMT-H and one MTVF manned by two combat technicians and two DS technicians. Teams will vary in types of systems supported with teams specializing in particular systems such as power generation, water purification, field kitchens, computers, etc. Where possible, an additional TSM may be provided for each platoon in a static mode of operations.
Recovery/Evacuation/Swap Platoon (40 personnel)
The Recovery/Evacuation/Swap Platoon is responsible for providing transportation of company systems during deployment and for transporting disabled systems in the forward area. Equipment includes eight commercial semi-tractors with SLT trailers, four HEMTT recovery vehicles, four MTVR, and four MTVF. Personnel will evacuate systems that cannot be fixed in the forward area or will strip the system of useable components for reuse. Personnel include eight recovery specialists, 16 DS technicians, and 16 combat technicians.
Joint Support, Higher Echelons
Beyond the EDSG, the majority of maintenance support will come from civilian contractors. Some additional military units should be pooled in a joint logistics element to provide for long-term maintenance operations using specialized technicians operating in garrison facilities. These units will make greater use of depot level technicians and will often mix military and civilian DOD technicians. As these units are not specific to any given type of combat capability, these resources can be effectively shared amongst all of the branches of service.
Major Equipment and Personnel Summary
Maintenance Co., Group Support Battalion, Combat Maneuver Group
HQ Section 1 officer 3 HMMWV
8 enlisted 2 3/4T trailer
Support Platoon (1) 1 officer 4 HEMTT-FRS
31 enlisted 2 HMMWV
2 3/4T trailer
2 TSV-CM
2 MTV w/ MHE
4 MTVF
2 M88 RV
8 ULLS-OOO
8 VTS
Maneuver Platoon (3) 1 officer 2 HEMTT-FRS
31 enlisted 4 HMMWV
4 3/4T trailer
4 TSV-CM
2 MTV w/ MHE
2 MTVF
2 M88 RV
8 ULLS-OOO
8 VTS
Totals 5 officer 10 HEMTT-FRS
132 enlisted 17 HMMWV
137 personnel 16 3/4T trailer
14 TSV-CM
8 MTV w/ MHE
10 MTVF
8 M88 RV
32 ULLS-OOO
32 VTS
Major Equipment and Personnel Summary
Maintenance Battalion, Early Deploying Support Group
Automotive/Armament (2) 5 officer 11 HMMWV
164 enlisted 3 3/4T trailer
24 HEMTT-FRS
24 TSV-CM
1 HETS w/ SLT trailer
7 HETS w/ standard trailer
4 M88 Recovery vehicles
4 MTVR
4 MTVF
4 ULLS-OOO
72 VTS
Aviation/Munitions (2) 5 officer 11 HMMWV
164 enlisted 3 3/4T trailer
24 HEMTT-FRS
24 TSV-CM
1 HETS w/ SLT trailer
7 HETS w/ standard trailer
4 HEMTT Recovery vehicles
4 MTVR
4 MTVF
4 ULLS-OOO
72 VTS
General Equipment (2) 5 officer 11 HMMWV
164 enlisted 3 3/4T trailer
24 CMT-H
28 MTVF
8 commercial tractor w/ SLT trailer
4 HEMTT Recovery vehicles
4 MTVR
4 ULLS-OOO
72 VTS
Totals 30 officer 66 HMMWV
984 enlisted 18 3/4T trailer
1014 personnel 96 HEMTT-FRS
96 TSV-CM
4 HETS w/ SLT trailer
28 HETS w/ standard trailer
16 commercial tractor w/ SLT trailer
8 M88 Recovery vehicles
24 MTVR
16 HEMTT Recovery vehicles
44 MTVF
24 ULLS-OOO
432 VTS
Appendix I
Combat Technicians
What is a Logistician? This is a fairly reasonable question that, unfortunately, currently has no reasonable answer. While the concept of logistics typically covers the areas of transportation, supply, maintenance, and communications, each of these areas falls under separate and unrelated Corps commands. Everyone working in logistics must be functional in all supply operations. All logistics personnel should also be functional in all transportation operations. Logistics personnel should also be able to operate all unit level communications equipment. And finally, all logistics personnel need a fundamental understanding of the concepts of troubleshooting.
All logistics personnel are not going to be mechanics nor should they be expected to be. But they should be able to recognize fundamental problems with equipment like whether or not batteries are dead or where an oil leak is coming from in a vehicle. These personnel need to be adept at all areas of operator-level and organizational-level maintenance and they need to be able to recognize when a system has a serious problem. They need to know the basic components that make up an electrical system, a hydraulic system, and how these systems function. They do not need comprehensive training - just enough so that when something ceases to function, they can send the equipment to where it needs to go in order to be repaired.
Every unit has specific personnel assigned to the roles of unit maintenance, unit supply, and unit communications (pretty much everybody drives). These separate areas should be merged at the unit level into a single role of Combat Technician.
Combat Technicians
The idea of a Combat Technician is for units to have a substantial group of personnel that are trained and experienced in all organizational level logistics functions. The operative phrase here is organizational level; higher echelons of support will still be manned by personnel with more specific skills. But at the unit level, there should be no separation of maintenance, supply, transportation, and communications.
The primary reason for this change in structure is that too many of these tasks are currently performed by one or two people and an everyday occurrence like personnel turnover can cause the unit’s logistics to shut down. By having all of these personnel trained in the full spectrum of logistics, the unit can simply move remaining personnel around to adjust for loss. While this isn't the most efficient means of dealing with the problem, it will keep the unit functioning at a sufficient level until personnel can be replaced.
This also allows for the unit to shift personnel to meet short-term critical needs. Oftentimes, a requirement will come up in a certain section requiring additional assistance and this program will ensure that qualified personnel are readily available to fill these short-term needs. As an example, when a new commander is assigned to a unit, they are required to inventory the entire unit for the transition. With this system, additional personnel can be shifted to the unit's supply section to assist in the transition. Another example would be when a unit gets new vehicles or is pulling vehicles out of storage. This often requires more personnel than the typical motorpool has for performing the necessary inspections and small repairs. With this system, additional personnel will be available and properly trained to help.
The unit will retain the same total number of personnel for these unit logistics function; the personnel will simply be trained to engage in a wider array of missions than they currently are. This builds redundancy within the logistical system without increasing the total number of personnel. In the interim, unit commanders should insist on cross-training all personnel in the unit's logistical areas to perform the other missions.
Oftentimes, leaders make the mistake of allowing personnel to cross train into higher support echelons because the Soldier will need this training later in their careers. Unfortunately, the unit rarely has the resources or workload to justify this training. What tends to get lost is that as these Soldiers gain rank, they will also be required to engage in the other areas of logistics. Every military unit has the resources to provide this horizontal type of cross training at the organizational level. The Soldier will benefit more in the long run from learning the rest of the logistical areas than from learning a higher echelon of support and the unit will be stronger as well.
A Logistics Corps
To manage this new field, we will need to establish a Corps that can oversee training and personnel issues for Combat Technicians. Essentially, the various MOS that are being combined into the Combat Technician concept will be removed from their respective Corps' and merged in the Logistics Corps. A joint Logistics Corps that will effectively function as an entirely new branch of service will manage and provide higher echelon support. The following MOS should be merged to form the Logistics Corps:
31C - Radio Operator Maintainer
52D - Power Generation Equipment Repairer
63B - Light Wheel Vehicle Mechanic
63S - Heavy Wheel Vehicle Mechanic
63Y - Track Vehicle Mechanic
92A - Automated Logistical Specialist
92Y - Unit Supply Specialist
88H - Cargo Specialist
88M - Motor Transport Operator
At first glance, this list appears to be rather huge and unmanageable for merger into a single job, but remember, we're only combining the organizational level activities of these MOS and we're also streamlining them. In the case of some MOS listed, the current timeframe for training is only a couple of weeks. And by focusing on generalized training instead of going into great depths that aren't required, there's no reason that training for this new MOS should take more than 16 weeks. Most of the necessary training will come on the job.
Combat Technicians will occupy all of the logistics-related positions within units. Promotions will lead to higher positions within the unit or to higher levels of logistics such as the S-4 sections at battalion and brigade levels. Senior NCOs and Officers in the Logistics Corps will hold the position of Combat Logistician. Appropriate training will educate these personnel in the command side of logistics functions.
Training Doctrine
As with all of the administrative Corps units, the Logistics Corps will have its own training doctrine and facilities. For facilities, the Corps will take over those training facilities currently used by the 63B training program. These facilities exist at a number of bases and will be available anyway as 63B is included in the Logistics Corps. A 16 week training course will be structured on the lines of:
* Introduction to Logistics - one week
* Supply Operations - one week
* Cargo Handling and Loading - one week
* Vehicle Operations - one week
* Communications Operations - one week
* Additional Systems Operations - one week
* Electrical Systems Diagnostics - two weeks
* Mechanical Systems Diagnostics - two weeks
* Hydraulic Systems Diagnostics - two weeks
* Fuel Systems Diagnostics - two weeks
* Vehicle Maintenance and Repairs - one week
* Equipment Maintenance and Repairs - one week
Additional Skill Identifiers should include the following:
* Airborne Operations - additional training focused on applying logistics concepts to airborne and heliborne operations. Includes training in air load operations, air drop operations, and sling load operations.
* Amphibious Operations - similar to Airborne Operations but dealing with naval support and amphibious vehicles instead of airborne systems.
Basic Noncommissioned Officers Course should cover:
* Managing Supply Operations - Organizational Level
* Managing Transportation Operations - Organizational Level
* Managing Maintenance Operations - Organizational Level
* Managing Communications Operations - Organizational Level
Advanced Noncommissioned Officers Course will address:
* Managing Supply Operations - Higher Echelons
* Managing Transportation Operations - Higher Echelons
* Managing Maintenance Operations - Higher Echelons
* Managing Communications Operations - Higher Echelons
Basic Officers Course should cover all of the above items. Upon completion of the above items, the Soldier becomes a Combat Logistician.
Warrant Officers will have already completed the mentioned courses and will need to complete additional training in the following areas:
* Joint Supply Operations
* Joint Transportation Operations
* Joint Maintenance Operations
* Joint Communication Operations
Officers will be required to complete all of the above training for promotion to ranks O-4 and above and will also be required to have completed all of the above in order to hold the position of S-4.
Appendix II
Direct Support and ASI
The proposed combat groups utilize a rotational readiness system to optimize training and combat readiness. An ideal side effect of this approach is an overall reduction in the need for organizational maintenance support in deployable units. For example, with a rotational system, common sense suggests that regularly scheduled major services, such as the annual and semi-annual services, should be performed during the downtime programmed into the readiness cycle with a "refresher" service performed at the end of the training cycle. Most minor repairs can also be deferred until these same timeframes. Consequently, the primary maintenance needs at the organizational level will be diagnosis of equipment malfunctions and repairs of minor deadline deficiencies.
This frees us to emphasize higher echelon maintenance capabilities that are more suitable for expeditionary warfare environments. For example, given suitable training and equipment, competent technicians can perform many maintenance services in a deployed environment that are currently limited to depot support units. Most depot powertrain work can be performed effectively in a forward posture so long as the units are properly designed, trained, and equipped for this role. Similar results are possible in armament, aviation, general equipment, and electronics repairs.
Direct support MOS should be merged into five general categories of DS technicians.
Each category of DS technician will then have an additional group of ASI in specific segments of depot repairs that are suitable for forward operations. For example, automotive technicians should have ASI available in welding, automatic transmission repair, electrical system repair, drive train repair, engine repair, and engine performance. These ASI will correspond to equivalent civilian certifications such as ASE certification (an industry standard).
Technicians who have completed ASI in their field and are scheduled for additional ASI courses should be allowed to remain in active service up to 12 years regardless of rank or promotion status. Those technicians who complete all of the ASI in their respective field will be considered Depot Technicians and can remain in service up to 20 years regardless of rank, serving in either DS or Depot positions. Because the ASI coursework directly correlates to civilian certification, many young Soldiers will chose to leave service for civilian employment as they progress through ASI courses. This will ensure that the Army retains only those who are truly committed to serving in these critical fields. It will also help in countering the problems associated with service members achieving rank without adequate experience, as experienced technicians will be available to all units.
Appendix III
ULLS-OOO
Managing this system, as well as other logistics operations at the unit and support levels, should be a system called ULLS-OOO. The OOO stands for OpenOffice.org. This application suite is a powerful alternative to Microsoft Office with many features ideally suited to military applications. In addition to the standard word processing, spreadsheet, and presentation capabilities, OOO also includes drawing and diagram software, database software, and compatibility with a variety of file and technology types including Adobe PDF, Macromedia Flash, PDA, XML, and ActiveX. Virtually all organizational computer software used in the Army can be effectively replaced by OOO, which is free of charge. This software can also manage such difficult document types as maps, books, and forms. The database tools should be used to develop a replacement to the existing ULLS family of computer programs. These systems can then be integrated with the systems fielded under LOGMOD for a seamless and powerful logistics management system.
In the area of support operations ULLS-OOO should replace existing ULLS, SAMS, and SARSS. This system will handle work order processing, man-hour tracking, and report generation. Additionally, the maintenance section should be designed upon a framework similar to the warranty monitoring systems used by major auto manufacturers. These systems require data inputs that allow for better tracking of maintenance information, including user complaints that led to repair, coding of failed part to indicate cause of failure, listing of labor performed and parts and materials used in repair, and technician comments. In the supply portion of this proposal, it was mentioned that existing supply budgets should be converted to expense accounts that will operate on a reimbursement basis. With this new maintenance system, reimbursement will be determined by what is entered into the system. While somewhat ponderous, this system will enable leaders with critical information needed to improve maintenance support operations.
When combined with a satellite modem, this system will result in dramatic reductions in report generation for maintenance elements. Higher command elements can monitor the maintenance operations of subordinate units without the need for lengthy reports and inspections as most repetitive information will be available through the new ULLS. By directly linking reimbursement with entry into the ULLS system, many repairs that currently go unreported and undocumented will be entered into the system. Units will not be reimbursed for PLL purchases, as all PLL will be managed at the discretion of the unit commander. Only declared repairs to vehicles with reported deficiencies will be reimbursable.
Appendix IV
Tracked Support Vehicle – Contact Maintenance
The ideal TSV would look similar to the existing M1108 Universal Carrier from United Defense. This design is based on the M113 Gavin chassis and could be modified into a TSV. The design already includes an armored cab and can also include an NBC over-pressure system (which the TSV should have). Band tracks are already available for this chassis allowing for reduced noise, road wear, and maintenance. There is also a hybrid powertrain system available that produces 500hp, as much as the engine in the current PLS (a much larger, heavier vehicle that hauls 33 tons of cargo). It also comes with a mount for an M240 machine gun and can be equipped with thermal sights and GPS tracking systems (like those available on the current PLS). Ironically, even with substantial armor, this vehicle only weighs two tons more than the current MTV and it weighs roughly the same as older 5 ton cargo vehicles. There is no problem transporting this vehicle with all available airlift assets; it can roll-on/roll-off of C-130 and with little work it should even be air-droppable if it isn't already.
In the TSV-CM configuration, a pallet is installed on the vehicle that includes storage for tools and parts as well as equipment for electrical and compressed air systems. For most automotive and armament applications, the TSV-CM will be the maintenance vehicle of choice. It can also be equipped with a small winch in the front for light recovery operations and the vehicle has ample power for towing most wheeled and light armored vehicles.
While the vehicle is capable of transporting a three person crew, it will normally only carry a crew of two as the third space will be occupied primarily by computer systems including Vehicle Tracking Systems (VTS), ULLS-OOO, and unit radios. The pallet can also be off-loaded to allow the vehicle to assist in resupply operations as well.
Appendix V
Mobile Tactical Vehicle – Fitter (MTVF)
The MTVF is a modified M113 Gavin vehicle designed for performing maintenance support operations. It includes a MHE crane for lifting and positioning major components as well as a large cargo area and storage for tools and parts. In this configuration, the MTVF will also be outfitted with a variety of cutting systems for purposes of stripping disabled vehicles of useable components on the battlefield.
Current methods for cannibalization require extensive manpower and time as single repairs are performed twice, once to the repaired vehicle and once to the cannibalized vehicle. In this new maintenance construct, damaged vehicles will be stripped in a fashion that will prevent the vehicle from ever being reused. In essence, we are accepting that in some instances of warfare, it will be better to simply scrap an existing damaged vehicle and replace it altogether than to take the effort to repair it. Once we decide to scrap the vehicle to be cannibalized, the MTVF can be brought in. Instead of time-consuming, careful disassembly of components over a period of hours, the MTVF will cut all desired components from the vehicle in a matter of minutes.
Where extraction of an existing HMMWV engine can easily take 30 hours, the MTVF can extract an engine from a disabled vehicle, in useable condition, in less than one hour by cutting many of the components that would otherwise be disassembled. This same practice is commonplace in civilian salvage yards as well as criminal "chop shops" which are the closest examples available to military cannibalization.
By cutting the vehicle into various blocks of useable components, most vehicles can be fully cannibalized of all useable subsystems in less than two hours by a skilled technician. These component blocks may be stored by the unit or disassembled for their individual components. In either example, the excess labor currently inherent in military cannibalization processes can be dramatically reduced using these methods. This will involve a premium in that replacement vehicles will need to be procured and deployed but this is a small price to pay for maximizing the benefits of cannibalization in the early phases of combat. In deployed operations on non-linear battlefields, time is a luxury that maintenance operations do not possess.
REFERENCES
www.au.af.mil/au/aul/school/acsc/7.doc
Au/ACSC/647-4/2002-04
Air Command and staff college
AIR UNIVERSITY
Logistics and pattonÂ’s third army
lessons for
todayÂ’s logisticians
by
Jeffrey W. Decker, Major, United States Air Force
A Research Report Submitted to the Faculty
In Partial Fulfillment of the Graduation Requirements
Advisor: Doctor Richard R. Muller
Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama
April 2002
Disclaimer
The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author(s) and do not reflect the official policy or position of the US government or the Department of Defense. In accordance with Air Force Instruction 51-303, it is not copyrighted, but is the property of the United States government.
Contents
Page
Preface
When conducting serious study of any operational campaign during World War II, the military student quickly realizes the central role logistics played in the overall war effort. Studying the operations of General George S. Patton and his Third United States Army during 1944-45 provides all members of the profession of armsÂ-especially the joint logisticianÂ-valuable lessons in the art and science of logistics during hostilities. Future conflicts will not provide a two or three year “trial and error” logistics learning curve; rather, the existing sustainment infrastructure and its accompanying logisticians are what AmericaÂ’s armed forces will depend on when the fighting begins.
My
sincere thanks to Dr. Richard R. Muller for his guiding assistance completing
this project. I also want to thank the United States Army Center
of Military History for providing copies of the United States Army in
World War II official histories and
Lt Col (S) Clete Knaub for his editing advice and counsel. Finally,
thanks go to my wife Misty for her support writing this paper; her grandfather,
Mark Novick for his wisdom and guidance during the preparation of this
project; and to his brother David, a veteran of the Third United States
Army. I dedicate this project to him.
Abstract
George
S. Patton and his Third Army waged a significant combined arms campaign
on the Western Front during 1944-45. Both his military leadership
and logistics acumen proved decisive against enemy forces from North
Africa to the Rhine River. This paper illustrates PattonÂ’s logistical
experience before assuming command of the Third Army in 1944, examines
how logistics successfully contributed to Third ArmyÂ’s 1944-45 campaigns,
and suggests appropriate lessons for todayÂ’s joint logistician.
The research findings summarize PattonÂ’s career and his exposure to
the importance logistics plays in modern war. Next is an analysis
exploring how logistics influenced PattonÂ’s campaigns in North Africa,
Sicily, France, and Germany; including examples of PattonÂ’s troops continually
adapting logistically during these campaigns. The discussion concludes
with suggested lessons learned for todayÂ’s joint logistician.
Though almost sixty years have elapsed since Patton’s Third Army raced across the French countryside and into Germany, this incredible feat of combined arms still offers fresh insights for today’s warriors, and especially for the joint logistician. Patton may have been “hell on wheels,” but his Third Army’s accomplishments depended upon the agile combat support provided by his quartermasters and other logisticians scattered throughout the European Theater of Operations. This essay discusses Patton’s previous logistical experience before assuming command of the Third Army in 1944, examines how logistics successfully contributed to Third Army’s 1944-45 campaigns, and suggests appropriate lessons for today’s joint logistician.
After graduating from West Point in 1909, Patton began his army career with K Troop, 15th Cavalry Regiment at Fort Sheridan, Illinois. Patton eagerly jumped into his new assignment, and also spent a great deal of time studying Clausewitz and other military texts establishing a pattern that continued throughout his life. His professional studies during his early career focused on the operational level of warÂ-“the movement, support, and sequential employment of large military formations in military campaigns.”1 After passing the promotion exam to First Lieutenant in early 1916, PattonÂ’s reassignment to the 8th Cavalry at Fort Bliss, Texas moved him closer to the simmering American-Mexican border. After Pancho VillaÂ’s raid on Columbus, New Mexico, Brigadier General John J. Pershing assembled a retaliatory force to find Villa. When Patton discovered his unit would not be part of the expedition, he asked to be assigned as an aide to Pershing. Leaving Fort Bliss together on 13 March 1916, Patton and Pershing began a close and lifelong friendship. Also, Patton would experience the first phases of the growing technological revolution on the twentieth century battlefield.
As a participant in the Mexican Punitive Expedition of 1916, Patton witnessed the beginnings of Army motorization in the combat arms and quartermaster corps. While purchasing food from local farmers, Patton discovered a Villista compound. Without hesitation, he used his three assigned automobiles and 14 accompanying personnel to attack and secure the stronghold. This motorized engagement, a first in U. S. Army history “foreshadowed Patton’s later expertise in this kind of combat.”2 In addition, the use of internal combustion engine vehicles in delivering supplies would enhance an army’s ability in future conflicts. Major John F. Madden the Quartermaster General for the punitive expedition, commented:
It can be asserted with conviction as a result of observation of motor transport operating with this Expedition, that this method of forwarding supplies is eminently practicable and comparatively inexpensive under ordinary normal conditions, that it is dependable enough to be worthy of adoption for general use and it would be the policy of wisdom to continue and expand the motor units now in service, to perfect their organization and training, from now on so that when again the Army is called on for service akin to this expedition, it will have ready and at maximum effectiveness, this modern and proven aid to its efficiency.3
Though Major Madden constantly struggled with vehicles designed for civilian use, poor roads, and parts shortages, he enthusiastically supported incorporating trucks as a means of delivering supplies to forward deployed elements. Patton biographer Martin Blumenson describes Patton’s exposure to both technology and the central role of logistics during his first operational campaign: “He had become acquainted with the primitive motor vehicles used by the U. S. Army and employed them for the first time in extended operations and become aware of the importance of logistics as he studied the supply system.”4 After completing the Punitive Expedition, Patton’s superior, the newly promoted Major General Pershing, left for France to assemble and train the American Expeditionary Force (AEF). Patton also accompanied his lifelong idol to the war-torn European continent.
Upon arrival in France, the AEF faced enthusiastic crowds but a logistical nightmare. Another of Pershing’s staff officers, Major George C. Marshall, observed conditions rivaling those facing “Washington’s forces at Valley Forge in the fall of 1917…seen soldiers of the First Division without shoes and with their feet wrapped in gunny-sacks, marching ten or fifteen kilometers through the ice and snow…seen so many horses of the First Division drop dead on the field from starvation.”5 After assuming directorship of the Tank School at Bourg, France, Patton faced similar logistical circumstances but expertly tackled issues such as “requisitioning land, constructing buildings and tank training areas…requisitioning supplies and spare parts for a tank battalion (calculated down to a mechanic’s need for replacement nuts and bolts), and employing the machines in combat once they had been transported by rail to the appropriate sector of the front.”6 Even his course of instruction “provided the skills needed to assure that his tank units would mesh with the activities of infantrymen, artillerymen, signalers, airmen, and logisticians (emphasis added).”7 After training enough troops and obtaining equipment sufficient to outfit a brigade, Patton and his tankers faced their first combat test: the September 1918 Meuse-Argonne Offensive.
Patton and his 345 tanks fought valiantly during this critical battle. After 14 days, the brigade had exhausted its tank complement and out of 834 troops, only 80 were available to fightÂ-even Patton required hospitalization due to a wound. However, this combat test had allowed Patton to hone doctrine, while self-critiquing his leadership and logistical abilities. Upon his return after convalescence, he authored notes on “Entraining and Detraining at Night” followed by “Practical Training, Tank Platoon.”8 These two papers emphasized PattonÂ’s commitment to both logistical matters and combat preparation. His brief but intense experiences during World War I prepared him for bigger challenges, but he would have to wait over 20 years before again leading and sustaining troops on the battlefield.
As Patton itched for a field command in late 1939, the American army under its new Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall was building a credible military force after the neglect of the 1920’s and 1930’s. Marshall’s exposure to the haphazard buildup of forces during the First World War and the difficulties presented by training and employing troops without the required logistics greatly shaped his efforts prior to America’s entry into World War II. Marshall also encountered a mindset throughout the Army in which “logistics was held in low esteem.”9 This outlook would change during the Second World War as the greatest contribution made by the United States to the Allied effort would be “in weight of materiel rather than in weight of manpower.”10
The “Arsenal of Democracy” eloquently described AmericaÂ’s materiel contributions but underestimated the challenges to delivering sustenance to forces fighting the Axis powers. First AmericaÂ’s dormant industrial power required a great deal of time to “ramp up” to support both Allied and American logistical requirements. During an address in 1938, General Marshall told the Army Industrial College, “No matter how many billions of dollars Congress places at our disposal on the day war is declared, they will not buy ten cents worth of materiel for delivery under twelve months, and a great deal of it requires a year and a half to manufacture.”11 Secondly, tenuous sea lines of communications (LOC) across the Atlantic and then Pacific oceans plus the requirement to plan, manufacture, assemble, and deliver all manner of materiel taxed Army planners and logisticians. Marshall viewed AmericaÂ’s army as one of battalions spread amongst 130 posts without significant service forces. Training of large unit formations was lacking, and “…neither the Regular Army nor the National Guard had any tactical corps or field army headquarters.”12 Finally, the United States would fight as a part of a worldwide coalition, providing significant quantities of war materiel to each partner. Many of the logistics decisions made at the strategic, operational and sometimes tactical level would be influenced by coalition, rather than solely U. S. considerations. Even at the first staff discussions between American and British representatives in late January 1941, “logistics provided the frame within which the first great strategic decision was made.”13 Known as ABC-1 (United States Plan Rainbow-5), proposed a “Germany first” strategy if America entered the war. Even with its burgeoning materiel might, America “could not have mustered sufficient effort to deal with both major enemies simultaneously.”14 For Marshall it was now time to mold and support the armies of a democracy and find men to lead themÂ-men such as George S. Patton.
When Germany invaded Poland in September 1939, Patton was in command of Fort Meyer, Virginia. This was a largely ceremonial and socially demanding posting and Patton yearned to get any field command as he saw war approaching. He and others observed the mechanization of the battlefield and the Wehrmacht’s superb efficiency in incorporating tanks, aircraft, and “panzer grenadiers” (mechanized infantry) into one destructive sledgehammer against enemy forces. Experienced American personnel with a similar background were few, and formations larger than a battalion were virtually nonexistent. Marshall hurriedly determined the need for an armored force and authorized a corps with two armored divisions. These “saplings” would in time lead an American Army schooled in the methods of “blitzkrieg” style of warfare, and in temporary command of the Second Armored Division was Brigadier General (S) Patton.
Patton zealously executed his duties and projected an aura of youthfulness even though he was nearly 55 years old. Leading and training a newly formed armored division mirrored budding American concepts of fighting the impending war in Europe. Marshall and other prewar planners determined that mobile formationsÂ-abundantly equipped, rapidly resupplied, and heavily supported by air and naval powerÂ-would defeat the Nazi legions. U.S. Army planners devised a logistical strategy in which “the emphasis upon weight and quantity of materiel, sometimes at the expense of qualitative superiority over the enemy radiated through every aspect of the ArmyÂ’s logistics. It was reflected above all, perhaps, in a supply system that accepted and greatly extended the modern mass armyÂ’s dependence on continuous resupply.”15 With this basic guidance, Patton and others began the task of building up AmericaÂ’s armored forces, but faced immediate logistical hurdles due to the expanding war in Europe.
As in past wars, initial American manpower requirements were met first and the follow-on materiel needs languished or were redirected toward more pressing emergencies. The newly created armored divisions quickly filled out with new draftees (compliments of the September 1940 Selective Service Act) but with an “authorization of 6,486 vehicles to attain full combat strength, the Armored Force inherited less than 1,000.”16 Even after ten months of extensive training and expanded production, War Plans Division Chief, Brigadier General Leonard T. Gerow reported to General Marshall “the First Division (reinforced) is the only division we have which even approximates readiness for combat service involving a landing on a hostile shore.”17 Combined with a robust naval shipbuilding program, American factories were producing vast quantities of aircraft, mortars, certain types of antiaircraft artillery and machine guns, rifles, field artillery ammunition, light tanks, and trucks. Unfortunately, Army brass saw much of this new materiel allocated to Great Britain and the Soviet Union. Patton and other division commanders addressed these discrepancies with typical Yankee ingenuity. Using trucks as tanks, pine logs as machine guns, or flour sacks as air delivered munitions, the rapidly growing American army pressed ahead with the U.S Army GHQ maneuvers for 1941.
The 1941 maneuvers provided Patton and his Second Armored Division an opportunity to showcase the capabilities of mechanized warfare and hone the “nuts and bolts” of logistics and movement. Fortuitously, Patton’s division was assigned to the Third Army and his troopers ran roughshod through the opposing forces. During the smaller scale Tennessee games held in June, “Patton’s forces knifed through the defenders with such speed that the umpires stopped the action after nine hours instead of the allocated two days.”18 Patton also pointed out to Secretary of War Stimson that his division covered “in some cases over 110 miles, every fighting vehicle in the division, except two tanks and a scout car, got to the place it was supposed to be in time to deliver the attack.”19
The Louisiana maneuvers in which over 350,000 men participated, were the largest peacetime exercise in the history of the US Army. Beginning on 15 September 1941, the exercises progressed on a two-phase agenda. Evaluating mobility in the attack and the defensive capability of smaller forces, Patton’s Second Armored met overwhelming infantry and antitank opposition during the first phase and was essentially destroyed. During Phase II his forces executed a “wide hooking movement that covered some 200 miles in 48 hours…despite the fact they were overextended logistically…”20 Operating from a 300-mile supply line, Patton kept his mechanized forces fueled by purchasing gasoline from commercial dealers and service stations. Besides testing further the impact of mechanization and defensive doctrine, the Louisiana maneuvers provided invaluable logistics instruction as well. Patton procuring gas on the march exposed the criticality of a flexible and responsive Communications Zones (COMZ). General Marshall also recognized the importance of COMZs, demanding each army reposition its COMZ between the first and second phases of the maneuvers. He recalled in later years:
Eisenhower for example, was chief of staff of General KruegerÂ’s [Third] Army in the South. All of them learned a great dealÂ…I directed that they change their bases on each side. They told me it would take a month for something like that and be very, very expensive. Well, I said, they would have to do it anyway. They would have to do it in Europe, and they would have to do it hereÂ…I remember in one case it took ten days, and cost 40,000 dollarsÂ…but it was a very economical sum when it came to the efficiency it developed in the troops. That is the reason that Patton and Hodges and Bradley were able to move as rapidly as they did across the face of Europe.21
The mock combatants concluded their activities in Louisiana and prepared for a final large unit training opportunity in the Carolinas.
The Carolina games commenced on 16 November 1941 and evaluated a battle between an infantry heavy force numbering 195,000 (General Hugh Drum’s First Army) against a smaller mechanized heavy force numbering 100,000 (Major General Oscar W. Griswold’s IV Corps). Assigned to the smaller force, Patton’s Second Armored Division attempted to repeat the stunning successes of the previous wargames. Facing numerical superiority, the IV Corps was unable to exploit its inherent mobile advantage. A shortage of infantry within armored formations was evident as well. During both phases, the armored units were used more as roving “fire brigades” to stem opposing force attacks than in their intended roles. Also evident was the inability of quartermaster units to properly fuel vehicles on the march. Prior to game commencement, the Assistant I Armored Corps G-4 summed up the problem to Patton: “General, in the I Armored Corps, we do not have trucks, tank trucks, cans nor men to move a hundred gallons of gas.”22 In order to remedy the situation, the assistant G-4 locally contracted railroad tank cars and used gravity to refuel the tanks. Similar to a Confederate cavalry raid, Patton’s armored forces continued to press attacks behind enemy lines though he had to be reminded again of the precarious balance between combat power and sustainment. The 1941 maneuvers showcased Patton’s effective use and movement of mechanized forces; exposure to large-scale logistical requirements during these games combined with his previous experiences from the First World War prepared him for his next assignment, commander of the I Armored Corps and the Desert Training Center.
Immediately after the attack on Pearl Harbor, Patton again faced the daunting task of training, leading, and sustaining combat forces in the field. Equipping an 8 million-man force, the US Army would continue facing materiel and personnel shortages during the first months of the war. Patton’s selection as the I Armored Corps commander at Fort Benning, Georgia in late December 1941, he, and his staff, faced the basic shortages still afflicting a rapidly expanding American Army. Then First Lieutenant Porter B. Williamson (the previously mentioned assistant G-4 from Carolina) described his issued gear; “I rolled my bedding roll and strapped on my empty pistol holster. This was my full pack! No rifle, no ammunition, no canteen, almost nothing required to have a full military pack for a soldier.”23 Service troops were in short supply as well. At the beginning of World War II:
Only 11 percent of the Army consisted of service troops, compared to 34 percent at the end of World War I. The unrealistically low ratio of service troops to combat troops made itself felt at onceÂ…few trained service troops were available for overseas duty; and service troops, beyond all others, were required in the early phases of the war. It was imperative that they prepare depots, receive equipment and supplies, and establish the essential services for combat troops.24
Tables of Organization and Equipment had to be “fleshed out” according to priorities set at the highest levels of the Army and U. S. government. Munitions were centrally controlled and a combined Anglo-American Board oversaw distribution. Other classes of supply operated via decentralized procedures and within a wholesale logistical operation, “to free the flow of supply from the erratic pace of day-to-day demand, in order to gain flexibility in the use of transport, storage, and handling facilities.”25 These initial efforts severely affected the training and establishment of air and ground forces early in the war. The Army Inspector General reported in July 1942, “that lack of spare parts was accounting for from two thirds to three fourths of the disabilities among vehicles in the United States.”26 Even with these logistical difficulties, Patton’s I Armored Corps arrived within 60 days at the Desert Training Center and in March 1942, training of the first forces to meet the Wehrmacht began.
Encompassing an area approximately the size of Pennsylvania, the Desert Training Center was a post established with a minimum of higher headquarters logistical support. Establishing bivouac, range, and other associated training areas taxed the existing staff officers to the limit. Newly arrived troops detrained improperly uniformed, and encountered shortages in equipment, tools, and supplies. Personal hygiene relied on G. I. issue steel helmets for washing hands, shaving, and bathing until at PattonÂ’s direction Army quartermasters contracted with a San Bernadino Sears and Roebuck store to supply enough washbasins for the expanding number of troops. Mindful of troop morale in the hot and dusty climate, Patton ensured running water, latrines, and showers outfitted the post within 30 days. Testing valuable lessons learned from the 1941 maneuvers, combat commands replaced brigades and division trains used to provide logistics and personnel were introduced as well. Establishing COMZs complete with airfields, railheads, and a road network afforded quartermaster units combined training with their ground force counterparts. Newly assigned ground and service staff officers too had the opportunities to train with their opposite number in both the employment and sustainment of large units. PattonÂ’s efforts at the Desert Training Center would not only prepare forces for the upcoming North Africa invasion, but also ensured that an additional 20 divisions received large-scale unit training until the Spring of 1944.
On 8 November 1942, the first ever Anglo-American amphibious invasion landed three separate task forces and quickly seized key parts of French North Africa. Once ashore, troops linked up with the westward advancing British Eighth Army, ultimately forcing the Afrika Korps off the continent. Five months of hard fighting against Rommel’s desert veterans awaited inexperienced American troops. Quartermasters too encountered difficult conditions but garnered valuable logistics “seasoning” applicable to future operations; especially Operation OVERLORD, the invasion of Normandy.
From the beginning, TORCH faced logistical hurdles, including inexperienced Combat Service Support (CSS) troops and ill-trained staff officers. An operation of this scope and size had never been attempted, with American planners facing competing demands for shipping and equipment. Convoy size was limited due to escort availability and thereby decreased the number of vehicles available for operations once ashore. Forces were also staged from the United States and Great Britain, complicating an already complex coordination cycle. Merchant ships were loaded based on expediency or peacetime practices, ignoring the immediate requirements of combat forces. Poor supply marking and record keeping resulted in duplicate orders of Class II and IV supplies. CSS troops exercised sloppy blackout, concealment, camouflage, and dispersal and truck convoy procedures, which added, further losses to an already diminished truck fleet. American infantrymen used to riding into battle “soon realized that a truck or vehicle in North Africa was worth ten times its value in the United States, and must not be abandoned until there was no hope of recovery.”27 After the poor employment of American combat arms at Kasserine Pass and continuing logistical deficiencies, TORCH commander Lieutenant General Dwight D. Eisenhower, replaced the corps commander Major General Lloyd R. Fredendall with Patton. The latterÂ’s “buoyant leadership and strict insistence upon discipline rapidly rejuvenated the II Corps and brought it up to a fighting pitch”28Â-just in time for the pivotal battle at Al-Guettar.
The Patton trademark of infusing a fighting spirit into all his soldiers including the CSS elements proved instrumental during Al-Guettar. Patton biographer Blumenson captures both his attention to fighting and commitment to logistics: “He [Patton] had to be ruthless, for he had only eleven days to shake his troops out of slovenly habits and into a state of alertness. At the same time he expedited the arrival of new equipment, clothing, and mail. He improved living conditions by insisting on better food and well-cooked meals.”29 Observing the poor state of many of his soldier’s footwear, Patton requested the immediate requisition and delivery of 80,000 pairs of boots, with most arriving within 24 hours. Patton’s attention to both warfighting and logistical issues proved decisive at Al-Guettar, but more importantly, the battle reinforced his keen understanding of both combat and sustainment. The battle also provided American ground and service forces valuable logistics lessons as well. Innovations such as the use of mules to move supplies, establishing forward supply points, evacuating damaged vehicles in the far forward combat areas, and thinking as soldiers first then as logisticians greatly enhanced the logistics capability within Patton’s divisions and throughout his II Corps.
Haphazard at first, the North African campaign reaffirmed American reliance on the weight of materiel as opposed to manpower. The official Army Historian James A. Huston noted:
The invasion of North Africa was a graduate school in logistics when too many officers had not yet completed elementary school in that subject, but on the whole the officers learned their lessons well. More importantly, “the operation impressed upon everyone a fact they already knew…the necessity for close co-ordination between tactical and logistical planning. The invasion served as a proving ground for developing data for supply replenishment, for service troops, for troop replacements, for casualty estimates, and for amphibious assault planning and support.30
Now assigned to lead the Seventh Army, Patton and the quartermasters would apply the hard earned lessons of the North African campaign against enemy forces on the island of Sicily.
Leading an army of over 160,000, Patton along with Field Marshal Bernard L. Montgomery’s Eighth Army began the invasion of Sicily on 10 July 1943. In many respects HUSKY was a rehearsal for OVERLORD. Improved and in-depth logistical planning prior to the invasion, better equipment, and tested logisticians accompanied the assault elements. In addition, the invasion convoys originated within theater; easing coordination, command, and control of numerous ships and assault craft prior. The invasion would “also be a landmark in the development of amphibious logistics support, both in far-shore organization and equipment.”31
Lacking adequate seaports and reliance on over-the-shore resupply, Patton hoped recently developed equipment would improve logistical sustainment. The new amphibious truck known as the DUKW or “duck” received its baptism of fire and performed magnificently. In Logistical Support of the Armies, Volume I, Dr. Ruppenthal describes the crucial role DUKW’s played in Sicily and their impact on subsequent amphibious operations:
The amphibians were used for many purposes, including some not intended. They carried stores far inland to forward dumps, evacuated casualties and prisoners, and in at least one emergency were used to transfer a Ranger battalion to meet a sudden enemy counterattack…but they demonstrated their usefulness in a hundred ways and proved themselves one of the most valuable “weapons” in the Allied arsenal. From HUSKY on no landing operation was to be attempted without them.32
Additional logistics lessons learned from TORCH, included “perfecting the methods of moving supply over the assault beaches, of decreasing the soldier’s load, of weighing and balancing Quartermaster troops lists, and of using new Quartermaster packaging, crating, loading and marking techniques,”33 were incorporated into the Sicily campaign.
Improving immediate availability of POL, water, and rations during the initial landing a palletized load (unit load) was introduced during HUSKY. Unit loads were, “water and gasoline packaged in 5-gallon cans, with 56 cans on each pallet; oil, in boxes of 24 quart cans, 30 boxes per pallet; and 5-in-1 rations in boxes, 60 fiber boxes per pallet and varied in weight from two to three thousand pounds.”34 Upon delivery to the assault area (usually by a DUKW), the pallet would be torn down, contents distributed for consumption, and the platform used to move nonpalletized materiel. Another item used for the first time during the Sicily campaign was the assault pack. Containing individual equipment for one soldier, these haversacks weighed fifty pounds and combined items ranging from clothing, rations, and cigarettes to toilet paper. For every 100 soldiers assaulting the beach, five assault packs were authorized. Equipment and new materiel resupply methods proved valuable, and the increasingly experienced logisticians and their staffs were proving their flexibility during combat operations.
Incorporating another lesson learned from the Tunisian campaign, a third echelon (supply) was established. Located not far from the forward battle areas, the G-4 commanded the assigned six sections. These logisticians were better able to monitor, forecast, and adapt logistics support as necessary. Ordnance, maintenance and medical evacuation improved when the corps G-4 staffs assumed these responsibilities from the army level G-4. However, by D+ 13 and with stiffening enemy resistance, the divisions and corps troops had outrun their supply lines. To deal with this problem corps and army level G-3 and G-4 staffs quickly met and cobbled together a temporary solution to maintain the flow of fuel, ammunition, and other supplies. From this the forerunner of the famed “Red Ball” express debuted during the Sicily campaign. Merging both corps and army level transportation units and executing round trips covering up to 200 miles, the logisticians were able to resupply forward ammunition, fuel, and supply transfer points and keep the Seventh Army on the march. With adequate logistical support, Patton continued advancing against collapsing German resistance and liberated the final stronghold of Messina just ahead of Montgomery’s Eighth Army.
Both the Tunisian and Sicily campaigns highlighted PattonÂ’s skill at rapidly moving his forces and logistics to sustain them in order to engage and defeat the enemy. In his book Crusade in Europe, Eisenhower praises PattonÂ’s mobility: “Speed requires training, fitness, confidence, morale, suitable transport, and skillful leadership. Patton employed these tactics relentlessly, and thus not only minimized casualties but shook the whole Italian Government so forcibly that Mussolini toppled from his position in late July.”35 Also in a letter to Marshall, Eisenhower praised PattonÂ’s “native shrewdness about logisticsÂ…and as a truly aggressive commander with brains.”36 PattonÂ’s combat and logistics units plus his staff elements constantly improved their abilities to fight and sustain their formations in the tactical environment. Now with the invasion of Europe quickly approaching, the logistics lessons learned from the Tunisian and Sicilian operations would be put to good useÂ-as well as Patton and his Third Army.
On 22 Jan 1944, Patton received word of his selection to lead the Third Army. Planned as an exploiting element once the initial lodgment had been established ashore in Normandy, the Third Army barely existed as a fighting force. With many of the divisions untried and staff echelons inexperienced, Patton again had to start from scratch and mold his army into a “hell on wheels” outfit. Luckily, he was able to keep his principal Seventh Army staff officers including his G-4, Walter J. Muller, who “functioned with such efficiency that Patton rarely inquired into his methods.”37 With operations in France expected to last considerably longer than Patton’s two previous campaigns (Tunisia and Sicily at 30 and 38 days respectively), the Third Army had to quickly plan and prepare for logistics support on a much larger scale.
In mid-March, Patton greeted the remainder of his staff officers at Peover Hall near Knutsford, England to outline his plans for bringing Third Army up to fighting shape in the few remaining months before its commitment to combat. Finding suitable maneuver areas and planning training regimens were at the top of the list, but the whole gamut of logistics occupied the staff as well. Preliminary efforts focused on identifying new equipment requirements and requisitioning authorized TO&E. American divisions arriving in the United Kingdom possessed their personal kit and a few limited equipment items, but required “marrying up” with previously shipped gear. This ensured units received the latest in field equipment. Additionally, the Signal Section identified required radio nets, mapped circuits and obtained applicable supplies. The Engineers busily conducted “analyses of bridge requirements, road studies, traffic circulation plans, computation of supply requirements, and survey and mapping plans.”38 Patton even read The Norman Conquest by Edward A. Freeman, “paying particular attention to the roads William the Conqueror used in his operations in Normandy and Brittany.”39 In addition, the need to address the ongoing Quartermaster Troop shortage to support operations haunted initial planning. According to Colonel Everett Busch, Third Army Quartermaster General, “this question was the most difficult in many respects of any encountered during the preliminary phase.”40 It also underscored the strategic and operational concerns logistics was playing in Europe’s liberation and indirectly the combat ability of Third Army. Nowhere was this more evident than Patton’s role in Operation BODYGUARD
Besides leading the Third Army, Patton also “commanded” the fictitious First U. S. Army Group (FUSAG). As part of the FORTITUDE SOUTH component of BODYGUARD, Patton and FUSAG were created to deceive German intelligence into believing the Pas de Calais would be the actual landing areas for D-Day. The German High Command (OKW) determined Patton would lead the invasion force and his billeting in Southeastern England plus the combination of real and fake units added to the deception. Adding to the plausibility were both Allied and German strategic and operations logistics concerns:
What made the story particularly believable to OKW was the terrain associated with the Pas de Calais. It was the closest to England, providing the shortest invasion route. It provided the most direct route to the Ruhr, the industrial heart of Germany and the anticipated objective of any invasion. The area boasted an excellent road and rail network to the interior and finally the port of Le Havre, France, would provide the Allies with a superb facility to sustain any drive on the continent.41
Patton and FUSAG kept up “appearances” even after the invasion. Deception operations continued until the first week in August, but with Patton’s quiet deployment to France on 4 July, BODYGUARD continued to diminish in effectiveness. Trading his comfortable English manor for a canvas tent in a Norman orchard, Patton prepared to activate his headquarters known as “Lucky Forward.” En route, or already in France, were five hundred units of the Third Army awaiting orders to attack.
Officially activated on 1 August 1944 (but not publicly acknowledged until 15 August), Third Army spent the preceding two months transiting from England, bivouacking within the narrow Cotentin Peninsula, and scrounging available Class I, III, and V supplies. Colonel Muller and the remainder of his small G-4 staff (nineteen officers, three warrant officers, and forty enlisted men) began the campaign “adapting and improvising” to an ever-changing logistics situation. First, almost all supplies were still arriving at Omaha and Utah beaches instead of the anticipated Cherbourg port, causing substantial problems in distribution and storage. Initial tonnages delivered approached planned figures, but due to a heavy gale (19-22 June) and damage to the MULBERRY artificial harbors, the logistics buildup schedule fell behind. Eventually only the British MULBERRY remained in operation. Secondly, Montgomery requested a faster buildup of combat forces with a proportionate delay in their accompanying service and support troops. With more “tooth” and less “tail,” “some shortages occurred in supplies, but with the exception of artillery ammunition these were not serious because casualties and materiel consumption were less than anticipated.”42 Thirdly, the planned COMZ organizational structure did not become operational as scheduled. The Advance Section Communications Zone (ADSEC) was present in France, but Colonel Busch was concerned that there was “no opportunity for a warming up, smoothing out period either for Third Army’s Quartermaster section or ADSEC...”43 Finally, rapid changes in the strategic and operational situation would play havoc as the Third Army roared through Avranches, Brittany and across France to the Siegfried Line.
Operation COBRA and the breakout from Normandy brought Patton and his Third Army finally into action. The rapid rate of march and overwhelming of enemy forces, immediately affected ADSEC and COMZs ability to supply PattonÂ’s voracious appetite for fuel and other supplies. Eminent British historian John Keegan describes the initial breakout through Avranches and PattonÂ’s logistical common sense:
Sending clusters of senior officers out to the feeder routes which led to it with orders to keep the vehicles rolling without regard for strict sequence of units; at the other end, the bunched columns were unscrambled by the simple means of marking each of the roads which fanned from it for a separated division. In this way, which defied every rule of staff college logistics, his seven divisions were got into the new theater of operations in seventy-two hours.44
Keeping pace to support Patton and Lieutenant General Courtney Hodges’ First Army, ADSEC moved forward three times in as many weeks. However, as the administrative elements moved forward, accompanying depots and supply points could not keep pace. At the end of August, “90 to 95 percent of continental supplies still lay on the beaches, 300 miles behind the army dumps.”45 With enemy forces retreating towards Paris or French ports still under German control, Twelfth Army Group commander, Lieutenant General Omar Bradley changed Patton’s original battle plan to reflect a quick drive towards the Seine, and not the all-out effort mopping up resistance throughout the Brittany Peninsula. Splitting the Third Army in two, only the VIII Corps remained behind to secure Brest and St. Malo and their accompanying port facilities. This partition furthered strained resupply efforts within Third Army and the remainder of Allied Forces in France.
During August 1944, supply support for Major General Troy MiddletonÂ’s VIII Corps emphasized not only the adaptability and dedication of the quartermaster corps, but also the impending logistical difficulties Patton would face as he approached the German frontier. As a tactical headquarters, MiddletonÂ’s VIII Corps assumed many administrative and tactical responsibilities normally associated with higher echelons. William M. King of the 44th Armored Infantry Battalion, 6th Armored Division described the logistical situation during the breakout:
Supplies were secured on the basis of expediencyÂ…permanent supply dumps were out of the question because the breakthrough had never stopped. Within a couple of days [we] were passing out rations like Santa Clause on his sleigh, with both giver and receiver on the moveÂ…The trucks were like a band of stage-coaches making a run through Indian country. We got used to keeping the wheels rolling, disregarding the snipers, and hoping we wouldnÂ’t get lost or hit.46
The quartermasters certainly could perform logistical feats of magic, but the VIII Corps attack revealed “the normal difficulty of satisfying even the minimum requirements in a period when the logistic organization is over-taxed by the pressure of pursuit operations.”47 Shortages in all supply classes, especially ammunition, afflicted the VIII Corps throughout the 40-day operation. These limitations were not only due to an allocation problem, but a shortage of available transportation throughout France proved the limiting factor.
As Patton continued focusing his main energies eastward towards Germany, Third Army quartermasters struggled to keep his spearheads fueled and supplied. Just six days into battle, the Third Army daily combat diary recorded that “supply lines were lengthening rapidly and putting a strain on the truck companies.”48 Dipping into emergency ration reserves began almost immediately, with corresponding “acquisition” (also known as stealing or liberating) of available fuel stocks from other units. The advance moved so rapidly, that communication wire soon was in short supply as were medical supplies. Third Army G-4 requested additional truck companies and aviation groups to increase medical evacuation and resupply efforts. In late August, over 1,000 aircraft delivered rations and fuel to PattonÂ’s forward elementsÂ-averting a complete halt for a few more days. Captured German food, medical supplies, POL, and communications wire were also reallocated for immediate use. Eventually, German POWs contributed to the repair and refurbishment of materiel. At Depot Q-256 near Reims, France, the commanding officer Colonel Albert Barden formed “an elaborate German officer staff, which handled practically all details of POW administration, both in the prison compound and in the shopsÂ…Incidentally, one couldnÂ’t ask for better personnel.”49 Significant amounts of materiel were repaired and the workload continued increasing up until the German surrender. “At the close of 1944, the depot had processed nine million items and in March 1945 was handling 160,000 pieces per day.”50 Host nation support played an important role as well. French rail lines were used but due to significant damage caused by the pre-invasion interdiction campaign and French underground sabotage efforts, supply tonnage transported was small when compared to that delivered by truck (up until October 1944). The reopening of mines, industrial shops for repair and reclamation efforts, plus the supply of limited food stuffs supported Third Army efforts; especially in the Civil Affairs arena. With the Third Army and other Allied armies rapidly approaching the German frontier, COMZ logisticians endeavored to keep all Allied Forces fed, fueled, and armed, but faced a continuing shortage of trucks and misplaced allocation priorities. COMZÂ’s answer to expedite supply deliveries would be the Red Ball Express.
Activated on 25 August 1944, the Red Ball Express was intended as a temporary measure to keep the American First and Third armies supplied across ever-widening LOCs originating in Normandy. The Express relied on 67 Transportation Corps truck companies, vehicles from other combat support units (for example, artillery and anti-aircraft units) and the trucks from three infantry divisions. At its peak, Red Ball operated 6,000 vehicles and moved 12,000 tons of supplies daily. A calculated tactical decision by Allied leaders, “the scale of these motorized operations was a complete surprise to the enemy and upset his calculations.”51 Unfortunately, short-term battlefield advantages attributed to the Red Ball brought with them accelerated wear and tear on personnel and equipment plus poor shipment documentation and control. Driver fatigue contributed to a large number of accidents. There were also significant increases in malingering and black marketing. Required truck maintenance suffered as untrained provisional units kept the trucks rolling literally until the wheels fell off the vehicles. Tire replacement and stockage figures “rose from an average of 29,142 in preceding months to 55,059 in September, and in mid-September 40,000 of that type awaited repair.”52 By mid-September, 135,000 tons of supplies were moved forward but due to haste and inattentiveness much of the materiel delivered was not what the armies had requisitioned. Poised to enter Germany, Third Army watched its supply situation steadily deteriorate even with the Red Ball Express’ Herculean efforts.
In action for just 30 days, Third Army units had dashed across France, liberated the Brittany Peninsula, seized bridgeheads east of the Meuse River and occupied “forward positions at the phase line set for 2 April 1945 (D+300).”53 With the Rhine River just over 100 miles distant, Patton now had to halt his “cavalry,” and watch his supplies and fuel dry up. German units were able to reorganize within the Siegfried Line or withdrawal for refitting or reconstitution (for the Ardennes Counteroffensive). Previously accustomed to tactically oriented operations in North Africa and Sicily, Patton now had to compete for logistics with other Allied armies and within the context of General EisenhowerÂ’s overall strategic plan. The strategic situation in early September mandated logistics support towards the upcoming MARKET-GARDEN operation in HollandÂ-especially gasoline and cargo aircraft. Operationally, HodgesÂ’ American First Army received the lionÂ’s share of what limited supplies trickled in via the Red Ball Express to support an impending drive to the Rhine and MontgomeryÂ’s Holland venture. At least 14,000 tons of supplies per day were required to support both the First and Third Armies though the amount arriving barely approached 7,000 tons; with two-thirds going to HodgesÂ’ troops. Civil affairs requirements also affected COMZÂ’s logistical flow to the Allied armies. German occupied territory was liberated at a much faster rate than envisioned in the original OVERLORD plan; causing reallocation of supplies and POL originally destined for front line forces. Twelfth Army Group chief of civil affairs “found that the French capital needed 2,400 tons of supplies daily and proposed that they be brought in by air.”54 This further diversion of aircraft occurred at the same time as Third Army gasoline deliveries halted in late August. Unable to advance, PattonÂ’s troops paused to regroup, conduct limited operations in the Lorraine Valley, and prepare for the eventual invasion of Germany.
At the bottom of the supply priority list from September to November 1944, the Third Army could only mount infantry assaults against the Metz fortifications and other local German strong points. Continually plagued by fuel, munitions, and other supply shortages, PattonÂ’s logisticians pulled every rabbit out of the hat to sustain the troops. Patton did authorize “three-day passes for those soldiers who could steal the most gasoline drums, full or emptyÂ-American or enemy,”55 but his forces actually relied more on strict rationing of fuel and ammunition. A gasoline rationing board consisting of one officer and three enlisted men determined a daily allotment of “five thousand gallons for the infantry divisions; twenty-five thousand gallons for the armored formations; ten thousand gallons for the corps troops, and eighty-four thousand gallons for the Army troops.”56 Military policemen were kept busy “apprehending jeeps and command cars without authorized trip tickets.”57 Third Army artillerymen “stressed observed fires and held unobserved fires to a minimum to conserve ammunition.”58 Even liaison aircraft were used to curtail enemy fire. German artillery refrained from firing when spotter planes were airborne, thus minimizing American counter battery fire. Adapting these aircraft to a combat support role, “liaison pilots of the 80th Division artillery, dropped over 20,000 rounds of small arms ammunition to the 3rd Battalion, 318th Infantry, isolated for three days near St. Genivieve, France.”59 PattonÂ’s quartermasters also used enemy parts and equipment to assist with maintenance and equipment repair and to provide additional mobility.
Due to the static tactical situation, units were now able to forward reports of captured enemy materiel. Obtaining a warehouse in Nancy, the Third Army QM “organized a captured enemy materiel guard and inventory detail within his Field Service Section.”60 Materiel inventories were circulated to all QM sections, technical services, and staff directors. A veritable treasure trove for ordnance and maintenance personnel, items such as “14,000 German spark plugs were modified to refurbish Sherman tank engines and many German motorcycles were rebuilt with captured spare parts and reissued to U.S. troops.”61 The unexpected respite also provided time to prepare for winter campaigning and the impending invasion of Germany.
Preparing for the expected cold and rainy European winter, Colonel Muller initiated winter clothing requisitions and pre-staging of Bailey bridging sets to prepare for the eventual crossings of German rivers. Always concerned about the welfare of his troops, Patton raised his ire when he learned rubber overshoes were issued on a one pair for four men basisÂ-“complaining bitterly until a more reasonable issue was established.”62 He also wanted plenty of bridging available to quickly get his troops across the icy and rain swollen rivers. Bailey bridges built during the pell-mell dash across France were disassembled and restaged forward in camouflaged positions, ready for immediate placement. Though he was obviously anxious to get moving again, these three months of limited operations allowed Patton to refit weary troops, reconstitute available equipment, and buildup supply reserves.
Many of the Allied armies on the go since D-Day were still engaged in heavy combat while Third Army conducted limited attacks in the Lorraine Valley. Able to “stand fast” in one location for a brief period, Patton did not allow a “garrison” mentality to develop. Along with the November attack against Metz, robust patrolling occurred when logistically feasible. Husbanding of supplies, ordnance repair, additional training, and rest were the order of the day. New railheads at Nancy, Chambley, Belleville, Dieulouard, Barancourt, Trieux, and Audun-le-Roman greatly improved daily delivery and establishment of supply dumps. Tanks ridden hard since fighting began received long overdue maintenance; however, units such as the 4th Armored Division were continually kept in the line. Ordnance and maintenance repair facilities were established or located in French and Belgian factories, greatly increasing efficiency and morale of the overburdened maintainers. Equipment modifications such as welding additional tank armor or installing extended end connectors or “duck bills” on the treads of medium tanks improved both the protection and traction on mud and soft terrain. Approximately 1 million of the plates were constructed in forty plants located near Paris and the Liege-Charleroi area. Additional training for the impending West Wall assault, or attending a new floating Bailey bridge school occupied many Third Army troops. Patton too could be seen “everywhere in his army area addressing his troops and radiating optimism.”63 Guaranteed mail deliveries, hot chow and showers, plus liberal distribution of passes and unit rotations out of the line all contributed to high morale despite miserable weather. After capturing Metz on 13 December and with the logistics tail catching up with the frontline forces, Eisenhower gave Patton the go ahead to conduct a breakthrough to the Rhine River scheduled for 19 December. Third Army forces were ready to get back on the move. Fortunately for the Allies, Patton and his staff were prepared for other contingenciesÂ-such as the Ardennes Counteroffensive.
Many in the Allied high command were caught off guard when German forces smashed into the thinly held Ardennes sector on the morning of 16 December. Patton and his G-2, Colonel Oscar W. Koch, were not. Anticipating an attack on 12 December, Patton directed “his Staff to make a study of what the Third Army would do if called upon to counterattack such a break-through.”64 Colonel Koch even sent a report to SHAEF on 13 December “warning of the continuing buildup of German forces east of First Army’s VIII Corps area.”65 Third Army Staff members, especially the G-4 and other logistics related sections prepared to reorient the entire army 90 degrees, move it over 100 miles in the middle of winter in a period of 72 hours, and then attack with three divisions in the lead. At the 19 December senior staff meeting at Verdun, Patton briefed Eisenhower, Bradley and other major Allied officers on his general plan of attack. Patton’s aide Colonel Charles R. Codman described the reaction from those present, “There was a stir, a shuffling of feet, as those present straightened up in their chairs. In some faces skepticism. But through the room the current of excitement leaped like a flame.”66 Patton’s army and logisticians would now “be responsible for a major effort to knife into the German southern flank.”67
Quickly preparing for the planned 23 December attack, Third Army quartermasters and transporters focused their initial efforts towards the vital road hub of Bastogne. Colonel Busch, described the supply redeployment:
Longwy, France was selected from the map as the Quartermaster transfer point because of its good rail connections with Verdun and points in the new area, and by 182030 December, after a conference of the Quartermaster staff, the plan of supply was settled. It was arranged by telephone to load rations aboard cars at Verdun and to have a locomotive ready, to load 100,000 gallons of gasoline aboard Army trucks at Briey and Manicieulles; and to alert railhead, gasoline and service troops at Supply Point Number 57, Koenigsmacker (near Thionville). Officers were sent in jeeps with orders to lead and accompany the supplies and service units to the railway station at Longwy.
The operations officer was to proceed from Nancy to Longwy, approximately 100 miles and take charge. The operations officer arrived at Longwy at 190900, the rations from Verdun and the gasoline from Briey and Mancieulles arrived between 0900 and 0930 and the service units a few minutes later. At 190945 the Quartermasters of the two leading divisions reported and before 1000 hours were drawing supplies. This switch, concluded in less than fourteen hours, was blessed by an extraordinary amount of good luck.68
Transportation sections were busy moving 11,800 vehicles over four troop movement routes “even though vehicles encountered a landslide, a weakened bridge, enemy bombing and strafing, and several wrecks which caused a number of detours.”69 Attacks still commenced as scheduled. In just three days elements of the 37th Tank Battalion, 4th Armored Division reached the beleaguered Bastogne garrison allowing much needed resupply and medical evacuations. Described by Patton’s superior, Bradley as “one of the most astonishing feats of generalship of our campaign in the West,” 70 Third Army’s swift attack hit the rear echelons of the still advancing panzer spearheads, further weakening the German attack and ultimately preparing the battlefield for an Allied counterattack in early 1945.
The Battle of the Bulge highlighted the agility and skill of the Allied logistics system and individual logistician. The entire COMZ endeavored to sustain Allied forces by rapidly relocating supply and fuel dumps or forwarding critical items to the front. Third Army ammunition trains moved an average of 4,500 tons of ammunition per day during the last half of December and consumed on the average, only 3,500 tons per day. American fuel captured and used by enemy forces equaled no more than 100,000 gallons, but fuel successfully evacuated during the chaotic 17-19 December 1944 period equaled three million gallons. Third Army requested fifty thousand yards of white muslin to fashion white tunics as winter camouflage. COMZ did not have the material available but instead provided five thousand mattress covers which yielded ten thousand white snowsuits. Though successful in almost all areas, quartermasters faced continuing problems providing effective winter footwear to American G.I.s. Many of the overshoes issued to troops were discarded due to poor traction or a decrease in foot speed or worn without combat boots; substituting them with “cardboard insoles or Dutch felt slippers or in some cases several thicknesses of blanket.”71 Even with these field expedients, trench foot and frostbite cases would hospitalize “44,728 men by the end of April 1945.”72
Officially, the Battle of the Bulge concluded on 28 January 1945. Again able to refocus on offensive operations, Patton continued pushing his forces eastward towards the Rhine. Facing tough winter weather and favorable defensive geography, his Third Army endeavored to reach the Rhine first, only to be beaten by HodgesÂ’ First Army at the Ludendorff Bridge near the town of Remagen on 7 March. Vigorously pursuing enemy forces, Patton linked up with Hodges by 11 March and began preparations to conduct the first assault crossings of the Rhine in modern history.
Extensive logistical support as well as improvisation were crucial to continuing Third Army successes leading up to the Rhine crossing. Restored rail lines and shorter truck hauling distances initially kept Third Army units well supplied. As operations proceeded deeper into Germany, truck transit distances approached those of late August 1944, though German autobahns lessened actual delivery times. Air Transport Service aircraft kept Patton’s spearheads rolling with “approximately twenty-five percent of the gasoline provided by air.”73 Mobile tire repair teams also kept the Third Army on the move. Patrolling all main and auxiliary supply routes, these teams “were equipped with hot patches, tubes, tires and air compressors. When wheels were available, tires and tubes were premounted for direct exchange.”74 In addition, preplanned priority deliveries of bridging, pontoons, and treadways as well as the requisite buildup of supplies and POL preceded the planned 22 March 1945 Rhine assault. Patton even considered mustering all Third Army L-5 liaison aircraft, “each carrying one infantryman, and making several trips an hour…to transport several regiments over the river and behind the enemy fortifications.”75 After G-2 determined minimal opposition could be expected the ambitious air assault plan was dropped in favor of the planned river crossing. Without a preparatory artillery bombardment, the 5th Infantry Division (XII Corps) crossed the Rhine at Oppenheim, ten miles south of Mainz. So complete were Third Army Staff and quartermaster preparations that “within 36 hours of the initial crossing, a treadway and pontoon bridge had been erected, and by the 24th both the 26th Infantry and 6th Armored Divisions had crossed into the bridgehead area.”76 Encountering light and confused resistance, Patton’s Third Army continued mopping up German forces east of the Rhine. With the First Army wheeling left to seal off the Ruhr pocket, Eisenhower directed the Third Army towards the “National Redoubt” in the Bavarian Alps to prevent possible Nazi guerilla attacks and then onto the partial occupation of Czechoslovakia. Patton and his beloved Third Army would not lead the final attack on Berlin.
An examination of both PattonÂ’s career and Third Army operations during 1944-45 provides many lessons for todayÂ’s joint logistician. First was PattonÂ’s extraordinary knowledge of military history. Studying the campaigns of Alexander, Caesar, and Napoleon provided Patton with more than lessons in leadership and commandÂ-their successes as great commanders relied on logistical prowess. Today commanders and their joint logisticians too must maintain secure lines of communication, husband resources before campaigning, and rapidly reconstitute forces after battle to ensure continued success in the modern battlespace, although at a much faster pace and with considerably less resources available. Applying a robust study regimen similar to that practiced by Patton is still practical in the twenty-first century. Road networks, seaports, and topography have changed very little since antiquity (for example, both the Greeks/Spartans in 480 BC and British forces in 1941 defended the Thermopylae Pass) and understanding previous campaigns will greatly assist both the joint force commander and the joint logistician.
Patton’s exposure to the beginnings of both motorization and mechanization did not change his approach to warfare but did increase the ability to sustain his forces. A dominant figure in the evolution of armored warfare, he employed military forces successfully because of his ability to logistically support them over longer distances and at a much faster rate. As the services “transform” to fight in the twenty-first century battlespace, commanders too will witness continual technological improvements in mobility, weapons platforms, and precision ordnance; however, mission accomplishment will depend upon their abilities to logistically sustain expeditionary forces. With many overseas posts closed and “mountains of materiel” no longer available to maintain forces in combat, deployed units will be tethered to CONUS based lines of communication. Joint logisticians will have to explore, adopt, and adapt current and future technology to assure timely and adequate support over much greater distances.
Third ArmyÂ’s style of fighting mirrors much of Joint Vision 2020Â-especially relating to dominant maneuver, precision engagement, and focused logistics. Patton relished the breakout, pursuit, and attacking of German forces in August 1944. Similar to Nathan Bedford ForrestÂ’s cavalry raiding during the American Civil War, PattonÂ’s operations across France during that critical month relied on speed, maneuver and overwhelming strength at the right place to defeat the withdrawing Wehrmacht. Patton seemed to be echoing ForrestÂ’s “advice associated with his name: ‘Git thar furst with the mostest,Â’ an astute, albeit homey, rewording of JominiÂ’s fundamental principle to be strong at the decisive point.”77 During the Lorraine campaign, Patton relied on his logisticians to maintain limited operations, but more importantly to stockpile resources for an eventual move into greater Germany. Engaging the panzer spearheads during the Battle of the Bulge, Patton combined dominant maneuver, precision engagement, and focused logistics to move his Third Army into position, attack, and exploit the Allied counterstroke. By analyzing Third Army operations and understanding PattonÂ’s style of fighting, the joint logistician has an impeccable “playbook” to combine with joint doctrine and ensure support to the warfighter.
The most important lesson for today’s joint logistician is to make every effort to properly equip and support each individual soldier, sailor, airman, or marine. Patton led from both the front and rear. He strongly demanded additional gasoline and ammunition for his forces; however, requests for dry socks, hot chow, or replacement clothing would be worded in similarly strenuous terms. Any source of supply was considered and the use of host nation support, local purchase, and enemy prisoners of war augmented the quartermaster’s efforts to refurbish equipment and provide needed clothing. He also expected his staff officers to spend time “up front” to gauge the battle and see what additional support the troops required. His logisticians understood the importance of personal items in maintaining morale and overall fighting ability.
Patton
and the accomplishments of the Third Army will continue to be a testament
to the bravery and adaptability of the American warrior. Their performance
during the European fighting of 1944-45 highlights the central role
logistics plays in any military operation. In addition, PattonÂ’s
knowledge of military history, understanding and incorporating the latest
technology, employment of combined arms, and his genuine concern for
the troops provides logisticians and leaders alike a worthy example
to study and emulate. His adage:
“Gentlemen, the officer who doesn’t know his communications and supply,
as well as his tactics, is totally useless” is still applicable today,
and is valuable advice to all who will fight AmericaÂ’s wars in the twenty-first
century.
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