Spetsnaz

Highly secretive and deadly, spetnaz units were not even acknowledged to exist by the Soviet Union until recently. These crack troops are trained to undertake a wide variety of tasks including assassination, sabotage and disabling enemy nuclear weapon.

Voiska Spetsialnogo Naznacheniya (VSN) - forces of special designation - have no real equivalent in the West. In the eyes of the Soviet Union they are forces of special designation rather than NATO-style commando units. Until 1989, references in the Soviet military press to VSN were rare and usually couched in historical terms. References to activities such as special reconnaissance (spetsialnaya razvedka) or diversionary reconnaissance (diversiya razvedka) appeared in the Soviet military press, but the existence of a multi-talented elite within the Soviet Army was discounted as Western propaganda.

This was party a deliberate deception by the Soviets, but there are also conceptual differences between Western and Soviet Special Forces. The West was slow to accept the need for elite forces capable of carrying out special operations. When such troops were recognised, after their large-scale use in the WW2, they need to be packaged into elite units with their own highly specialised roles, training, selection and weaponry. In contrast, the USSR was eager to spread such ideology of communism and was quick to appreciate the value of special operations and resourceful, politically-reliable troops capable of operating independently under harsh climates and behind enemy lines. 

The spetsnaz are different in being dedicated to one or more types of covert special operations and in receiving specialised training in the intelligence gathering (razvedchiki), long-range reconnaissance patrols (iskatelia), abduction (okhotniki), foreign raids (reydoviki), partisan support, sabotage and assassinations. Spetsnaz units usually have a historical tradition of special operations and are controlled by the intelligence staff of Fleet, Front, theatre or Army headquarters.  

Spetsnaz forces were an integral part of the Soviet operation to suppress the 'Prague Spring' in 1968. In order to mask their intentions towards Czechoslovakia for as long as possible, and being well versed in the art of maskirovka (deception), the Soviets pointedly confined the vast majority of their troops within Group of Soviet Forces Germany (GSFG) to barracks immediately prior to the invasion. The Czechs had nothing to fear, therefore, when an unscheduled civilian Aeroflot aircraft landed at Prague's Ruzyne Airport late at night, taxied and parked at the end of the runway. An hour later, a second Aeroflot aircraft landed. This aircraft disembarked its passengers who, having cleared customs, set off for the city centre. Two hours later the 'passengers', now fully armed, returned to take over the main airport buildings. Almost at once, one, or possibly two, further aircraft landed carrying teams of uniformed spetsnaz. This was the first in a series of transports containing spetsnaz and conventional troops of the 103rd Guards Airborne Division. Within two hours of the first uniformed spetsnaz troops landing, the airport and its environs were in Soviet hands and the capital was under overt attack. By day-break the presidential palace, the radio and television studios, the city's main transmitter, principal railway stations and the bridges over the River Vltala were all under Soviet control. 

The role played by spetsnaz in the takeover of Afghanistan was no less critical. Between 8 and 10 December 1979, some 14 days before the invasion, spetsnaz troops, in the company of an airborne regiment, deployed to Bagram, a key town to the north of Kabul, the secure the Salang Highway with its critical tunnel. Between 10 and 24 December, a battalion from the regiment, together with the spetsnaz contingent, moved to Kabul International Airport, less than three kilometers from the city centre. Between 24 and 27 December, troops from the 105th Guards Airborne Division, again supported by spetsnaz, landed at and secured Kabul Airport, together with the air force bases at Bagram, Shindand and Kandahar. During the course of the next night the full offensive began. Paratroopers arrested members of the Afghan government while spetsnaz teams demolished the central military communications centre. Spetsnaz teams also captured the still functioning Ministry of the Interior, the Kabul radio station and several other key points. 

Simultaneously, two spetsnaz companies, with KGB assistance and supported by an airborne regiment, attacked President Amin's palace situated at Darulaman. Amin, his family, entourage and guards were killed in the subsequent battle. The soviets lost 25 dead including KGB Colonel Bayerenov, reportedly hit by 'friendly' crossfire. Soviet internal security troops may also have been present, possibly even 'units of special designation', as evidence by the participation of Major-General V. S. Paputin of the MVD, apparently killed, like Colonel Bayerenov, during an abortive spetsnaz attempt to seize the palace before the main assault.

Spetsnaz units passed the first two years of the Afghan War quietly, defending their barracks and major installations. They were also used to defend the command structure in Kabul, while two reyoviki battalions are reported to have used aggressive patrolling to blunt guerilla attacks against the airfields at Jalalabad and Kandahar. 

In 1983, however, spetsnaz forces went on the offensive. Working in conjunction with heli-borne troops and Afghan militia, they attacked isolated towns and villages which the Mujahedeen had once considered safe. These tactics are reported to have been used in November 1984 during fighting at Black Mountain in Nangarhar Province. Infiltration and supply routes were ambushed or peppered with mines, while villages suspected of helping the guerrillas were razed to the ground in a ''scorched earth' policy as vicious as any seen in Vietnam. Some of these operations may have been carried out by spetsnaz disguised as guerrillas, who burned mosques and food supplies to heighten tension between warring Mujahedeen factions.

While the regimental spetsnaz troops continued to operate closely with the ground troops, the regular headquarters detachments were given almost complete autonomy. These troops, usually in their thirties, battle~hardened and totally acclimatised to mountain warfare, quickly began to register successes. Reconnaissance (razvedka) units would operate from camouflaged hides high in the mountains. The results of their reconnaissance and surveillance patrols were often encoded into high-speed Morse and sent directly to the GRU for dissemination to the planners in the Kremlin. Some groups would be disguised as peasants to enable them to move comparatively freely about the mountain passes. Others were dropped many kilometres from their objective, travelling overnight to lay ambushes and observe infiltration routes. Depending on the tactical situation, mountain trails were mined, targeted for air strikes or ambushed. Some of these operations employed BAID airborne infantry fighting vehicles lifted in by helicopter. $petsnaz activity within Afghanistan was curtailed when the Mujahedeen started to receive large shipments of American-made surface-toair Stinger missiles. Nevertheless, the role of spetsnaz within the Afghan campaign remained significant until the final Soviet withdrawal.

The Special Operations Brigade - of which 16 existed at the height of the Cold War - is the basic spetsnaz unit. One brigade is assigned to each Military District, whose forces form an operational wartime Front. These are subordinate to. the Chief Intelligence Directorate (GRU) of the General Staff. In addition, each of the four fleets have a naval spetsnaz brigade subordinate to the Intelligence Directorate at Naval Headquarters. Each brigade usually comprises a headquarters element, a headquarters company, three or four parachute battalions and other supporting units. A spetsnaz brigade has between 1000 and 1300 men and is trained to operate either as a single unit or in a number of sub-units to a maximum of 135. It is highly trained in specialist assassination and subversion roles, liaises directly with spetsnaz field agents and, therefore, is likely to come under direct GRU operational control. It is also probable that it liaises directly with its opposite numbers within KGB spetsnaz. Although highly trained, these headquarter companies are relatively small.

Two more spetsnaz formations are tasked below district level. A spetsnaz regiment, comprising between 600 and 700 men divided into six or seven companies, is attached to each tactical theatre. Until recently, one regiment, based within the Non-Soviet Warsaw' Pact (NSWP), was maintained in a. constant state of readiness, but this has now been withdrawn to the USSR. The 'Independent Company', one of which is attached to each Army, consists of a headquarters and three parachute platoons plus various logistics/communications support. Although the exact size will vary according to the nature of any specialist task allotted to it, company strength is always in the region of nine officers, 11 warrant officers and 95 men. While capable of operating as a single unit, each company will normally divide into 2-15 sub modules. The structure of each sub-group is not rigid and may even change during the operation of a mission.

During the course of the recent Soviet domestic unrest it became clear that a new elite cadre has been added to the Interior Ministry troops (MVD), who are responsible for internal security. Photographs appearing in the publication Novotni have shown fit young MVI) personnel carrying AKS-74 assault rifles with an extra magazine taped to the one inserted into the weapon. These troops 'Were issued with conventional camouflage trousers and jackets but wore bright scarlet berets in the floppy style of  the Soviet paratrooper. In action these troops wore equally distinctive white helmets.

It is probable that this MVI unit of special designation, variously referred to in the press as Oznaz or Omon, comprises the Soviet Union's latest anti-terrorism team. It is even possible that the group is geared to undertake hostage rescue missions in conjunction with the KGB's own internal hostage-rescue unit (HRU). All are army veterans, mostly ex-paras with experience of combat in Afghanistan. A recent article in Krasnaya Zvada suggests that the unit is part of the elite Dzerzhinsky Division. Its members undergo a 10-month training programme at their own training centre in the Moscow area. The course starts with unarmed combat and fitness training before progressing, to hostage rescue scenarios employing:~ aircraft and an SAS-style 'killing house'. Thi~ special designation company should not be confused with the MVI 'blue berets', which are regular MVI) troops drafted into particularly volatile areas to support the local, often poorly trained and outnumbered, conscript forces.

The KGB spetsnaz is the most secretive and mysterious of all the Soviet units of special designation. While its more aggressive activities have been curtailed in the light of the recent Cold War thaw, KGB spetsnaz is known to focus on foreign strategic, social, economic and political targets. It consists of a small cadre of professionals assisted by several hundred support personnel, including clandestine agents. It may be assumed to have its 'legals' - accredited diplomats who, often masquerade as commercial attaches - in most key embassies and may even run teams ~of 'illegals', i.e. citizens (not usually Soviets) living in the target country who are not covered by the protection of diplomatic status.

Organised within Department Eight, a tiny cell within Directorate S (Illegals), KGB spetsnaz conducts a small number of painstakingly selected operations under conditions of extreme security, e.g. strategic sabotage and assassinations. KGB spetsnaz, disguised as conventional airborne troops, accompanied their GRU and, possibly, MVI spetsnaz colleagues on the assault on Darulaman which resulted in the murder of President Amin and his entire family.