Attempts to Create an 'Ottoman System' of European Alliances
(the End of the 18th Century)
Veniamin Ciobanu
Università di Iaşi
A
t the beginning of July, 1798, the Egypt invasion by the French armies commanded by the General Napoleon Bonaparte, at the beginning of July, 1798, represented the commencement of a new stage of the 'Oriental crisis'. This phase would be wider and would present effects totally different than those planned by this undertaking's initiator and sustainers [1]. The first great powers that reacted to the French aggression were the Ottoman Empire and Russia. Their promptness and vehemence demonstrated the acuity with which they had received the menace directed against the position that they held in the Eastern Europe. The importance of a possible French installment in a strategic area, as it was Egypt, was obvious. The above mentioned aggression's psychological impact on the Ottoman and Russian leading society was so powerful that the common Russian-Turkish naval operations against the expeditionary French forces began before the two states establish the principles of their subsequent cooperation. When those principles were specified, they were included in a simple defensive treaty, on December 23, 1798 / January 3, 1790 [2].The events' pressure clearly influenced the treaty's form and background. Although it was formulated in the terms of a defensive alliance, the treaty could be considered as having also offensive features, in case that the common interests of the parties were to have "the same friends and the same enemies" in the future. According to those days' circumstances, the most dangerous "common enemy" was the republican France. Perceived in conformity with the reality, the danger was understood differently, since the Ottoman empire was the one directly threatened by the French territorial expansion. Under these circumstances, it was interfered in the treaty the pledge that the both parties guarantee mutually their territorial possessions, without any exception. The mentioned difference was specified by the express stipulation that the Ottoman empire was guaranteed on his entire territorial containing, on sea and by land, that he had had before the French invasion in Egypt. Thus, this province was also included. Concerning the offensive feature, it resulted from the articles 6-11's content. Those articles stipulated the obligation of the mutual assistance, without any reserve, not only in the case of qualified aggression, but also in the opportunity of a possible aggression's danger against one of the parties [3].
Nevertheless, the real purposes of the Ottoman empire were different and thus, his interpretation given to the alliance was distinct.
First, it was because the Ottoman were not willing to the accept that Russia to invoke that alliance, in the sense to promote her eastern or continental aggressive policy against France or any other European power. On the contrary, the Ottoman empire was willing to retake the cooperation policy with France, whether this latter's leadership was to be replaced by another one. The Ottomans had in mind a France which would renounce to the hostile plans against the Ottomans and would return to the ancient French eastern policy, based upon the preservation of the Ottoman territorial integrity. That is why the reis efendi, Atif Mehmed efendi, gave assurances to the extraordinary envoy of Prussia in Istanbul, Friedrich Wilhelm Ernst von Knobelsdorff that, although Turkey declared war against France on September 2, 1798 and took severe measures against all the Frenchmen on the Ottoman territory, "la Porte ne s'est pretée, qu'a regret à cette mesure de severité vis-à-vis des individus certenement inocens des fautes de leuir gouvernment" [4].
This possibility could become reality in the Ottoman conception, only whether the European powers were to approve the creation of another security system. According to this, the Ottoman empire was to be accepted as partner able to effectively contribute to the new 'European order'. The necessity was as imperious as Europe could be compared, as Atif Mehmed efendi concluded, "à un glob rempli à moitié egal de feu et d'eau dans lequel, le premier de ces elements agissoit continuellement a faire evaporer l'autre; que si bientot on ne prenoit des mesures decissifs pour etuffer le feu, l'Europe entiere se trouveroit en combustion; qu'il etoit donc necessaire que toutes les Puissances, mais principalement des Cours aussi vrayment amis que la Prusse et l'Empire Ottoman se tiennent plus serrées ensamble que jamais" [5].
Thus, the main purpose of the Ottoman leaders was, at that time, the re-establishment of the European peace, the only status that could offer him the opportunity to be 'integrated' in another 'European security system'. It was to offer him the respite for the structural reforms' fulfillment that was to impose the European model in the Ottoman empire. That is why his leaders intended to emphasize the defensive feature of the treaty signed on January 3, 1799 with Russia, "comme il parroit par la moderation de ses expressions presentoit plutot le plan d'une association des grandes puissances de l'Europe affin d'opposer par une garantie de leurs Etats respectifs une digue aux attentats usurpatiores des Français que celui d'une coalition offensive contre le gouvernement de la France" [6]. Consequently, the Frenchmen, 'une fois à la raison, ce même Traité serviroit de base a une paix solide en Europe" [7].
Reis efendi's pleading had first in intention to attract Prussia in that alliance and, as von Knobelsdorff concluded, "c'est la le grand avantage que la Porte se promet de cette alliance [n.n. the one with Russia] et elle desire si ardement l'accession de V. Mte [n.n. that is Frederic William III, the King of Prussia]" [8]. Nevertheless, the terms of the treaty between Turkey and Russia was considered by the King of Prussia as "excessivement vagues, et susceptibles dans la plupart des articles d'une interpretation evasive" [9]. Moreover, Frederic William III intended to warn his representative in Istanbul, von Knobelsdorff, who was totally won by the Ottoman idea, that "il est aise de prevoir que les avantages de l'Alliance seront difficilement du coté des Turcs" [10]. Thus, the Prussian king demonstrated a good knowledge in the Eastern Europe's political realities and especially in the balance of forces between Ottoman empire and Russia.
Less enthusiastic to the mentioned treaty, which he regarded as "un monstre en politique" [11], Küciuk Husein Paşa, the capudan paşa, considered Russia's attitude, since Russia had retired from the second anti-French coalition in the Spring of 1799, as a consequence of the Austrian defeat in Switzerland. Concerning Prussia, the high Ottoman dignitary appreciated her neutral policy respecting the war between France and the second Coalition. He declared to the Swedish representative to Istanbul, Carl Gustav König in a conversation that was reported to Stockholm by the Swedish diplomat on January 11, 1800, that "il seroit ridicule que ce Souverain [n.n. that is the king of Prussia] prodigues ses tresors et le sang de ses sujets pour étendre la frontiere de l'Allemagne [n.n. that is Austria's] avec laquelle il a été de tout en rivalité" [12]. Since he was closely preoccupied by the European situation's evolution, the capudan paşa expressed also his own viewpoint. According to Carl Gustav König's rapport, the capudan paşa compared "l'etat actuel de l';Europe à une mer agitée, au fond de la quelle est le tableau fidel de l'univers entier. Chaque Puissance, continua-t-il peut y decourvrir ce qui la concerne, mais les eaux en sont encore trôp troublés et il est impossible d'y rien distinguer" [13]. However, the Ottoman dignitary was convinced that "le calm succedera un jour à cette tempête et pour lors chaques Etat verra Sa position. Il est à presumer qu'il en aura, qui ne seront pas trôp satisfaits du spectacle, qui s'offrira à leurs vuës" [14].
Among all these latter states, one could count undoubtedly also the Ottoman empire. For "le spectacle" taken by the capudan paşa into consideration be as unpleasant as possible, the Ottoman empire insisted that the subsequent 'European security' system be as comprising as possible. There was only one condition, essential from the Ottoman point of view. That is that the Ottoman empire be present among the 'founding members', having his own 'collaborators' there.
According to the Ottoman leaders, such a condition was fulfilled not only by Prussia, but also by Sweden. That is why they began to a certain moment to manifest a hard controlled fluster, provoked the Swedish hesitations respecting the Ottoman proposals to adhere to the alliance with Russia [...]. Such a state of spirit dominated one of the meeting between the Ottoman great dragoman, Alexandru Nicolae Şuţu and the Swedish diplomatic mission's first translator in Istanbul, Carol Testa, meeting reported by Carl Gustav König on August 10, 1799. Şuţu's impatience to have a definite answer about the moment when Sweden was to decide to embrace "la cause commune" [15] with the Ottoman empire, meaning the coalition with Russia and England, was not still satisfied. It was because, at that time, the priority of the Swedish leaders was the imperious necessity to avoid the grave consequences of his position in the Baltic area and the deterioration of his relationship with the Great Britain. This is the reason why Gustav IV Adolf, the King of Sweden, declined the Russian czar, Paul I's invitation to adhere to the second anti-French coalition [16]. In exchange, the Swedish leaders intensified the diplomatic activity in the sense of the approaching to Russia, as a guarantee for the Sweden's Baltic interests. Thus, among the clauses of a stipulated defensive alliance with Russia, Sweden engaged to send an army corps - infantry and chivalry - in Pomerania. Its mission was one of a corps "d'observation du coté de la Prusse et le fera agir en demonstration au cas que S. M. P. [n.n. that is Frederic William III] se porta à des mesures agressive contre la Russie, en faveur de la Republique Française" [17]. In other words, Sweden was ready to get into conflict with one of the possible 'founding members' of the European alliances system - on of the greatest importance, as it was regarded by the Ottomans -, that is Prussia.
In such a perspective, the Ottoman diplomatic applications towards Sweden were not able to reach the desired finality. It was especially because Sweden would belong to an alliance system that would include also the Great Britain. Such a perspective was totally inconsistent with England's 'quality' as a main danger for the Swedish interests in Europe, especially in the Baltic area [18]. This is the explanation for the answer given by Carol Testa to the Ottoman great dragoman, in the purest diplomatic manner. He assured the great dragoman that "ce qu'il y a de certain, c'est que la Suede, si elle acceda ou non à la Coalition, prendra toujours un vif interet à la conservation de l'Empire ottoman, et que pour que la Sublime Porte veille jetter un regard sur l'avenir, tout doit l'engager à ne pas negliger la Suede" [19]. Naturally, it was in connection with his efforts to create an European alliance system, inside of which the Ottoman empire was to have an important part in his own security affairs. It was in front of an Europe that, once pacified after the hypothetical defeat of the French republic, would not delay to manifest her hostile tendencies, perhaps more vigorously. Anyhow, the Ottoman chances to refresh his internal situation and consequently his international position in order to assure his stability and a place in the European alliance system were considered by the Swedish diplomat in St. Petersburg, Curt Bogislav Ludwig Christoffer, Baron of Stedingk as being null. Expressed in a letter to Carl Gustav König, dated on February 14/25, 1799, the Swedish representative's opinion was that the Ottoman weakness had been once again emphasized by the Great Visir, Iusuf Zia paşa's campaign in Egypt against the Frenchmen, campaign considered as "bien ridicule et bien malheureuse" [20]. He asked him, "Que croyez Vous qu'il pourra en arriver?", and he also gave the answer: "il me semble que tous les ressorts sont rélachés dans l'Empire Ottomane, et qu'il avance à grans pas vers sa destruction. Les morçeaux en seront bons, et serviront à augmenter encore la Puissance de ses Voisins" [21].
Against the Ottoman purposes' fulfillment, there were also some other obstacles, difficult to be surpassed. One of them was represented by the Austrian attitude respecting the Ottoman projects. It is true that the Imperials did not enjoy neither the Ottoman sympathy nor the Ottoman will to have them as partners in the supposed European alliance system proposed by the Ottoman empire. This was especially because of the Austrian annexation of Istria and Dalmatia. However, their position could not be neglected, for the reason that, consequently to the Austrian forces' defeat in Switzerland, it was not excluded the possibility of a new center of military conflicts in Europe, with results for the Ottoman empire's international position. That anxiety was expressed by the reis efendi, Rasih Mustafa efendi, as a question during an audience accorded to Carol Testa, reported by Carl Gustav König to Stockholm on June 25, 1800, "quelles peuvent etre les vuës du Cabinet de St. Petersbourg?" [22]. The high Ottoman dignitary did not deny that the Russian government was right "d'etre mecontent de celui de Vienne". Still, he asked himself, "ne seroit-il pas mieux de se reserver à temoigner son mecontentement à la pacification generale? Jusqu'à quand l'interet de la cause commune sera-t-il sacrifié à des vuës particuliers?" [23].
Nevertheless, the Imperials also did not intend to renounce to their 'particular' interests in the Eastern Europe, in the name of a cause that was not 'common'. They still were not wishful to offer new arguments for the idea launched by the Prussian diplomacy, launched on the background of the Prussian-Austrian competition in the German space. This Prussian version implied that, although in war against France, the Austrians cooperated secretly with the French Republic, exactly in the aim of their 'particular' interests' fulfillment in this area, to the prejudice of the Ottoman benefits [24]. Therefore, the Imperial diplomacy used different explanations for the lack of will in the Austrian involvement in an alliance system against France and together with Russia and Ottoman empire. Those efforts could be detected in the arguments presented by the imperial legate at Istanbul, Peter Philipp, Baron of Herbert-Rathkeak, to Carl Gustav König during a meeting on November 1799. On that occasion, the Austrian diplomat had affirmed that "pour detruire et ecarter ces insinuations incidieuses [n.n. the ones expressed by Prussia], lui, l'Internonce Imperial, reçut sur le cham les ordres de Sa Cour d'offrir une Alliance defensive à la Porte", the project of the treaty proposed by him being even approved by the Ottomans [25]. Still, the project was one more time analyzed by the Imperial Court in Vienna, because, as the Austrian diplomat pretended, "les circonstances venoient exactement à changer de manier, que l'Empereur, ayant perdû l'esperence d'une pacification [n.n. with France] à la quelle on avoit travaillé depuis si long temps, et Se voyant à la vieille d'une nouvelle rupture S'envisagoit comme la seule Puissance menacée qui par sa position topographique, devoit naturellement succomber d'abord et avant que la tour pourroit venir à la Porte d'etre attaquée" [26]. Henceforth, the Austrian situation "avoit changé de face et exigoit par cosnequence de nouvelles bases pour la Traité à conclure" [27]. As Herbert Rathkeal pretended, the Imperial Court's 'good intentions' were baffled exactly by those who had sustained them initially, that is by the Ottomans. Because "cette Nouvelle Negotiation, etant assujettée à des très longues discussions, elle en est restée là sans qu'on en ait parlé depuis" [28]. The same diplomat insinuated that it did not mean that Austria was evidently against an European alliance system created by the Ottoman empire. According to the Imperial legate, the formal non adherence and the restraints of the Imperial Court was due to the fact that the Ottomans empire "ayant contractée depuis des liaisons très intimes avec la Russie, dont les interets étoient très unic avec ceux de l'Autriche, son accession à cette derniere Alliance [n.n. the Russian-Ottoman on January 3, 1700] paraissoit inutile et superflue" [29]. In reality, it was because the discussed alliance referred to the guarantee of the Ottoman empire's territorial integrity, in the existed frontiers, before the French invasion in Egypt. Austria was not ready to assume this commitment by her formal adherence to that international act, for reason that are not to be necessarily underlined.
Thus, the Ottoman empire imagined a plan, proposing the limitation as far as possible of the negative consequences of the forced association with two great powers and especially with Russia. Those powers could not 'protect' his interests without taking their own into account. Therefore, the political leaders in Istanbul did not exclude the possibility that the Russian and English troops' victory against the French ones in Egypt be rather pernitious than useful to the Ottoman empire. That is why they wished to involve also Prussia and Sweden, which, having only political interest, but not also geo-strategic in the European East, could assure the Ottoman state's existence as European power. The Ottoman empire was worried to the perspective of being definitely excluded outside of Europe, with all the disastrous results for his political future. He was concerned to such a degree that he finally attempted to force his implication in an alliance system, already created, but not from his own initiative, but from the Russian one. Although this system did not totally represent the aspirations of the Ottoman political leaders, meaning that it did not offer the possibility to exert a control according to the Ottoman interests, the Ottoman empire would not still remain 'outside' of Europe. Yet, the only great power that still symbolized the Ottoman hopes remained Prussia. That is why that, as von Knobelsdorff reported to his king on July 10, 1800, the reis efendi had charged him "de supplier V. M. de ne pas ublier la Porte dans tout ce qui rapport a ses interets, et elle se croir sans doute forte heureuse de se voir associée à une pareille alliance" [30], that is to the Army Neutrality Alliance, renewed by Russia and Prussia, to whom Denmark also adhered in 1800-1801 [31].
[1] As it is well known, the idea of the Egypt's conquest had been present in the rapport of the French consul in Cairo, that is Megallon. The rapport was delivered by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, that is Talleyrand, to the Executive Directory, on February 14, 1798. The idea was then retaken by the General Napoleon Bonaparte and was approved by the Executive Directory on March 5. Four months later, on July 1, 1798, the French expeditionary forces descended in Alexandria, where there was already an English fleet, commanded by the future admiral Nelson. The latter had as mission the preventing of that landing (see also "Les grandes dates de la Revolution 1789-1799", Historia Special, March 1989, No 507: 150).
[2] Cf. Boris MOURAVIEFF, L'alliance russo-turc au milieu des guerres napoléoniennes (foreword by Charles J. BURCKHARDT), Neuchâtel, 1954: 29.
[3] These specifications, also in ibidem.
[4] Cf. Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preussischer Kulturbesitz (Berlin), I. HA, Rep. XI, No 275, d, Türkei, fasc. 83, f. 147v.
[5] Loc. cit., f. 95v.
[6] Loc. cit., fasc. 85, f. 32.
[7] Loc. cit.
[8] Loc. cit.
[9] Loc. cit., f. 45v.
[10] Loc. cit.
[11] Sveriges Riksarkiv, Turcica, vol. 88, C. G. Königs depescher 1799-1800; year 188; this fond's documents are not numbered. In the quotations, we entirely respected to original spelling.
[12] Loc. cit.
[13] Loc. cit.
[14] Loc. cit.
[15] Loc. cit., vol. 88, C. G. König depescher 1799-1800, year 1799.
[16] Cf. Adam KERSTAN, Historia Szwecjii, Wroclaw-Warsaw-Krakow-Gdansk: Zaklad Narodwy Imienia Ossolinskich Wydawnictwo, 1973: 290.
[17] Sveriges Riksarkiv, Muscovitica, vol. 509, Ambassadören Frih. Stedings Koncepter 1790-1806.
[18] Cf. loc. cit.
[19] Loc. cit., Turcica, vol. 88, C. G. Königs depescher 1799-1800; year 1799.
[20] Loc. cit., Muscovitica, vol. 508.
[21] Loc. cit.
[22] Loc. cit, Turcica, vol. 88, C. G. Königs depescher 1799-1800; year 1800.
[23] Loc. cit.
[24] Loc. cit.; year 1799.
[25] Loc. cit.
[26] Loc. cit.
[27] Loc. cit.
[28] Loc. cit.
[29] Loc. cit.
[30] Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preussischer Kultubesitzt (Berlin), I, HA, Rep. XI, No 275, d, Türkei, fasc. 86, f. 195v; see also loc. cit., ff. 163-163v, 180-181, 195.
[31] For this, see H. ULMANN, "Preußen, die bewafnete Meeresneutralität und die Besitznahme Hanowers i. J. 1801", Forschungen zu brandenburgischen und preußischen Geschichte 27 (1914): 189-245; O. FELDBAEC, "Danemark and the Armed Neutrality 1800-1801. Small Power", in World War, Copenhagen, 1980, passim.
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