Siamo veneziani e poi christiani:
Some Remarks concerning
the Venetian Attitude towards the Crusade
Ovidiu Cristea
"Nicolae Iorga" Institute,
Bucharest
Over four decades ago, Franz Babinger believed that, in the fifteenth century, "la questione della condotta politica veneziana nei confronti dei Turchi sia ancora ben lontana da una chiara risposta" [1]. Indeed, Venice’s attitude towards the anti-Ottoman war effort is an extremely complex issue, given the host of aspects that should be taken into careful consideration, including the various stages in the relations between the Turks and the Serenissima, the relations between the Republic and other Christian powers, the positive or negative feelings ellicited by Venice’s participation in the previous Crusades and, last but not least, the economic backdrop of the time. A global assessment of the Venetian involvement in the anti-Ottoman struggle can be risky, and the first impression is that of extreme caution. The war with the Turks was regarded by Venice as a "rimedio cosi violente e dubioso, che non aveva ad usarsi se non in caso di una somma necessita" [2]. This caution was often interpreted by contemporaries, and by some modern historians alike, as a sign of ambiguity, if not duplicity, in relation to the "Holy War" against the Pagans. The famous formula "siamo veneziani, poi christiani" was often cited in support of this interpretation. Do the words reflect pragmatism, selfishness, indifference, or rather a particular vision on the war against the Infidels? An analysis of the Venetian participation in the Crusade and the Venetian political discourse, as reflected in the documents of the time, is liable to shed a light on the issue. Rather than providing a definite answer, the present paper aims to sketch out the problem under discussion.
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Venice involved herself in the first three crusades to a lesser degree than her rivals, Genua and Pisa [3]. Nonetheless, it enjoyed the favourable image painted by the chroniclers of the Italian Thalassocracies that were looked upon as the essential allies of the Latin Principalities [4]. The impression stemmed from the contribution of the Genoese and Pisan squadrons to the success of the First Crusade, as well as the participation of the maritime powers in the expansion of the Latin states to the Holy Land [5]. The conquest of the Mediterranean ports could not have been made without the naval support of Genua, Pisa and Venice, and the Christians suffered defeat whenever the terrestrial forces lacked the backup of the fleet [6]. The importance of naval support in the survival of the Latin states in the East was also grasped by the Moslem, with Saladin exclaiming, upon the arrival of fleet led by Jacques d'Avesne in aid to the Christians under siege at Tyr, "il me semble que les Frans soient afoletis, que il font lor tors dedens la mer" [7].
This favourable image of the maritime powers gradually started to deteriorate before the Christian disaster of Hattin (1187), when the first reproaches against the Italian cities were heard. A predilect target of criticism was their eternal rivalry, which did nothing but undermine the position of the Latin States. In this sense, an anonymous source noted that the Genoese, Pisans and Venetians of the Kingdom of Jerusalem, whose experience on sea was unquestionable, were nonetheless exempt from taxes [8], did not fall under the Royal jurisdiction, while the disputes raging between them served the interests of the Saracens [9]. In addition to these reproaches, several other factors contributed to creating this negative impression: the endurable aversion of Church people towards the revenues of the merchants [10], the trading relations with the Moslem territories (by which strategic products were being supplied, including wood, iron, slaves, armies) despite the blockade set up by the Papacy [11], the agreements signed with the Islam powers, and the difference in mentality as to the behaviour of the Knights and of the merchants [12].
The fall of Byzantium in 1204 produced a sensible change in Venice’s position on the Crusade. Whether before that year the participation of the Republic of St. Mark in support of the enterprises in the Holy Land had been episodical, and had ceased once the goals had been achieved (the setup of some commercial districts in the main ports of the Latin States, and the obtaining of privileges), after the conquest of Constantinople the creation of a colonial empire in the Levant marked a decisive turn in the Venetian policy in the East. If it is true that the Serenissima was the main beneficiary of the dismantling of the Byzantine Empire, no less true is that the Republic was given a great responsibility: to defend the Latin Empire of Constantinople, a political construct which proved from the beginning too fragile to act as a launching basis for a Crusade meant to free Jerusalem [13]. Actually, instead of making a contribution to the reconquering of the Holy Places, the Latin occupation of Constantinople cut down the Western support to the Holy Land, and redirected it to Romania. The Venetian policy took a similar course, with the main military effort being directed towards Constantinople - the Aegean Sea, an area which had gained essential importance in the defensive system of the Serenissima, and which stretched from the Adriatic to the Holy Land [14]. This system targeted the defense of Constantinople, whose possible loss would have highly detrimental to the Catholic Church [15]. For this reason, the Venetian chronicles depict the enemies of the Serenissima as the enemies of Christendom. In continuation to the chronicle of Villehardouin, Marino Sanudo Torsello noted that the Genoese-Nicaean alliance of Nymphaion had been signed "contra Deum et omnia jura" [16], and Gian Giacopo Caroldo underlined that the treaty signed by Genua with Michael VIII Palaeologus, "inimico di santa Romana Chiesa", was made "per l'invidia che havevano <the Genoese> de traffichi e richezze che posedeva la nation veneta" [17]. In 1204–1261, the Venetians tried to promote the "image" of a Republic devoted to the Roman Church and spending large sums of money in defense of Constantinople [18], while other Catholic powers - Genua [19] or the Principality of Morea [20] - were undermining the position of the Latin Empire by their actions.
Since the Byzantine reconquest of Constantinople (1261) and to the end of the thirteenth century, Venice proved to be the most reliable supporter of a Crusade meant to restore the Latin authority at the Straits. Less than two months after the Byzantines’ return to Constantinople, the Doge Ranieri Zeno wrote to the Pope Urban IV in the attempt to convince him about the importance of the Empire of Romania for the Catholic Church, and the necessity to organize a Crusade in order to restore it [21]. Until 1310, Venice’s position on the goal of the Crusade - Constantinople – remained unchanged, which could be seen in her refusal to sign the peace with Byzantium, and in the alliances made against the Palaeologues with Charles of Anjou, and subsequently with Charles of Valois. Only after the failure of the latter project, under the impact of the threats to the Venetian possessions in the Aegean by the Catalans in the Duchy of Athens and the Turkish Emirates, the policy of the Serenissima took a significant turn. The hostility in the relations to Byzantium was replaced by a conciliatory attitude, aiming to strengthen Venice’s positions at the Straits and enhance her competitive edge against Genua in the Black Sea [22]. At the same time, the Crusade turned into an enterprise directed against the basileus, as a means to diminish the pressure exerted by the Turkish Emirates over Byzantium and the Latin possessions in the Levant. In the first half of the fourteenth century, two visions on the Crusade coexisted in opposition. One was put forward by French royalty, which had made of the Holy Land an ideal goal [23]. The other one, proposed by Venice, reflected a more pragmatic position. Practically, it supposed the redirecting of the Christian efforts towards strengthening the Latin positions in Romania. The Venetian point of view was consistently justified by the argument that the possessions in Romania were key-posts in the recuperation of Jerusalem.
Venice’s stand in the issue of the Crusade, reflected in a number of letters by Marino Sanudo Torsello, prevailed eventually. The difficulties experienced by France with the outbreak of the Hundred Years War and the intensification of the Turkish raids, forced Pope Clement VI into admitting the setting up a naval league with short-range objectives: to free the waters of the Aegean of pirate ships and secure free navigation at the Straits. The victory of Adramyttion (1334) and the conquest of Smirna (1344) [24] marked the culmination of the "Aegean deviation" in the history of the Crusade. It was a time when Venice tailored the Crusade to suit her best needs. From an ample terrestrial operation in the direction of the Holy Land, reuniting the main powers of Christendom, the war against the Infidels was turned into a small-scale naval expedition of some regional powers: Venice, the Hospitallers, the Kingdom of Cyprus and, theoretically, the Byzantine Empire. The end of the "Venetian period" can be set at the outbreak of the second war of the Straits (1350-1355). Judged from the perspective of the history of the Crusade, the outcome of the naval enterprise might appear insignificant. On the contrary, from the Venetian point of view, the actions of 1333-1345 bore important consequences: they strengthened the Venetian positions in the Aegean, dealt a powerful blow at the “Maritime Emirates” (Aydın, Sarukhan, Qarasi), and contributed to a break in the relations between John VI Cantacuzene and the Bey of Aidın, Umur-beg. However, the elimination of the latter severed the fragile ties uniting the Christian powers in the league. Anti-Venetian feelings arose during the Crusade of Dolphin Humbert (1345), and the idea was put about that Venice was using the Crusade to achieve her own goals. The dissentions between the Venetians and the Hospitallers over the sums needed for the defense of the port of Smirna only made things worse, and the alliance was eventually dissolved upon the outbreak of the Venetian-Genoese war.
While the first half of the fourteenth century Venice concentrated her efforts against the maritime Turkish Emirates, beginning with the second half of the same century the Republic employed herself in checking off the ascension of the Ottoman Emirate. The settling of the Ottomans at Gallipoli, a sensitive issue liable to sever the links between the Pontic Bassin and the Aegean one, followed by their rapid expansion into the Balkan Peninsula, triggered an involvement of the Venetians in the Crusades of the fourteenth-fifteenth centuries in direct relation to the coincidence in objectives. As a result, Venice disavowed the conquest of Alexandria by Pierre of Lusignan [25] and conditioned the support to the projects of the Hungarian King, Louis of Anjou [26], on an attack on the Emirates with which she had not concluded any agreements [27]. She engaged with extreme caution in the Crusade of Nicopolis (1396) [28] and took part in the campaign of Varna of 1444 only after one of her requests was granted (the control over the port of Gallipoli in case of victory) [29]; and, at the Congress of Mantua, adopted a reserved attitude, and requested the participation of the entire Christendom, and the mobilizing of huge terrestrial and naval forces [30].
All the above explains why beside the voices praising the Serenissima as the main promoter of the anti-Turkish actions [31], there were accusations of collaboration with the Infidels [32].
The impression left by this brief review of the Venetian participation in the Crusade is that of an involvement conditioned on particular interests. During the first crusades, Venice targeted the connection of the trade in the Near East by creating some commercial districts in the towns of Syria and Palestine. After the Fourth Crusade, she strived to preserve her positions in the Levant, which allowed her to oversee the trade routes linking Constantinople to the Eastern Mediterranean. Eventually, in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, Venice struggled for the security of these routes, and subsequently for their survival. Is this position mirrored in the expression "siamo veneziani, poi cristiani"? Camillo Manfroni gave a negative answer to this question. Over a century ago, the Italian historian asserted that, "io non credo che la politica di Venezia fosse ispirata a sentimenti di gretto egoismo mercantile, e mi par di scorgere nelle deliberazioni del Senato l'intima persuasione che, date le condizioni dei tempi, le discordie italiane, le guerre che funestavano l'Europa, una nuova crociata non potesse compiersi senza immense difficolta, senza gravissimi pericoli" [33].
Undoubtedly, an assessment of Venice’s attitude towards the Crusade should take into account that - irrespective of the decision adopted, peace or war with the Turks - Venice’s enterprises were constantly based on the idea that she was the most faithful supporter of the war against the Infidels. It was in fact the idea of the "Christian shield", such as illustrated by Hungary [34], the Kingdom of Cyprus [35], the Romanian Principalities [36], Poland [37], to which Venice would give a more subtle argumentation. The leadership of the Republic and its chroniclers strove to picture Venice as devoted to the Holy See [38], to the Catholic faith, and to the mission devolved upon her by Saint Mark [39]. The invariable answer to the accusations that Venice was interested in preserving her positions in the Levant, and maintaining the respective commercial routes, was that trade was indispensable to a town with no other sources of revenue [40] and that "el stado bon de Veniexia non e solo ali abitanti de quella utile, ma anchor el xe molto utile a tutta Christianitade" [41]. Venice’s military operations against the Turks, "mortali nemici e persecuttori della Cristiana Fede" [42] were always presented as actions "per honor e zelo dela santa fede catolicha" [43]. The naval Venetian victory at Gallipoli (1416) became the supreme argument in demonstrating Venice’s role as a defender of Christendom; the Chronicle of Niccolo Trevisan notes that, during the Council of Constance, Sigismund of Luxemburg accused the Venetians of having offered assistance to the Ottomans. The accusation was proven ungrounded by the naval victory, and therefore, in the opinion of the chronicler, "fo molto magnificada per tutta la christianitade come unica colonna de quella contra turchi" [44].
The examples above suggest another interpretation of the expression "siamo veneziani, poi christiani". As Camillo Manfroni suggested, it would show, not as much the selfishness of the Venetians as a pragmatic vision on the Crusade, which had to take place at the lowest possible financial costs, with reduced but very mobile forces [45] and a short-range, but clearly established objective. "Nella guerra si doveva ponere principalmente celerita e secreteza" [46], said the Dodge Andrea Dandolo (1343-1354). This Venetian principle was observed throughout the Middle Ages. To the grandiose plans, the Serenissima would constantly oppose a well-thought project, in which the expenses in people, war and transport vessels, quantity of supplies, etc. were rigorously calculated [47].
Marino Sanudo Torsello had a fine grasp of the superiority of the strategy put forward by his conationals and, as a result, in all his approaches in favour of the Crusade he tried to persuade the crowned heads of Christendom that the war against the Infidels had to be carried out in the Venetian way. According to Delaville le Roulx [48], the formula "siamo veneziani, poi cristiani" is best illustrated by Marino Sanudo the Elder, whose project aimed to impose the commercial hegemony of the Serenissima in the Eastern Mediterranean, and who was placing Venice for the first time at the head of the Crusade [49]. Therefore, the Serenissima would have superseded France by becoming the leader of the Crusade, and implicitely of Christendom. Marino Sanudo Torsello’s dream became reality for a short while, 1334-1345, when the Crusade was tailored after the Venetian strategy and interests.
The fact that Venice was unable to maintain herself at the leadership of the Crusade was due to a series of factors. Apparently paradoxically, one of them deserves to be mentioned: the tension developed between Venice and two other consistent promoters of the war against the Turks: Hungary and the Hospitaller Order [50]. The tense relations with the Hungarian Kingdom had dire consequences on the anti-Ottoman war, and hindered the application of the basic strategy of the Late Crusade: the collaboration between the "terrestrial arm" (the force striking a blow at the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans) and the "maritime arm" (the fleet meant to block the Straits and sever the links between the Asian and European possessions of the Sultan). Because of the conflict with Hungary "la Ducale Signoria [...] non poteva mandar fuori le sue armate contro Turchi" [51], and the Republic was forced to reach a compromise with the Crescent. The event was deplored by Venice herself, who had made "spesa infinita et esposto il sangue de suoi cittadini per diffensione della Cristianita, e principalmente della citta delle Smirna et altri lochi, li quali per non essere soccorsi da Cristiani sono pervenuti in potere de Turchi con multo danno[?] de la Cristiana Rep[ublic]a" [52].
Far more important was the fact that the various agreements signed with the Ottomans provoked a chorus of discontent, and the accusations of treason against the Venetians redoubled. The echoes are found in the Chronicle of Pietro Dolfin, in which record is made of the rumour put about against the Venetians by Sigismund of Luxembourg: "Considerandose per molti la grande infamia seminada per tutto el mondo per lo dito signor Sigismundo, Re de Ungaria haver sploverudo e straparlado contra Venitiani. Dando quello sempre a saver a tutto el mondo, che nui ieremo caxon de impedir la union del summo Pontifico Papa de Sancta Giesa, che salva sempre sia la Maiesta Sua. Questo non ha mai operado Venitiani per algun tempo. Et oltra de questo desportando la Dogal Signoria de Veniexia, che quella dava favor e subsidio di infideli Turchi, et a altri renegadi Christiani, azň li andasse contra Christiani. La qual cosa ben se puo adesso per experientia veder e cognoscer esser el contrario, habbiando habudo dall'eterno Dio, dal qual prociede tutte gratie si copioxa, e meraveiosa victoria" [53]. The excerpt shows that, to the contemporary accusations, which seemed to confirm the principle "siamo veneziani, poi cristiani", Venice responded by the victory of Gallipoli and by the prosperity of the Republic, two signs of the Divine Grace.
[1] Franz BABINGER, "Le vicende veneziane nella lotta contro i Turchi durante il secolo XV", in La Civiltà Veneziana del Quattrocento, Florence, 1956: 51. For Paul COLES, The Ottoman Impact on Europe, London, 1968: 133, "Venetian response and resistance to Ottoman pressure was characteristically cunning, complex and tenacious". The raise of the Ottoman Empire, although posing a serious problem to Venice, was never perceived as an "apocalyptic challenge."
[2] Words belonging to the Doge Pasquale Cicogna, quoted by P. PARUTA, La legazione di Paolo Paruta (1592-1621), Venice, 1887: II, 166, cf. Carol GÖLLNER, "Semnificaţia europeană a luptelor lui Mihai Viteazul în cadrul războaielor turceşti din secolul al XVI-lea" [The European Impact of Michael the Brave’s Struggle in the Turkish Wars of the Sixteenth Century], in Mihai Viteazul. Culegere de studii, (ed. by Paul CERNOVODEANU and C. REZACHIEVICI), Bucharest, 1975: 27, n. 25.
[3] Steven RUNCIMAN, "L'intervento di Venezia dalla prima alla terza Crociata", in Venezia dalla prima crociata alla conquista di Constantinopoli del 1204, Florence, 1965: 3-22; Jonathan RILEY-SMITH, "The Venetian Crusade of 1122-1124", in I Comuni Italiani nel regno crociato di Gerusalemme, (ed. by Gabriella AIRALDI e Benjamin Z. KEDAR), Genua, 1986: 339-350.
[4] Sylvia SCHEIN, "From «Milites Christi» to «Mali Christiani». The Italian Communes in Western Historical Literature", in I Comuni Italiani nel regno crociato di Gerusalemme: 680.
[5] The involvement of the naval powers, Venice especially, was not less important in transporting pilgrims from the West to the Holy Land; for an analysis of this aspect, see David JACOBY, "Pélérinage médiéval et sanctuaires de Terre Sainte: la perspective vénitienne", in IDEM, Studies on the Crusader States and on Venetian Expansion, Northampton: Variorum, 1989: especially 29-32.
[6] For an excellent analysis of the naval aspect in the history of Crusades, see Michel MOLLAT, "Problèmes navales de l'histoire des croisades", Cahiers de civilisation médiévale 10 (1967), 3-4: 345-359.
[7] La Continuation de Guillame de Tyr(1184-1197) (ed. by Margaret Ruth MORGAN), Paris, 1982,: 90.
[8] For the privileges of the Italian republics, see Eliyahu ASHTOR, "Il regno dei crociati e il commercio di Levante", in I Comuni Italiani nel regno crociato di Gerusalemme: 17-56 (especially 19-21). Unlike Genua, Venice seems to never have enjoyed complete full tax exemption.
[9] G. M. THOMAS, "Ein Tractat über das heilige Land und der dritte Kreuzug", Sitzungsberichte der K. Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, philos.-plilolog. Classe 1865, 2: 147: "De Italia sunt in terra ierosolimitana tres populi ipsi terre efficaces et utiles Pisani, Januenses et Venetici [...] Inter se tam invidi quam discordes, quod maiorem securitatem exhibet Sarracenis". This opinion is often shared beginning with the thirteenth century, see for instance Pierre DUBOIS, The Recovery of the Holy Land (translation, introduction and notes by Walther I. BRANDT), New York, 1956: 78, or Traité d'Emmanuel Piloti sur le Passage en Terre Sainte (1420) (ed. by Pierre Herman DOPP), Louvain-Paris, 1958: 217: "Les divisions et guerre qui ont esté entre la seigneurie de Venise et celle de Genevois a fait ung très grant dompmage à l'estat des crestiens, et grant prosperité à l'estat de poyens". The same idea was embraced by Venetian chroniclers, see for instance Lorenzo de MONACIIS, Chronicon de Rebus Venetiis ab urbe condita ad annum MCCCLIV, Venice, 1758: 194: "Dum Venetorum, Januensium & Pisanorum concordia multum Terrae Sanctae prodesset, inimicus humani generis, cogentibus peccatis, inter eos graves seminavit zizanias". It should be noted that the same idea lays at the core of the peace mediation between Venice and Genua by Louis IX the Saint in 1268.
[10] Jacques Le GOFF, Pentru un alt Ev Mediu. Valori umaniste în cultura şi civilizaţia Evului Mediu (translated by Maria CARPOV), Bucharest, 1986: I, 91. For an interesting episode telling of the difference in mentality between a merchant and the people of the Church, see Gh. I. BRĂTIANU, Marea Neagră. De la origini până la cucerirea otomană [The Black Sea. From the Origins to the Ottoman Conquest] (translation by Michaela SPINEI, edition, noted and bibliography by Victor SPINEI), Bucharest, 1988: II,. 8-9 and n. 3, 30-31.
[11] Eliyahu ASHTOR, Levant Trade in the Later Middle Ages, Princeton, 1981: 17-62.
[12] For a knight’s vision, see La Continuation de Guillaume de Tyr....: 46: "Car ciaus de France tienent ciaus d'Ytalie en despit. Car ja tant riches ne sera ne preus que il nel tieignent por vilain. Car le plus de ciaus d'Ytalie sont usuriers ou corsans ou marchaanz ou mariniers et orce qu'il sont chevaliers tienent il cil en despit". The same attitude is also reflected by Ramon MUNTANER, La spedizione dei Catalani in Oriente (ed. by Cesare GIARDINI), Milan, 1958: 70-71 "he who trusts the word of the people of the communes is a fool, for those who do not know what honour is, do not know how to respect it". For the point of view shared by the merchants, an example is offered by the chronicle of Martino da CANAL; the aspect is examined by Agostino PERTUSI, "Maistre Martino da Canal interprete cortese delle crociate e dell'ambiente veneziano del secolo XIII", in Storia della civiltà italiana. I. Dalle origini al secolo di Marco Polo" (ed. by Vittore BRANCA), Florence, 1979: 279-295.
[13] An issue taken under consideration by Şerban PAPACOSTEA, Românii în secolul al XIII-lea. Între cruciată şi Imperiul Mongol [The Romanians in the Thirteenth Century. Between Crusade and the Mongol Empire], Bucharest, 1993: 25-28; cf. Malcolm BARBER, "Western Attitudes to Frankish Greece in the Thirteenth Century", Mediterranean Historical Review 4 (1989): 112-113.
[14] For the organization of the Venetian colonial empire after the Fourth Crusade, see A. CARILE, "Partitio Terrarum Imperii Romanie", Studi Veneziani 7 (1965): 125-135; Dionysos ZAKYTHINOS, "La conquête de Constantinople en 1204, Venise et le partage de l’Empire byzantin", in IDEM, Byzance: Etat-Société-Economie, London: Variorum Reprints, 1973: 139-155; Nicholas OIKONOMIDES, "La décomposition de l’empire byzantin à la veille de 1204 et les origines de l’empire de Nicee: à propos de la «Partitio Romaniae»", in IDEM, Byzantium from the Ninth Century to the Fourth Crusade. Studies, Texts, Monuments, London: Variorum, 1992. For the maritime measures taken by the Venetians, see David JACOBY, "Les gens de mer dans la marine de guerre vénitienne de la mer Egée aux XIVe et XVe siècles", in IDEM, Studies on the Crusader States ....: 169-201
[15] Gian Giacopo CAROLDO, Cronaca, Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana, mss. It. VII. 128b (=7443): 244 presents the Greek as the enemies of the Latin name and of the Holly Catholic Church; the fall of Constantinople into their hands was a catastrophy that caused "lacrime e molto dolore". The part played by the Venetians in preserving Constantinople is also highlighted by Marino SANUDO the Young, "Vitae Ducum Venetorum italice scriptae ab origine urbis sive ab anno CCCCXXI usque ad annum MCCCCXCIII", in Rerum Italicarum Scriptores (ed. by L. A. MURATORI), vol. 22, Milan, 1733: 550.
[16] Robert Lee WOLFF, "Hopf’s So-Called «Fragmentum» of Marino Sanudo Torsello", in IDEM, Studies in the Latin Empire of Constantinople, London: Variorum Reprints, 1976: 152.
[17] Gian Giacopo CAROLDO, op. cit.: 233.
[18] Robert Lee WOLFF, "Hopf’s So-Called «Fragmentum»...": 150: "Etiam Veneti fuerunt multum gravati quamplurimis expensis ad substinendum civitatem Constantinopolitanam predictam".
[19] Even though the Genoese fleet was not involved directly in reconquering Constantinople, the alliance with the Genoese, despite some tension (see Şerban PAPACOSTEA, "La première crise des rapports byzantino-génois après Nymphaion. Le complot de Guglielmo Guercio, 1264", Revue Roumaine d'Histoire 27 (1988), 4: 339-350) and the basileus’ attempts to lessen the burden of the concessions granted at Nymphaion [see IDEM, "Byzance et les Détroits sous les premièrs Paléologues", forthcoming in Il mar Nero 4 (2000-2001)], provided Michael VIII with the necessary naval support to counteract a Western Crusade.
[20] The accusation referred to the dispute over Negroponte (1255-1258) between the Venetians and the Prince of Moreea, Guillaume II of Villehardouin. The chronicle of CAROLDO: 233 accuses him to have made an alliance with Michael VIII in order to gain the upper hand in the dispute, and that the interference of the Pope alone determined him to eventually break the alliance with the Greeks.
[21] G. L. Fr. TAFEL, G. M. THOMAS, Urkunden zur älteren Handels-und Staatengeschichte der Republik Venedig, Vienna, 1857: III, 56-59. Venice’s efforts to rally the West against Byzantium are also mentioned by Marino SANUDO, Vitae Ducum Venetorum....: 560.
[22] In addition to these motifs, Camillo MANFRONI, Storia della marina italiana dal trattato di Ninfeo alla caduta di Costantinopoli (1261-1453), part 1: Dal trattato di Ninfeo alle nuove crociate, Livorno, 1902: 232 mentions among others: the war with Padua, the conflict with the Pope Clement V over Ferrara, the conjuration of Bajamonte Tiepolo, and the peril of Zara’s revolt.
[23] Gian Giacopo CAROLDO: 296 mentions about the reconquest of Jerusalem "qual impresa era molta a cuore del re di Francia". For the attitude of the French Kings towards the Crusade in the fourteenth-fifteenth centuries, see Sylvia SCHEIN, "Philip IV and the Crusade: A Reconsideration", in Crusade and Settlement (ed. by Peter W. EDBURY), (Papers Read at the First Conference of the Society for the Study of the Crusades and the Latin East), Cardiff, 1985: 121-126. C. J. TYERMAN, "Philip V of France, the assemblies of 1319-1320 and the Crusade", Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research 57 (1984): 15-34; IDEM , "Sed nihil fecit? The Last Capetians and the Recovery of the Holy Land", in War and Government in the Middle Ages (ed. by J. GILLINGHAM and J. C. HOLT), Woodbridge, 1984: 170-181.
[24] For these Crusades, see Paul LEMERLE, L’emirat d’Aydin, Byzance et l’Occident. Recherches sur "La Geste d’Umur Pacha", Paris, 1957: 40-88; Elisabeth ZACHARIADOU, Trade and Crusade. Venetian Crete and the Emirates of Menteshe and Aydin (1300-1415), Venice, 1983: 29-62.
[25] Gian Giacopo CAROLDO: 732 maintains that the attack on Alexandria was a disaster to Venice "per li gran traffichi che facevano nella Soria et Egitto". The Chronicle of Pietro DOLFIN, B.N.M., mss. It. VII, 2558 (=12450), f. 77r noted that the price for eastern goods had risen by 100% after the action of Pierre de Lusignan. Thomas WALSINGHAM, Historia Anglicana (ed. by Henry Thomas RILEY), London, 1863: I, 302 notes that after the conquest of Alexandria "quae clavis est Aegypti" there was a considerable increase in spice prices in the West.
[26] Norman HOUSLEY, "King Louis the Great of Hungary and the Crusades (1342-1382)", in The Slavonic and East European Review 62 (1984), 2: 192-208.
[27] In the negotiations of 1366 with the Hungarian King, Venice underlined that she was at peace with "domino Palacie et Teologi, quibus nullo modo vellemus defficere fide pro honore et bono nostro" (Sime LJUBICI, Listine o odnosajih izmedju juznoga slavenstva I mletacke republice (= Monumenta spectantia historiam Slavorum Meridionalium), 1358-1403, Zagreb, 1874: doc. 148: IV, 85-86). In his answer, the Hungarian King declared that he would take into account the Republic’s treaties with the Turkish Emirates (Ibidem, doc. 151: 88). Gian Giacopo CAROLDO: 735 mentions that the Venetians had requested to the Hungarian King that no attack should be made on "li Turchi della Palatia".
[28] According to the chronicle of Pietro DOLFIN: 181v, the Venetian fleet had counted so many ships that "in algun luogo galie de Turchi non ardiva apparer".
[29] Şerban PAPACOSTEA, "Gênes, Venise et la croisade de Varna", Balcanica Posnaniensia 8 (1997): 27-39.
[30] Enea Silvio PICCOLOMINI, I Commentari (ed. by Giuseppe BERNETTI), Siena, 1972: I, 297-298. The Pope asserted that the Venetians declared themselves for the Crusade, but deeply in their souls they were against it.
[31] Among the numerous examples one should mention the letter attributed to Mehmed II, included in a number of Western chronicles. According to it, the Sultan had reproached the Pope with having consented to the preaching of the Crusade "aux pryeres et requestes du peuple Venicien" (see Jehan de WAVRIN, seigneur du FORESTEL, Recueil des Chroniques et Anchiennes istoiries de la Grant Bretaigne a present nomme Engletere (ed. by sir William HARDY and Edward L. C. P. HARDY), London, 1891: V, 359. A similar version in Chronique de Mathieu d'Escouchy, ed. par G. du FRESNE de BEAUCOURT, Paris, 1863: II, 58. The testimony is as the more interesting as the letter most certainly is forged by the enemies of the Venetians. This forged letter was based on another forgery – the letter of Umur beg to Pope Clement VI (see Jules GAY, Le pape Clément VI et les affaires d’Orient 1342-1352, Paris, 1904: 172-174) – that Paul ALPHANDÉRY, Alphonse DUPRONT, La Chrétienté et l'idée de croisade, Paris, 1995: 495 considers to be a document drawn up by an enemy of the Crusade and of the Venetians; see also the qualification given to Venice by Philippe de MÉZIÈRES, Le Songe du Vieil Pelerin (ed. by G.W. COOPLAND), Cambridge University Press, 1969: I, 279, in the second half of the fourteenth century: "la Dame des Eauves, vray refuge et seur retrait de tous bons Crestiens desolez et a tribulacion livrez".
[32] The French King Louis XI advised the Duke of Burgundy, Philip the Good, not to answer to the appeals to Crusade of the Serenissima, for the Venetians were only interesting in occupying Morea and, as soon as they were to achieve their goals, they would come to peace with the Turks [see the comments of Richard VAUGHAN, Philip the Good. The Apogee of Burgundy, London, 1970: 370); the same accusation is brought by the ambassador of Florence to Pope Pius II, before the Congress of Mantua. The Florentines maintained that Venice had her eyes on the Peloponesus, not on Christ. Pius II agreed, but added, "it is good enough for us, for should Venice conquer, the conqueror would be Christ the Lord" (v. Memoirs of a Renaissance Pope. The Commentaries of Pius II (edited with an introduction by Leona C. GABEL), London, 1960: 351]. For other critical stands against Venice, see Robert SCHWOEBEL, The Shadow of the Crescent: The Renaissance Image of the Turk (1453-1517), Nieuwkoop, 1967: 179.
[33] Camillo MANFRONI, Storia della marina italiana....: I, 258-259.
[34] In relation to Hungary, the formula appears in the time of Sigismund of Luxembourg, in a letter addressed by the King to the cardinals faithful to Pope Boniface IX, see Sandor CSERNUS, "Sigismond et la soustraction d'obedience:une doctrine de politique internationale?", in Crise et Réforme dans l'Eglise. De la Reforme Gregorienne à la Préreforme", Paris, 1991: 326.
[35] The idea of the Island of Cyprus as a wall for the defense of the Christians appears in Philippe de MÉZIÈRES, Le Songe...: I, 295: "Ceste ysle mal fortunee estait lors le vray mur defensable de la Crsetiente d'orient. C'estoit comme ung gracieux hospital des Crestiens d'occident. Et briefment c'estoit la frontiere puissante et necessaire de la Crestiente catholique [...]. C'estoit la banniere de la croix encontre les ennemis de la foy, plus redoubte que nulle autre en sin temps qui puet estre trouvee".
[36] Andrei PIPPIDI, Tradiţia politică bizantină în Ţările române în secolele XVI-XVIII [Byzantine Tradition in the Romanian Principalities in the Sixteenth-Eighteenth Centuries], Bucharest, 1983: 145.
[37] For an analysis of how this idea was received in Poland, see Wiktor WEINTRAUB, "Renaissance Poland and Antemurale Christianitatis", Harvard Ukrainian Studies 3-4 (1979-1980), 2: 920-930 [= Eucharisterion. Essays presented to Omeljan Pritsak on his Sixtieth Birthday by his Colleagues and Students (ed. by Ihor SEVCENKO & Frank E. SYSYN)]. The authors demonstrate that the idea of an ante-mural Poland did not enjoy much popularity in the Polish Kingdom in the fifteenth century. I was unable to consult the study of Paul W. KNOLL, "Poland as «Antemurale Christianitatis» in the Late Middle Ages", Catholic Historical Review 60 (1974): 381-401.
[38] For Martino da CANAL, the Doge "estoit acostume d'estre au comendement de Sainte Yglise". The topic was taken up by the Venetian Diploma during the War of Ferrara, when the Serenissima was in open conflict with Pope Clement V. The Venetians were trying to imply in this way that the guilt of having launched the war lays with the Pontif Sovereign, and that the Republic faithfulness to the Holy See was unquestionable. See Elisabeth CROUZET-PAVAN, "Gênes et Venise discours historiques et imaginaires de la cité", in Le forme della propaganda politica nel due e nel trecento (ed. by Paolo CAMMAROSANO), Rome, 1994: 438. For the attitude of the Papacy towards Venice during the war of Ferrara, see Bernard GUILLEMAIN, "A propos de la politique italienne des papes d'Avignon: menaces spirituelles et temporelles", Byzantinische Forschungen 12 (1987): 635-648.
[39] The ties between Saint Mark and the town meant to reinforce the idea that Venice was born as a defender of the faith, that it had this intrinsec goal. See Elisabeth CROUZET-PAVAN, "Gênes et Venise discours ...": 438.
[40] Gian Giacopo CAROLDO: 251 "[trade] senza di quali era sempre impossibile conservar Venetia, come chi volesse sostentar il corpo senza nutrimento, quale non poteva vivere per altra via, che de' traffichi e con mercantili...".
[41] The Chronicle of Enrico DANDOLO, B.N.M., ms. It. cl. VII, 559: 6r; for the Chronicle of Enrico DANDOLO, see Silvana COLLODO, "Temi e caratteri della cronachistica veneziana in volgare del tre-quattrocento (Enrico Dandolo)", Studi Veneziani 9 (1967): 127-151.
[42] Gian Giacopo CAROLDO: 383.
[43] The Chronicle of Niccolò TREVISAN, Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana (= B. N. M.), It. VII. 519 (= 8438), microfilm Pos. Marc. 164: 81r. The assertion is made in relation to the naval league that obtained the victory of Adramyttion; for a presentation of the Chronicle of Niccolo TREVISAN, see Freddy THIRIET, "Les chroniques vénitiennes de la Marcienne et leur importance pour l'histoire de la Romanie gréco-vénitienne", Mélanges d'Archeologie et d'Histoire publiés par l'Ecole Française de Rome 1954: 262-266 and IDEM, "L'Importance de la chronique de Niccolo Trevisan", in Miscellanea Marciana di studi Bessarionei, Padua, 1976: 407-414. The chronicle is extremely important owing to the information conerning the fourteenth century, especially on the Venetian domination in Crete. For a contrary view on the paternity of the chronicle, see Silvana COLLODO, "Temi e caratteri...": 150, who considers it to be a fourteenth-century compilation by several clerks. For a similar opinion, see A. CARILE, "Note di cronachistica veneziana: Piero Giustinian e Niccolo Trevisan", Studi Veneziani 9 (1967): 120-124.
[44] Ibidem: 168r; a similar assertion in Gaspare ZANCARUOLO, B. N. M., mss. It VII 1274-1275 (coll. 9274-9275): 569: "Fuo molto magnificada per tuta la christianitade come unica colonna, sola speranza dela christianitade contra li infideli".
[45] When consulted, the Venetians often answered that a Crusade had to involve war professionals, and scorned the adventurers "[...] private persone e vili le quali per tale impresa non sarrebbeno d'alcuna uttilita ma piu tosto impedimento e confusione (Gian Giacopo CAROLDO: 383-384).
[46] Assertion by Gian Giacopo CAROLDO: 465.
[47] This oppositions shows clearly at the time of the negotiations for what would be known in history as the Fourth Crusade. The overestimation by the aristocrats [Hans Eberhard MAYER, The Crusades (translation by John GILLINGHAM), Oxford University Press, 1988: 198] triggered a whole series of consequences which, according to the Chronicle of VILLEHARDOUIN, led to the conquest of Constantinople. Another situation of 1219 was analysed by Olivier GUYOTJEANNIN, Gabriele NORI, "Venezia e il transporto dei cruciati. A proposito di un patto del 1219", Studi Medievali 30 (1989), 1: 309-321. For the costs of the Crusade project estimated by Marino Sanudo Torsello see Franco CARDINI, "I costi della Crociata. L’aspetto economico del progetto di Marin Sanudo il Vecchio", in IDEM, Studi sulla istoria e sull’idea di crociata, Rome, 1993: 377-411.
[48] J. DELAVILLE Le ROULX, La France en Orient au XIVe siècle, Expéditions du Maréchal Boucicaut, Paris, 1886: I, 35.
[49] Marino SANUDO Torsello, Liber Secretorum Fidelium Crucis, Jerusalem, 1972: 26; cf. the letter by the same author, published by Fr. KÜNSTMANN, "Studien über Marino Sanudo den älteren, mit einem Anhange seiner ungedruckten Briefe", Abhandlungen der historischen Classe der königlichen bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften 7 (1853): 792-793.
[50] Anthony LUTTRELL, "Venice and the Knights Hospitallers of Rhodes in the Fourteenth Century", in IDEM, The Hospitallers in Cyprus, Rhodes, Greece and the West 1291-1440, London: Variorum, 1978: 195-212. One of the reasons of the antipathy was the settling of the Hospitallers at Rhodes and the relations established by them with the Genoese.
[51] Gian Giacopo CAROLDO: 888
[52] Ibidem.
[53] Pietro DOLFIN: 647r.
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