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Romanian-Italian Relationship inside of the Triple Alliance.

The 1888 Agreement

 

 

 

Rudolf Dinu,

Romanian Institute of Humanist

Culture and Research, Venice

 

 

 

Historiography

 

The various respects regarding the Italian presence and policy inside of the Triple Alliance (1882-1914) have frequently been approached. Without the pretension of an exhaustive image concerning the historiography about this problematic, we mention here a number of studies considered as ‘classic’: Luigi Chiala, Triplice Alleanza. Pagine di storia contemporanea, Torino, 1893; idem, La Triplice e la Duplice Alleanza (1881-1897), new edition, Torino, 1898; Avarna di Gualtieri, L’ultimo rinovamento della Triplice Alleanza (5 dic. 1912), Rome, 1923; Pietro Silva, L’Italia fra le Grandi Potenze, Rome, 1931; Luigi Salvatorelli, La Triplice Alleanza. Storia diplomatica, 1877-1912, Milan: A. Nicola, 1939; Gioacchino Volpe, L’Italia nella Triplice Alleanza, 1882-1915, Milan: Istituto per gli studi di politica internazionale, 1939; Luigi Albertini, Le origini della guerra del 1914, vols. 1-3, Rome, 1942-43; Federico Chabod, Storia della politica estera italiana dal 1870 al 1896, vol. 1, Bari: Laterza, 1962; Carlo Morandi, La politica estera dell’Italia, da Porta Pia all’età giolittiana, Florence: Le Mounier, 1968; R. G. B. Bosworth, Italy, the Least of the Great Powers: Italian Foreign Policy before the First World War, [Cambridge]: Cambridge University Press, 1979; R. Petrigniani, Neutralità e alleanza. Le scelte di politica estera dell’Italia dopo l’Unità, Bologna: Il Mulino, 1987; Enrico Decleva, L’Italia e la politica internazionale dal 1870 al 1914. L’ultima fra le Grandi Potenze, Milan: Mursia, 1987; idem, L’incerto alleato. Ricerche sugli orientamenti internazionali dell’Italia Unita, Milan: Franco Angeli, 1987; Enrico Serra, L’Italia e le grandi alleanze nel tempo dell’imperialismo, 1870-1915, Milan: Franco Angeli, 1990.

The Italian military presence inside of the Triple Alliance also seems to be seriously studied, taking into consideration the works of Massimo Mazzetti, L’esercito italiano nella Triplice Alleanza, Naples: Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, 1974; Fortunato Minitti, Esercito e politica da Porta Pia alla Triplice Alleanza, Rome: Bonacci, 1984, and Maurizio Ruffo, L’Italia nella Triplice Alleanza. I piani operativi dello S.M. verso l’Austria-Ungheria dal 1885 al 1915, Rome: Ufficio Storico dello Stato Magiore dell’Esercito, 1997. The level of the researches

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regarding the Romanian relations with the Triple Alliance during the period between 1883 and 1914 is definitely inferior in comparison with all the things above exposed. Actually, the only general work dedicated to the relations between Romania and the political-military system represented by Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy is the one written by Gheorghe Nicolae Cazan and ªerban Rãdulescu-Zoner, România ºi Tripla Alianþã, 1878-1914, Bucharest: Editura ªtiinþificã ºi Pedagogicã, 1979. Exclusively based upon the Romanian and Austrian archives, this study is effectively a history of the Romanian relations with the Central Powers. Avoiding the details, it may be appreciated that all the other works, more or less specialised, present the same exclusive feature: George Fotino, “Les missions de Goluchowski et Bülow auprès du Roi Charles I-er de Roumanie”, Revue d’Histoire Diplomatique [R.H.D.], 46 (1932), no. 2: 275-291; Lilio Cialdea, La politica estera della Romania nel quarantennio prebellico, Bologna, 1933; Assen Smedowski, “La Roumanie et la Triple Alliance, 1883-1913”, R.H.D., 51 (1937): 39-56; Ernst Ebel, Rumänien und die Mitelmächte von der russisch-türkischen Krise (1877-1878) bis zum Bukarest Frieden vom 10 August 1913, Berlin, 1939; Glenn Torrey, “Irredentism and Diplomacy. The Central Powers and Rumania, August-November 1914”, Südost-Forschungen, 25 (1966): 285-332; Carol Göllner, “Aufgaben und ziele der Aussenpolitik Rumaniens nach dem Unabhängigkeits-Krieg. Die Haltung der offentlichen Meinung zum ‘Dreibund’, 1900-1916”, Forschungen, 20 (1977), no.1: 57-75; V. Cristian, A. Filimon, “Les prémisses du renouvellement du traité d’alliance de la Roumanie avec les Puissances Centrales (1892)”, DacoRomania, 1977-78, no. 4: 147-172; V. Cristian, Politica externã a României în lupta pentru consolidarea independenþei ºi realizarea unitãþii naþionale, in Gh. Platon, V. Cristian, Gh. Iacob, Cum s-a înfãptuit România modernã, Jassy, 1993: 245-296. At a similar unsatisfactory level, there is the research concerning the Romanian-Italian relation inside of the same political-military structures. According to Bibliografia istoricã româno-italianã (before 1996), recently published (1997) by Veronica Turcuº in Cluj, this kind of research produced no more than one study, the one of Renato Mori, “Francesco Crispi e l’accessione italiana all’acordo austro-rumeno”, Clio, 5 (1969), nos. 2-3: 192-238. There must be added the works of Antonny Di Iorio, “Italy and Rumania in 1914: The Italian Assessment of the Rumanian Situation, 1907 to 1914”, Rumanian Studies, 4 (1976-1979): 127-173; ªerban Rãdulescu-Zoner, “Convergences des relations diplomatiques roumano-italiennes à la veille de la première guerre mondiale”, Rassegna storica del Risorgimento, 61 (1974), no. 3: 432-445; G. Torrey, “The Rumanian-Italian Agreement of 23 September 1914”, The Slavonic and East European Review, 44 (1966), no. 103: 403-420; ªerban Delureanu, “L’Italia e l’opinione romena nei primi anni della Triplice Alleanza”, Revue Roumaine d’Histoire, 28 (1984). Thus, it may result the completed image of this subject’s bibliography.

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How could this bibliography’s brevity been explained? There could only be emitted simple hypothesis. On the one side, there is the idea of an inconsistency and irrelevance of the Romanian-Italian relations inside of the Triple Alliance, idea become a stereotype in the Romanian historiography. On the other side, a more plausible explanation should be the scarcity of a Romanian diplomatic reference regarding this topic, and the difficulty in having an immediate access to the foreign one, especially to the Italian one. As the problem supposed to be subsequently researched, the 1888 Italian-Romanian agreement was approached only once a time, due to Renato Mori at the end of the 60s. The archive documentation may be detected in three archives: Archivio Storico Diplomatico del Ministero degli Affari Esteri [ASDMAE] (the funds of Archivio Segreto di Gabinetto, 1869-1914, cassette no. 10; Carte dell’Eredità Crispi, fascicle II; Carteggio Gabinetto Crispi, card no. 6 and no. 13; Carte Nigra, case no. 1; Rappresentanza italiana a Berlino, case no. 61 and no. 63; Rappresentanza italiana a Vienna, case no. 138; Archivio Centrale dello Stato (the fund of Carte Crispi, case no. 68, fascicle 412 - Stati Balcanici); Museo Centrale del Risorgimento (the fund of Carte Crispi, case no. 661, fascicle 12). Finally, it may be added the documentation published in the German collection of diplomatic documents Die Grosse Politik der europäischen Kabinette, 1871-1914, [G.P.], vols. 6 and 7, Berlin: Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft für Politik und Geschichte M. B. H., 1922, 1926, in the Italian one I documenti diplomatici italiani [D.D.I.], 2nd series, vols. 12, 15-16, 17-18, 21, Rome: Istituto Poligrafico e Zecca dello Stato, 1968-1994, and also the ancient Italian collection of diplomatic documents (Documenti diplomatici) [D.D.], published for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ internal use, beginning with 1878, researchable at ASDMAE.

 

 

 

 

Political Background (1879-1887)

 

On December 5, 1879, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Benedetto Cairoli, informed the Italian agent in Bucharest, the Baron Saverio Fava, about the decision of His Majesty’s Government to “inaugurate the diplomatic relations between Italy and Romania based upon the new pattern established by the Treaty of Berlin”[1]. More precisely, Italy announced the official recognition of the Romanian independence and the beginning of the bilateral diplomatic relations under the level of legation. The Count Giuseppe Tornielli-Brusati di Vergano was accredited in Bucharest, under the quality of Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Minister[2].

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During the nine-year period that covered the act of recognition and the alliance signed in 1888, the Romanian-Italian relations did not follow a constant evolution. They had moments of intensity and also of rebound before the radical changing of the former position. Obviously, for different reasons, we only propose here to notice some of these starting points, not only the bilateral, but also the individual ones.

The period between 1879 and 1881 is undoubtedly one of the moments of immediate contact. Unexpectedly, Italy continued in 1879 (under Cairoli as Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs) the policy promoted at Berlin by the Count Corti[3]. This latter one had been appreciated by the Italian historiography as ‘sentimental’, ‘of the clean hands’, etc[4].

Under the circumstances appeared after the Congress of Berlin, the recognition of the Romanian independence was undoubtedly a decision of force. The results of the mentioned decision have not been well known and not enough studied, especially in the case of Italy[5].

In a moment when it was more and more difficult for Romania to support the increasing pressures exerted by Germany and not only by it[6], the Consulta decided to break the agreement with Germany respected before, offering more or less consciously an important support to the new Principality[7]. The Italian decision

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obstructed the strategies of this halved European concerto. It provoked the tension in the relations with Germany and finally caused caution at Vienna[8].

On December 15, 1879 De Launay, the Italian Ambassador in Berlin announced that “[…] les nouvelles parvenues au Département Impérial des rélations extérieures, prouveraient de plus en plus que c’est ensuite de notre reconnaissance que la Roumanie a cru pouvoir braver l’Allemagne. On entendait affirmer à Bukarest que l’accord de l’Italie, de la France et de l’Angleterre devenait vacillant. Notre exemple ne tarderait pas à être suivi à Londres et sourtout à Paris. […] Ainsi qu’il était à prevoir, ajoutait M. de Radowitz, le chancelier impérial regrettait profondément notre decision. […] Le prince de Bismarck trouvait que notre procédé était décourageant pour ses sentiments à l’égard de l’Italie. […] Le chancelier estime très-vraisemblablement que ses sentiments ont été mis à une trop rude épreuve. Quelle garantie peut-il trouver en Italie dans des combinaisons à venir, si nous l’abandonnons sans même crier gare? […]”[9]. The position seemed to be more unexplainable more Italy had not special interests in Romania. Italy was not supposed to create a coherent and long strategy regarding this State in the imminent future, as it would not create a Balkan strategy in general.

Under the new conditions, Italy had to assume the uncomfortable part of mediating between Romania and Germany, especially because of its urge to normalise the relations with the latter.

 

“Nous nous trouvons - wrote Cairoli to the new Minister in Bucharest, Tornielli - vis-à-vis de l’Allemagne, dans une situation des plus délicates. […] Le

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prince de Bismarck, est, à tort ou à raison, sous l’impression que la majorité et le Ministère ont pris courage de braver l’Allemagne, dans l’annonce de notre reconaissance. Il est inutile de chercher à combattre ou à atténuer cette impression, qui se traduit par une irritation des plus accentuées à notre endroit. M. de Keudell[10] me tient, à cet égard, un langage qui nous donne une vive préoccupation. […] nous ne devons rien épargner pour faciliter une entente entre Bucarest et Berlin. Nous avons donné à la Roumanie, par notre initiative et en résistant aux instances qui nous étaient faites de plusieurs côtés, la mesure de l’intérêt que nous portons à son avenir. Nous ne pensons pas qu’il lui convienne ni d’inaugurer ses rapports avec nous par une rupture avec l’Allemagne, ni d’ajourner indéfiniment la reconnaissance de la France et de l’Angleterre ces deux Puissances étant fermement résolues à ne pas se séparer de l’Allemagne. […] Si nous n’aboutissons pas à une solution satisfaisante, je prévois que nous allons nous trouver, la Roumanie comme l’Italie, dans un très grave embarras. […] Nous avons, en un mot, absolment besoin d’un succès pour prouver à l’Allemagne que notre présence officielle à Bucarest est loin d’avoir nui à ses intérêts. […]”[11].

 

The ‘delicate’ situation came finally to an end on January 26, 1880, when it was promulgated the law concerning the ransom of the railways by the Romanian State, whose construction had been accorded to the German concern Stroussberg. On this occasion, the Romanian agent in Rome, Constantin Esarcu, following the Government’s orders, communicated to the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Cairoli, “que cette solution satisfaisante pour l’Allemagne est due en grand partie aux bons offices de l’Italie”[12].

Thus initiated, the relations did not present modifications or syncopes in the immediately following interval. On the contrary, Italy would also demonstrate the same favourable attitude when Romania became a Kingdom (March 14, 1881), being the first to recognise the new form of state (April 3, 1881)[13]. A modification in this position may only be noticed beginning with 1882. Romania would receive this changing of attitude in the context of the international negotiations about the

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Danube navigation (1881-1883)[14]. Partially, the explanation was the alliance signed by Italy and the Central Powers in 1882, alliance that would represent the starting point of its external policy for more than thirty years[15]. The making up of the Triple Alliance appeared as a reply to the modification in the Mediterranean system, following the settling of Austria in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1879, of France in Tunis in 1881 and of the Great Britain in Egypt in 1882. Italy was excluded from those modifications, and its approaching to the Central Powers was supposed to provide it with the necessary support. It was needed for a more certain re-taking of the protection of its Mediterranean interests in front of the two Powers that dominated this European area, namely England and France[16]. There is also true that Italy renounced to its liberty of action in exchange for the agreement, more or less complete, of the Northern empires. This is the explanation for the fact that Italy could be found out in the situation of sustaining Vienna’s positions on 1883, during the debates of the European Commission of Danube (E. C. D.). Romania negatively received this alignment of Italy in the Central Powers’ camp and this

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feeling seemed to be unanimous in Romania, from the governors to the public opinion.

 

“[…] Mi resta a dire che ciò che io ho udito da questo signor presidente del consiglio [Ion Brãtianu - emphasis mine] mi sentii ripetere in parole chiarissime da tutte le persone influenti del partito liberale che sta al potere. Né diverso è il linguaggio della stampa di tutti i colori negli apprezzamenti che fa delle notizie corse circa gli accordi che avrebbero stabilito relazioni di speciale intimità fra l’Italia, la Germania e l’Austria-Ungheria. L’opinione dell’Italia ed il suo voto nelle questioni di particolare interesse per questi paesi, sono già considerati come anticipatamente impegnati in favore delle potenze con le quali qui si sostiene una lotta di cui non si calcolano, né si prevedono forse le ultime conseguenze. […] Il governo e la pubblica opinione non aspettano da noi altro ciò che i due imperi del centro diranno o faranno essi stessi. […] Mi duole di dover scrivere queste cose; ma sono vere ed il tacerle a me non lice mentre Vostra Eccellenza starà, probabilmente, in procinto di concertarsi con gli altri governi circa l’azione diplomatica da esercitarsi verso la Romania”[17].

 

The editing of a collection comprising Italian diplomatic documents (Libro verde - Questione Danubiana, 1881-1883 - presented to the Senate on April 11, 18833), referring to the Danube question, would deepen this perception[18]. One year later, , in the correspondence with Di Robilant, the Italian ambassador at Vienna, P. S. Mancini, the minister of foreign affairs would recognise that the Italian position actually was “to a high degree favourable to Austria”.

 

“[…] Ne [sic!] a Vienna possono aver dimenticato il segnalato servizio che al nostro alleato rendemmo quando, col nostro atteggiamento nella questione danubiana, abbiamo contribuito a costituire la Romania in quella condizione d’isolamento che, se non valse finora ad assicurare la [sic!] effettiva soluzione del problema fluviale, ebbe, però, per l’Austria-Ungheria, un ben più importante

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risultato, il radicale mutamento dei rapporti suoi col giovane regno [emphasis mine] […]”[19].

 

Relying upon this documentary testimony, it may be asserted that Italy, by its help given towards the action of politically and diplomatically isolation of Romania, at least indirectly determined the Romania’s approaching to Vienna, and finally the Romania’s alliance with Austria. Anyhow, the Danube question demonstrated one more time Romania’s external isolation, and the non-existence of an ally among the Great Powers. Although Rudolf Kejellen had not expressed yet his theories respecting the topositions and the intermediary states, the Romanian governing political elite realised the non-realistic feature of the continuation of a neutral policy. Thus, it decided the approaching to the only political-military group that had expressed its interest towards Romania, that was to the Central Powers[20]. The agreement was prepared by the Romanian King’s visits to Vienna and Berlin (August 4-16, 1883), by the negotiations of P. P. Carp at Vienna, and by the contacts of I. C. Brãtianu, the Romanian prime minister with Bismarck and Kalnoky. The basis of the alliance were established at Gastein on September 7, 1883, during the appointment between Bismarck and Brãtianu, while the adherence to the Triple Alliance took place by the secret treaty signed on October 30, 1883 between Romania and Austria-Hungary, to which Germany underwrote at the same day[21].

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The Romanian-Austrian-Hungarian treaty and the German adherence did not transform the Triple Alliance into a Quadruple one since the only direct agreement was the one signed with Austria. From the diplomatic technique viewpoint, this respect is extremely clear. That is why Romania was to be regarded as a simple Triple Alliance’s satellite, as an “important outpost against Russia” as the Count De Launay would name it in 1888. Its adherence to this political-military system was first and foremost the consequence of its Hohenzollern King’s and of a restricted politicians group’s desire. This group was formed in the German intellectual background (as an exception, the Liberal leader I. C. Brãtianu) and was recognised for its anti-Russian options[22]: P. P. Carp (the Romanian minister at Vienna), Dimitrie Sturdza (the minister of the foreign affairs), and Ion Kalinderu (the administrator of the Crown’s domains and King Charles I’s counsellor). Also consequence of the powers’ interests, the treaty presented some advantages for all of them. For Austria-Hungary, it represented the finalisation of the alliance system that protected its Southern frontier. By the 1883 agreement, Austria-Hungary could hope that the Romanian government would not sustain and would not be involved in the movements in Transylvania, although I. C. Brãtianu rejected such a stipulation. For Germany, the meaning was the same, of the accomplishment of its Eastern front[23]. Nevertheless, the treaty must also be regarded as the basis for the

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future economical penetration of Germany in the Romanian space. Ultimately, the alliance assured three decades of external security for Romania and also the possibility for it to concentrate upon its internal development.

In this political-military integration process of Romania, the detail that inevitably striked was the absence of Italy. It was not invited to underwrite, and not even consulted. The Romanian historiography any time solved this mystery, presenting the Romanian diplomatic strategy as one exclusively built upon the relationship with Germany and Austria-Hungary. To a certain extent, the affirmation was real for that epoch. Nevertheless, did exist any other explanations? There is a question that unfortunately has not a clear answer in the available documentation. What could be certainly stated is that Italy was not informed about the negotiations and about the final agreement. Neither by its allies, nor by Romania. However, the Consulta had for a long time knowledge about the ‘disposition’ and the successive explorations for an alliance. The Baron Saverio Fava informed in this sense since 1879[24]. At his turn, after only three months after his accreditation at Bucharest, Tornielli referred to the Romanian situation in the international context, extremely insisting upon the following two points:

 

“ 1° Facilità di adescare la Rumania ad entrare in combinazione di alleanze anti-ruse;

  2° Mancanza assoluta di una preparazione per esercitare in questo paese una contro [sic!] azione che bilanciasse i mezzi di cui dispone l’Austria-Ungheria”[25].

 

This would not be an obstacle for him to make all the efforts to prevent the Romanian approaching to Vienna. Coming back to the negotiations in 1883, it is very clear that the only information received in Rome was the ones transmitted by the diplomats accredited in Berlin, Vienna, and Bucharest. These information are still sufficient to certainly suspect the establishing of an alliance. The first indication was represented by the King Charles I’s visit in Austria and Germany on August 1883, signalised by the Italian ambassador at Berlin, De Launay, as “[…] la consequence d’une demande faite personnellement par l’Empereur d’Allemagne auprès de Prince de Hohenzollern, père de S. M. [the Romania’s king - emphasis mine]. L’Empereur se plaignait ouvertement de la politique antiautrichienne du

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Roi Charles, et exprimait le désir d’une entrevue pour avoir l’occassion de s’expliquer la dessus avec ce dernier”[26]. Probably the most conclusive, the second sign was represented by the discussion had by the Italian affairs representative at Vienna, Galvagna, with the Austrian-Hungarian minister of foreign affairs, Gustav Kalnoky, after the appointment had by the latter with the German chancellor, von Bismarck, at Salzburg. “[…] Il m’a ajouté que dans cet ordre d’idées il ne pouvait que se réjouir des bonnes dispositions temoignées par le Roi de Roumanie pendant son séjour à Vienne, et confirmées depuis par le Président du Conseil des Ministres de Roumanie. Le Cabinet de Bukarest a, enfin, compris la nécessité d’être en bons rapports avec l’Autriche-Hongrie, et paraît enfin désireux d’ammener [sic!] un rapprochement entre les deux pays sur le terrain politique. […]”[27]. Despite the general terms utilised by the Austrian-Hungarian minister, the Italian diplomat perfectly realised the meaning of the event: “[…] il mutamento nell’indirizzo politico della Rumania, cui ha accennato il conte Kalnoky, ha evidentemente una portata maggiore di un semplice suo riavvicinamento all’Austria-Ungheria, e che le trattative che furono iniziate qui dal signor Bratiano, che saran [sic!] da lui proseguite a Gastein, e forse condotte a termine più tardi a Vienna, sono intese ad associare, mediante formale accordo, la Rumania all’alleanza austro-germanica”[28]. The fact did not modified the reality of the moment at all.  Italy continued to be ‘out of the game’ - an additional proof for its position of inferiority inside of the Triple Alliance. In this sense, there are interesting the commentaries made by the Apostolic legate at Vienna, Vannutelli, during I. C. Brãtianu’s presence in the Austrian-Hungarian capital:

 

“L’udienza data jer l’altro dall’Imperatore al Signor Bratiano, capo del gabinetto rumeno, prima del suo ritorno, può essere considerata come l’ultimo suggello apposto alle trattative iniziate in queste ultime settimane per fare entrare la Rumenia nel concerto austro-germanico. […] Checché ne sia della situazione futura della Rumenia di rimpetto all’alleanza austro-germanica, se questa situazione cioè sia o no del tutto identica a quella che anche l’Italia crede di avere rispetto ai due imperi alleati certo è che, né al principe Bismarck, né al conte

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Kalnoky, né al Bratiano è sorto neppur da lungi pensiero di sentire l’avviso del Mancini e Depretis prima di decidere se la Rumenia debba entrare nella lega e in qual modo e sotto quali condizioni possa o debba essere ammessa [emphasis mine]. Il che prova che l’Italia occupa in questo concerto un posto abbastanza secondario. […]”[29].

 

This secondary position was therefore appreciated at Bucharest also. In addition, as we already noticed, the Romanian treaty with Austria-Hungary and the German adherence were produced by a group of ‘decision makers’ having a pro-German formation and orientation, who regarded the German Reich as the model to be followed. It was exactly established the fact that the Romanian governors actually wished a direct alliance with Germany and only finally they had to content themselves with a treaty signed with Vienna, because of the policy of Russia’s sparing, promoted by Bismarck. However, they permanently conditioned the existence of such an alliance with the German adherence[30]. All of these explain why Romania ignored Italy during the negotiations. Actually, the probability was low that Brãtianu have another attitude regarding Rome than a reserved one, since the Italian representative at Bucharest, Tornielli, made all the possible to hinder the Romanian approaching to the Central Powers.

 

“Sono stato oggi - wrote Galvagna to the ambassador Di Robilant on October 2, 1883 - dal conte Kalnoky. […] Avendo saputo da me ch’ella deve recarsi da un giorno all’altro a Rome, mi ha pregato di farle conoscere quanto segue: ‘Le comte Torn [Tornielli - emphasis mine] s’agite beaucoup trop; il fait son possible pour empêcher le rapprochement de la Roumanie à l’Autriche; il ne cache pas à cet égard sa manière de penser, il est en confabulations continuelles avec Urussov [the Russian minister at Bucuresti - emphasis mine], qui est bien heureux d’avoir dans ces agissements anti-autrichiens un allié tel que Torn. Brãtianu même, à son passage à Vienne, s’est plaint avec moi de l’attitude du ministre d’Italie qui ne facilite pas l’evolution qu’on est en train d’opérer dans l’opinion publique en Roumanie’ [emphasis mine]. Gli ho risposto che la cosa mi stupiva assai, giacché conoscevo a fondo Torn, e lo consideravo come incapace di agire contrariamente alle istruzioni del ministero e potevo assicurare nel modo più formale che le istruzioni costanti e ripetute di Mancini gli prescrivevano l’assoluta astensione tanto negli atti che nei consigli. ‘Je ne doute nullement que les instructions de M. Mancini soient telles, mais je vous affirme qu’il ne s’y conforme pas. Je sais que Torn est rongé par le désir d’une ambassade, et on me dit que c’est par un aimable égard à Berlin et à Vienne qu’on ne veut pas le

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nommer à Pétersbourg. S’il en est ainsi, je serais plus tranquille de le voir en Russie qu’en Roumanie. A Pétersbourg il ne pourra pas nous faire grand mal, tandis qu’il nous nuit beaucoup à Bucharest. La Roumanie n’est pas un grand Etat mais elle occupe une position qui rendrait très utile son concours en cas de complications avec la Russie, et il est de tout notre intéret qu’elle soit avec nous; et c’est ce que Torn veut empêcher. Veuillez je vous prie écrire tout cela confidentielement, au comte Robilant.’ […]”[31].

 

Therefore, the Romanian adherence to the Triple Alliance took place without Italy’s participation. After this moment, the relations between the two states entered into a stationary phase. In the following interval, Italy would adopt a reserved position regarding Romania, and generally regarding all the Balkan states[32]. This did not necessarily meant the renunciation to a policy towards the South Eastern Europe. It only represented the certification of the impossibility to activate it, under the circumstances of an Austrian-Russian preponderance in the Balkans. In spite of some grave problems and of the defections appeared in the future relationship with the Central Powers - the customs war against Austria-Hungary (1886-1892) and especially the intensification of the Romanian movements in Transylvania -, Romania would maintain the orientation adopted in its foreign policy. The fact was essentially explained on the circumstances of the international conditions created by the ‘Rumelian crisis’ (1885-1887). The frictions appeared between St Petersburg and Sofia, and the Russian repeated intentions to re-establish its control in the Southern of Danube principality imposed the maintaining of the alliance and even its perfecting.

The same international conditions allowed to Italy, represented at the Consulta by Carlo Felice Di Robilant (since October 1885), the restructure inside

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of the Triple Alliance. The 1882 rudimentary system was transformed into a much more complex one, destined to assure to it not only the security, but also to respect the existed statu quo in North Eastern Africa and in the Balkan Peninsula[33]. Recommended by Di Robilant in 1881-1882 as the most adequate in order to transform Italy from a passive into a searched element, the tactic of reservation demonstrated as being practical and fruitful this time. This was proved by the two instruments integrated inside of the Triple Alliance’s treaty, renewed on February 20, 1887[34], that augmented Germany’s and Austria-Hungary’s obligations in the East and in the Mediterranean Sea, but not the Italian ones regarding the two empires. Because of this diplomatic strategy, Italy would be in the centre of the complex system of Mediterranean and continental alliances recomposed by Bismarck after the 1885-1887 crisis. It was not a trivial result. “Da molti anni l’Italia non aveva più discusso, da pari a pari con le altre Potenze e non aveva fatto pesare il proprio voto nella bilania della diplomazia europea […]”[35]. Fifteen days before the treaty’s signing, the irony made that the principal architect to be forced to abandon the Consulta. Always considered by him as a useless and dangerous diversion for Italy, the Eastern Africa meant his ruin. The massacre of a detachment of 500 Italian soldiers by the Ethiopians at Dogali at the end of January, 1887 determined him to resign[36]. Because of the quite few possible solutions, the Depretis government’s resignation (February 8, 1887) was followed by the constitution of another Depretis government - the last one - which would include Francesco Crispi, as minister of internal affairs, on April 4. Subsequently, after Agostino Depretis’s decease (July 29, 1887), Crispi would become ad interim minister of the foreign affairs since August 13[37]. Crispi was the one who accomplished the adherence to the Austrian-Romanian agreement in 1883, inside

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of a vast and ambitious program, destined to consolidate the alliances’ system of Italy.

 

 

 

Economy and Emigration

 

The legal background for the economical Italian-Romanian relationship’s development was created by the signing of the Convention of Trade and Navigation in Rome, on March 23, 1878, ratified on March 1, 1881[38]. During the analysed interval, the commercial exchanges between the two states - meaning  over 90% from the economical relations in that period - quantitatively and qualitatively reduced, expressed the type and the economical level of development for both of them. From the external trade viewpoint, the Italy’s economic profile was a prevalently agrarian one, although the industrialisation process was more advanced than in Romania[39]. At that time, Italy was still farther to the position of economic metropolis, as it would be after 1900, with a great power’s economy, subordinated to the imperatives of the export.

In the Romanian case, the economic profile is much easier to be deduced. It is sufficient to compare the structure of its external trade at 1871 - exports: vegetal materials (over 80%), animals and animal products (approximately 20%), minerals (circa 1%); imports: textiles, metals, and machines (over 70%) - with the 1905 one - exports: cereals and farinaceous products (75%), fruits (10%), wood (6%), oil (2%); imports: textiles and derivatives (34%), metals and machines (28%), rice (5%), colonials and Southern fruits (3%), etc.[40], and it may be noticed that the Romanian economy was to a high degree agrarian. Consequently, the similarities between the two economies were not able to stimulate the commercial exchanges’ development. There is also to be remarked that the two states were connected (and at the same time, dependent) to different economical systems: Romania to the Central European one (Austria-Hungary and Germany), Italy to the Western one (France and England, but also Austria-Hungary)[41], and this very fact imposed them certain economical strategies. In addition, there missed the directed communication routes, the rail and maritime transports. For instance, in 1881 there

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was only one navigation society, a French one that accomplished the direct courses between the Italian and the Romanian harbours[42]. This situation could only disadvantage the trade between the two countries. On the one hand, all these facts explain the typology of the exchanges. For example, in 1879, 39,99% from the total of the imports from Italy was represented by the rice, while 96,9% from the total of the Romanian exports in Italy was represented by the cereals[43], situation that would not register significant modifications in the following years. On the other hand, they denote the low level of these exchanges (see tables 1, 3, and 4).

 

 

 

Table no. 1. Romania’s Imports from Italy (1880-1885)[44].

 

Year

The total Value of the

Romanian Imports

(in French Franks)

The Value of the

Imports from Italy

The Percentage

Value

1880

255,336,415 Fr. f.

1,539,911 Fr. f.

0.60%

1881

274,757,458 Fr. f.

1,885,254 Fr. f.

0.68%

1882

268,851,921 Fr. f.

1,789,946 Fr. f.

0.66%

1883

359,907,178 Fr. f.

3,018,477 Fr. f.

0.83%

1884

296,352,391 Fr. f.

2,726,442 Fr. f.

0.92%

1885

268,723,711 Fr. f.

2,606,620 Fr. f.

0.97%

 

(The calculations are based on the data transmitted by G. Tornielli in 1887, see loc. cit.)

 

 

 

 

 

 

Table no. 2. The Romanian exports of cereals in Italy (1880-1883)[45]

 

Year

The total Value

of the Romanian Exports

The Value of the Exports

in Italy*

The percentage Value

1880

218,918,878 Fr. f.

3,026,151 Fr. f.

1.38%

1881

206,518,317 Fr. f.

4,599,349 Fr. f.

2.22%

1882

244,730,199 Fr. f

4,174,107 Fr. f.

1.70%

1883

220,650,279 Fr. f.

2,077,097 Fr. f.

0.94%

 

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*The data are available only for the export of cereals (wheat, maize, rye, and barley).

(The calculations were based upon the data transmitted by G. Tornielli in 1885, see loc. cit.)

 

 

 

For the interval 1880-1885, the value of the Romania’s imports from Italy varies between 0,6% and 0,97% (see Table no. 1), while the exports to the same country would augment from 3,23% in 1879 to 6,51% in 1886[46]. Thus, the increasing of the Romanian products’ presence (cereals, especially) on the Italian market is considerably bigger than the one of the Italian products on the Romanian market. Whether between 1879 and 1884 Italy had constantly occupied the 8th place, in 1886, it would pass into the fourth position as a destination country for the Romanian exports, after England, Austria-Hungary, and France (see Table no. 3). However, it would not succeed the same performance in the case of the imports, where it remained on the eighth position (1,06%), being surpassed not only by Austria-Hungary (31,54%), Germany (24,73%), England (24,08%), or France (4,88%), but also by Belgium (4,88%), Russia (3,22%), Turkey (1,90%), and Greece (1,15%).

 

 

 

Table no. 3. The percentage Evolution of the Romanian Trade with Italy (1883-1885)[47]

 

Year

The percentage Value of the Imports from Italy

The percentage Value of the Exports   to Italy

1883

0,83%

1,01%

1884

0,92%

1,86%

1885

0,97%

5,20%

 

 

Table no. 4. The Foreign Trade of Romania in 1886[48].

(in Italian Lire)

 

No

Country

Import

Export

The percentage Value

1.

Austria-Hungary

93.518.187

34.687.718

31,54%

13,56%

2.

England

71.407.229

116.627.134

24,08%

45,62%

3.

Belgium

14.495.507

15.240.368

4,88%

5,96%

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4.

Bulgaria

3.324.385

5.349.060

1,12%

2,05%

5.

Switzerland

2.559.412

68.262

0,86%

0,026%

6.

France

14.494.550

29.134.135

4,88%

11,39%

7.

Germany

73.339.859

2.713.400

24,73%

1,02%

8.

Greece

3.409.862

2.713.400

1,15%

1,06%

9.

Italy

3.152.883

16.663.133

1,06%

6,51%

10.

The Netherlands

***

5.508.374

***

2,15%

11.

Russia

9.554.514

12.897.407

3,22%

5,04%

12.

Turkey

5.660.817

11.522.657

1,90%

4,50%

13.

Other countries

1.500.148

2.527.612

0,50%

0,98%

 

Total

296.497.362

255.647.263

100%

100%

 

(The calculations are based upon the data transmitted by P. Riva, the Italian general Consul at Galaþi in 1888; v. loc. cit.)

 

 

 

The discrepancy would be also maintained in the immediately following interval, since the 1889 statistics indicated Italy on an important third place as destination market for the Romanian products (8,02% from the total) and only a ninth place concerning the imports (1,08% from the total)[49]. That is somehow unexplainable, since the Italian trade did not suffer because of the protectionist measures promoted by Romania after 1885[50]. At that time, the Legation at Bucharest, and also the General Consulate at Galaþi uselessly drew the attention to the Italian economic ministries that it might take advantage of this drastic diminishing of the French and Turkish presence on the Romanian market, and especially about the outbreak of the customs war with Austria-Hungary in 1886, in order to extend the Italian trade in Romania[51].

Inside of the same economical relations, there must be also taken into consideration the activity in Romania of an important number of Italian construction firms, which by 1895 would held the supremacy in the urban and railways sectors, financed by the state. Unfortunately, the only available data in this sense are the ones transmitted in 1896 by the minister at Bucharest, Beccaria[52]. According to these data, the value of the works achieved by the Italian firms between 1890 and 1895 attained the amount of 21,5 million of French Franks, figures that do not comprise the value of the works effected by the same firms in

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the Romanian Ministry of Defence’s account[53]. From the data transmitted by Beccaria, it results that in 1895, from the number of 116 engineers engaged by the Romanian Railways Society, 23 were Italians, a part of them naturalised[54]. However, it is impossible to precise an approximate figure regarding the Italian workers in Romania at that time and, especially before 1888. It is known that they were especially engaged  in the forest activity, the quarries of stone, the urban constructions or the railways sector. Giulio Tesi, the general consul at Galaþi, would report for 1895 a number of approximately 7000 Italian immigrants only for the Galaþi district, among whom 2000 worked for the construction of the railway bridge of Cernavodã[55]. The only evaluation of the temporary and permanent emigration would only be accomplished in 1912 by an inspector of the Commissary for emigration, inside of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs[56].

There are two other statistics: one of them, elaborated in 1889, indicates 8,841 Italians in Romania, figure that probably also includes the temporary emigration[57]. Achieved by Beccaria in 1902, the other reveals that the number of the Italians in Romania was 7,436[58], figure that also seems to include the temporary emigration.

Under these circumstances, it is difficult to establish the Italian emigration in Romania before 1888. From the available data, it results the existence of an Italian colony in Bucharest as certitude, and it owned a Società di mutuo soccorso of 120 members[59]. There was also an Italian agrarian colony in Dobroudja, at Cataloi that reunited 72 families coming in Romania before 1878 and having on lease state’s land[60]. For the time being, it is impossible to find out whether some other such a colonies existed or not, whether they were in the Bucharest legation’s and in the Galaài consulate’s evidence and especially whether they had the Italian state’s assistance.

Nevertheless, there is difficult to appreciate the economical relationship between the two countries before 1888-1890, and also the Italian emigration in Romania as factors that could influence the diplomatic strategy towards an approaching. Taking the level of the bilateral commercial exchanges into consideration during the analysed interval, it is difficult to suppose the existence of some economical groups of pressure, on one side or another, that could influence

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the decision making process. So much the less, the Italian colonies in Romania could represent a pressure/influence factor. The explanation for the 1888 agreement must be somewhere else explored.

 

 

 

People and Strategies

 

Before the First World War, the diplomacy remained a reserved domain in all the European states. Generally, the diplomatic strategies depended on and were the result of a restrained group of decision factors. Among them, the monarchs occupied the first rank. It may be noticed that in all the monarchies of the period, the sovereigns gave a great importance to the prerogatives in this domain. It is not only the case of the ones that owed exceptional powers (the Russia’s tsar or the Ottoman sultan), but also of the constitutional monarchs: Emperor Franz Joseph of Austria-Hungary, the German emperors William I and William II, the kings and the queens of Great Britain, from Victoria to Edward VII and George VI, King Leopold II of Belgium, etc.[61] Italy and Romania did not represent exceptions from this rule. The King of Italy had this kind of prerogatives according to the Article 5 of the Albertine Status (Statuto Fondamentale del Regno): “Al Re solo apartiene il potere esecutivo. Egli è il Capo supremo dello Stato: comanda tutte le forze di terra e di mare; dichiara la guerra, fa i trattati di pace, d’alleanza, di commercio ed altri, [emphasis mine] dandone notizia alle Camere tosto che l’interesse e la sicureza dello Stato il permettono, ed unendovi le communicazioni opportune. I trattati che importassero un onere alle finanze o variazione di territorio dello Stato non avrano effetto se non dopo ottenuto l’assenso delle Camere”[62]. Obviously, he exercised them having the ministers as intermediaries, but those ministers were ‘his ministers and diplomats’ (Article 65), were persons that enjoyed his entire confidence and represented the restricted circle of the sovereign’s intimates[63].

In Romania’s case, the situation was less explicit: according to the Article 93 from the 1866 Constitution, the king (the prince, before 1881), “conclude with the foreign states the conventions necessary for trade, navigation, and the other similar ones [emphasis mine]; however, for the necessary authority of these acts, they firstly must be subdued to the legislative power and approved by it”[64]. Since the constitutional act had been elaborated when Romania had not yet gained its independence, there were not stipulated the political-military conventions in the respective paragraph, in order the avoid the complication of the international relations. In these conditions, the King of Romania was in the paradoxical

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situation to have not the possibility to claim such a prerogative, not expressly specified in the Constitution, and at the same time to be not controlled by the Parliament whether he exerted it, interpreting on a large sense the Article 93[65]. With or without the monarch’s prerogatives, the diplomacy would remain the King’s reserved domain, the sovereign being the only warrant of the foreign policy’s continuity, in the conditions of the parliamentary life. P. P. Carp, one of the closest Charles I’ s collaborators, would not be fearful to declare this respect in front of the Parliament in 1888, from his position of minister of foreign affairs: “The foreign policy does not belong to the country, the foreign policy belongs to the king […], the foreign policy must have a well defined and a well established purpose, and a continuity staying outside of the political parties’ fluctuations, and this continuity is represented by the Crown, which is the supreme referee in front of the parties and which has a bigger preponderance than the Conservatives’ head and than the Liberals’ head […], the sovereign represents the country’s sovereignty […]”[66]. However, in the case of Romania, the king would be obliged to carefully select his collaborators, inside of the government, since the Article 92 of the same Constitution stipulated that “no one of the King’s acts could be available, whether it is not countersigned by a minister, who consequently becomes responsible for that act”[67].

The above considerations explain to a certain extent why the decision making group was so restrained. We noticed that the group that concluded the agreement with Austria-Hungary in 1883 did not surpass the number of five persons (including the king). The regime of ministerial responsibility was not able to allow a minister to superficially accept the signing of a treaty, especially in the case that it contravened to the public opinion’s manifestations (as it was the case in 1883). Also imposed by the promoted foreign policy’s lack of the mass basis, the collaboration with such a group would prove to be an extremely risky alternative under the conditions of governmental instability[68].

During the period between 1883 and 1888, the continuity in the Romania’s foreign orientation was preserved by the maintaining of the government presided by I. C. Brãtianu, one of the main promoters of the 1883 treaty. More exactly, by the maintaining of I. C. Brãtianu as the head of the government, character considered as the warrant of the signed treaties’ conservation not only by the king,

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but also by the Austrian-German diplomacy[69]. This was probably because the ministers of foreign affairs that would succeed to D. A. Sturdza, namely Ion Câmpineanu (February 2-October 28, 1885) and Mihai Pherekyde (December 16, 1885-March 20, 1888), and also the entire cabinet had no idea about the treaty’s pledges. That is why there must not be surprising the different ministers’ official declarations about the Romania’s strict neutrality, more and more numerous after 1886-1887. Included in the Parliament, the debate upon the foreign policy in this period would gravitate around the same option. The discourse based upon duplicity was inevitable under the conditions of a secret diplomacy. However, it was not difficult for the informed persons to deduce the country’s real strategy, which could not be another one than the preserving of the alliance with the Central Powers, under the existent international conditions. Considered by the observers’ greatest part as an Austrian-Hungarian success, the end of the interregnum period in Bulgaria by the offering of the throne to the prince Ferdinand of Saxa-Coburg was not able to relax the situation in the Balkans. On the contrary, it caused the intensification of Russia’s efforts in order to receive again the control over the principality[70]. The danger of a war’s breaking out continued to exist, and this danger would determine Romania to begin the arming in order of the ‘preserving of the neutrality’. Actually, 1887 is the year in which it would be started off the fortification program on the Focºani-Nãmoloasa-Galaþi-Bucharest/Prahova’s Mountains line, program whose meaning was to be read “in the direction of the guns from Nãmoloasa”, as P. P. Carp would later affirm[71]. Although they denied the existence of an alliance, the declarations of the liberal leader I. C. Brãtianu gave an idea about the Romania’s foreign orientation. Answering to a parliamentary question regarding the foreign policy, he declared on March 10, 1888:

 

“The program of our policy is to do not provoke anyone, to do not vex any state’s interests, but to defend ours when they are attacked. […] I do not know where from the honourable Mr. Blarenberg[72] could notice that we concluded an alliance, either because of sympathy, or because of  interest; but what could I say to you is that nobody honoured us, in the sense of proposing us an alliance. […] When the Prince of Bismarck asked me once what do I look for at Vienna and

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Berlin, I answered him that I simply came to have an orientation, since a small state could not propose anything from himself, but it is indebted, more than a big state, to be not surprised by the events. […] After these words, the Prince of Bismarck told me: whether you came to have an orientation, then you should know that Austria and Germany want the peace. If you wish the peace, then be inclined to us. And if you wish the war, then address yourself to somebody else. Sirs, I am inclined to where I find out the peace”[73].

 

At that time, it was known the nickname of the ‘League of the peace’ given to the Triple Alliance. On its last months of existence and through the agency of D. A. Sturdza, the Brãtianu government would be to begin the negotiations for the Italian adherence to the Austrian-Romanian agreement. After I. C. Brãtianu’s resigning (March 20, 1888), the arrangements would be followed by P. P. Carp, minister of foreign affairs in the new ‘Junimist’ cabinet presided by Theodor Rosetti. Carp would express himself in clear and firm terms about Romania’s foreign policy, in a brief time after the taken of the foreign affairs’ portfolio, during the Deputy Chambers’ meeting on March 23, 1888:

 

“[…] Mr. Blaremberg talked about the foreign policy saying that not in a case, although it would be made a dissolution, he could not offer his confidence to us. I have always asked myself, what for? And here we are again confronted with a legend, namely the German policy’s legend. We asked ourselves, why this German policy took such a terrible air that, without any explanation, still it is said: A! You are for the German policy, so you are the real traitors! Sirs, the German policy is especially characterised by the fact that the German government does as less as possible for the foreign policy. Maybe it sounds for you as a paradox, but this is strictly the truth. All the wars carried by the Prince of Bismarck were internal policy wars and they did them only to do away with the obstacles appeared at the constitution of the German empire; beside this, it prudently searched for the peace that Europe needed. This is the characteristic of the German policy and we ask, what do we need, we that have a territory that could feed a population three times bigger than it is, that the growing of our resources could double the Romanian state’s powers without any external action, what do we need if not the peace? Thus, we must associate to them who always worked for the silence and peace, necessary for the Romanian people’s prosperity and increasing. This is the German policy and, in this sense, the present day government is for the German policy, whom was also recognised by Mr. Brãtianu with a strategy that must have our approval, and I have never had any reason to give my entire approval to him for such a policy in

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accordance with the real country’s interests, although he is now in the opposition.”[74]

 

With such a conception, Carp could only consider the perfecting of the existent alliances system by the Italy’s adherence - as a member of the ‘League of peace’ - to the Austrian-Romanian agreement, as being timely. However, there could be noticed that the referrals to Italy misses in his speech, like in Brãtianu’s one, practically the same person who five years before had imposed the orientation towards the Central Powers. Since the idea of the approaching to Rome did not belong to the Romanian governments, then to whom?

In Renato Mori’s study dedicated to these problems, one of the deductions was that the concluding of the Italian-Romanian agreement was to a significant extent due to Francesco Crispi’s presence ahead of the Ministry of the Foreign Affairs[75]. As we already pointed out, Crispi’s naming as ad interim minister at the Foreign Affairs occurred in the less favourable conditions for the Italian diplomacy, created by Di Robilant’s resignation and afterwards by Agostino Depretis’s death. Crispi was not one of the members of the elitist club of the monarch’s confidences at all. On the contrary, his Jacobine past put him in a suspect position in his relation with the Crown[76]. Actually, a sum of favourable factors contributed to his instalment ahead of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. First, the missing of a general secretary at Consulta determined the King Humbert I to entrust Crispi with the momentary administration of the current affairs during the Depretis ministry’s last weeks of existence[77]. On the other side, Crispi had already assumed this task since, in the prime minister’s and the minister of the foreign affairs’ s absence, it was the minister of internal affairs’ s duty to co-ordinate the Consulta, according to the Italian practice[78]. Nevertheless, the task entrusted by the sovereign was not intended to be definitive at all. It was demonstrated by the fact that, in a brief time after this naming, Humbert I addressed to the Italian ambassador at Vienna, Costantino Nigra, inviting him to assume the leading of the Ministry of the Foreign Affairs[79]. Nigra enjoyed the entire sovereign’s confidence, because of his diplomatic experience and his manifest monarchic loyalty.

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It was only after this latter’s refusal[80] when he would be obliged to confirm Crispi’s temporary mandate at Consulta, on August 13, 1887. The Italian historiography has extensively  expressed its judgements about the foreign policy promoted by Francesco Crispi, and they are almost negative[81]. Among the oldest ones, the image traced out by Gaetano Salvemini remains pertinent, despite its firm and polemical feature:

 

“[…] Ignorava la misura […] in tutti suoi sentimenti. Era un agitato nella vita pubblica, come era un disordinato nella vita privata. Si lanciava a testa bassa contro gli ostacoli, invece di girarli con prudenza scettica o temporeggiatrice, come faceva Depretis, o di trattarli con ironia tranquilla da gran segniore, come faceva Robilant. Portava, nel azione diplomatica quelli stessi squilibri di pensiero, quella stessa intemperanza di linguaggio, che si incontrano ad ogni passo nei suoi discorsi parlamentari, sia di oppositore, sia di ministro, e che provocavano inutili incidenti e gli moltiplicavano senza bisogno i nemici. Gli mancava - riconosce un suo ammiratore inglesse, lo Stillmann - quell’arte del ‘suaviter in mondo’, che consente all’avversario di accettare il ‘fortiter in re’ senza doversi pubblicamente riconoscere provocato ed offeso”[82].

 

Later, Carlo Morandi regarded Crispi’s activity as a dramatic and contradictory attempt to impose an addition of dynamism to the Italian foreign policy, inside of some conservative alliances[83]. Proving the same firmness like Salvemini, Fernando Mazzotti concluded that, without conceptual clarity and without style, Crispi’s foreign policy was practically dominated by the mirage of his own country’s greatness[84]. More practical, Renato Mori has many times demonstrated that Crispi’s diplomatic experience was reduced to the visit effected in the European capitals, on August 1877, in order to investigate the Great Powers’ intentions. Crispi considered this mission as being nothing less than the foundation of the future alliance with Germany, but in reality it was a complete failure[85].

The best evidence to certify Crispi’s diplomatic inexperience in that moment was his attempt to obtain an agreement against Austria from Bismarck[86]. He would demonstrate the same inexperience in 1887, only one-month after the taken of the foreign affairs’ portfolio. Then he immediately accepted von Bismarck’s invitation

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to effect a visit in Germany, for different consultations about the international situation, invitation that had been elegantly refused by Di Robilant two years ago. As Salvemini clearly proved it, the notes about the appointments had with the German chancellor demonstrate that Bismarck discussed with Crispi nothing more than he could communicate to the Italian diplomat using a postal card[87]. Provoking Crispi’s passage in Germany, the German diplomacy gained what it had proposed, meaning the determination of Paris’s suspicions, the maintaining of the tension state inside of the Italian-French relationship in its own profit[88]. Anyhow, Bismarck had the surprise to achieve even more than he had initially expected since Crispi offered him the military collaboration on the Rhine against France, proposal that would become concrete by the military convention signed on the beginning of February, 1888[89]. These were the ‘achievements’ and the ‘potential’ of the one who, unsatisfied with the alliances system created by his predecessor, Di Robilant[90], would ‘succeed’ the performance to sign an agreement that not only that none of Italy’s ministers of foreign affairs after 1882 would ever imagine it, but - paradoxically - also he himself had never proposed to conclude.

 

 

 

The 1888 Italian-Romanian Agreement

 

The policy of the perfecting of the alliances system with the Central Powers was in direct connection with the Crispian anti-French option, maintained by the ambitions of cultural and moral primate, by the economic nationalism, and ideological considerations[91]. It urged Crispi to a fundamental anti-French policy, and to the emphasis of the relationship with the Northern empires and with the Great Britain, in the tendency to create a kind of ‘sanitary belt’ against France, in order to prevent the possible subsequent manifestations of the French imperialism[92]. In the case of a supposed conflict with France, the German assistance would guarantee the success in the terrestrial military operations. On the

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other side, on the sea, the Italian fleet was not capable to oppose to the much stronger French one and could not count on the German one, blocked in the Northern Sea. Crispi needed a warrant in the Mediterranean Sea and the only state that could offer it was Austria-Hungary. However, the existent documentation leads to the conclusion that the idea of the Italy’s adherence to the 1883 Austrian-Romanian appeared as the result of some proposals of military co-operation between Vienna and Rome against Russia, proposed advanced by Francesco Crispi at the end of December, 1887 in exchange of the naval assistance.

Di Robilant had also made this kind of demand, during the negotiations of the Triple Alliance’s renewal, but the Austrian-Hungarian government had declined it[93]. Nevertheless, the new proposal deserved more attention, since the Bulgarian throne had been occupied by Ferdinand of Saxa-Coburg, and thus it had been intensified the existent tension between Austria-Hungary and Russia and the chances for a war’s breaking out had increased[94]. In the case of such a conflict’s commencement, the Austrian-Hungarian minister of foreign affairs, Gustav Kalnoky would wish that the neighbour kingdom’s army to not remain untouched and inactive at the empire’s frontiers[95]. On the other side, the same minister momentarily regarded Crispi as a maintainer of the firm policy promoted by De Robilant. Therefore, he hesitated towards these negotiations, considering them as giving the opportunity to Italy to again pretend new compensations[96].

The Austrian ambassador in Rome, von Bruck, would sustain Crispi’s proposal, regarding that such a military agreement would shelter the Austrian government against every surprise from the Italy’s side. He would inform Kalnoky that the only compensation demanded by Crispi was the Austrian military fleet’s co-operation in the Mediterranean space, in exchange for the two army corps that were supposed to be concentrated in Veneto immediately after the agreement’s conclusion, so that to be rapidly utilised against Russia[97]. His argumentation did not cease the Viennese government’s hesitations. It was demonstrated by the order sent to the lieutenant-colonel Steininger, participant at the negotiations in Berlin regarding the Italian-Austrian-German military agreement (this agreement exclusively stipulated the sending of troops in Germany’s sustain and against France; Vienna participated at the discussions only because the manner of the Italian troops’ moving was regulated, through Austria, to Germany), in order to avoid the hypothesis of sending Italian troops on the Eastern front, in the conversations with the allies[98]. However, all the probabilities indicate that the

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temporisation was due to the wish for gaining the necessary time for an attentive analysis of the offering.

The idea of the Italian troops’ directing towards Romania undoubtedly belonged to Gustav Kalnoky. The Austrian-Hungarian minister developed and argued it in a discussion with the German ambassador at Vienna, von Reuss, on January 7, 1888. He pointed that, in a case of war against Russia, the greatest part of the Austrian railways would be occupied with the troops’ transport towards North and East, the only available remaining the ones towards Romania. For this reason, the Italian army corps could be exclusively moved towards this last country[99]. On January 16, he would inform the Austrian ambassador in Rome, von Bruck, about the same matter. The logical argumentation would be however accomplished by an ethnical-linguistic one:

 

“[…] Tanto più che, con tale provedimento i rumeni si avvantaggerebbero di un valido aiuto e l’ala destra dello schieramento austriaco si appoggerebbe su un solido bastione. Infine, le truppe italiane si intenderebbero bene con i rumeni, parenti di razza, e si darebbe ad esse la soddisfazione di svolgere un ruolo più importante di quello di semplici satelliti dell’armata austriaca”[100].

 

Utilising such an intelligent offers, Kalnoky assured a considerable military assistance in the East for Austria-Hungary - in the case of an Italian affirmative answer. At the same time, he avoided any requiring of compensations. In his analysis, Renato Mori attributed only a negative value to this Austrian initiative, considering it as having exclusively the role to provoke an Italian refusal. Nevertheless, he did not explain why would Kalnoky intend such a finality![101] In exchange, he considered Bismarck as the principal promoter of the Italian-Romanian agreement[102]. Obviously, the German diplomacy had also well-grounded reasons to sustain the idea of an Italian presence in the East, since a possible Italian-Austrian co-operation on the Eastern front - in the Romanian support –

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would practically liberate it from the obligation to assist the Romanians. This is the way in which the phrase written by Bismarck concerning the von Reuss’s report on January 7 must be understood: “It is much better to perform the promised help to the Romanians, using the Italian troops instead of the German ones”[103]. Anyhow, the German chancellor’s intervention was essential for two viewpoints:

1.     Because he informed von Moltke about Kalnoky’s proposal and solicited a military examination from the German feld-marshal. Positive to a high degree, this latter’ s conclusion was:

 

“I really keep in mind as deserving to be taken into account the proposal to send Italian troops to Romania in order to fight […] against Russia. Alone, the Romanian army would not be strong enough to attempt an offensive in Bessarabia. The situation would be completely different whether there could be merged a sufficient force in Romania to organise an offensive. Russia could lose Poland without considering its vital interests in danger, but it could not accept to lose its connection to the Black Sea. Odessa, the main Russia’s commercial port, fortified only towards the sea, is only at 30 miles distance to the Romanian frontier. Whether the strengthening of the Romanian army with around 100,000 people (meaning three army corps) would succeed, then Russia would be rapidly forced to retreat at least the same number of forces from its march against Germany and to send them on the battle fields in Bessarabia, and thus Austria would have the possibility to take a march towards Kiev into consideration, with its army’s right flank. An Italian-Romanian army’s operation in the Southern Russia could also become a reason for Turkey to associate against Russia”[104].

                                                                                      

The argumentation built by the German marshal was decisive to eliminate the Austrian cabinet’s hesitations.

2.     Because it also fastened the Italian side’s acceptance, insinuating that its presence in Romania would represent a counterbalance to the exclusive Austrian-Hungarian tendencies in this area: “Une coopération de votre part en Roumanie exciterait, peut-être, quelque dèfiance à Vienne, à cause d’une certaine affinité de race avec les habitants de ces régions danubiennes”[105]. It is remarkable that Bismarck ‘borrows’ the idea of the common Latin origin from Kalnoky ‘s speech, giving it a complete different sense. Because of the Bismarck’s apply, on February 13, 1888  Crispi would inform von Bruck that Italy is capable to send “corpi d’armata anche sui campi di battaglia lontani, fossero questi anche la frontiera rumena”[106].

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Nevertheless, the merit for the idea of an Italian-Romanian military co-operation belongs to the Austrian-Hungarian minister of foreign affairs, Gustav Kalnoky. A similar apply to the German chancellor’s ones was also undertaken by the feld-marshal von Moltke in front of the Italian ambassador in Berlin, De Launay. The report drawn out by the Italian ambassador on this occasion was only partially utilised by Mori, and also wrongly interpreted, at least from two points of view[107]. On that occasion, it is extremely truth that De Launay definitely rejected the possibility to send Italian troops in Romania:

 

“Dernièrement le marèchal de Moltke me demandait quelle était notre pensée à l’egard du rôle réservé à la Roumanie en cas de graves complictions européennes. Je répondais ignorer la manière de voir de V. E., mais qu’à mon avis ce Royaume formait un avant-poste important,un boulevard contre la Russie. Il appartenait à l’Autriche de veiller dans cette direction. En ce qui nous concernait, il ne saurait nous convenir, en cas de guerre, de trop diviser nos forces, dont le meilleur emploi serait une campagne contre la France vers le Rhin, en pleine entente avec l’Allemagne[…]”[108].

 

However, analysing the final paragraph of the same document, it may be noticed that the negative argumentation took exclusively a military intervention into consideration. Thus, the Italian diplomat recommended a political action in the support of Romania:

 

“[…] Il me revient en voie strictement confidentielle, que la question a été examinée entre Vienne et Berlin s’il serait à propos d’inviter l’Italie à s’associer à ces arrangements. Les deux Cabinets sont tombés d’accord et des ouvertures ont été faites à V. E., qui les a accueillies favorablement. Le Cabinet de Berlin abandonne à celui de Vienne de porsuivre avec nous les pourparlers. Je suppose qu’il s’agit plutôt, en cas de conflagration, d’obtenir de notre part un effet moral qu’un veritable concours militaire vers le Danube. Il paraît que les négociations traînent en longueur. La Russie met en ce temps à profit pour chercher, par l’entremise de M. Hitrowo[109] à renverser le Cabinet Bratiano. On fait flêche de tout bois à cet effet. Or, sa conservation répond aux intérêts de l’Italie, de l’Allemagne et de l’Autriche. V. E. jugera elle même si et dans quelle mesure nous pourrions contribuer à déjouer les projets russes. Une démonstrations de sympathie de la part d’un Gouvernement constitutionnel et libéral, comme le nôtre, agirait peut-être

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davantage sur l’opinion publique en Roumanie que les marques de bon vouloir de l’Autriche et de l’Allemagne [emphasis mine]”[110].

 

On the other side, there is difficult to believe that his opinion could negatively influence Crispi, taking into account that at that time (February 29) the indirect explorations were substituted by direct negotiations. Also, the one who turns over the documentation about these negotiations could notice that the greatest part of the Italian correspondence took place on the one hand between Crispi and Nigra, and on the other hand between Crispi and Curtopassi, the new Italian minister in Bucharest. De Launay did not take any part in these transactions. On the contrary, it seemed that Crispi ignored his diplomatic reports[111]. The explanation for this marginal position must be probably searched for in the old disagreement between the ambassador in Berlin and Nigra[112].

What is less clear for this phase of the negotiations takes the Romanian governors’ position and participation into account. Certainly enough, we could affirm that the Romanian diplomacy was informed about the discussions only on the middle of February. D. A. Sturdza, the ex-minister of foreign affairs who had signed the alliance treaty with Austria-Hungary, now minister of the public instruction in the Brãtianu cabinet, was in Germany on January, 1888. He had the task to arrange a loan with the Berlin banks, destined to the construction of the fortifications on the Southern Moldavia, in order to protect Romania against a presumed Russian invasion. According to a tradition established since the beginning of the 80s, Bismarck received him in audience. Although the German chancellor already prospected the possibility of Italy’s adherence to the Austrian-Romania agreement, Sturdza was not informed in this sense at all[113]. The explanation for this attitude could be the one a month later presented by the Italian ambassador De Launay, namely that Berlin ‘had abandoned’ the negotiations’ initiative to the Viennese cabinet[114]. The fact that there were references to the conversations held by Sturdza in Vienna and Berlin in the memorial forwarded to Crispi by Kalnoky on February 26 or 28, must be put into connection with the Austrian diplomacy’s intention to underline that an agreement between Italy and Romania particularly interested the government in Bucharest and that, at the

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latter’s demand, the Austrian government only intermediated its accomplishment[115].

Most probably, Sturdza was informed about the events, during his passing through Vienna, sometime at the beginning of February. At his turn, he informed the king at his returning in the country. That is why Charles I’ s visit in Berlin and Vienna, beginning with March 13, must be put into connection with the wish to be informed about the negotiations that directly regarded Romania[116]. As a whole, Romania’s part in these arrangements would be marginal. It was proved by the reduced participation at the negotiations and especially by the manner in which the adherence’ s instruments would be achieved.

Meanwhile, the Austrian diplomacy had decided to directly approach the Consulta, as a consequence of the impression produced by the Marshal von Moltke’s memorial. Anyhow, it initially demanded an evaluation of the Italian army’s potentialities and efficiency to the military attaché in Rome, the colonel von Forstner. This latter’s report, essentially negative[117], still admitted that Italy had the capacity to send troops on the Eastern front. Probably before comprehending the conclusions of this informative note, Kalnoky mailed a memorial to the Italian minister of foreign affairs through the agency of the ambassador von Bruck. After he officially announced the existence of an alliance treaty between Austria-Hungary and Romania, Kalnoky solicited Italy’s adherence to this agreement:

 

“Comme V.E. le sait nous sommes depuis plusieurs années lies par un traité secret avec la Roumanie, traité qui repose sur le mêmes principes défensifs et conservateurs que celui conclu avec l’Italie. L’Allemagne s’est jointe à ce traité de manière qu’elle a envers la Roumanie juste les mêmes obligations que l’Autriche-Hongrie. Je suis certain que le Gouvernement italien est informé que la Roumanie, dans sa ligne politique, cherchait à s’appuier aux deux Puissances centrales, mais il n’aura pas en connaissance de l’existence d’un traité formel et obligatoire. Dans la situation actuelle de l’Europe il est de toute importance - tant sous le point de vue politique que militaire - de s’occuper attentivement du Gouvernement roumain qui, dans le cas d’une guerre, devient un des facteurs les plus importants pour toute action dans l’Est. […] Du point de vue politique que je désire mettre en première ligne - vu que la guerre n’est que l’ultima ratioo - il serait pour nos buts politiques, l’Angleterre y comprise, un grand avantage de s’assurer de la

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Roumanie dont la position géographique - entre l’Autriche-Hongrie et les bouches du Danube, et entre la Russie et la Bulgarie - est certainement d’une importance capitale pour tout ce qui concerne les événements en Orient. Au fur et à mésure que les intérêts de l’Italie augumentent dans les questions de la Mer Noire, de la Mediteranée et dans celle du maintient du statu quo en Orient, il nous semblerait important qu’elle se rapproche de la Roumanie, rapprochement d’autant plus facile, qu’il aurait pour point de départ les traités déja existants entre les Puissances centrales et la Roumanie, traités qui ont pour base les mêmes principes que ceux conclus avec l’Italie. - Ces considerations nous semblent on ne peut plus justes et d’un intérêt reciproque. Dans les conversations tenues tant ici qu’à Berlin avec Mr. Sturdza et dans lesquelles toutes les questions ont été envisagées sous les points de vue les plus serieux le manque de contact ou d’un lien plus intime entre l’Italie et la Roumanie s’est fait sentir et s’est certainement un anneau qui manque à la chaine qui relie les Puissances alliées dans leur politique conservatrice. […] Il n’y a pas de doute que la Roumanie - qui par la raçe de sa population est une ennemie naturelle de la Russie - verrait avec une grande satisfaction un rapprochement avec l’Italie, rapprochement qui lui donnerait au moins moralement, un nouvelle force de résistence envers la Russie. […] Nous serions charmés si Mr. de Crispi voulait entrer dans notre manière de voir. Veuillez donc Lui donner, tout à fait confidentiellement, lecture de ce qui précéde et Le prier d’en garder le secret plus absolû. Il n’y a que bien peu de personnes qui sont instruites de ces faits, voilà pourquoi Mr. Sturdza nous a priés que cette question ne passe que par notre intermédiaire. Nous croyons qu’un accord entre l’Italie et la Roumanie, pareil à celui p.e. qui nous lie à l’Angleterre, serait un résultat très satisfaisant et qui donnerait un grand appui moral à la Roumanie”[118].

 

It may be observed that the document was conceived in order to: 1. To place Austria in the secondo piano, pushing thus Romania on the principal position. At that moment, it was impossible for the Romanian minister D. A. Sturdza - whom the referral is made to - to have such an endeavour, without the informing and the previous agreement of the King Charles I. At most, Sturdza could deliver a favourable opinion, detail that could not be known by Crispi; 2. To create the impression to the Italian minister that Italy, adhering to this agreement, was to be strongly associated to the ‘conservative powers’ interested in the preserving of the statu quo in the East. Kalnoky did not omit to include England in this group, having noticed Crispi’s idea to strongly collaborate with this power. Thus, it was

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elegantly avoided the promoted proposal to create an Italian-Austrian military agreement and accordingly, the possibility for Italy to demand compensations was deluded.

It seemed that Crispi already inclined towards a favourable answer before the receiving of this memorial, since he had noticed on February 19, probably before an appointment with Bruck: “De Bruck. Alleanza con la Rumania dei due imperi. Proposta che si stipuli una uguale alleanza con Italia. Si stabilisce: un telegramma a Kalnoky che inizia le pratiche. Per le trattative di un nostro concorso militare in Austria se ne parlerebbe dopo che mi avrei combinato col mio collega della guerra”[119]. Thus, the memorial on February 26(?) is the answer to the invitation proposed by Crispi to his Austrian homologue, in order to begin the official negotiations. Undoubtedly, the minister of defence, general Bertolé-Viale, closer to Humbert I and one of the warrants of the political orientation adopted by Italy, sustained the idea of such an adherence, since on January 26 Crispi drew up a “Projet de traité” in the following version:

 

“1. L’Italie et la Roumanie se promettent mutuellement paix et amitié et le maintien de l’ordre politique existant.

2. L’alliance des deux Etats ayant un but conservateur et défensif, l’Italie s’engage de garantir au Roi de Roumanie l’integrité de son territoire [emphasis mine].

3. Dans le cas ou la Roumanie était menacée par la Russie, S. M. le Roi d’Italie se concertera avec S. M. l’Empereur d’Autriche-Hongrie, dans le but de défendre contre toute aggression la puissance attaquée.

4. Dans le cas de participation à une guerre commune, les hautes parties contractantes s’engagent à ne conclure ni armistice ni paix que d’un commun accord entre Elles.

5. Le présent traité est signé sous le sceau du sécret sur son contenu et sur son existence.

6. La durée de ce traité est de 5 ans à partir du jour de l’échange des ratifications.

7. Les ratifications de ce traité seront échangées à Rome dans un délai d’un mois, ou plus tôt si faire se peut”[120].

 

Unlike the Austrian-Romanian treaty whose text was unknown by Crispi, the project elaborated by him did not stipulate an immediate casus foederis, in case

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of an attack against one of the parts. What is extremely interesting[121] is that it guaranteed the Romanian territorial integrity (Article 2). The most important respect that should be underlined is that practically what Francesco Crispi thought and proposed was a direct alliance with Romania, and not an adherence to an already existed treaty. It is beyond any suspicion that, under other circumstance that Romania would not be only informed part, but directly involved in these negotiations - the project elaborated by the Italian minister would be differently regarded and probably the negotiations would follow another trend. However, there is nothing to permit us to assert that the Romanian governors had ever known about its existence. On the contrary, on April 5, 1888 Curtopassi[122] would report immediately after his post’s retaken that: “Ministre des affaires etrangerès [P. P. Carp - emphasis mine], avec lequel je suis entré en rapports officiels, m’a interogé à plusieurs réprises sur etat notre affaire. Je ne suis pas sorti généralités en attendant instructions de V. E.”[123].

Nevertheless, the Italian project did not correspond to Berlin and Vienna’s intentions, since the latter was not interested in the Romania’s territorial integrity or in the perfecting of its alliances system. Austria simply needed to obtain the Italian military intervention together with the Central Powers’ troops in the case of a Russian attack, through the agency of the adherence to the Austrian-Romanian

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agreement. As we already pointed[124], the Austrian-Romanian treaty stipulated at the Article 2 the mutual obligation of the military assistance in the case of attack. Concretely, the adherence to this treaty would imply an immediate casus foederis for Italy, in the moment when one of the signing parts would be attacked by Russia or by another adjacent state[125]. Exactly the same thing was desired at Vienna and Berlin. Thus, it is explained why during the subsequent interval Kalnoky would make all his efforts in order to determine Crispi to renounce to the conceived alliance project and to accept the adherence to the already existed one between Romania and Austria-Hungary. It is the period when Crispi vanishes the initiative of the negotiations in the favour of the ambassador Nigra, to whom Kalnoky would make continuous pressures in order to convict him to adopt the modus procedendi wished by Vienna. Followed by Curtopassi (at his turn, influenced by Kalnoky, with whom he had an ample discussion in Vienna  on March 26, 1888), Nigra was actually the one who would make pressures on his own minister of foreign affairs, in order to determine him to abandon the reservations and to adopt the Austrian form. In the name of Curtopassi, he would telegraph to Crispi on March 26 that: “Kalnoky m’a dit que le Roi de Roumanie, plus que jamais antirusse, est enchantée de ce que l’Italie vienne se joindre aux deux empires pour le maintien du statu quo in Orient. Sa Majesté recommande le plus grand secret et à preuve, elle ne s’en est ouverte qu’a messieurs Bratiano, Stourdza et Carpean [Carp - emphasis mine], de la conversation […]”[126]. It happened after he had beforehand underlined in another telegram that: “Kalnoky m’a dit que le Roi de Roumanie s’est montre très-désireux de l’accord avec l’Italie […]”[127]. Thus, the idea of the pressing solicitations launched by Romania was retaken. In Curtopassi’s speech, the accent would be put on the minimisation of the obligations that were supposed to derive from such an adherence:

 

“Il Conte Kalnoky che vidi ieri mi ha assicurato con vera soddisfazione d’aver trovato il Re Carlo sempre più convinto della necessità ed utilità per la Rumania di affidarsi ciecamente alla lega delle Potenze Centrali. Sua Maestà si compiace oltremodo di vedere i suoi interessi spalleggiati eziandio dall’Italia, e fa ressa perché dessa stringa un patto in questo senso; se non che, diffidando della discrezione ed onestà politica di parecchi tra i membri del suo Gabinetto, stima dover serbare il più geloso segreto in ordine all’imminente nostra adesione [emphasis mine]. […] Il Conte Kalnoky poi insisteva egli pure sulla opportunità de ne pas ébruiter la chose, e soggiungeva spontaneamente che comunque l’Italia non

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sarebbe forse mai costretta ad intervenire materialmente in caso di ostilità a cagione della distanza che la separava dall’eventuale teatro della guerra, pure la sua presenza tra i defensori dello statu quo in Oriente non potrà che produrre favorevolissima impressione ed incutere maggiore rispetto, a destra ed a manca [emphasise mine]. Con pari franchezza ed iniziativa dichiaravami S. E. essere ben inteso che, in caso di guerra fortunata, niuna delle parti contraenti dovrebbe trarne profito, bensi concorrere tutte alla esclusione della influenza Russa, sotto qualsiasi forma, nella penisola de’Balcani: tale, del resto, essere lo scopo unico del patto al quale siamo per aderire. […]”[128].

 

At the end of the audience, Kalnoky had not forgotten to require the preserving al oscuro of the Romanian government, regarding the evolution of the negotiations: “Al momento di lasciarlo, il Conte Kalnoky mi pregò, ove mai fossi interogato tuttavia dal Re Carlo intorno alla adesione nostra, di rispondere che i ngoziati sono tuttavia in corso tra esso e V. E. Né altro saprei o potrei dire, memore delle ultime istruzioni verbali ricevute a Rome. […]”[129].

On March 30, Nigra practically summoned Crispi to favourably answer to Vienna’s solicitations: “Kalnoky est d’avis que l’Italie pourraît faire accession à l’accord Autrichien-Roumain de la même manière que l’Allemagne. La formule pourrait être rédigée ici et ensuite soumise à V. E […]”[130]. The latter would do exactly this, on the same day: “J’ai votre dépêche de ce jour. J’accepte proposition”[131]. He would apprehend the treaty’s text only three days later, when he would remark in the presence of the ambassador Bruck, that the Article 2 could not be applied for Italy[132].

On April 5, Nigra would intervene for the second time in the favour of the adherence, giving as argument the German example: “Kalnoky m’a dit que l’accession de l’Allemagne était pure et simple et que les articles du traité principal y étaient textuellement incorporés. Il propose de suivre le même modus procedendi, sauf à énoncer dans le préambule les idées donc V. E. a parlé à M. de Bruck. J’attends les instructions de V. E. pour m’occuper avec Kalnoky de la rédaction, qui vous sera, naturellement, soumise avant toute conclusion”[133]. On April 7, Crispi definitely conceded and transmitted him the order to elaborate the

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adherence act together with Kalnoky[134]. At last partially, Nigra realised during those days the gravity of the obligations that Italy was prepared to assume, and required from the Austrian side the introducing of some specific ‘limitations concerning the Articles 2 and 3’, that had previously been also objected by Crispi[135]. The agreement’s text was elaborated on April 11 and dispatched through an Austrian messenger on the very next day. The conditions for the adherence were the following:

 

“[…] Sa Majesté, le Roi d’Italie, approuvant le but pour lequel ce traitè [the 1883 Austrian-Romanian treaty - emphasis mine], a été conclu et qui est la conservation de la paix générale et de l’ordre existant, a autorisé le Sousigné….., son Ambassadeur Extraordinaire et Plénipotentiaire auprès de Sa Majesté, l’Empereur d’Autriche, Roi Apostolique de Hongrie, à déclarer en Son nom qu’Il accéde au dit traité dans les limites ci-après indiquées en ce qui concerne les stipulations des Articles 2 et 3, savoir: Si les éventualités pouvant donner lieu au casus foederis, tel qu’il est prévu dans les Articles 2 et 3, venaient à se produire, Leurs Majestés, le Roi d’Italie, l’Empereur d’Autriche, Roi Apostolique de Hongrie, et le Roi de Roumanie prement l’engagement mutuel de se concerter en temps utile pour une action commune dont les modalités seront réglées par une convention spéciale. […]”[136].

 

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Nigra added an ample report to the project, endeavouring on the one side to minimise the proportions of the assumed obligations, and on the other side to explain why was such a modality to adjoin to Romania was preferable than a direct alliance:

 

“[…] Secondo questo progeto, S. M. il Re d’Italia fa accessione al trattato del 30 ottobre 1883. Ma siccome quel trattato contiene negli articoli 2 e 3 stipulazioni che non sono applicabili all’Italia, così l’accessione è data con restrizioni che limitano gl’impegni dell’Italia, dell’Austria-Ungheria e della Rumania all’obbligo reciproco di concertarsi per un’azione comune, che sarà posteriormente e a tempo utile determinata, semprecché si verifichino le eventualità che possono dar luogo al casus foederis, quale è contemplato nei detti articoli 2 e 3. […] Il progetto, quale fu concordato fra il conte Kalnoky e me, salva la di lei approvazione, mi sembra dover rispondere alle intenzioni dei quattro governi interessati. Naturalmemnte, il progetto stesso dovrà essere sottomesso all’esame e all’approvazione del governo rumeno e comunicato al governo germanico. […] Ho detto qui sopra che il progetto sembrava dover rispondere alle intenzioni dei governi interessati. Difatti non potrebbe ora essere questione, a mio avviso, d’un trattato attuale ed effettivo d’alleanza fra l’Italia e la Romania. Né potrebbe trattarsi d’una guarentegia dell’integrità del Regno rumeno, giacché né la Rumania chiede una tale guarentegia, né l’Austria-Ungheria sarebbe disposta a stipularla, né la Germania l’ha promessa, né converrebbe all’Italia d’assumere un tale impegno che non sarebbe facile a tenere e che sarebbe d’altronde unilaterale. Quello che importa fare per ora, salvo sempre il di lei avviso, si è che l’Italia affermi anch’essa l’intenzione pacifica e conservatrice che guidò e inspirò le stipulazioni del 30 ottobre 1883 e se ne renda partecipe e solidale, e nel tempo stesso si apra l’adito a stipulazioni per un’azione effetiva comune se questa sia resa necessaria dagli eventi e consigliata dal comune interesse. […]”[137].

 

Anyhow, it is as obvious as possible that the limitations imposed by Nigra were irrelevant. The best proof in this sense is the easiness with which Vienna accepted the ‘restrictive’ clause required by the Italian side. They only substituted the immediate intervention with an intermediated one through a ‘special convention’; it did not mean the elimination of Italy’s obligation to intervene in the assistance of the contracting parts, whether the conditions stipulated by the Article 2 were verified. Anyway, the text would be submitted by Crispi to the King Humbert I’s approval, and it would be confirmed on April 19, 1888[138].

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Having in intention to finalise as sooner as better the transactions, Kalnoky invited Nigra, on 20 April, to be prepared for the signing of the agreement, meaning to require the necessary authorisations. At the same time, Kalnoky announced Nigra that he would take the measures to inform the Romanian government[139]. On April 23, 1888, without any real negotiation, the Romanian decision factors - the King Charles I and the minister of foreign affairs P. P. Carp - took into knowledge about the adherence act’s texts: “Ministre d’Autriche - informed Curtopassi - est venu me donner lecture du projet de notre traité d’accession et il l’a remis ensuite au ministre des affaires étrangerès qui se trouvait par hasard, le priant de le soumettre à S. M. le Roi Charles. Mon collègue m’a annoncé de la part du comte Kalnoky que je recevrai incessament l’instrument et les pleins pouvoirs. […]”[140].

On April 24, Kalnoky announced Nigra that he already had the Romanian accord[141]. The fact that the King Charles I took this decision in less than 24 hours is not to surprise. Unlike Italy, Romania needed this alliance, indifferently on the form of materialisation (direct treaty or simple adherence). It is undoubted that it would prefer a direct treaty, in the situation that it would have the opportunity to select. However, nobody considered to offer it this possibility. In this sense, we already underlined that it is not correct to regard these complex negotiations that lasted 4-5 months, as being destined to perfect the alliances system of a state that to a significant extent ignored their evolution.

From this moment on, the development would be rapid and without any problem. On April 24, Nigra received from the Consulta the authorisation to sign[142]. Three days later, Kalnoky informed him that he had already sent the two necessary copies to Bucharest, one for the Romanian minister of the foreign affairs, the other one for the Italy’s plenipotentiary[143]. On April 30, Curtopassi confirmed the receiving. Undoubtedly surprised by the totally abnormal procedure, he added that he waited for the arriving of a copy from Rome, for more security[144].

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Through the agency of a German messenger, he received on May 5, the necessary authorisation compiled at Rome, but not also the adherence act’s copy[145].

In order to remove his colleague in Bucharest’s suspicions, Nigra assured him twice that the dispatched acts are exact and that he himself had participated to their elaboration[146]: “Les deux copies remises à V. E. et à M. Carpe [Carp - emphasis mine], ont été collationnées par Kalnoky et par moi. D’ailleurs, nous ne signerons pas à Vienne avant d’avoir reçu et collationé de nouveaux, le texte signé par vous, que vous pouviez confier au courrier autrichien. J’informe de tout cela Crispi. Je vous prie de me téllégraphier lorsque vous aurez signé”[147].

As a result of the received guarantees, Curtopassi would sign on May 9, 1888 the treaty of Italian adherence to the Austrian-Romanian alliance[148], afterwards completed in Vienna by the correlative act signed by Nigra and Kalnoky (May 15)[149]. The exchange of the ratification instruments would take place in Sinaia, on June 18, 1888. Informing about this fact to Rome and to Vienna, Curtopassi needed to underline the special satisfaction proved on this occasion by the Romanian sovereigns:

 

“Siccome ho avuto l’onore di telegrafare poco fa [the telegram on June 13, 1888[150] - emphasis mine], ieri segui tra il signor Carp e me lo scambio delle sovrane ratifiche e dei relativi processi verbali. Il di precedente ebbi l’onore di sedere a mensa con questi Reali al castello di Pelesh [Peleò - emphasis mine], e, dopo, S. M. la Regina volle stendere di proprio pugno l’esemplare dell’atto destinato a noi, onde attestare vieppiù, dicevami insieme al Re, l’estremo compiacimento per l’accordo intervenuto. Non potrei che esprimere gli stessi sentimenti di cordiale soddisfazione ed inoltre l’intimo convincimento dell’alto pregio in cui sarà tenuto da S. M. il Re Umberto l’autografo di una Regina al tempo stesso elettissima autrice; sotto tali auspici, soggiunsi, il patto dovrà certamente recar fortuna ai contraenti. Mi permetta ora l’E. V. di offrire i miei vivissimi ringraziamenti per la fiducia dimostratami”[151].

 

p. 217

Thus there were finalised - paradoxically, we dare to say - the negotiations initiated on December 1887 by Francesco Crispi, in order to accomplish a military co-operation accord with Austria-Hungary. Instead of the much desired perfecting of the alliance with the Central Powers, and instead of a naval collaboration with Austria-Hungary against France, Crispi ‘succeeded’ the ‘performance’ to involve Italy politically and militarily into a sector where it had no direct and immediate interests. It was to the exclusive advantage of Austria-Hungary and Germany, and without any compensation’s expectation from the concluded agreement.

To a significant extent, the advantages and the position that Di Robilant placed Italy  were thus cancelled after the renewal of the Triple Alliance, because of the assuming of grave and useless obligations. Created as an integrated part of the other Triple Alliance’s instruments, the agreement and its stipulations were to oppress upon Italy, practically as far as it would be connected to this political-military system. Here is the explanation for the helplessness of the Crispi’s successors at the Ministry of the Foreign Affairs and the extremely negative judgements that were emitted. On May, 1891, the Marquis Di Rudini, prime-minister and minister of the foreign affairs between January 1891 and May 1892, would write to Nigra in the following terms:

 

“[…] Io ero informato degli accordi Rumeni, prima di venire al Governo, ma non conoscevo i particolari. La conoscenza di questi mi ha fatto stupore.[…]”[152] “[…] Con quali criteri, con quali intenti, con quali speranze, siasi, invece, accettato nel 1888 - senza corrispettivo qualsiasi, a quanto pare - un così oneroso patto qual è quello di trascinare in Italia popolo ed esercito ad una guerra contro la Russia a beneficio dell’Austria-Ungheria o della Rumenia [emphasis mine], non mi è agevole lo intendere [emphasis mine]. […]”[153].

 

The following minister of foreign affairs would also embrace the same attitude and opinion, Benedetto Brin (May 1892-December 1893)[154].

It was helplessness because, under the circumstances that Italy to remain connected to the Central Powers, its refusal to sign this adherence would be interpreted by the allies as a sign of changing in its foreign orientation, possibility that could not be allowed by the Italian diplomacy.

p. 218

What still remained unexplainable in the 1888 diplomatic action is Costantino Nigra’s attitude. Whether the explanations in the case of Crispi could be found out, and they were many[155], the ones to clarify the position of the Italian representative in Vienna should be searched for somewhere else. In his study, Mori invoked Nigra’s deep relationship with the Crown and the fact that exactly the monarch’s conservative preoccupations and political conceptions determined him to sustain such a project . Indeed, for Humbert I every additional connection to the Central Powers, regarded as the warrants of the existed order, was welcome - determined him to sustain such a project. However, it is too few to explain the defective and negative manner to negotiate and to finalise the Italy’s adherence. Especially because unlike Crispi, he could not be accused of incompetence. Being the one who had practically elaborated the instruments’ texts created in 1887[156] - the Italian-German and the Italian-Austriian separated treaties -, Nigra was one of the Italian diplomat to be capable to appreciate the political line imposed by Di Robilant and the results achieved on the basis on that strategy. There remains a mystery why he abandoned this line during the 1888 negotiations. Perhaps he really believed that Italy would never be solicited to fight against Russia, and this would actually be proved as being real[157]. However, it is not less true that the diplomacy has not been exclusively guided by the instinct.

The agreement’s positive part - under the conditions that we admit that it had such a part for Italy - depended on the transformation imposed by the instrument created in 1888 to the Italian-Romanian relationship, with all its limits. It determined in time the establishment of a specific intimacy in the relations between the two governments, of a community of interests in distinctive fields and

p. 219

moments (the Balkan questions, the relations with Austria-Hungary, the ones with Russia, etc.).

The polarisation existing since the beginning inside of the Triple Alliance, the preferential relationship between Berlin and Vienna would determine, especially after 1900, what a Romanian historian[158] called as ‘an alliance inside of another alliance’. It would induce periods of very deep co-operation between Romania and Italy and finally the almost simultaneous manifestation of the centrifugal tendencies inside of the Triple Alliance system.

 

 

 

 

p. 220

ANNEXES

 

No. 1

 

[The memorial transmitted by the Austrian-Hungarian minister, Gustav Kalnoky, to the Austrian ambassador in Rome, von Bruck, in order to be presented to the prime minister and minister of foreign affairs, Francesco Crispi]

 

Ambassade d’Autriche-Hongrie

           en   Italie

Rome, [February 26, 1888][159]

 

Kalnoky to von Bruck

 

Comme V. E. le sait nous sommes depuis plusieurs années lies par un traité secret avec la Roumanie, traité qui repose sur le mêmes principes défensifs et conservateurs que celui conclu avec l’Italie. L’Allemagne s’est jointe à ce traité de manière qu’elle a envers la Roumanie juste les memes obligations que l’Autriche-Hongrie. Je suis certain que le Gouvernement italien est informé que la Roumanie, dans sa ligne politique, cherchait à s’appuier aux deux Puissances centrales, mais il n’aura pas en connaissance de l’existence d’un traité formel et obligatoire. Dans la situation actuelle de l’Europe il est de toute importance - tant sous le point de vue politique que militaire - de s’occuper attentivement du Gouvernement roumain qui, dans le cas d’une guerre, devient un des facteurs les plus importants pour toute action dans l’Est. Vu les difficultés de terrain dans les Carpathes et vu la grande éntendue de notre ligne d’opération de la Vistule jusqu’au Pruth, une armée qui prendrait position à notre aile droite et qui opérerait vers le Sud de la Russie serait non seulement d’un précieux secours militaire mais aurait aussi une influence décisive sur l’attitude des autres Etats balcans. Il n’y a donc point de doute sur le rôle important qui incomberait à l’armée roumaine. Du point de vue politique que je désire mettre en première ligne - vu que la guerre n’est que l’ultima ratio - il serait pour nos buts politiques, l’Angleterre y comprise, un grand avantage de s’assurer de la Roumanie dont la position géographique - entre l’Autriche-Hongrie et les bouches du Danube, et entre la Russie et la Bulgarie - est certainement d’une importance capitale pour tout ce qui concerne les événements en Orient. Au fur et

p. 221

à mesure que les intérêts de l’Italie augumentent dans les questions de la Mer Noire, de la Mediteranée et dans celle du maintient du statu quo en Orient, il nous semblerait important qu’elle se rapproche de la Roumanie, rapprochement d’autant plus facile, qu’il aurait pour point de départ les traités déja existants entre les Puissances centrales et la Roumanie, traités qui ont pour base les mêmes principes que ceux conclus avec l’Italie. - Ces considerations nous semblent on ne peut plus justes et d’un intérêt reciproque. Dans les conversations tenues tant ici qu’à Berlin avec Mr. Sturdza et dans lesquelles toutes les questions ont été envisagées sous les points de vue les plus sérieux le manque de contact ou d’un lien plus intime entre l’Italie et la Roumanie s’est fait sentir et s’est certainement un anneau qui manque à la chaine qui relie les Puissances alliées dans leur politique conservatrice. Je Vous donne tous ces détails pour que dans Votre entretien avec Mr. de Crispi Vous puissiez attirer Son attention sur l’importance de nos rapports avec la Roumanie dont la portée tant politique que militaire ne Lui echappera point. Ils doivent servir de digue au torent des idées panslavistes et slaves avec lesquels la Russie voudraient inonder la Peninsule balcanique. - Nous croyons être certains que Mr. de Crispi partagera notre manière de voir. - Il n’y a pas de doute que la Roumanie - qui par la raçe de sa population est une ennemie naturelle de la Russie - verrait avec une grande satisfaction un rapprochement avec l’Italie, rapprochement qui lui donnerait au moins moralement, un nouvelle force de résistence envers la Russie. La position que la France occupe en Roumanie pourait être facilement conquise par l’Italie, tandis que, d’un autre côté la tâche qui incombe à la Roumanie - vu sa position géographique, qui sert de barière entre la Russie et les Etats balcans - serait sûrement facilitée si la plus grand partie des Puissances européenes lui prétaient leur concours. - Nous serions charmés si Mr. de Crispi voulait entrer dans notre manière de voir. Veuillez donc Lui donner, tout à fait confidentiellement, lecture de ce qui précède et Le prier d’en garder le secret plus absolû. Il n’y a que bien peu de personnes qui sont instruites de ces faits, voilà pourquoi Mr. Sturdza nous a priés que cette question ne passe que par notre intermédiaire. Nous croyons qu’un accord entre l’Italie et la Roumanie, pareil à celui p.e. qui nous lie à l’Angletérre, serait un resultat très satisfaisant et qui donnerait un grand appui moral à la Roumanie.

 

 

No. 2

 

[The summary scheme of the treaty’s project elaborated by Francesco Crispi][160]

 

[Rome, February 26, 1888]

 

p. 222

(1) Maintien de l’ordre politique existant en Roumanie;

(2) Garantie de l’integrite de son teritoire;

(3) Dans le cas, ou la Roumanie était menacée par la Russie, S. M. le Roi d’Italie se concertera avec S. M. l’Empereur d’Autriche-Hongrie, dans le but de la défendre contre toute action agresive;

(4) Conclusion de l’armistice ou de la paix, en cas de guerre, d’un commun accord des puissances alliès;

(5) Le traité sous le sceau du sécret;

(6) Durée du traité: 5 ans;

(7) Les ratifications à Rome.

 

 

No. 3

 

[The adherence act’s project, elaborated by Nigra and Kalnoky on April 11, 1888][161]

 

“Sa Majesté l’Empereur d’Autriche, Roi Apostolique de Hongrie, et Sa Majesté la Roi de Roumanie, ayant conclu le 30 octobre 1883 un traité d’amitie et d’alliance, actuellement en vigueur, traité dont la teneur suit: (inserer le traité avec son préambule). Ce traité ayant reçu, à la même date, l’accession de Sa Majesté, l’Empereur d’Allemagne, Roi de Prusse, et ayant été ensuite communiqué par les Hautes Parties Contractantes susmentionnées à Sa Majesté, le Roi d’Italie, avec l’invitation à y accéder, Sa Majesté, le Roi d’Italie, approuvant le but pour lequel ce traitè a été conclu et qui est la conservation de la paix générale et de l’ordre existant, a autorisé le Sousigné….., son Ambassadeur Extraordinaire et Plénipotentiaire auprès de Sa Majesté, l’Empereur d’Autriche, Roi Apostolique de Hongrie, à déclarer en Son nom qu’Il accéde au dit traité dans les limites ci-après indiquées en ce qui concerne les stipulations des Articles 2 et 3, savoir: Si les éventualités pouvant donner lieu au casus foederis, tel qu’il est prévu dans les Articles 2 et 3, venaient à se produire, Leurs Majestés, le Roi d’Italie, l’Empereur d’Autriche, Roi Apostolique de Hongrie, et le Roi de Roumanie prement l’engagement mutuel de se concerter en temps utile pour une action commune dont les modalités seront réglées par une convention spéciale. La présente accession sera en vigueur pour 5 ans à dater du jour de la signature; mais, si le traité principal du 30 octobre 1883 venait à expirer avant ce terme, elle sera considérée comme expirée en même temps. Le secret serra gardé sur cet acte d’accession qui ne pourra être révélé sans le consentement de chacune des Hautes Parties Contractantes.

p. 223

Sa Majesté l’Empereur d’Autriche, Roi Apostolique de Hongrie, à autorisé de Son coté le Soussigné …..Son Ministre etc….., à dèclarer en Son nom qu’Il accepte, dans les termes ci-dessus relatés et avec les mêmes obligations mutuelles l’accession de Sa Majesté, le Roi d’Italie au traité du 30 octombre 1883. Le présent acte d’accession et d’acceptation sera ratifié par le Sa Majesté, le Roi d’Italie et par Sa Majesté l’Empereur d’Autriche, Roi Apostolique de Hongrie, et les ratifications seront échangées le plus tôt possible. En foi de quoi les Soussignés, Ambassadeur etc. …., et Ministre etc. …., ont signé le présent acte et y ont apposé le cachet de leurs armes.”

 

 

 

Other articles published in our periodicals by Rudolf Dinu:

 

Documents regarding the History of the Italian Legation in Bucharest 1879-1914

 

Giuseppe Tornielli-Brusati di Vergano. Notes regarding his Diplomatic Mission in Romania 1879-1887

 

L’alleanza ideale: appunti per la storia delle relazioni italo-romene nell’ambito della Triplice Alleanza (1883-1903)

 

Note e documenti riguardanti la storia della Legazione italiana a Bucarest (1879-1914)

 

 

 

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[1] D.D., no. 645 (7th series), Cairoli to Fava, Rome, December 5, 1879.

[2] Giuseppe Tornielli Brusati, count of Vergano (1836-1908), twice General Secretary of the Ministry of the Foreign Affairs, between April 1876 and June 1878, and between December 1878 and July 1879, plenipotentiary minister in Athens (1876), Belgrade (September-December 1879), Italy’s ambassador in Madrid (1887-1889), London (1889-1894) and Paris (1895-1908), was undoubtedly one of the greatest Italian diplomats before the First World War. “Al pari del Maffei di Boglio, anche’egli piemontese, il Tornielli fu l’ispiratore della politica italiana dal ‘76 al ‘81, alle spalle del Depretis e del Cairoli e fino all’arrivo del Mancini, che rivoluzionò effettivamente la mentalità, lo stile e la prassi diplomatica, ancora tipicamente piemontesi. Salisbury, che visitò Roma nel novembre del ‘76 pensò che il Tornielli fosse ‘il vero ministro degli Esteri’”, cf. Rosaria QUARTARARO, “L’Ambasciata di Londra: Alcuni interpreti della politica estera italiana 1861-1915”, in La formazione della diplomazia italiana 1861-1915 (edited by Laura PILOTTI), Franco Angeli, 1987: 610.

[3] Luigi CORTI held the foreign affairs’ portfolio between March 26 and October 24, 1878.

[4] Cf. E.C. CORTI, “Il Conte Corti al Congresso di Berlino (secondo documenti inediti)”,  Nuova Antologia, April 16, 1925: 351-361;  Pia G. BALDELLI, “La politica estera della Sinistra: il banco di prova della Questione d’Oriente, 1876-1878” (second part), Storia e Politica, 20 (1981), no. 2: 264-280.

[5] None of the subsequent studies has approached this problem: F. D’AMOJA, “La Sinistra e i problemi di politica estera”, Rassegna Storica Toscana, 1965: 39-77; D. CACCAMO, “L’Italia, la questione d’Oriente e l’indipendenza romena nel carteggio del consolato italiano a Bucarest (1870-1879), Storia e Politica, 18 (1979), no. 1: 65-124; C. GIGLIO, “Il secondo gabinetto Depretis e la crisi balcanica”, Rivista Storica Italiana, 1955: 182-212; William O. OLDSON, “Italy and the Question of Romanian Independence”, Il Politico, 54 (1989), no. 2: 197-217.

[6] According to the Berlin treaty (Article 44), Romania’s independence had been conditioned by the modification of the Article 7 in the Romanian Constitution, which obstacled the granting of the citisenship to the persons not belonging to the Christian faith.

[7] Italia had already declared the desire to delimit its position than the three powers (Germany, France and Great Britain) one, being prepared to recognise the Romanian independence on June 1879. It would renounce to this decision at the very last moment because of the French-German pressures. “[…] Je m’attendais bien, dit Mr. Tornielli [at that moment, the general secretary of the Ministry of the Foreign Affairs - emphasis mine] à ce que les trois autres Cabinets se montrent quelque peu mécontents de nous voir sortir de rangs, les laisser eux trois en arrière, et nous avancer tout seuls pour faire un pas important. Car en somme, c’est beaucoup ce que nous avons fait. Nous avons substitué un personnel de légation à un personnel consulaire. […]”; cf. Independenàa Romùniei. Documente, vol. 4, Bucharest, 1978, no. 215, the warrant secretary of the Romanian agency in Rome, Obedenaru to the minister of foreign affairs, M. Kogãlniceanu, Rome, June 8, 1879: 551.

[8] The naming of Tornielli in Bucharest, known for his pro-Russian attitude, unpleasantly impressed Vienna that reacted as follows: “Trovandomi ieri dal Barone Haymerle S. E. dissemi: […] che il Conte Tornielli durante il suo soggiorno a Belgrado avvrebbe costantemente spiegato la sua azione in senso ostile all’Austria, ponendo sotto gli occhi del Governo Serbo i pericoli di cui il Principato è minacciato dall’occupazione Austriaca nella Bosnia e nell’Erzegovina, e caldeggiando inoltre l’ideea della Lega Balkanica. Il Barone Haymerle soggiungeva che il Conte Tornielli dovendosi ora recare a Bucharest sarebbe sommamente desiderabile non spiegasse colà del pari la sua azione in modo ugualmente ostile all’Austria-Ungheria, creando così imbarazzi al Governo Imperiale. […]”; cf. D. D.I., 2nd series, vol. 12, no. 479, the ambassador in Vienna, Di Robilant, to the minister of foreign affairs, Cairoli, Vienna, December 15, 1879: 371.

[9] Ibidem, no. 477, De Launay to Cairoli, Berlin, December 15, 1879: 369-370. “[…] La Germania è irritatissima contro di noi per aver riconosciuto il Principato prima che fosse risoluta la questione delle ferovie. Anzi pretende che la prematura risoluzione nostra ha imbaldanzito al punto il Parlamento Rumeno, da fargli adottare un emendamento contrario alle condizioni stabilite in comune accordo con Stourdza a Berlino. […]” ; cf. ibidem, no. 492, general secretary of the Italian minister of foreign affairs, Maffei, to the ambassador in Vienna, Di Robilant, Rome, December 18, 1879: 384.

[10] The German ambassador in Rome.

[11] D.D.I., 2nd series, vol. 12,  no. 480, Cairoli to Tornielli, Rome, December 16, 1879: 372-373.

[12] Ibidem, no. 583, Cairoli to the Italian ambassador in Berlin, De Launay, Rome, January 28, 1880.  

[13] D.D., no. 272 (7th series) Cairoli to the Italian minister in Bucharest, Tornielli, April 3, 1881. Because of the intimate realetions with Bucharest, Rome was for one year informed about the Romanian governors’ project to proclaim the Kingdom. On March 22, 1880, De Launy reported: “Hier, M. Bratiano a sondé ici le terrain relativement au projet d’élever la Roumanie au rang de Royaume. Le prince de Bismarck lui a dit que l’adhésion de l’Allemagne était acquise à ce projet; il n’y aurait de difficultés à attendre, ni de la France, ni de l’Angleterre, ni surtout de l’Italie qui déjà avait donné des gages de ses sympathies. Si l’Autriche hésitait, le Cabinet de Berlin emploierait ses bons offices pour aplanir les difficultés. […] L’agent roumain vient de me comuniquer ce détails très confidentieles et à l’usage exclusif du Roi et du Gouvernement. […]”. Cf. D.D.I., 2nd series, vol. 12, no. 772: 622-623.

[14] The Articles 53-55 of the treaty of Berlin preserved the European Commission of the Danube. According to the new stipulations, its authority/activity was supposed to be also extended upon the Poràile de Fier-Galaài river sector, by the elaboration of some navigation and river police rules. Romania would require that these prerogatives to belong to a commission of the three river states (Bulgaria, Serbia, and Romania). However, Austria-Hungary pretended its participation with prevalent vote and the Commission’s presidency. Despite the Romania’s and Bulgaria’s protests, the rulement’s project finally adopted by E. C. D. (the Barrère project), stipulated the constitution of a commission according to the version proposed by Austria-Hungary. The E. C. D.’s resolutions were transposed in the treaty of London (March 10, 1883). Romania did not recognised the European decision and since the treaty did not stipulate punishing measures, it continued to exert the police and the supervision in its territorial streams. Cf. ª. RãDULESCU-ZONER, Dunãrea, Marea Neagrã ºi Puterile Centrale, Cluj-Napoca, 1982: 88 sqq; idem, “La souveraineté de la Roumanie et le problème du Danube après le Congrès du Berlin”, Revue des études sud-est européennes, 9 (1971), no. 1: 152.

[15] Italy’s adherence to the alliance with the Central Powers was for a long time and attentively studied. For this, see: L. SALVATORELLI, op. cit.: 45-72; E. DECLEVA, op. cit.: 53-74; idem, L’Incerto alleato...: 83-108; R. PERTIGNANI, op. cit.: 290 sqq.

[16] Cf. Daniel J. GRANGE, L’Italie et la Mediteranée (1896-1911). Les fondements d’une politique étrangère, Ecole Française de Rome, 1994, II: 1126. There is a well-known fact that this alliance was not unanimously accepted by the Italian political elite, or better saying by all the ones that were comprised in the group of ‘decision making’. Anyhow, there was interesting the opinion ennounced by two of the experienced diplomats of the period, both of them representing Italy in Bucharest, one of them as plenipotentiary minister (Tornielli), the other one as secretary (Alberto Pansa). Pansa, subsequent ambassador in Constantinople (1895-1901), London (1901-1906), and Berlin (1906-1912), would notice at the end of 1882: “Lettera C-te Tornielli. Finito il 1882. […] D’accordo con Tornielli per disapprovare la Triplice Alleanza. 1. Perché giunta troppo tardo. Se a suo tempo poteva prevenire il disastro di Tunisi, essa non serve ora che nominalmente proteggerci dal pericolo che non esiste di una scomposta aggressione francese; 2. Perché ci espone cosi, inutilmente ai danni di un guasto colla Francia colla quale l’Italia non può mantenersi in ostilità permanente; 3. Perché il giorno in cui fossiamo invitati a marciare in nome del casus foederis, non si marcerà; e ciò con danno della nostra reputazione”. ASDMAE, fund Alberto Pansa, case no. 1 Diario, 2, Sunday, December 31, 1882. 

[17] ASDMAE, Rapporti in arrivo. Romania, case 1397, the Italy’s minister in Bucharest, Tornielli, to the minister of the foreign affairs, Mancini, Bucharest, May 2, 1883.

[18] Considered as the official magazine of the Romanian Ministery of Foreign Affairs, Gazette de Roumanie wrote on June 22: “On s’occupe beaucoup de nous, en ce moment, à Vienne. C’est d’abord la Gazette Allemande qui, parlant de l’Italie et la triple alliance, fait payer à Roumanie les frais de l’intimité austro-italienne. ‘S’il fallait, dit l’organe viennois, encore une preuve de l’existence de la triple alliance, elle serait donnée par le nouveau Livre vert italien. L’attitude de M. Mancini, dans la question du Danube, est, en effet, éminemment favorable à l’Autriche’. Cette attitude du cabinet de Rome devrait nous surprendre si nous n’avions depuis longtemps reconnu sa politique entrainée sur une pente de concessions et de sacrifices qu’a provoqués son idée d’entrer, quand même, dans l’alliance austro-germanique. […]”; cf. ibidem, Tornielli to Mancini, June 23, 1883. See the appendix 1 of this report.

[19] D.D.I., 2nd series, vols. 17-18, no. 170, Mancini to Di Robilant, Rome, April 15, 1884: 171.

[20] On August 19, 1883, von Bismarck charged the German ambassador at Vienna, von Reuss, with the exploration of the political ground, in order to attract Romania towards the Triple Alliance. In his discussion with the Prince von Reuss, the Count Kalnoky revealed that he had a long time ago an approaching to Romania into consideration, commonly with his sovereign. The approaching had not been possible not only because of the Romania’s attitude regarding the Danube question, but also because of the fact that the Romanian government had not demonstrated his desire to accomplish this step. Cf. G.P., 3: 263-264. In connection with Kalnoky’s considerations, Bismarck would notice: “This has no importance, the point is whether we need them or not, with or without this step”. Cf. ibidem.

[21] The treaty was ratified by the King Charles I on November 16, 1883, by William I and Francis Joseph I on November 12, 1883. Cf. Alfred PRIBRAM, Les traités politiques secrets de l’Autriche-Hongrie, 1879-1914, Paris, 1923, 1: 40 sqq. The treaty was secret (art. 6), having a validity of 5 years, that was supposed to be automatically extended one more 3 years whether none of the parts would denounce it one year before its expiration or would ask its revision (art. 5). The essential was concentrated in the Article 2: :”Si la Roumanie, sans provocation aucune de sa part, venait à être attaquée, l’Aurtiche-Hongrie est tenue à lui porter en temps utile secours et assistance contre l’agresseur. Si l’Autriche-Hongrie était attaquée dans les mêmes circonstances dans un partie de ses Etats, limitrophe à la Roumanie, le casus foederis se présentera aussitôt pour cette dernière.” Cf. ibidem. The German adherence was accomplished on the following terms: “[…] En conséquence Sa Majesté l’Empereur d’Allemagne, Roi de Prusse, a muni de ses pleins pouvoirs à cet effet son représentant à Vienne le conseiller de légation comte Max de Berchem pour adhérer formallement aux stipulations contenues dans le traité susmentionné. En vertu de cet acte d’accession, Sa Majesté l’Empereur d’Allemagne, Roi de Prusse, prend au nom de l’Empire d’Allemagne envers Leurs Majestés l’Empereur d’Autriche, Roi Apostolique de Hongrie, et le Roi de Roumanie et en même temps Leurs majestés l’Empereur d’Autriche, Roi Apostolique de Hongrie, et le Roi de Roumanie prennent envers Sa Majesté l’Empereur d’Allemagne, Roi de Prusse, les mêmes engagements auxquels les hautes parties contractantes se sont mutuellement obligées par les stipulations du dit traité inséré ci-dessus. […]”, ibidem.

[22] The anti-Russian current had taken proportion in Romania as a result of the loss of Southern Bessarabia in 1878. There is also truth that supporters for an alliance with Russia still existed. Cf. Titu MAIORESCU, Istoria politicã a României sub domnia lui Carol I, Bucharest: Humanitas, 1994: 118-119; Lilio CIALDEA, op. cit.: 163 sqq; Bernhard von BÜLOW,  Memorie, Milan: A. Mondadori Editore, [n.d.], 4: 623 sqq. It is interesting that Tornielli, the Italian minister in Bucharest, very well anticipated the debates around the Romanian external strategy that would would finally lead to the Central Powers’ alliance option: “[…] Scemata, direi anzi scomparsa, l’influenza Francese che altre volte qui fu grande, scancellato il ricordo dell’azione preponderante delle potenze occidentali nel periodo storico che prende nome dal Congresso di Parigi, gli uomini di Governo della Rumania furono spinti da varie cause, di cui non sarebbe impossibile una [sic!] accurata analisi, a parteggiare per i due grandi stati più vicini. Vi fu e vi è dunque in tutti i partiti chi parteggia per la Russia e chi per l’Austria-Ungheria. Persone che pensino seriamente allo sviluppo della nazione per sole forze interne senza mescolarvi l’influenza estera, sono pochissime e queste sognano per il loro paese una situazione di neutralità guarentita dall’Europa […]”. Cf. ASDMAE, Rapporti in arrivo. Romania, case 1396, Tornielli to Cairoli, Bucharest, March 25, 1880.

[23] Here is only one of the strategical-military arguments that made necessary the alliance with Romania for the Central Powers: at that time, the Romanian-Russian frontier had 900 km in length, while the Austrian-Romanian one 1,300 km. On the other side, the frontier between Austria-Hungary and Russia measured 1,440 km. Consequently, whether Romania would be in war together with the Central Powers, the Russian front would grow in length with more than a half. On the contrary, whether it would participate as the Russia’s ally, the Austrian front would almost double in comparison with the initial phase. Even in the case of an absolute neutrality of Romania, the two empires would be obliged to maintain important military forces at the Romanian boundary. Cf. V. CRISTIAN, A. FILIMON, art. cit.: 152.

[24] “Le bruit s’est répandu que, dans le but de s’opposer à de nouveaux envahissemens de la Russie dans les Balkans, l’Autriche serait disposée à conclure une alliance avec la Roumanie. Mes informations me portent à croire que c’est Monsieur Balatcheno [Ion Bèlèceanu, the Romanian minister at Vienna - emphasis mine] qui, le premier aurait insinué à Vienne l’idée d’une Convention militaire entre la Roumanie et l’Autriche […]”. Cf. ASDMAE, Rapporti in arrivo. Romania, case 1396, the diplomatic agent of Italy at Bucharest, Fava, to Cairoli, Bucharest, November 3, 1879.

[25] Ibidem, Tornielli to Cairolli, Bucharest, March 25, 1880.

[26] Ibidem, Copialettere in partenza. Romania, register no. 1202, the minister of the foreign affairs, Mancini, to Tornielli, Rome, September 3, 1883.

[27] Ibidem,Telegrammi in arrivo, register no. 64, Galvagna to Mancini, Vienna, September 6, 1883, hour 17,55. See also D.D.I, 2nd series, vols. 15-16, no. 684, Galvagna to Mancini, Vienna, September 7, 1883: 662. “[…] Il Re Carlo, durante il suo recente soggiorno qui, erasi mostrato desiderosissimo d’iniziare cordiali rapporti di vicinato tra Vienna e Bucarest e queste buone disposizioni erano state confermate [sic!] poscia dal presidente del Consiglio rumeno […]. Ora il signor Brètianu è partito per Gastein onde visitarvi il principe di Bismarck; ed il conte Kalnoky se ne compiaceva per l’influenza che i consigli del cancelliere Germanico, meno di lui interessato a vedere stabilirsi buoni rapporti tra la Rumenia e l’Austria-Ungheria dovranno esercitare sull’animo del presidente del Consiglio rumeno. […]”  

[28] D.D.I., 2nd series, vols. 15-16, no. 684, Galvagna to Mancini, Vienna, September 7, 1883: 661 sqq.  

[29] Apud I. DUMITRIU-SNAGOV, Le Saint-Siège et la Roumanie moderne, 1866-1914, Rome: Editrice Pontificia Università Gregoriana, 1989, appendix no. 135, Vanutelli to the Folderinal Iacobini, Vienna, September 28, 1883: 487-88.

[30] Cf. V. CRISTIAN, loc. cit.: 255.

[31] D.D.I., 2nd series, vols. 15-16, no. 703, Galvagna to Di Robilant, Vienna, October 2, 1883, (the appendix of the letter of Di Robilant to Mancini, Torino, October 6, 1883): 679-80. However, one year later, the minister of foreign affair in the same government of Brãtianu would flatterly speak about the Italian minister at Bucharest, in a discussion with De Launay in Berlin: “[…] En terminant ce rapport, je ne veux pas oublier de mentionner que le ministre des affaires étrangères de Roumanie m’a parle dans les termes les plus flatteurs de M. le comte Tornielli, avec lequel S. E. entrètenait les meilleures relations.”, cf. ibidem, 2nd series, vols. 17-18, no. 251: 244. This demonstrates that Tornielli had normalised his relations with the Romanian officials.   

[32] During the ‘Rumelian crisis’ (1885-1887), Tornielli would condemn  this passive attitude, considering it as being inconsistent with the Italian interests in the South-Eastern Europe. “[…] Tornielli ha risposto alla mia lettera privata circa la conversatione da me avuta con D’Arco sul conto del nostro ministro a Bucarest. […] È curiosa l’idea del riserbo adottato da noi verso i piccoli Stati balcanici. L’Italia, che non è ancora un’aquila ma un aquilotto, dovrebbe, secondo Tornielli, circondarsi, a sua difesa, di paseri. […]”; cf. D.D.I., 2nd series, vol. 20, no. 144, The Ministry’s general secretary, Cappelli, to the minister of foreign affairs, Di Robilant, Rome, September 30, 1886: 147. Curious or not, the Tornielli’s opinion coincided at that moment with the one expressed by the Russian minister of foreign affairs, De Giers, who defined this policy as being “un peu vague” in a private letter to the Russian minister at Rome, Uxkull! Cf. ibidem.

[33] For the ‘Rumelian crisis’ and the Italian position, see Angelo TAMBORRA, “La crisi balcanica del 1885-1886 e l’Italia”, Rassegna Storica del Risorgimento, 55 (1968),  fasc. 3: 371-396; Francesco GUIDA, “La crisi bulgaro-rumeliota (1885-1887): una rivincita italiana”, in La Bulgaria, l’Italia e i Balcani. Relazioni storico-sociale ed estetico-culturali, XV-XX. Atti della Quarta Conferenza italo-bulgara, Sofia, 22-25 maggio 1984, Sofia, 1988: 263-288.

[34] For the texts of the new instruments created at the Triple Alliance’s renewal (the Italian-German and Italian-Austrian-Hungarian separated treaties), and also for the text of the Mediterranean agreement between Italy and Great Britain (signed on February 12, 1887), see Enrico SERRA, op. cit.: 140 and 142; PRIBRAM, I: 63. Also Mariano GABRIELE, “Aspetti del problema adriatico con particolare riguardo al primo rinnovo della Triplice (1887)”, Storia e Politica, 20 (1981), no. 3: 482 sqq; E. DECLEVA, L’Italia e la politica internazionale…,: 80-83, Bruno MALINVERNI, Il primo accordo per il Mediterraneo (Febbraio-Marzo 1887), Milano: Marzorati Editore, 1967.

[35] UN EX DIPLOMATICO, “La politica estera dell’Italia sotto il cessato Ministero”, Nuova Antologia, April 16, 1887: 741.

[36] Cf. Christopher SETON-WATSON, L’Italia dal liberalismo al fascismo, 1870-1925, Bari: Laterza, 1976, 1: 148.

[37] Renato MORI, La politica estera di Francesco Crispi (1887-1891), Rome: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1973: 47

[38] Trattati e convenzioni tra il Regno d’Italia ed i Governi esteri. Raccolti per la cura del Ministero degli Affari Esteri, Rome: Ipolito Sciola, 1881, vol. 7: 212 sqq.

[39] Actually, there was registered a boom in agriculture in the decade between 1880 and 1890, the greatest part of the investitions being directed to the cereals’, fruit trees’, and vines’ crops. Only 3% from the investments are destined to the hard industry. The scarcity of the raw materials, of the specialised personnel, of the investments, of the protectionist measures, the discrepancy between the Northern economy and the Southern one, all of these hindered the industrial development. Cf. G. LUZZATO, L’economia italiana dal 1861 al 1914, vol. 1 (1861-1894), Milan, 1963: 212 sqq.

[40] Cf. Gheorghe IACOB, Luminiþa IACOB, Modernizare-Europenism. România de la Cuza Voda la Carol al II-lea, Jassy, 1995, vol. II: 51.

[41] For the Italy’s quantity of exchanges with France and England in 1883 and 1884, see Almanach de Gotha, 1886: 851.

[42] Cf. Giuseppe TORNIELLI BRUSATI, “Le importazioni e le esportazioni della Rumania”, Bollettino Consolare, 17 (1881), part II: 360.

[43] The calculations base upon the data transmitted by Tornielli in 1881, see loc. cit.: 357-507.

[44] idem, “Intorno ad una pubblicazione della Direzione generale delle Dogane intitolata: ‘Quadro generale del commercio esteriore della Rumania’, per l’anno 1885”, Bollettino Consolare, 23 (1887), part 1: 614.

[45] Idem, “Relazione intorno al commercio esteriore della Rumania”, Bollettino Consolare, 21 (1885), part 1: 626.

[46] For 1879, see the data transmitted by Tornielli in 1881, loc. cit.: 496.

[47] TORNIELLI BRUSATI, “Intorno ad una pubblicazione…”: 614.

[48] Paolo RIVA, “Relazione sulle condizioni generali del commercio d’importazione e di esportazione del Regno di Rumania dal 1 gennaio 1886, sino al corrente mese di giugno 1888”, Bolletino del Ministero degli Affari Esteri, 2 (1888), fasc. 1: 297-337.

[49] Giulio TESI, “Commercio esterno della Rumania negli anni 1889-1890”, Bollettino del Ministero degli Affari Esteri, December 1891: 724.

[50] Beginning with July 1/13, 1884, it was abolished the favourable treatment that had equalised that positions of the states without trade treaties, with the states that stipulated conventions with Romania. Especially affected because of this legislative disposition would be France and Turkey.

[51] TORNIELLI BRUSATI, “Intorno ad una pubblicazione…”: 616.

[52] Emanuele BECCARIA INCISA, “I lavori pubblici in Rumania”, Bollettino del Ministero degli Affari Esteri, January 1896: 16-19.

[53] Ibidem: 17.

[54] Ibidem: 18.

[55] G. TESI, “Navigazione internazionale nel basso Danubio nel 1895. Immigrazione italiana nel Distretto di Galatz”, Bollettino del Ministero degli Affari Esteri, March 1896: 160.

[56] G. E. DI PALMA DI CASTIGLIONE, “L’Oriente d’Europa quale mercato per la mano d’opera italiana (Rumania, Bulgaria, Serbia)”, Bollettino dell’Emigrazione, year 1912, no. 11.

[57] The 1899 census, cf. G. IACOB, L. IACOB, op. cit.: 45.

[58] E. BECCARIA, C. BAROLI, “La Rumania e l’immigrazione italiana”, Emigrazione e Colonie, 1 (1905), part 3: 190.

[59] See “Le società italiane all’estero”, Bollettino del Ministero degli Affari Esteri, April 1898: 60.

[60] G. E. DI PALMA DI CASTIGLIONE, loc. cit.: 57 sqq.

[61] Cf. René Girault, Diplomatie européenne et impérialisme, 1871-1914, Paris, 1979: 13.

[62] Annuario Diplomatico del Regno d’Italia per l’anno 1886, Rome: Ipolito Sciolla, 1886: 12.

[63] Cf. F. CHABOD, op. cit. (ed. 1965), II: 709-710.

[64] Monitorul. Jurnal oficial al României, on July 1/13, 1866; for the revised version in 1884, see Monitorul Oficial, no. 51, June 8/20, 1884: 1041-1048.

[65] This did not mean that the Royal practice was less unconstitutional. According to the Article 96, “the King has not any other powers than the ones stipulated in the Constitution”, ibidem.

[66] Dezbaterile Adunãrii Deputaþilor [D.A.D.],  no. 14, December 8, 1888: 212-213.

[67] Nevertheless, taking into consideration the king’s and the government’s possibilities of manipulation in the foreign affairs’ field because of this confusing wording, the lack of alteration of the Article 93’s content during the revision of the Constitution (1884) is explainable. See Monitorul Oficial, no. 51, June 8/20, 1884: 1043.

[68] For the King Charles I’ s foreign policy, see Gh. I. BRãTIANU, La politique extérieure du Roi Charles I de Roumanie, Bucharest, 1940.

[69] Cf. V. CRISTIAN, loc. cit.: 261.

[70] R. GIRAULT, op. cit.: 13. In 1887, it is registered the significant increasing of the number of Russian agents that used Romania as the base for the preparation of the Southern of Danube’s operation, under the covering of the Russian legation in Bucharest. For instance, they would be accused for the criminal attempt against the major of Russe, on March 19, 1887; cf. T. MAIORESCU, op. cit.: 147.

[71] The direction was East-NorthEast, meaning towards Russia; cf. V. CRISTIAN, loc. cit.: 261.

[72] Nicolae Moret Blarenberg (1837-1896), Romanian politician, one of the leaders of the ‘Opoziþia Unitã’, hostile to the Brètianu government; cf. Ion MAMINA, Ion BULEI, Guverne ºi guvernanþi, 1866-1916, Bucharest: Silex, 1994: 167.

[73] Cf. Ion N. ªOIMESCU, România, Rusia ºi Întreita Alianþã. O paginã de istorie politicã contimporanã de I. N. ªoimescu, senator, Bucharest: Tipografia Grigorie Luis, 1889: 233-234.

[74] Ibidem: 231-233.

[75] R. MORI, art. cit.: 192-193.

[76] He was also suspectly regarded by Germany, where the news of his appartenence to the Depretis cabinet caused the following declaration of the Count Herbert von Bismarck - the Chancellor’s son -, addressed to De Launay: “Les bras en tomberent à mon père en voyant qu’un remaniemant du Cabinet italien se faisait au profit de la gauche avancée”; cf. idem, “Crispi e la Triplice. Gli accordi militari italo-germani”, Rassegna Storica Toscana (Atti del XIX Convegno Storico Toscano “Crispi e il suo tempo”), 16 (1971), no. 1: 85.

[77] Idem, La politica…: 45.

[78] Ibidem: 46.

[79] Cf. D.D.I., 2nd series, vol. 21, no. 11: 9-10, Humbert I  to Nigra, Rome, August 7, 1887.

[80] Respecting the reasons for this refusal and generally Costantino Nigra’s attitude and diplomatic evolution, see F. CHABOD, op. cit., II: 677 sqq.

[81] For a panorama of this historiography, see Fernando MAZZOTTI, “Crispi e la politica estera”, Rassegna Storica Toscana” (Atti del…), 16 (1970),  no. 1: 56-70.

[82] Cf. Gaetano SALVEMINI, La politica estera dell’Italia dal 1871 al 1914, Florence: G. Barbèra Editore, 1944: 85.

[83] Carlo MORANDI, op. cit.: 223-249.

[84] F. MAZZOTTI, art. cit.: 60.

[85] R. MORI, La politica…: 49-53.

[86] Ibidem: 51.

[87] G. SALVEMINI, op. cit.: 86.

[88] Ibidem.

[89] V. Massimo MAZZETTI, “L’Italia e le convenzioni militari segrete della Triplice Alleanza”, Storia Contemporanea, 1 (1970), no. 2: 405 sqq.

[90] This system comprised, beside the alliance with Germany and Austria-Hungary, the two supplementary instruments created in 1887, that augmented the allied empires’ obligations in the East and in the Mediterranean Sea: the Italian-British agreement respecting the warrant of the statu quo in the Mediterranean space (February 12, 1887), to which Austria-Hungary would adhere (March 24, 1887); and also the Italian-Spanish agreement concerning the warrant of the same Mediterranean statu quo, stipulated on May 4, 1887, to which Vienna and Berlin would also adhere (May 21, 1887). None of these treaties would oblige Italy to intervene in the East. For these agreements’ texts, see E. SERRA, op. cit.: 141-142.

[91] See the ample discussion in R. MORI, La politica…: 56-65.

[92] Idem, “Francesco Crispi…”: 193.

[93] Ibidem.

[94] Cf. W. MEDLICOTT, “Austria-Hungary and the war danger of 1887”, The Slavonic Review, 6 (1927), no. 4: 437-441.

[95] G.P., VI, the German ambassador at Vienna, von Reuss, to the Chancelor von Bismarck, Vienna, January 7, 1888: 246.

[96] Cf. R. MORI, “Francesco Crispi…”: 194.

[97] Bruck to Kalnoky, Rome, January 9, 1888, cf. ibidem: 195.

[98] Ibidem.

[99] G.P., VI, von Reuss to Bismarck, Vienna, January 7, 1888: 245: “[…] Der Minister sagte mir endlich, Italien habe auch hier seine materielle Hülfe angeboten, auf welchem Punkte und in welcher Stärke Österreich dies wünschen sollte. Seine Idee wäre, diese Hülfe nicht von der Hand zu weisen. Da aber die österreichisch-ungarischen Bahnen genug zu tun haben würden, um die eigene Armee nach dem Norden und Osten zu befördern, so würde es vielleicht nützlich sein, wenn man die italienischen Truppen nach Rumänien dirigierte. Die Eisenbahnen, welche von der österreichisch-italienischen Grenze nach Rumänien führten. Würden weniger belastet sein, ausserdem würde es für die Rumänen stärkend wirken, wenn sie sich auf gute italienische Truppen stützen könnten, und der österreichische rechte Flügel eine sehr wünschenswerte Verstärkung erhalten. Auch würden sich italienische Truppen mit fen halb und halb stammverwandten Rumänen ganz gut einrichten und den Italienern die Satisfaktion gewährt werden, dort eine bessere Rolle zu spielen, als wenn sie als Appendix der österreichischen Armee aufzutreten hätten.”

[100] Kalnoky to von Bruck, Vienna, January 16, 1888, cf. R. MORI, “Francesco Crispi…”: 196.

[101] Ibidem; see also V. CRISTIAN, loc. cit.: 261.

[102] Ibidem: 205.

[103] G.P., VI, the Bismarck’s conclusive note upon von Reuss’s report on January 7, 1888: 246.

[104] The feld-marshal Baron von Moltke’s memorial on January 18, 1888, cf. R. MORI, “Francesco Crispi…”: 197.

[105] D.D.I., 2nd series, vol. 21, no. 531, De Launay to Crispi, Berlin, January 29, 1888: 447.

[106] Bruck to Kalnoky, Rome, February 13, 1888, cf. R. MORI, “Francesco Crispi…”: 198.

[107] Ibidem: 198. The Italian historian emphasises: 1. The fact that De Launay ‘severely’ condemned the idea of the adherence to the Austrian-Romanian treaty; 2. That his position imposed a dubious period to the Italian minister of foreign affairs!

[108] D.D.I., 2nd series, vol. 21, no. 635, De Launay to Crispi, Berlin, February 29, 1888: 532.

[109] M. Hitrovo, chancellor and chamberlain, the Prince Ourossov’s successor at the Russia’s legation in Bucharest (acredited on November 15, 1886).

[110] D.D.I., 2nd series, vol. 21, no. 635, cit.

[111] De Launay was the one who inform Crispi on January 12, 1888 about the existence of a treaty between Austria-Hungary and Romania. He did not even the receive the confirmation from the ministry! Cf. ibidem: 533.

[112] F. CHABOD, op. cit., II: 680, 754-758; among the diplomats, Nigra seemed to be the most honoured one by Crispi, and his opinions were permanently searched for and listened by Crispi; the sympathy seemed to be mutual,, cf. ibidem, II: 686, 761.

[113] D.D.I., 2nd series, vol. 21, no. 525, De Launay to Crispi, Berlin, January 27, 1888: 443-444.

[114] Ibidem, no. 635, cit.

[115] Cf. R. MORI, “Francesco Crispi…”: 201.

[116] ASDMAE. Serie politica A (1888-1891). Romania, case 107, Giorgio Vigoni (the Bucharest legation’s secretary), to Francesco Crispi, Bucharest, March 14, 1888.

[117] The Austrian military attaché’s opinion was that Italy could mobilise 12 army corps, among which 6 were supposed to be sent in Germany, 3 on the Alps front and 3 in the East, under the circumstances that the French pressure would not be too strong. The improper equipment and the scarcity of the specialised personnel was not able to let a considerable expectation from those troops. Von Forstner to the Great Major State’s commander, the Baron von Bech, Rome, February, 1888, cf. R. MORI, “Francesco Crispi…”: 198-199.

[118] Conserved at Museo Centrale del Risorgimento [M.C.R.], Rome, the document is not dated; R. Mori cronologically placed it on the second half of February, taking as guiding marks the Romanian minister’s visit in Vienna and a Crispi’s note, annexed to the memorial that was dated on February 26. We confess that we could not detect Crispi’s note. See Carte Crispi, case 661, fasc. 12, doc. no. 12. See also Appendix no. 1.

[119] ASDMAE. Archivio Segreto di Gabinetto (1869-1914) [A.S.G.], green cassette no. 10, fasc. 1 (Crispi Ministry), doc. no. 1.

[120] M.C.R., Carte Crispi, case 661, fasc. 12, doc. no. 2. The project was accompanied by a preliminary scheme, dated on February 26, 1888 (see Appendix no. 2).

[121] Interesting but at the same time uncomfortable, because Crispi reactualised the matter of the mutual territorial warrant, this latter being eluded from the Triple Alliance’s treaty because of the two empires’ restraint to guarantee Rome to Italy and of the Austria’s restraint to guarantee Alsacia and Lorena to Germany. This would be an additional reason for the project’s rejection. Cf. R. MORI, Francesco Crispi…: 201, note 26.

[122] Francesco Curtopassi (1837-1895), diplomat at the end of his career, was not a character of Tornielli’s calibre at all. After seven years in Bucharest, Tornielli finally gained the nomination (on December 25, 1887) to an embassy: Madrid (1887-1889). Curtopassi was transfered to Bucharest from the Athens, where he had been in mission since 1880. He would remain in Bucharest by 1895, when Alberto Blanc, the minister of foreign affairs at that moment, needed a post of plenipotentiary minister for one of his protegée, Emanuel Beccaria (see ASDMAE, A.S.G., green cassette no. 10, fasc. 7, Beccaria to Blanc, Bucharest, August 19, 1895.). Blanc would name him as ambassador at St Petersburg (February, 25), a post that he never occupied, deceasing in Bucharest, on April 7. Curtopassi would be the plenipotentiary who would also negotiate the second Italy’s adherence treaty, on 1892. Far anyhow to enjoy Tornielli’s consideration and influence in Bucharest, the new Italian minister complained to Crispi on 1889 that he was put “in condizione inferiore a quella di ministri coi quali dovrebbe camminare di pari e dividere la piena fiducia della Corte rumena [the Austrian-Hungarian and German ministers - emphasis mine]”, cf. ASDMAE. Carteggio Gabinetto Crispi, folder no. 3, fasc. 6-b, Curtopassi to Crispi, Bucharest, April 8, 1889, hour 16,40; D.D.I., 2nd series, vol. 22, no. 543, Crispi to De Launay and Nigra, Rome, April 10, 1889: 322.

[123] ASDMAE. Carte dell’Eredità Crispi, fasc. 2, Curtopassi to Crispi, Bucharest, April 5, 1888, hour 17,30. It is possible that Curtopassi would discuss more with the King Charles I, when he was received in audience, on April 2, 1888. However, he only mentioned in the reserved telegram mailed to Rome that “Sa Majesé m’a exprimé dans des termes très chaleureux sa vive satisfaction de l’entrée de l’Italie dans l’accord relatif à la Roumanie”, cf. D.D.I, 2nd series, vol. 22, no. 3, Curtopassi to Crispi, Bucharest, April 2, 1888; see also ASDMAE. Serie politica A, Romania, case no. 107, Bucharest, April 3, 1888.

[124] See above, note 21.

[125] See also R. MORI, “Francesco Crispi…”: 202.

[126] ASDMAE. Carteggio Gabinetto Crispi, folder 3, fasc. 6-b, Rumania, Nigra to Crispi, Vienna, March 26, 1888, hour 15,10.

[127] Ibidem, A.S.G., green cassette no. 10,  fasc. 3 (Rudini administration), Nigra to Crispi, March 26, 1888.

[128] M.C.R., Carte Crispi, case 661, fasc. 12, doc. no. 4, Curtopassi to Crispi, Vienna, March 26, 1888; see also D.D.I., 2nd series, vol. 21, no. 702: 582-583.

[129] Ibidem.

[130] ASDMAE. A.S.G., green cassette no. 10, fasc. 3, Nigra to Crispi, Vienna, March 30, 1888; see also D.D.I., 2nd series, vol. 21, no. 714: 590.

[131] Ibidem, Crispi to Nigra, Rome, March 30, 1888, hour 18,45.

[132] “Ce matin le baron de Bruck m’a parlé de notre affaire avec la Roumanie. Il m’a donné lecture du traité 30 octobre 1883 entre l’Empereur d’Autriche-Hongrie et le Roi Charles, sans toutefois, m’en laisser copie. J’ai remarqué que l’article deux ne pouvait pas nous être applique. […]”, ibidem, Crispi to Nigra, Rome, April 2, 1888, hour 15,35; see also D.D.I., 2nd series, vol. 22, no. 2: 3.

[133] Ibidem, Nigra to Crispi, Vienna, April 5, 1888; see also D.D.I., 2nd series, vol. 22, no. 7: 3.

[134] Ibidem. Carte dell’Eredità Crispi, fasc. 2, Crispi to Nigra, Rome, April 7, 1888.

[135] “Secret. J’ai proposé à Kalnoky une redaction qu’il a accepté et que vous sera portée par le courrier de Cabinet autrichien samedi. Les articles deux et trois n’étant pas applicables à l’Italie, j’ai pensé, d’accord avec Kalnoky, que nous devions nous borner à prendre engagement mutuel de nous concerter en temps utile pour une action commune si les éventualités visées par ces articles venaient à se produire. V. E. jugera”. Cf. ibidem, Nigra to Crispi, Vienna, April 11, 1888, hour 16,50. The same fund comprises a memorial forwarded by Kalnoky to the ambassador Bruck respecting the same question of the Articles 2 and 3: “En comparant le texte de l’accession allemande avec celui du projet pour l’accession italienne Mr. Crispi s’apercevra que nous avons eu soin de prendre en consideration: et la position géographique de l’Italie et la circonsatnce particulière que l’Allemagne, en cas d’une attaque russe est liée envers nous par le casus foederis, tandis que l’Italie n’a, jusqu’à présent aucune obligation semblable concernant une action militaire à l’est. Dans cet ordre d’idées nous avons modifiés pour l’Italie les art. II et III. Le Comte Nigra croyait qu’il serait préférable d’adjoindre tout le texte de notre traité y compris le préambule dans la déclaration d’accession de l’Italie. Aussitôt que S. E. Mr. Crispi et le Gouvernement roumanin auront donné leur assentiment au projet du traité en question, l’Italie devrait en délivrer deux exemplaires dont l’un serait signé à Bucarest entre Mr. Carp et Mr. Curtopassi et l’autre échangé entre l’Italie et nous. Quant à la signature de ce dernier Mr. de Crispi decidera s’il désire le faire à Rome ou à Vienne. Aussitôt après la signature nous nous empresserons de porter à la connaissance du Cabinet de Berlin le texte de l’acte d’accession. Je Vous prie de demander à Mr. de Crispi s’il accepte ce modus procedendi et d’ajouter que, s’il le désire nous sommes tous disposés de communiquer par le Comte Goluchowski à Mr. de Carp le projet de traité dont il s’agit aussitôt qu’il aura été approuvé par Mr. le Président du Conseil d’Italie”. Cf. ibidem, [Kalnoky to Bruck, undated].

[136] Ibidem. A.S.G., cassette no. 10, fasc. 3, annex at the reserved report no. 18/4 on April 12, 1888 (Nigra to Crispi). See also Appendix no. 3.

[137] Ibidem, Nigra to Crispi, Vienna, April 12, 1888; seel also D.D.I., 2nd series, vol. 22, no. 15: 15.

[138] Ibidem, Crispi to Nigra, Rome, April 19, 1888; ibidem, no. 23: 20.

[139] “Kalnoky vient de me dire, d’après un télégramme de Bruck, que V. E. a approuvé le projet dèaccession, et mèinvité à procéder à la signature. Il se prepare dèenvoyer en même temps, le projet a Bukarest per qu’il est signé par Curtopassi et Carp.[…]”, cf. ibidem, Nigra to Crispi, Vienna, April 20, 1888.

[140] D.D.I., 2nd series, vol. 22, no. 25, Curtopassi to Crispi, Bucharest, April 23, 1888, hour 14,02: 22.

[141] ASDMAE. A.S.G., green cassette no. 10, fasc. 3, Nigra to Crispi, Vienna, April 24, 1888.

[142] Ibidem, Nigra to Crispi, Vienna, April 24, 1888.

[143] Ibidem, Kalnoky to Nigra, Vienna, April 27, 1888.

[144] “Mon collégue d’Autriche vient de remettre à moi et à ce ministre des affaires étrangerés pour être revêtues de nos signatures les deux exemplaires de l’instrument par lequel S. M. le Roi Humbert accéde au traité déja existant entre le roi Charles. Lorsque je serai en possession des pleins pouvoirs … [missing passage - emphasis mine] …. Instructions de V. E. j’aurai bien soin avant de signer, de collationer ces exemplaires avec le texte qui me parviendra de Rome”, cf. ibidem. Carte dell’Eredità Crispi, fasc. 2, Curtopassi to Crispi, April 30, 1888. Actually, he would not have the possibility to verify anything, although on May 8, Crispi forwarded for the second time the instructions to Nigra to dispatch such a copy to Bucharest, ibidem.

[145] Ibidem. A.S.G., green cassette no. 10, fasc. 1, doc. no. 3, Curtopassi  to Crispi, Bucharest, May 5, 1888, hour 22,50.

[146] “Les copies de l’acte destinées aux deux Parties, ont dû être envoyées par Kalnoky. Elles sont exactes et doivent suffire. Cependant, si vous avez besoin d’une autre copie, je vous l’emmène.[…]”, cf. ibidem, Nigra to Curtopassi, Vienna, May 6, 1888.

[147] Ibidem, Nigra to Curtopassi, Vienna, May 7, 1888.

[148] Ibidem, Curtopassi to Nigra, Bucharest, May 9, 1888.

[149] Ibidem, Nigra to Crispi, Vienna, May 15, 1888.

[150] “Scambio delle ratifiche avra luogo il 19 al castello di Sinaia, ove sono custoditi trattati ed atti d’accessione. Presi misure perché mia gita cola non abbia a destrare sospetti o curiosità”, cf. ibidem. Carte dell’Eredità Crispi, fasc. II, Curtopassi to Crispi, Bucharest, June 13, 1888, hour 13,45. Wished not only by Bismarck, but also by Charles I, the secret feature of the unpopular alliance concluded in 1883 made that Italy’s adherence also to be perfected on the same conditions.

[151] Ibidem, Curtopassi to Crispi, Bucharest, June 19, 1888; see also D.D.I., 2nd series, vol. 22, no. 109: 65.

[152] Ibidem. A.S.G., green cassette no. 10, fasc. 3, Rudini to Nigra, Rome, May 10, 1888. We signalise that in the quoted fund there are only the drafts of the letters mailed by Rudini to Nigra. The originals could be detected in a relatively recent fund, entitled Miscellanea Renato Mori, parcel no. 8.

[153] Ibidem, Rudini to Nigra, Rome, May 8, 1891.

[154] Brin was the one who would sign the second treaty of adherence, on November 28, 1892.. This occured because the direct Austrian-Romanian treaty expired on November, 1891 without the possibility for the Romanian sovereign to renew it, having not the collaboration of an informed and confident minister. In 1892, a new alliance treaty between Austria-Hungary and Romania would be practically signed, in the same terms as the precedent one.

[155] See above: 18-20.

[156] For this, see F. CHABOD, op. cit., II: 754, note 178.

[157] Undoubtedly, Nigra was not the only Italian statesmen that expected that the agreement would not be put into practice. However, it does not seem to be the case of the other two sides: the Austrian-Hungarian and Romanian ones. More than 25 five years after, in the middle of the Balkan crisis, Titu Maiorescu, the Romanian Prime-Minister and Foreign Secretary remarked in his diary: “Friday, November 16 / 29 [1912]. In the morning, at the Ministry. - Between 6 and 7 o’clock [I was] called by the king, who tells me: he talked with Hötzendorf [Chef of Austrian-Hungarian Military Staff - n.n.]  today between 2 ¼ and 4. It means that they talked about our all plan that our army co-operate with the Austrian-Hungarian one in a case of a war against Russia, when also Germany and probably Italy [would participate] with 40,000 soldiers compulsory sent to us [emphasis mine]. […]”. Cf. Titu Maiorescu, România, rãzboaiele balcanice ºi Cadrilaterul (edited by Stelian Neagoe), Bucharest: Ed. Machiavelli, 1995: 47. Immediately after the beginning of the First World War, I. I. C. Brãtianu, the Romanian Prime-Minister, would refer to the clauses of the same agreement, to the co-operation of the Italian troops on the Romanian territory against Russia: “ Bratianu allarmatissimo rinnova a V. E. domande circa casus foederis fatto dal Re Carlo. Egli inoltre dice di non aver trovato traccie negli archivi rumeni delle modalità del passaggio di truppe italiane in Romania attraverso territori austro-ungarici e chiede informazioni in proposito come pure sul quantitativo di tali truppe che se ben ricordo è di 40 mila uomini. […]”. Cf. D.D.I.,  4th series, vol. 12, no. 472, Fasciotti to Di San Giuliano, Sinaia, July 24, 1914: 303.

[158] Cf. Ion BULEI, “O alianþã în mijlocul altei alianþe. Un studiu de caz: Italia-România, 1909-1910”, in Concepte ºi metodologii în studiul relaþiilor internaþionale, Jassy: Editura Anakarom, 1997: 113-120.

[159] M.C.R.., Carte Crispi, b. 661, doc. no.12 (12). The present text is a French copy elaborated by the Austrian-Hungarian ambassador, von Bruck, based upon the original memorial transmited by Kalnoky. The date is the one deduced by Renato Mori on the basis of Crispi’s note, annexed to the document.

[160] M.C.R., Carte Crispi, case 661, fasc. 12, doc. no. 2.

[161] ASDMAE. Carte dell’Eredità Crispi, fasc. 2, the appendix of the report no. 18/4, on April 12, 1888.