University of Massachusetts Boston
Conflict Studies Conference
FROM STRUCTURAL BARRIERS TO NEGOTIATED SOLUTIONS: Successes and
Failures of the Third-Party Interventions in Cyprus: A Systemic
Approach
By Idil P. Izmirli, George Mason University
Introduction:
You can not be a peace- builder Unless you are a risk taker
Ambassador John McDonald
Traditionally, most third-party interventions, such as UN Peace
keeping missions have been administered from above either after a
negotiated settlement between states have been obtained, or in the
midst of a war, or prior or after the outbreak of violence. Several
mediation efforts, fact finding missions, and good offices are some
examples of this type of third-party interventions. I will define
these types of interventions top-down, high-intensity interventions.
During the past decade, gradually, a softer approach of third-party
interventions entered the international and intra-national arena in
the form of second track diplomacy which were mostly initiated from
below. I will define these types of interventions bottom-up,
low-intensity interventions. These later ones recognize the
importance of civil society in bringing peace and democracy. A third
type of intervention which was born through a holistic convergence of
these two types of interventions is called the multi-track diplomacy
where top down and bottom up approaches are integrated and related in
a system for sustainable peace.
In the first part, this paper will summarize the specific attempts
made by third parties from track II as well as the multi-track
diplomacy (including the bi-communal talks) to resolve the Cyprus
conflict. In the second part, I will attempt to demonstrate the
causes of barriers and obstacles to peace-building in Cyprus through
a systemic framework. The conflict in Cyprus is an ethnic conflict
within a broader context of Greco-Turkish relations in terms of the
wider regional balance and can not be, in my opinion, analyzed in
isolation. Systems analysis can be used in the analysis of ethnic
tensions in deeply divided societies, where the systems are
interdependent with the larger systems, such as in the case of
Cyprus. Thus, in the final part of this paper, I will try to bring a
more integrated and holistic framework to the explanation of this
complex conflict, and I will attempt to illustrate that in protracted
ethno-religious, identity conflicts such as the one in Cyprus, the
negotiated solution to peacebuilding can only come through a
combination of multi-track efforts including the track I involvement
parallel to second track initiatives.
According to Brian Mandell
This elasticizing of third-party roles offers several advantages
in the Cyprus case. It permits a more inclusive approach to
third-party intervention (i.e. beyond the predominant UN role), one
that envisages several more actors (official and non-official)
participating in and sharing the risks and benefits of the
peacemaking process. By expanding the list of third-party attributes
necessary for resolving multi-party/multi-issue conflicts, it may be
possible to move beyond current thinking which suggests that only
small, select group of mediators with ``muscle'' are suitable for
intervention roles.
Literature Review:
First, I would like to revisit a few core concepts/models from the
conflict resolution literature that will be used in the analysis of
the Cyprus conflict.
-Put figure 1 here- Lederach's triangle and MTD circle-
In his book "Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided
Societies," J.P. Lederach came up with a descriptive model (a
triangle) of peacemaking on multiple levels (top-level, mid-range and
grass roots leadership). As seen from the figure 1, top-level
leadership is at the apex of this pyramid. These are the religious or
military elites, or mostly government related officials with high
visibility. By virtue of their high public profile, these leaders are
usually under a lot of pressures (from the adversary as well as their
constituencies) and usually locked in their positions with little
flexibility. Mid-range leadership can be delineated along several
different lines. ``They are positioned so that they are likely to
know and be known by the top-level leadership, yet they have
significant connections to the broader context and the constituency
that the top leaders claim to present. '' They are academic
intellectuals, ethnic or religious leaders, or humanitarian NGOs.
Finally, the grassroots leadership is the local level that represents
the base of the society including the local leaders, leaders of
indigenous NGOs, community developers, local health officials, and
refugee camp leaders. ``In many instances, the local level is a
microcosm of the bigger picture. ''
In comparison with Lederach's triangle, Louise Diamond and
Ambassador McDonald came up with a holistic model, that is a
multi-track framework, a systems approach to peacebuilding which
incorporates second track actors along nine tracks that are presented
in a circular form. This is called the multi-track diplomacy. Here,
``each track occupies a unique position in the diagram, yet they are
all connected by the outer circle and at the center. ''
The nine tracks are organized in a circle to suggest graphically
the underlying principle of systemic thinking: the whole is greater
than the sum of its parts. The components of this system are vastly
different from one another, yet somehow they are sufficiently related
to, and interactive with one another to build a synergistic
(reactive) energy that carries their efforts beyond simple listing or
summation of one plus one. ''
Both of these models utilize open dialogues or problem solving
workshops (PSWs) among the members of the different tracks (or the
different leadership positions in Lederach's triangle) for protracted
conflicts as a conflict prevention or transformation tool. The idea
behind these dialogues (PSWs) is to bring the members of conflicting
groups together on the assumption that contact will increase
understanding and foster de-escalation. But, the realization of
interaction between members of the conflicting group may have
negative, neutral, or positive outcomes based on a host of factors
led the social psychologists to search for the conditions under which
intergroup contact does lead to increased understanding and decreased
prejudice-the so called facilitative condition, which make up the
contact hypothesis.
Allport's classic work (1954) on the nature of prejudice still
offers one of the most succinct statements of the contact
hypothesis:
Prejudice may be reduced by equal status contact between majority
and minority groups in the pursuit of common goals. The effect is
greatly enhanced if this contact is sanctioned by institutional
supports (i.e. by law, custom, or local atmosphere), and provided it
is of a sort that leads to the perception of common interests and
common humanity between members
of two groups. (p. 281)
Further studies have shown that use of superordinate goals to
reinforce the positive effects of contact leads into intergroup
cooperation. Based on all these information, social psychologists
have devised several intervention and problem-solving methods about
the intergroup conflict, and PSWs became one of the widely used
techniques among the conflict resolution scholars to resolve
deep-rooted protracted conflicts in deeply divided societies.
The founding fathers of first PSWs were John Burton and his
colleagues. When they gathered in London (on December 1965) for the
first time, their agenda included series of intervention methods
(based on the work of Leonard Doob, a social psychologist) for
serious conflicts in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore. Afterwards,
Herb Kelman, Chris Mitchell, late Edward Lazar became the other
important key figures on these types of interventions that involved
bringing influentials from the different circles of life of the
divided societies to promote peaceful resolutions through joint
thinking (and action) that could generate mutually acceptable
solutions. Following a similar framework, Ronald Fisher later coined
the term Interactive Conflict Resolution (ICR), and with his work
going back to 1972 as a scholar-practitioner, became one of the key
figures of the CR field. His contingency approach to third-party
intervention, an approach that links the form of intervention to the
particular stage the parties to the conflict find themselves in,
became an important step for the third-party intervention tactics and
helped along to get the parties to the table. Building on similar
concepts, Joseph Montville, Vamik Volkan along with John McDonald,
and Louise Diamond founded the notion of unofficial-second track (or
multi-track) citizen diplomacy that focused on human or psychological
factors.
PSWs do not only aim to bring the parties together in order to
communicate and to get to know each other as human beings with
similar goals, fears, needs, and concerns, but also aim to challenge
the formed stereotypes, negative expectations, and self fulfilled
prophecies. Their characteristics are the analysis of conflict,
exploration of mutual perspectives, generations of new ideas, and
joint problem-solving. Creative problem-solving redefines,
fractionates, or transcends the conflict. In this manner,
positive-sum, or win/win solutions that leave both parties better
off, can be discovered. In other words, PSWs have a dual purpose:
they are designed both to produce changes in attitudes, perceptions,
and ideas for resolving the conflict among the individual
participants in the workshop, and the transfer these changes to the
political arena-i.e., to the political debate and decision making
process within each community . Thus, these PSWs are designed to
encourage system-level changes through changes in influential
individuals (Kelman, 1986).
Especially, the continuing dialogues and PSWs represent a
sustained effort to address concrete issues, enabling the scholars to
push the process of conflict analysis and interactive problem solving
farther and to apply it more systematically than it was formerly done
in the previous workshops. The continuing nature of sustained
dialogues make it possible to go beyond the sharing of perspectives
to the joint production of creative ideas. Moreover, the periodic
reconvening of a continuing workshop allows for an iterative and
cumulative process, based on feedback and correction. Finally, a
continuing workshop provides better opportunities to address the
question of how to disseminate ideas and proposals developed at the
workshop most effectively and appropriately. Some scholars named
these types of track II efforts sustainable dialogues, some defined
them as "continuing" PSWs.
The Summary of Third-Party Interventions in Cyprus:
Continuing workshops, track II and/or multi-track interventions,
bi-communal dialogues played a huge role in Cyprus, and impacted the
ethnic relations of the Turkish and Greek Cypriots who are the
cohabitants of the island that is located in the Mediterranean
Sea.
-Here put "Figure 2": Overview of CR activities in Cyprus: Their
Contributions to the Peace Process by B. Broome-
Low-Intensity third-party interventions in Cyprus:
As in any protracted conflict, in the beginning, trying to bring
people from both sides together even into the same room was initially
an almost impossible task for the third-party intervenors. However,
in time, some of these challenging and demanding initiatives
demonstrated successful outcomes. In this section of the paper, I
will focus on the third-party interventions that took place in Cyprus
within the last decade, and try to analyze their impact on the ethnic
relations in Cyprus.
According to Ambassador McDonald, who is one of the founders of
IMDT, the uniqueness of the IMDT was that they were the first
third-party, unlike the others, who were "invited in" to the
conflict. This invitation happened when a Greek Cypriot, Mrs.
Markides from the University of Maine, who was married to the
president of the Iowa Peace Institute, invited Louise Diamond to
Cyprus for 3 weeks, after meeting with her in a 1991 Conference on
Peace Institutes.
During her visit, Diamond just observed and listened (government
don't do), then got a permission and crossed the green line that
separates Cyprus into two with a barbed wire, met people from both
sides, asked people what their needs were, and listened."
After, Diamond's visit, based on the local peoples' suggestions,
McDonald Peace Institute was set in the Greek side in 1992. The
institute's main goal was to identify the risk takers. According to
McDonald "no one can tell anybody that they should be the risk
takers, it comes from within." Based on the IMDT initiatives and the
risk takers including local leaders, journalists, university
presidents, lawyers etc. who were mostly mid-range leaders in their
respective communities, first IMDT made a five year commitment, which
is now still continuing after eight years. According to McDonald,
before IMDT, there have been numerous third-parties involved in the
Cyprus question. UN has been on the island since 1964, there has been
several track I involvement, state department in Washington, and
various embassies, but they dealt with the political issues and
negotiated peace treaties. McDonald states:
When a third-party from track I was involved in peace talks,
usually the Cypriots were told to put down the barriers, but our goal
was for them (the Cypriot people) to want to put down the
barriers.
According to McDonald, IMDT's main aim was to train the
inhabitants of the island with CR skills. These trainees with new
skills were not only educated for the immediate need for the current
conflictual situation, but for the future. They were going to be
trained as conflict
resolutioners/practitioners/peace-keepers/peace-makers for the future
violent eruptions, after the fact the peace treaty would be signed by
the two communities and the UN peace keepers and the Turkish Armed
Forces would leave the island. Thus, the future goal of IMDT
operation was mostly preventive and aimed to break the cycle of
violence in Cyprus, before it turns into Angola or Sri Lanka and stop
it before it starts.
Up to now, we trained 2500 people from both sides, also we trained
50 CR trainers from each community (25/25). The later, obviously
takes a much longer time, than the former. Now, these people are
already working for peace in their respective communities. Our
framework is trust, listening, risk taking, patience, courage, and
transformative social change working with their heart and trying to
persuade change about the perception of the enemy. All the theory you
want to apply in a protracted, ethnic conflict such as in Cyprus, the
dynamics of face-to-face training by building trust and confidence is
priceless and it works.''
The other initiative of the IMDT was to bring forty 16 year olds
for two weeks to a summer camp in Pennsylvania, where they could
work, play, and build friendships. Before this IMDT effort, these
young people who were born after the partition in 1974, had never
even seen anybody from the other side. After their return to Cyprus,
these youngsters started their own web site and their own internet
connections where they kept in touch with each other with their
hearts and souls.
In addition to IMDT, there were also other multi-track initiatives
that aimed a transformation towards positive peace in Cyprus. For
example, "In 1994 over four months the "Cyprus Conflict Resolution
Consortium" conducted over 10 workshops with hundreds of Greek and
Turkish Cypriots [where the participants ranged from]
Fulbright recipients studying for degrees in the U.S., Fulbright
scholars, and political leaders who came with a mixture of open ears
and great skepticism and resistance." In addition to IMDT, Harvard
Conflict Management Group (CMG/Diana Chigas), National Training Labs
(NTL) initiatives, in recent years Seed for Peace (youth training
that was initially institutionalized by the IMDT). Some other
initiatives such as Ron Fishers' in Canada, that mostly concentrate
on educational issues of conflict resolution with the Cypriot
immigrants, are among the multi-track conflict resolution efforts
focused on Cyprus. Especially recently, after the "thaw" that came
about after the earthquakes in both Greece and Turkey (which is in
some spheres called the ``Earthquake diplomacy'') there has been a
visible increase in bi-communal talks and multi-track efforts that
were initiated by Greeks and Turks, as well as Greek and Turkish
Cypriots. Moreover, when the EU members met in Helsinki, they put up
the time frame for Turkey's membership in EU, and not only Greece,
but also Germany, one of the other country who opposed to the Turkish
membership in EU for a long time, also indicated that they will start
a policy shift in admitting new members and not object to the
membership any longer. In fact, very recently, on September 14th
2000, Greek foreign minister George Papandreou referred to the
warming of relations between Greece and Turkey since they helped one
another in the wake of earthquakes last year and said "Greece and
Turkey, through their rapprochement, share a rare opportunity to help
citizens of Cyprus rebuild their island, their homes, and their
dreams." In short, ethnic relations seemed to be improving after 5
decades of efforts. However, regardless of all these multi-track
initiatives as well as the recent rapprochement between the Greek and
Turkish governments based on the "earthquake diplomacy," the conflict
in Cyprus is still continuing (especially with the recent stalemate),
and the optimism about a negotiated solution is looking more and more
like a flickering candle next to the Green line separating Greek and
Turkish communities in Cyprus with barb wire and sand bags.
Currently, Turkey keeps 30,000 troops in Northern Cyprus. However,
there are divisions within the Turkish Cypriots as well as the Greek
Cypriots, and there is a potential for the development of a civil
society on both sides which has been lacking in Cyprus since it
gained its independence in 1960. Recently, for the first time in
decades, during the summer 2000, Turkish Cypriots took the streets in
violent protests after a string of banks collapsed in the isolated
enclave, which languishes under an embargo ranging from commerce to
sports. In fact, in the beginning of September 2000, a poll published
by the Northern Cyprus Public Opinion and Marketing Research Company
(COMAR) showed that 31.7 percent of the Turkish Cypriots are
supporting a bi-zonal solution and 27.2 percent are in favor of
confederal solution. Considering the Turkish Cypriot governments
persistent push for a confederal solution in the past three decades,
this poll points out the rise of civil society among the Turkish
Cypriots that is partially a result of the third-party interventions
and peacebuilding initiatives that have been taking place since the
conflict started on the island after the Turkish occupation in 1974
in response to a coup in Nicosia by the junta then ruling Greece.
Under the circumstances, how can one explain the stagnant inertia
that is keeping the peace process move forward? How can one explain
the recent stalemate? Most importantly, how can one push the
substance behind the Cyprus deadlock from structural barriers toward
a negotiated solution so that the simmering conflict on the island
does not undermine a newfound Greek-Turkish rapprochement? Can we
search for answers for the negative peace on the island within the
self-interests of regional powers and their impact on this specific
conflict? Or, can we pursue an explanation of the stalemate created
by within the Turkish Cypriot leadership's decision (specifically the
president of de facto TRNC Mr. Rauf Denktas) of shutting down of the
communication lines between Geek and Turkish Cypriots that were
somewhat open until December 1997, when Mr. Denktash decided to close
down all multi-track diplomacy efforts and bi-communal talks on the
island?
In the following section, I will attempt to answer these questions
by outlining the Cyprus conflict through a systemic analysis
framework.
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