GENERAL ABIZAID: YES, ITS A GUERRILLA WAR IN IRAQ

THE STRATFOR WEEKLY, 7 July 2003

by Dr. George Friedman

U.S. Counterinsurgency Strategies in Iraq

Summary

The appointment of Gen. John Abizaid as head of U.S. Central Command opens a new phase in both the Iraq campaign and the war on al Qaeda. In order to wage follow-on operations against al Qaeda, an effective counterinsurgency operation must be launched against the Iraqi guerrillas. This is a politico-military imperative. Politically, the United States must demonstrate its effectiveness against the full spectrum of opponents. Militarily, the United States must show it can project forces from Iraq while the base of operations remains insecure. Directly suppressing an insurrection without indigenous support historically has been difficult, but Iraq has a built-in opposition to the guerrillas: the Shiites in the south. But their desire to dominate an Iraqi government -- and their ties to Iran -- runs counter to U.S. policy. This means Washington will have to make some difficult choices in Iraq, and in the end will give away some things it does not want to give away.

Analysis

U.S. Army Gen. John Abizaid will officially take over as head of Central Command during the week of July 7. His mission will be not only to stabilize the situation in Iraq, but also to command the main U.S. offensive against al Qaeda. The summer offensive that Stratfor has written about has begun, and Abizaid's mission will be to wage war, integrate the various operations into a coherent whole and achieve the goal of the offensive: to further undermine al Qaeda's ability to strike at the U.S. homeland.

In war, no plan unfolds as expected. This war began in a completely unexpected fashion on Sept. 11, 2001. As is inevitable, the course of the war has taken unexpected turns. The most recent and significant turn of this war has been the emergence of a guerrilla war in Iraq. To be more precise, it appears to us that in Iraq, as in Afghanistan, the fighters on the ground understood that they could not win a conventional war. Rather than engage in the sort of conflict at which the United States excels, they put up token conventional resistance, all the while planning to engage the United States in unconventional warfare over an extended period.

In other words, the Iraqi forces understood that they could not defeat the United States in conventional war. Instead, the Iraqi war plan consisted of declining conventional engagement and subsequently engaging U.S. forces in operations in which their advantages were minimized and their weaknesses were exposed.

This has left the United States with the following battle problem: It must wage the broader summer offensive while simultaneously containing, engaging and defeating the Iraqi guerrillas. This is not an easy task, not only because it spreads U.S. forces thinner than planned, but also because the challenge posed by the guerrillas has trans-military implications, politically and psychologically. Abizaid must not ignore these considerations and must integrate them into his war plan. This is neither easy nor optional.

It is useful to begin by recalling the overarching strategic purpose of all of these operations: the disruption of al Qaeda and potential follow-on groups to prevent further major attacks on the United States. The Iraq campaign was an element in this broader strategy, designed to achieve these three goals, in increasing importance:

1. The elimination of a regime that potentially could support al Qaeda operations.

2. The transformation of the psychological architecture of the Islamic world. The perception in the Islamic world, developed since the U.S. withdrawal from Beirut in 1983 and reaffirmed by events since then, was that the United States was incapable of resolute action. The United States was seen as powerful militarily, but as lacking the political will to use that power. U.S. forces withdrew after taking minimal casualties in Beirut and Somalia. In Afghanistan, the United States halted operations after seizing major cities, apparently because it was unwilling to engage in more extended conflict. The U.S. invasion of Iraq was designed to change the Islamic world's perception -- accepting anger at the United States in exchange for greater fear.

3. The creation of a base of operations that would allow the United States to bring political and military pressure to bear on a cluster of nations the U.S. administration sees as directly or indirectly sustaining al Qaeda operations -- in particular Saudi Arabia, Syria and Iran. Riyadh began shifting its position prior to the Iraq invasion. Immediately after the end of the campaign, the United States turned its attention to follow-on operations against Syria and Iran. These operations have been primarily political since the end of the Iraq campaign, but the constant threat exists that they could move to a military phase at any point.

The guerrilla war in Iraq strikes directly at the second objective of the Iraqi campaign. It is what Stratfor has called a trans-military goal: It is rooted in a military operation but ultimately arrives at an issue that transcends the purely military -- namely the psychological perception of the United States and the credibility of U.S. military threats. As a secondary matter, it also complicates the logistics of follow-on operations after Iraq. At the moment, that is not the primary issue -- although it should be emphatically noted that an evolution in the conditions in Iraq very well could undermine the U.S. ability to use Iraq as a base of operations.

The problems that have arisen in Afghanistan and Iraq are rooted in U.S. strategy. The United States invaded both countries as a means toward other ends, rather than as ends in themselves. The invasion of Afghanistan was intended to disrupt al Qaeda's main operational base. The invasion of Iraq was intended to bring U.S. power to bear against al Qaeda's enablers in the region. In neither case did the United States have an intrinsic interest in either country -- including control of Iraq's oil.

The United States could achieve its primary purpose in each country without complete pacification. In Afghanistan, the U.S. administration accepted from the beginning that the complex tribal and ideological conflicts there would make pacification impossible. U.S. forces seized the major cities and a few strategic points, kept most forces in protected garrisons and conducted military operations as opportunities to combat al Qaeda arose. U.S. forces avoided any attempts at pacification projects, understanding that the level of force and effort required to achieve any degree of pacification far outstripped U.S. interests and probably U.S. resources. The United States had a limited mission in Afghanistan and ruthlessly focused on that, while publicly professing ambitious and complex goals.

The Iraq campaign took its primary bearings from the Afghan campaign. The goals were to shatter the Iraqi army and displace the Iraqi regime. These goals were achieved quickly. The United States then rapidly pivoted to use its psychological and military advantage to pressure Syria and Iran. As in Afghanistan, pacification was not a primary goal. Pacification was not essential to carrying on the follow-on mission. But the U.S. reading of the situation in Iraq diverged from that of Afghanistan. The U.S. administration always understood that the consequences of the invasion of Afghanistan would be the continuation and intensification of the chaos that preceded that invasion. The underlying assumption in Iraq was that the postwar Iraqi impulse would be toward stability. The U.S. administration assumed that the majority of the Iraqi public opposed Saddam Hussein, would welcome the fall of his regime, would not object to an American occupation and, therefore, would work harmoniously with the United States in pacification projects, easing the burden on the United States tremendously.

The U.S. administration expected the defeat of the Taliban to devolve into guerrilla warfare. The United States did not expect the defeat of the Ba’ath regime to devolve into guerrilla warfare. It did not expect the Shiites to be as well-organized as they are, nor did they expect this level of Shiite opposition to a U.S. occupation. In other words, the strategic understanding of the Iraqi campaign took its bearings from the Afghan campaign -- and the United States had no interest in pacification -- but at the same time, the United States did not expect this level of difficulty and danger involved in pacifying Iraq, because U.S. intelligence misread the situation on the ground.

At its current level of operations, the guerrilla war does not represent a military challenge to the United States. Therefore, the first and third goals are for the moment achieved. The United States has displaced the Iraqi regime, limiting its ability to engage in strategic operations with the United States, and U.S. forces can conduct follow-on operations should they choose to. But the United States is in serious danger of failing to achieve its second goal: transforming the psychological perception of the United States as an irresistible military force.

It certainly is true that the guerrilla war does not represent a strategic threat to the United States. But on one level, the reality is irrelevant. Perception is everything. The image that the U.S. Army is constantly taking casualties and is unable to cripple the guerrillas undermines the perception that the United States wanted to generate with this war. The reality might be that the United States is overwhelmingly powerful and the guerrilla war is a minor nuisance. The perception in the Islamic world will be that the United States does not have the power to suppress Saddam Hussein's guerrillas. It will complicate the politico-military process that the United States wanted to put into motion with the invasion. It is therefore a situation that the United States will have to deal with.

The United States has, in essence, two strategic options:

1. Afghanistize the conflict. Move into secure base camps while allowing the political situation on the ground to play itself out. Allow the tension between Shiite and Sunni to explode into civil war, manipulating each side to the U.S. advantage, while focusing militarily on follow-on operations in Syria, Iran and elsewhere. In other words, insulate the U.S. military from the Iraqi reality, and carry on operations elsewhere.

2. Try to engage and defeat the guerrillas through counterinsurgency operations, including direct military attacks and political operations.

The dilemma facing the United States is this: From a strictly military perspective, Option 1 is most attractive. From a political and psychological perspective, Option 1 is unacceptable. It also creates a military risk: The insurgency, unless checked, ultimately could threaten the security of U.S. forces in Iraq no matter how well-defended they were in their secure facilities. On the other side of the equation, counterinsurgency operations always require disproportionate resources. The number of insurgents is unimportant. The number of places they might be and the number of locations they might attack dictate the amount of resources that must be devoted to them. Therefore, a relatively small group of guerrillas can tie down a much larger force. A sparse, dispersed and autonomous guerrilla force can draw off sufficient forces to make follow-on operations impossible.

The classical counterinsurgency dilemma now confronts the United States. The quantity of forces needed to defeat the guerrillas is disproportionate to the military advantage gained by defeating them. Failure to engage the guerrilla force could result in a dramatic upsurge in their numbers, allowing them to become unmanageable. The ineffective engagement of guerrillas could result in both the squandering of resources and the failure to contain them. The issue is not how large the guerrilla force is but how sustainable it is. At this stage of operations, the smaller the force the more difficult it is to suppress -- so long as it is large enough to carry out dispersed operations, has sufficient supplies and the ability to recruit new members as needed. At this point, the Iraqi guerrilla force is of indeterminate size, but it is certainly well-dispersed and has sufficient supplies to operate. Its ability to recruit will depend on arrangements made prior to the U.S. occupation and the evolution of the conflict. This sort of guerrilla warfare does not provide readily satisfactory solutions for the occupying power.

The classic solution of a guerrilla threat to an occupying power is to transfer the burden of fighting to an indigenous force. Not accidentally, the Iraqi guerrillas in recent days attacked and killed seven Iraqis being trained for this role. Inventing a counterinsurgency force beyond your own forces in the midst of conflict is not easy. Nevertheless, successful containment of a guerrilla force must involve either an indigenous force motivated to suppress the guerrillas or, alternatively, forces provided by a faction hostile to the guerrilla faction -- an ethnic or religious group that shares the occupier's interest in suppressing the guerrillas.

The greatest threat the United States faces in Iraq is not the guerrillas. It is the guerrillas combined with a rising among the Shiites south of Baghdad. If the guerrilla rising combines with an Intifada -- a mass rising that might not use weapons beyond stones, but that could lead to a breakdown of U.S. controls in the south -- it would represent a most untenable situation. An Intifada, apart from its intrinsic problems, could complicate logistics. Demonstrators likely would clog the supply routes from the south. Suppressing an Intifada not only is difficult, it has political and psychological consequences as well.

It is imperative that the United States prevent a rising among the Shiites. It is also imperative that the United States find a native faction in Iraq that is prepared to take on some of the burden of suppressing the primarily Ba’athist guerrillas. The United States is afraid of a Shiite uprising, but could use the Shiites in suppressing the Ba’athists. The Shiites are the center of gravity of the situation.

Shiite leaders have made it clear that they want to dominate any new Iraqi government -- and that they expect the United States to create such a government. The United States has been concerned that Iran influences and even might control the Shiites and that handing over power to the Iraqi Shiites would, in effect, make Iran the dominant force in Iraq and ultimately in the Persian Gulf. That is a reasonable concern. Indeed, it violates the core U.S. strategy. The United States invaded Iraq, in part, to coerce Iran. To argue that the only way to stay in Iraq is to strengthen Iran makes little sense. On the other hand, if the United States continues to refuse to create a native government in Iraq, the probability of a Shiite rising is substantial.

The key to a U.S. strategy in Iraq, therefore, rests in Iran. If regime change in Iran could be rapidly achieved or a substantial accommodation with the Iranian government could be negotiated, then using the Iraqi Shiites to man an Iraqi government and bear the brunt of the counterinsurgency operation would be practical. The key is to reach an agreement with Iran that provides the United States with substantial assurances that the Iranian government would neither support nor allow Iranians to provide support to al Qaeda.

The regime in Tehran has no love for the Sunnis, nor do the Sunnis for the Shiites. The events in Pakistan show how deeply sectarian religious violence is rooted in the Islamic world. The United States cannot supplant Islamic fundamentalism. It can potentially manipulate the situation sufficiently to control the direct threat to the United States. In other words, if the United States can reach an understanding with Iran over al Qaeda and nuclear weapons, then the Shiites in Iraq could become a solution rather than a problem.

If there is to be an agreement with Iran, the United States must demonstrate to Iranian hardliners first that it has the ability to destabilize the Islamic Republic, and second that it is prepared not to do so in return for Shiite cooperation. Without this, any alliance with Iran over Iraq rapidly would spiral out of U.S. control, and Iran would become uncontrollable. The key for the United States is to demonstrate that it has leverage in Iran. The United States does not want to overthrow the Iranian government. It simply wants to demonstrate its ability to destabilize Iran if it chose to. If it can do that, then other things become possible.

It follows that the United States likely shortly will work to reignite the demonstrations in Iran -- in all probability in the next few days. The purpose will not be to overthrow the Iranian government -- that is beyond U.S. capabilities. Instead, it will be designed to persuade Iranian leaders -- including Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei -- that some form of cooperation with the United States over issues that matter to the Americans is in their interest, and could result in something that the Iranians have longed dreamed of: a Shiite-dominated Iraq.

This strategy is extraordinarily convoluted and fraught with difficulties. But the prospect of fighting a counterinsurgency campaign in Iraq, alone, without indigenous support, is equally fraught with danger. So too is attempting an Afghan solution -- packing forces into air bases and army camps and allowing the insurrection to evolve. There are few good choices in Iraq at the moment. Alliance with the Shiites is extremely difficult and risky, but the other choices are equally difficult. If the Iranian/Shiite play fails, then it will be time to choose between counterinsurgency and enclaves.

LEADERSHIP: Lions Led by Donkeys in the Special Forces

July 7, 2003: The U.S. Army Special Forces are having morale and recruiting problems, and they are largely self-inflicted. Special Forces units are already some 20 percent under strength and the situation is getting worse. The first visible signs were seen in Afghanistan when the brass "cracked down" on the Special Forces use of local dress and appearance (beards.) They were ordered to shave and wear their uniforms. Aside from the fact that this went against practical experience (going back to World War II), and put Special Forces troops lives at risk, it demonstrated a callous disregard for the expertise and professionalism of the Special Forces. The tradition continued in Afghanistan where Special Forces troops were threatened with punishment for having a beer or possessing "pornography" (a copy of Playboy magazine.) Again, the Special Forces troops, professional as ever, stood to attention, saluted and followed orders. But the number of senior men who choose to get out is increasing. Being expected to perform extraordinary mental and physical feats on the battlefield, and then being treated like a wayward child has not gone down well with the troops.

The troops see the "Mickey Mouse" (mindless attention to useless regulations") as symptomatic of larger leadership problems. The troops have noted that as Special Forces officers rise in rank, and leave the A Teams, they become more career minded. That, unfortunately, means responding to the demands of the system that puts great emphasis on "zero defects" and not doing anything that would embarrass a commander. This makes the battalion and group commanders tend to be looking over their shoulders rather than paying attention to what is happening out front and what their troops need. These problems were played down in peace time, but have become major sources of tensions because of problems in Afghanistan and Iraq.

There are still problems with senior commanders in understanding what Special Forces do, how they do it and how important it is. Especially in Iraq, Special Forces would often uncover choice targets and soon find that the brass were not interested, or didn't understand the importance of what the Special Forces had in their sights. This goes back to the situations in Afghanistan where the Special Forces literally had Osama bin Laden in their sights, but had to get clearance, which sometimes was withheld, to pull the trigger. Similar situations were encountered in Iraq.

The personnel shortages have been made up, in part, by calling up men of the two National Guard Special Forces groups. But some of these men were kept on active duty for over a year, causing personal hardship for the troops involved. Using lots of National Guard Special Forces also brought another problem to the surface. Promotions in the National Guard are often heavily influenced by state politics. Apparently this disastrous (for battlefield performance) practice resulted in some Special Forces promotions of less-than-qualified officers who were well connected politically. The Special Forces troops felt the loss in the field.

Speaking of losses, Special Forces officers are smoldering over the policy of giving the sergeants and warrant officers the Special Forces Duty Pay of $225 a month (when in a combat zone), but not the officers that lead the teams. Officers don't like to complain, as it will mark them as a "troublemaker" and hurt their career prospects.

And it's not just the special pay, but the general lack of attention to living conditions for Special Forces in the field. Many Special Forces troops are embarrassed when they set up shop in the field near foreign commando units, who receive more generous financial allowances for field quarters. In such situations, the shabby quarters of the Special Forces reflects poorly on the United States, but is typical of the attitude the senior generals still have for Special Forces.

While the generals at the very top may say they appreciate the edge Special Forces provides American forces, many other senior officers in the chain of command do not, or simply look on the Special Forces as a bunch of hot shot troublemakers. And treat them accordingly, trying to impose "discipline" where it is not needed. The Special Forces know they are good, but they are often lions led by donkeys. The careerism of senior Special Forces officers results in lack of support for the A-Team level troopers who actually do the work and the intense Special Forces operations of the last two years have forced these long standing problems to the surface. At the moment, the Army is spending more energy trying to keep a lid on the problem than in fixing it.

OPERATIONAL

Regaining Manned Observation and Airborne Forward Air Control in the Low-Level Air Space above the treetops

By Mike Sparks

“I know that Mike has been heavily in favor of the A-10s continuing as the CAS plane for the Army. There is an agreement reduced to writing named the “Port Everglades Accord” that forever binds the Air Force to provide the close air support for the Army. This document was executed as the Army and the Air Force were splitting the sheets in about 1946. The Army was restricted from owning any fixed wing aircraft (other than a few utility aircraft such as those used by artillery spotters and a few executive jets). There was no restriction on helicopters owned by the Army. When I arrived in Vietnam in 1965 I found that the Army had built itself quite a fixed-wing Air Force. They were flying the OV-1 “Mohawk” that was both a flying gun platform and an electronic sensor for border work. In addition, the Army had a fleet of CV-2B “Caribous” cargo planes that could carry 5,000 and land on short and rough airfields. The last one I saw was bringing supplies to my Special Forces camp on our horrible runway and the crew was Air Force. I asked one of the pilots what they were doing flying the Army planes and he told me the Air Force took them all because the Army was not supposed to have fixed-wing aircraft. I had worked with the OV-1 “Mohawk” in its attack mode and asked the Air Force officer if the Air force had taken over that plane also. He said, “No, that is a mission specific aircraft.” He lied! The Air Force didn’t want it because it took brass balls to slow down to slow flight and put the guns directly on an NVA bunker line. Anyway, if Mike wants to put the Air Force’s feet in the fire about the A-10, tell him to ask them how they intend to meet the promise they made in the Port Everglades Accords to provide the Army with close air support if they scrap the A-10? They can’t do it with jets. I worked with the F-4 “Phantoms” and F-5 “Tigers” in Vietnam. They would not “slow fly” over a target because of the danger of taking ground fire through a jet turbine blade. When they performed an air strike at 400 miles per hour we were lucky if the ordinance hit in the right Province we asked support for - much less on the target.”

--Lonnie Shoultz, Vietnam combat veteran 101st Airborne and 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne)

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Reports are that the non-battle for the A-10 CAS aircraft is over and the USAF will not retire it.

However, will the AF re-engine and rewing the A-10 fleet?

Will they create 2-seat observation OA-10B versions for Airborne Forward Air Control (AFAC) duties?

As much as the "lawn dart" AF hates the A-10, we will be lucky if the single-seat "A" models will remain flying. This may be hard for the military professional to fathom, but since the retirement of OV-1 Mohawks and OV-10 Broncos after the 1991 Gulf War, the U.S. military has NOT HAD A FAC AIRCRAFT in service! What this means is the flying "lawn darts"--your fast fighter-bombers (F-15s, F-16s, F-18s) have not had a slower, two-seat aircraft, one person an observer---marking targets and controlling air strikes for the last 12 years. The first consequence has been tragic---there have been several incidents where friendly troops have been killed by fast fighter-bombers and lumbering heavy bombers unwilling and unable to go slow and low to investigate before they drop ordnance. The second consequence is that in both Afghanistan and Iraq, enemy leaders have escaped across expansive borders because the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) looking thru a "soda straw" of optics is neither in large enough quantities or of perceptive human quality to maintain continuous air surveillance over vast areas of the earth to detect the bad guys.

Low-Level air space---which we will define as 5,000 feet and under to the treetops----is the domain of the U.S. Army.

However, the Army limited to rotary-wing helicopters cannot at 100 mph afford to fly much higher above the tree tops and lose terrain masking to gain good observation heights due to the threat of enemy ground fire. Thinking that 100 mph UAVs because they are throw-away can fly in the low-level air space region without terrain masking has resulted in dozens of UAVs being shot down. You can say, its no big deal because no humans died and the cost wasn't too great, this begs the question: DO YOU WANT TO SEE THE ENEMY OIR DON'T YOU? If your UAVs are getting shot down, then you are not achieving anything except wasting funds on aerial targets for the enemy's air defenders to paint kill marks on their guns and missile launchers. The realities here are clear---if you want to see something that’s trying to avoid you from the air-immediately---you need a MANNED aircraft. If you want to be in the best position to see you need to fly above the terrain mask----if you fly at 100 mph you will likely be shot down. If you fly too fast, say 600 mph plus like the "lawn darts" you can't see anything and your aerodynamics will not allow you to fly slow with agility to fly under overcasts skies or around rugged terrain. None of the lawn darts in service are armored to withstand enemy small arms and anti-aircraft cannon fires. The A-10 is armored to fly low and can fly slow or fast enough as needed in the low-level air spaces but lacks a second seat for an observer. It will have to fly overhead from a distance and/or be called in as needed from the observations of ground FACs (GFACs). But what if there are no ground GFACs because there are no Army maneuver units in the immediate vicinity? Even troops in contact with the enemy with GFACs needed AFACs to coordinate and control strike until of late when we have tried to do without with disastrous results.

The answer is the Army must have a 200-400+ mph, armored, two-seat observation/attack aircraft to maintain a Continuous Overhead Presence (COOP) over the battlefield and to PHYSICALLY MARK targets for other aircraft that cannot fly low/slow to visually and electro-optically acquire them and hit them-not friendly troops. Such an aircraft would NOT contradict any previous agreement(s) made with the AF since it would also be a “spotter” aircraft for Army artillery. This current idea that we can electronically vector in ANY aircraft and have them drop ordnance in close proximity to ground troops is frankly garbage; just this week the details of a B-52H training bombing run that killed a marine captain and destroyed two CH-53E Sea Stallion helicopters was reported in ARMY TIMES. Frankly I am sick and tired of friendly troops being killed by the rubbish that bombs can be steered electronically without PHYSICAL terminal guidance, the aircraft itself parallel to the forward line of troops or a clear visual mark for all to see. The “JDAM mentality” of strikes without positive AFAC/GFAC and marked target guidance is an abomination and must be prohibited.

So if for no other reason than the SAFETY of U.S. Army troops, its time the Army acquires its own fixed-wing AFAC capability. For 4GW COIN warfare, its clear that it needs a SIMPLE, EASY-TO-MAINTAIN fixed-wing aircraft to "artillery spot" and mark targets for its ground forces as well as other attack aircraft. The perfect aircraft for the job is already combat-proven and available: the A-37B Dragonfly. The A-37B has a fantastic combat record in the Vietnam war, with a top-speed of 537 mph its actually faster than the A-10 yet it can slow to sub-300 mph speeds to spot and acquire targets with an observer with binoculars by the pilot’s side. The A-37B was born from an experiment where T-37A trainer jets were given new wings capable of carrying ordnance like smoke marking and explosive rockets, gun pods and bombs. The result was an instant success resulting in over 500 “B” models built with more powerful turbojet engines with an ingenious particle screen over the air inlet and a 7.62mm mini-Gatling gun in the nose.

Here is where things get real interesting; the USAF used them very successfully in Vietnam and turned over many to the fledgling South Vietnamese Air Force and other Latin American countries who fly them today. If you remember the missionary aircraft that was shot-down mistaken for a drug smuggler a few years back, it was a pilot in an A-37B that did the shooting. The AF kept some A-37s as “OA-37Bs” in the Air National Guard for several years and then one day they were gone along with any other aircraft with the “O” designation in the U.S. military. In fact, take a look at the A-37's design configuration and the A-9 by Northrup that competed against the A-10 design---the A-37 is like a mini-version with 2-seats instead of one. This is in fact what the highly successful SU-25 Frogfoot look like: an aircraft that was never shot down during the long Afghanistan war.

I did some research and contacted Cessna, the manufacturer of the A/T-37 family and learned this startling discovery: THE USAF OWNS ALL DESIGN AND MANUFACTURING RIGFHTS TO THE A/T-37. The actual machining devices are in storage at Hill AFB, Utah.

An informed source reports upon reading a draft of this article:

"The attached, forwarded article detailing the plight of ground troops with regard to CAS, and the proposed A-37B solution, was very interesting. I would like to offer a few observations that might broaden the context of the discussion a bit. Please forward this email to whoever you think might benefit from reading it.

In recent months a great deal of research has been devoted to evaluating the feasibility of resurrecting the A-37B for ground attack and interdiction roles. This research initially centered on identifying sources for drawings, and produced a reasonably complete history of the transfer from Cessna to the USAF, which (briefly) follows. Note that I offer this bit of historical perspective as a well-intended counterpoint to the observation in the attached article that the USAF was somehow conspiring to eliminate the threat of the venerable Dragonfly to its fast movers, and therefore purchased all documents and production equipment from Cessna and then hid it away. The author's argument will be stronger if framed with context and without any hint of vitriol.

Cessna did not surrender drawings for the A-37B in response to being approached by the USAF, but because of a business decision stemming from the loss of the follow-on trainer contract in favor of Raytheon's T-6 "Texan II". Cessna had developed a twin-engine, jet replacement for the T-37, and had a multi-nation consortium prepared to produce an attack version of the airplane. When Raytheon won the contract for the AETC T-37 replacement, Cessna, in disgust, washed its hands of the USAF and gathered up every A/T-37 drawing--including those it could acquire from subcontractors--and sent them to Kelly AFB on a tractor trailer. Even the illustrated parts catalogues, some of which hung around in people's bottom drawers for awhile, were eventually eliminated from Cessna's premises. Cessna still gets multiple calls per month in various departments relating to the Tweet and Dragonfly, but disavows any involvement or interest in these or any subsequent, related aircraft.

The tractor trailer did not stay at Kelly, but found its way to Hill AFB. Most (but not all) of the drawings that do exist in the USAF relative to the Tweet and Dragonfly are in Building 1218 -- also known as the "warehouse". The drawings are in the process of being uploaded into an electronic database. So far, so good.

Here's the rub: There is not a complete set of engineering drawing documentation for either the Tweet or the Dragonfly, anywhere. Hill AFB does not have all the drawings, and many that they do have are marked "Restricted", meaning the companies that own the intellectual property will not allow the drawings to be released by the USAF for use by anyone else. Moreover, these companies are hesitant to provide parts in small volumes, making it extremely difficult to support the airplane with spares. Worse, many parts are forged and in some cases no forging dies or drawings exist, meaning there are multiple levels of the supply chain that are missing.

Following is a single classic example of the scope of the problem. A number of years ago a company that owned drawings for some 50 parts for the Tweet was purchased by a competitor. While the original company made good quality parts, the new company made junk and its owner was indicted--twice--by the USAF for fraud. He fled to Northern Ireland--along with his drawings--where he remains out of reach of US justice. There is no other source of which I am aware for the drawings he owns.

As for the T-37B's being retired to DM.... The schedule is roughly 64 AC per year from five AETC bases through the year 2009. The problem here is that most--if not all--of these AC are over 20,000 hours and at the end of their service lives. Those that can be flown a bit longer are committed to foreign militaries that are not on the same AETC, T-37 decommissioning schedule.

I have had many conversations with active duty and retired military personnel--most of which are USAF--and can say that without qualification, there is strong support for the Dragonfly on ideological grounds, stemming entirely from its mission capability. I cannot, however, vouch for the leanings of policy makers with respect to the AC. Assuming policy "sees the light" regarding the A-37B or some variant thereof (a grand assumption, I know), the tough part will be reconstituting the defense industrial base to produce the airplane. A great deal of research has also gone into that consideration, and I can happily report that "where there is a will, there is a way."

That, however, is another discussion.

Best regards,

Basically, my first suspicion was that the AF brass realized the threat the A/T-37 poses to their lawn darts and bought out Cessna in order to insure no one with common sense who would see the potential of the A/T-37 design could use it to fill the observation void now present in our military, least of all the U.S. Army. Now I'm not sure if its a case of Cessna having had enough of the AF not properly rxploting the design. If it ain't broke, don't fix it! Its unfortunate because Cessna had designs for 4-seat civilian T-37s that would have been fully aerobatic, fast and economical to maintain/fly. These aircraft with everyone seated like a fighter pilot ala an EA-6B Prowler EW aircraft would have been far more interesting than today’s business jets where you are a mini-version of the crammed like sardines passenger along for the ride.

The story could end right there, the USAF judging from its past history of non-existant ”jointness” owning the rights to the A/T-37 and would likely fight the Army getting a fixed-wing observation/attack aircraft regardless of how many American lives that would be saved by AFAC/COIN capability. However, the AF in its penchant to spend money is getting rid of hundreds of jet T-37s in favor of turboprop Texan IIs to be primary jet aircraft trainers-the wisdom of training for jets in props not withstanding. There is no reason why the retiring T-37s and all engineering drawings couldn’t by act of the U.S. Congress be turned over to ownership by the U.S. Army who would then have an aircraft firm re-wing them into “OA-37Ds” and re-engine them with small turbofan engines for greater power/better fuel economy. We did this the first time to create A-37As, why not again to make an even more capable aircraft? Equipped with laser target designators, night vision optics, FM comms to talk to ground troops, and digital tactical internet black boxes, smoke 2.75” rockets, 12.7mm heavy machine gun pods OA-37Ds would be fully equipped to act as AFACs. With short take-off and landing (STOL) capabilities, Army OA-37Ds could operate from short runways built by combat engineers alongside AH-64 Apache, UH-60 Blackhawk, OH-58D Kiowa Warrior and CH-47 Chinook attack/transport helicopters creating a COOP and Close Combat Attack (CCA) capability. The Army COOP AFAC capability would then interface with USAF GFACs and A-10 Warthogs to form the Joint Air Attack Team.

I propose that Army OA-37Ds be piloted by Army pilots and observers, both would do tours of duty on the ground as GFACs in Army Attack Pathfinder units. The dual air and ground tours of duty would increase Dragonfly aircrews in their ability to understand air-ground perspectives and spot targets from both points of view. Furthermore, the wings of the OA-37D should fold so the entire aircraft can be placed on a trailer and driven ON THE GROUND from forward operating base to forward operating base in conjunction with ground maneuver units. This would bust the paradigm that we have to work around the aircraft having to secured runways first and then fly them in, which takes times and results in Aviators becoming based farther and farther to the rear where the ground fighters are. Over time, ground units lose contact with aviation units operating in their own separate worlds resulting in a lack of air/ground synergy. Instead, OA-37D units could move forward on the ground as an option, saving fuel/supplies and giving commanders greater flexibility when fighting the enemy. The OA-37Ds can be on the ground as the runway is being set up for them and out of nowhere become an overhead observation and emergency attack asset for their Army ground maneuver units they work for.

TECHNOTACTICAL

Fixed Wing And The Attack Helicopter

By Richard T. Edwards

For over the course of the past four decades -- give or take a few months -- I have watched, with great awe, the metamorphosis of the attack helicopter.

We've gone from the tadpole signature of the AH-1C through the slender 36 inch wide AH-1G with its French Curve canopy to the appreciatively awkward looking, yet ginger replacement: today's AH-64 Apache.

Each of these machines -- besides invoking mayhem and damnation upon foes-- were designed to provide higher levels of protection for their crewmembers, increased range and flexibility, keen target acquisition, and the reduction the vulnerability signature. In-other-words, more lethal but not as vulnerable.

Where the fixed-wing aircraft enter the picture is when increased enemy fire suppression is needed or, in the case of Vietnam, we simply ran out of enough 10 and 17 pound warheads and required "fast movers" to kick in and finish off the task at hand.

It is my belief that the two should not be placed under the same branch of the military for two very good reasons. The first deals with logistics. Simply put, fixed wing -- the kind that require a runway for vertical lift -- are not logistically practical when something as light footed as the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) tends to want to move an entire Brigade from a jump point to another in due fashion and limited in scope only by the low fuel warning light coming on.

The A-10 Warthog with its twin engines -- about the same shaft horsepower as that of the C-141, loaded with ammo boasts of requiring 1900 to 2100 feet of runway. Somebody has the build that runway and somebody has to build the second -- otherwise a whole lot of AF pilots become Airborne parachutists and we lose a lot of A-10s.

From a tactical position it simply makes no sense to jump A-10s across the enemy lines -- much less to compromise fuel points and a landing zone positions in the process.

Furthermore, A-10s have a longer range, make incredibly more noise, and tend to crash and burn at anything below stall speed. As units like the 10st move across the FEBA, nap of the earth flying tactics often become a snails pace kind of find the enemy before he finds you game with Army Aviation and A-10s would simply make great burning black smoke in any attempt to maintain pace along the way. When the element of surprise is compromised so are far more lives of our Army's finest.

Fixed wing do tend to yield credibility at higher altitudes. Where line of site and SLR - side looking radar -- reconnaissance would aid in the movement of troops. The Army does have fixed-wing called the Mowhawk that fits this bill. [Editor: not anymore! Congress forcibly retired them in 1996!]

Even at that, its hard to get comfortable with the notion that something at 20,000 feet can accurately aid in the assistance of moving helicopters and manpower across enemy lines. As General John M. Brandenburg put it, in 1978, talking to the AAAA Annual Convention, "It was the most harriest thing I've ever done."

The current theater of operation thins the credibility of the AH-64 only because of the lack of terrain features and application. Its core design being that of a tank killer with a stand-off range as far as the missiles will go to target accurately and with deadly results.

There were two distinct roles the attack helicopter played in Vietnam; one was to provide the Air Cavalry gunship style 20mm cannon, 7.62 mini-gun, 40mm gernade gun -- known as a "chunker", and limited rocket support. The press called all AH-1G Cobras gunships. And yet the AH-64 owes its linage to the Aerial Rocket Artillery or Aerial Field Artillery.

It was billed by me as being the flying aerial artillery platform in a military publication, Rendezvous With Destiny published in 1970.

In it, I wrote of the distinct differences. I won't go on and on about it. Suffice to say, we carried 18 pairs of 10 pound rockets, 18 pairs of 17 pound rockets and sacrificed over target time -- we carried less fuel -- verses longer target time and less rockets.

I also wrote about and was witness to all the quirky things the development cycle went through. Form the AH-1Q to the Production S-Model Cobra and the coming of the AH-64.

In my way of thinking, it isn't a question of whether or not the A-10 should become part of the Army inventory, its more of the fact that the SIMPLER, EASIER-TO-MAINTAIN AH-1G -- souped up, of course -- should have been the tool for the job in the Middle East after all the tanks had the tops popped by the AH-64s.

Ending, -- and anyone who reads this knows and knows me also expects what I'm about to write. In Vietnam we had a saying, "Killing is our business and business is good" March 3rd, 1971, Time Magazine.

I wrote "Today, the tank killers have a new saying, 'Tank killing is our business and someday business will be good'" Army Magazine, February, 1979.

And it was.

The AH-1G needs to come back and be the A-10 of the Middle East Battle Field.

No need for junk that doesn't work in time of war : V-22, Stryker and Space Shuttles

By AVJ Staff

The New Safer Space Shuttle will sit ATOP of its rocket boosters

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Despite most Americans living a tease in quasi- peace to keep the consumer is to economy revved up and keep elected politicians in office , America is in comb at against Moslem extremists in Iraq , Afghanistan , and the Philippines .

War is a struggle against human foes who are often cunning and who show no moral restraint . The enemy is doing every thing he can to kill Americans by making our aircraft crash and destroy our ground vehicles - - - we do not need to help the enemy by trying to use faulty vehicles . War is a struggle that ALL available resources must be concentrated to defeat the enemy; not whittled away on junk .

V-22 : flying deathtrap

The marines are America's loud mouthed children that make a scene at the grocery store demanding a candy bar . After several years and several dozen deaths , its clear that the toy the marines want to fly them at turboprop speeds but land them softly so they don't have to empower individuals to think in a decentralized humble organization will not work on planet earth due to fragility, complexity and too little pay load for too much aircraft .

However, by pouring $ BILLIONS in to V-22s that will not work, monies that could have been spent on armored and fast compound helicopters the troops need TODAY to win the war are unavailable. Today we have the horror of our men dying in ancient CH-4 6 helicopter crashes because these aircraft are supposed to be replaced by V-2 2s that are still unsafe to fly in.

Stryker: deathtrap on rubber tires

Americas troops are riding into Iraqi ambushes in HMMWV and FMTV unarmored trucks and without rifle - bullet resistant Interceptor Body Armor because $BILLIONS were squandered on Canadian made Stryker armored cars instead of upgrading some of the Army’s superior for combat, M113 Gavin tracked armored fighting vehicles with digital comms, heavy weaponry and RPG resistant armor. Unable to go cross-country or fly far inside a C-130 due to its 19+ ton heavyweight, the thin steel Stryker cannot be fitted with much armor to repel RPGs and regardless rolls on 8 air-filled rubber tires that will be easily deflated by gunfire and burn up if Molotov cocktails are thrown at it .

Space Shuttle : deathtrap in space

For years NASA engineers have known that placing an aerospace plane the size of a DC-9 carrying both CARGO and PEOPLE ALONGSIDE two solid rocket fuel boosters (Challenger explosion, 1986) and a huge disposable fuel tank (Columbia burn-up, 2003) is a recipe for disaster and kept this secret from Congress and the American public. But what’s inexcusable is that in light of the latest disaster, a piece of fuel tank insulation breaking off and gouging a hole in the shuttles left wing - - - is that IT ALREADY HAPPENED BEFORE WITH SHUTTLE ATLANTIS. Atlantis barely survived by cleverly freezing its wings before re-entry. But afterwards did NASA insure future shuttles would have spacesuits to inspect and repair in case of future damages? NO . Did they super cool the shuttle Columbia before re-entry? NO. Did they have options to dock with the International Space Station in case a shuttle was too damaged to re-enter? No.

No, No, No, No, No.

In fact, NASA today wants to resume shuttle flights after some BS tweaking of procedures.

Clearly, its time that NASA be fired and disbanded in favor of a new organization employing private enterprise and with civilian oversight. The unsafe shuttles should be retired into museum displays and a new smaller, PEOPLE - ONLY aerospace plane that sits A TOP a controllable liquid rocket re-usable booster be developed.

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GET INVOLVED!

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WHAT CAN YOU DO ABOUT THE LAV3STRYKER FIASCO?

You can sign the General Gavin petition if you haven't already done so to name the M113 after its creator:

General James M. Gavin Petition

Next, you can write your Senator/Congressmen and insist that the Army's last two Brigade combat teams are TRACKED so they are COMBAT capable and safe for our men to operate from. Particularly focus in on Senators Ted Stevens, Mary Landrieu and Inouye who seem only concerned with getting local "PORK" for their voters. Inform them they can have a IBCT in their state, but it must be composed of TRACKED COMBAT capable vehicles not rubber-tired Lav3Stryker deathtraps.

Professional Military Education Hot Link

In light of the recent guerrilla warfare in Iraq, U.S. Army/Air Force Aviation Journal suggests reading:

The Facts and Myths of Colonial Air Control

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Staff, U.S. Army Aviation Journal